State, class and the organic elite: the formation of an entrepreneurial order in Brazil 1961-1965 by Dreifuss, René Armand
Glasgow Theses Service 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
theses@gla.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
Dreifuss, René Armand (1980) State, class and the organic elite : the 
formation of an entrepreneurial order in Brazil 1961-1965. PhD thesis. 
 
 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/4948/ 
 
 
Copyright and moral rights for this thesis are retained by the author 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or 
study, without prior permission or charge 
 
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the Author 
 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the Author 
 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the 
author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given. 
 
state, Class and the Organic Elite: 
The Formation of an Entrepreneurial Order in Brazil 1961-1965 
by 
Rene Armand Dreifuss 
Submitted for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) to the Faculty of Social Sciences, 
University of Glasgow, Nay 192D 
Table of Contents 
Acknowledgements 
SummaI"J 
Glossary 
Index of Tables 
Chanter I - The Formation of the Populist Polity. 
Chapter II - The ~conomic Ascendancy of Hul tina tional and 
Associated Capital 
- Introduction 
- Multinational penetration, concentration and 
integration of industry 
- Other aspects of the process of concentration 
- Conclusion 
- Footnotes 
Chapter III - The Cornorate-poli tical Power structure of Nul ti-
.. national Capital and its Associated Interest~ . 
- Introduction 
The organic intellectU3.ls 0 f the new economic 
bloc 
- Entrepreneurs and technoentrepreneurs 
- The techno-bureaucracy 
- The military officers 
Solidarity of interests among the new economic 
bloc 
- CONS UL TEC : a case study of bureaucratic-
entreprenelrrial entrenchment 
- CONSuL'Y~C: the t'9chno-entrepreneurial agency 
- CONSlJ"Ll'EC: the entrepreneurial-bureaucratic 
ring of power 
- The class associations 
- transnational support 
- From economic solidarity to political activism 
- The formation of action groups: rEAD 
i 
p. v 
p. vi 
p.viii 
p.xx:iii· 
p. 1 
p. 48 
p. 49 
p. 66 
p. 74 
p 76 
p. 83 
p. 25 
p. 85 
p. 87 
p. 97 
p. 1°6 
p. 112 
p. 113 
p. 119 
p. 124 
p. 1)5 
p. 1~0 
p.140 
- Conclusion 
- Footnotes 
ii 
p. 146 
p. 152 
Chapter IV - The Cri3is of Populism 
Chanter V 
- Introduction p. 183 
- The transition period: from lobbying tactics to 
government p. 184-
- The rise of a National-Reformist Executive p. 192 
- 'the economic-political crisis of populism p. 197 
- The perception of the crisis of authority p. 204-
- Conclusion p. 219 
- Footnotes p. 224 
- The Organic Elite~ 
Recruitment, Decision-Making structure and Organi-
zation Tor Action 
- Introduction 
- The formation of IPES 
- National and international dimensions 
- The decision-making structure 
The formal structure of authority 
p. 245 
p. 247 
p. 247 
p. 267 
p. 270 
- Organization for action p. 283 
- The Action and Study Groups of the Institute 
of Research and Social Studies p. 288 
- Grupo de Levantamento da Conjuntura 
- Grupo de Assessoria Parlamentar 
- Grupo de Opiniao Publica 
- Grupo de PublicaQoes/Editorial 
- Grupo de Estudo e Doutrina 
- Financing the organic elite 
- The Grupo de Integra9ao 
- Clearing financial contributions 
- The issue of transnational contribution 
- Conclusion 
- Footnotes 
p. 268 
p. 294 
p. 297 
p. 302 
p. 306 
p. 313 
p. J13 
p. 320 
p. 324 
p. 329 
p. :331 
Chapter VI_- The Class Action of the Organic Slite: 
The Ideological Campaign of the Bourgeoisie 
- Introduction p. :;61 
iii 
- Two types of action p. 365 
- Social and ideological action p. 365 
- General indoctrination p. 367 
- Psychological warfare through radio and 
television p. 392 
Psychological warfare through the comic 
strip and films p. 403 
- Specific indoctrinE<tion p. 406 
- Conclusion p. 420 
- Footnotes p. 422 
Chapter VII - The Class Action of the Organic Elite: 
The Political Campaign of the Bourgeoisie 
- Introduction p. 452 
- Action among students, in cultural activities and 
for popular mobilization p. 454 
- rliddle class mobilization and female support p. 470 
- Containing the peasantry p. 485 
- Action among the industrial >-fOrking classes p. 497 
- Political action in parties and Congress p. 521 
- The sources of finance p. 539 
- Conclusion p. 5.54-
- Footnotes p. 557 
Chapter VIII - The Class Action of the Organic liilite: 
IPSS/IBAD and the i'!ilitary 
- Introduction p. 590 
- The presence of IPES/IBAD in the Armed Forces p. 593 
- The political military movements p. 604 
- The IPC::S/ESG clustc:r p. 605 
- The right-wing extremists p. 608 
- The traditionalists p. 609 
- General Olympio i'Iourao Filho' s I greatest con-
spiracy of the Americas' p. 613 
- Conclusion p. 650 
- Footnotes p. 660 
Chanter L I?::-,S/IBAD in the 3tate: 
'llie Occunation of Key Agencies of Policy-i"ormation 
and Decision-:·:aking by the Organic .c..li to 
- Introduction p. 6d3 
- The take-over of the state: the political domin-
ance of multinational and associated industrial 
and banking interests 
- The organic elite in the state 
- Concl usion 
- Footnotes 
Chapter X - Conclusion 
Biblio.g;raphy 
Vclume II 
Appendices 
iv 
p. 6Bb 
p. 691 
p. 757 
p. 760 
p. 792 
p. 819 
Acknowledgements 
I give special thanks to Octavio Dulci, Regis de 
Castro Andrade, Herbet de Souza and Galeno de Freitas for 
a fruitful dialogue and to Brian Pollitt who offered much 
stimulus during the writing. My sincerest thanks go to 
Dr. Simon Mitchell, who supervised the thesis, and but for 
whose painstaking dedication and acute criticisms this 
thesis would not have been. Last, but no~ least, my 
gratitude goes to my wife Aurea for her support. 
v 
vi 
Summary 
This thesis is about the organization for action of a power 
bloc of multinational and associated interests, their policy of 
disruption of the Brazilian regime which took place from 1961 to 
1964, and their subsequent take-over of the State. The thesis does 
not attempt to present a historical reconstruction of the period. 
Rather, it aims to bring new evidence to bear on the little known 
activity of individuals and organizations which were crucial in 
shaping the period in question and its aftermath. 
Chapter I outlines the formation of the populist polity, since 
the fall of the oligarchic state in 1930. 
Chapter II describes the economic ascendancy gained by multi-
national and associated interests throughout the 1950s under the 
political aegis of an industrial-oligarchic populist polity. 
Chapter III describes the corporate-political power structure 
of multinational and associated interests. The chapter examines 
the social and political agents who over a period of ten years 
shaped an incipient bloc of modernizing-conservative interests. 
The chapter also describes the different political means and admini-
strative channels whereby the multinational and associated bloc was 
able to press its interests within the populist polity. 
Chapter IV describes the crisis of populism brought about by 
the political mobilization of the working classes and the militant 
action of the multinational and associated interests through their 
own political organizations. 
Chapter V examines the recruitment pattern, decision-making 
structure and organization for action of the organic elite of the 
multinational and associated interests, organized in IPES/IBAD. 
vii 
Chapter VI describes the ideological campaign of the organic 
elite against the regime and the working classes, and its attempts 
to indoctrinate the general public and in particular the dominant 
classes and the military. 
Chapter VII examines the political campaign of the organic 
elite among students, the female population, the middle classes, 
the peasantry, the industrial working classes, and the political 
parties. 
Chapter VIII describes the political campaign of the organic 
elite among the military and focuses upon the civilian-military 
movement which brought about the downfall of Goulart. 
Chapter IX describes the occupation of the state's key agencies 
of policy-formation and decision-making by the organic elite of 
IPES/IBAD. 
The thesis attempts to demonstrate how entrepreneurs and 
techno-entrepreneurs representing multinational and associated 
interests were an active force in Brazilian politics before and 
after the downfall of Goulart in 1964. 
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CO~CLAP - Conselho superior das Classes Produtoras (Superior Council 
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Conscientizacao - Gathering of consciousness of the masses 
CONSPLAN - Conselho Consultivo do Planejamento (Consultative Council 
on Planning) 
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(National Confederation of Workers in Agriculture) 
CONTEL - Conselho Nacional de Telecomunicacoes (National Council of 
Telecommunications) 
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Convenio - Agreement 
Conversacoes - Conversations among governors and party leaders 
Coronelismo - System of political bossism' by landowners (coroneis) 
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COS - Centro de Orientacao Social (Centre for Social Orientation) 
COSIBA - Companhia SiderUrgica da Bahia (steel Corporation of Bahia) 
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COSIGUA- Companhia Siderurgica da Guanabara (Steel Corporation of 
Guanabara) 
COSIPA - Com~nhia Siderurgica Paulista (Paulista Steel Corporation) 
CPDSP - Centro de Pesquisa e Documentayao Social e politica (Centre 
for Research and Social and Political Documentation) 
CPI - Comissao Parlamentaria de Inquerito (Parliamentary Commission 
of Inquiry) 
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CRElA - Carteira de Credito Industrial e Agrlcola (Industrial and 
Agricultural Credit Agency of the Banco do Brasil) 
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Cruzada Democratica - Democracy Crusade - an anti-Communist group 
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cruzeiro - Brazilian unit of currency 
CSG - Curso Superior de Guerra (Superior War Course) 
CSN - Companhia Siderurgica Nacional (National Steel Company) 
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IUL - Instituto Universitario do Livro (University Institute of the 
Book) 
Jango' - Nickmane of Joao Goulart 
Janguista - Follower of Joao (Jango) Goulart 
Janista - Follower of Janio Quadros 
JEC - Juventude Estudiantil Catolica (Catholic Student Youth) 
JFK Archives - John Fitzgerald Kennedy Archives 
JOC - Juventude Operaria Catolica (Catholic Workers Youth) 
JUC - Juventude Universitaria Catolica (Catholic University Youth) 
LAIC - Latin American Information Committee 
legalidade - legality 
Le-Ex - Abbreviated form of reference to the document 'Lealdade ao 
Exercito' (Loyalty to the Army), drawn up by Army officers 
against Goulart 
Legenda - Party banner of party political grouping for electoral 
purposes within one party or across party trends 
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LIDER - Liga Democratica Radical (Radical Democratic League) 
Liga Crista contra 0 Comunismo - Christian League against Communism 
~~§ Camponesas - Peasant Leagues 
LUIDE - Liga da Mulher pela Democracia ("'oman's League for Democracy) 
MAC - t-Iovimento Anti-Comunista (Anti-Communist Novement) 
M.AF - Noveimento de ArregimentaQao Feminina (r1ovement for Female 
Regimentation) 
tltanifesto - r·ranifesto - generally referred to the Colonels' Hani-
festo of 1954 
NAP - Military Assistance Program 
MASTER - Hovimento dos Agricultores sem Terra (I1ovement of Landless 
Peasants) 
MDB - Movimento Democratico Brasileiro (Brazilian Democratic Move-
ment) 
MEB - Novimento de Educa9ao de Base (Basic Education t1ovement) 
MECOR - Ninisterio para Coordina9ao Regional (Ninistry for Regional 
Co-ordination) 
J,lED - Movimento Estudiantil Democratico (Democ:ratic Student Hovement ) 
NFC - ~1ovimento Familiar Cristao (Christian Family Hovement) 
Hineiro - Native of the State of Minas Gerais 
HOBRAL - !'lovimento Brasileiro de Alfabetiza9ao (Brazilian Literacy 
~rovement ) 
MOS - Novimento de Orienta9ao Sindicalista (Movement of Syndicalist 
Orientation) 
MPJQ - Hovimento Popular Janio Quadros (Popular llovement Janio 
Quadros) 
r·ms - ~!ovimento Renovador Sindical (Syndical Renovating Hovement) 
NSD - Movimento Sindical Democratico (Democratic Syndical l'Iovement) 
HI'R - Movimento Trabalhista Renovador (Renovating Labour Hovement, 
a right-wing splinter group of the PTE) 
MUD - Movimento Universitario de Desfavelamento (University Novement 
of 'De-slumming' 
r,!unicipio - Local government unit below state level,. roughly com.',?arable 
to a municipal district 
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MDT - ;·rovimento de Unificaqao dos Trabalhadores (Movement of Unifi-
cation of the Workers) 
NSF - National Security Files 
OESP - 0 Estado de Sao Paulo newspaper 
Opus Dei - Powerful semi-secret Roman Catholic organization of firm 
traditionalist views founded in 1928 by the Spanish priest 
Josemaria Escriva de Balaguer 
ORIT - Organizacion Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores (Inter-
american Regional Organization a Workers) 
PAR Archive - Paulo Assis Ribeiro Archive 
Parecer - Technical evaluation 
.......... =-,~~ --=--= 
Paulista - Native of the city and state of 'Sao Paulo 
Paz Social - Social Peace - the slogan of theDutra regime and of 
Brazilian conservatives in general 
PDC - Partido Democrata Cristao (Christian Democratic Party) 
pelego - literally sheepskin which is placed under a saddle, as a 
cushion between rider and horse. Colloquially, it served 
to depict the professional trade union activist manipulated 
by the government and linked to the entrepreneur 
peleguismo - term used to describe the practices of the pelego 
Pessedismo - The practice of PSD political tactics 
PL - Partido Libertador (Liberator Party) 
Plano de ~ietas - Target Plan 
Plano Triena~ - three yearly plan of the government 
Poder Dirigente - Leading power 
Poder Hoderador - Hoderating of mediating power of the emperor to 
intervene to restore 'balance' to the political 
system 
Policia f.1ilitar - Nilitary Police 
politica Reinvidicatori~ - Policy of forwarding social and economic 
demands, not political ones 
Prontidao - Political or military emergency (readiness) 
PR - Partido Republicano (Republican Party) 
PRP - Partido de Representacao Popular (Party of Popular Representa-
tion), of ?linio Salgado, the former Integralista leader 
PSB - Partido Socialista Brasileiro (Brazilian Socialist Party) 
PSD - Partido Social Democratico (Social Democratic Party) 
PSP - Partido Social Progresista (Social Progressist Party) 
PTB - Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (Brazilian Labour Party) 
PTN - Partido Trabalhista Nacional (National Labour Party) 
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PUA - Pacto de Unidade e AQao (Trade Union Pact of Unity and Action) 
PUC - Pontificia Universidade Cat6lica (Pontificia Catolica University) 
Rede Mineira de Viaqao - Railway System of Hinas Gerais 
REDETRAL - Resistencia Democratica dos Trabalhadores Livres (Demo-
cratic Resistance of Free Workers) 
Rei vindicaQoes - \'Torking class short term socio-economic demands 
RFF - Re:ie Ferroviaria Federal (Federal Railway Network) 
reitoria - rectorship 
Republica Sindicalista - Syndicalist Republic 
R. I. - Regimento de Infantaria (Infantry Reg~ment, commanded by 
colonel) 
SAR - Servi90 de Assistencia Rural (RuI'al Assistance Service) 
S~I - Sociedade de ~studos Interamericana (Interamerican Society 
for Studies) 
SENAC - Servi90 Nacional de Aprendizagem Comercial (National Service 
of Commercial APprenticeship) 
SENAl - Servipo Nacional da Industria (hational Service of Industry) 
Senhor de Engenho - the owner of sugar plantations 
SESC - servi90 Social do Comercio (Social Service of Commerce) 
SESI - Servipo Social Industrial (Industrial Social Service) 
Sindicatos - i,forking class trade unions or employers' group 
sitio - country place 
Solidarismo - Doctrine of Christian Social Solidarity of which Padre 
D'Avila was the ideological mentor 
SCRPE - Servico de Orienta9ao Rural de rernambuco (Rural Orientation 
Service of Pernambuco 
SHE - Sociedade Rural Brasileira (Brazilian Rural Society) 
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SUDAr1 - Superintendencia da Amazonia (Superintendency of the Amazonia) 
SUDENE - Superintendencia do Desenvolvimento do Nordeste (Super-
intendency for the Development of the Northeast) 
SUMOC - Su:perintendencia da Moeda e do Credito (Superintendency of 
110ney and Credit 
SUNAB - Superintendencia Nacional de Abastecimento (National Super-
intendency for Supply) 
SUPRA - superintendencia para a Reforma Agraria (Superintendency for 
Agrarian Reform) 
Tecnico - Highly trained public administrator, often an economist 
or engineer 
Tenentes - General name given to the young and middle rank officers 
who rebelled against the central government and brought 
about the, coup d'etat of 1930 
testemunho - testimony 
turm~ - school class, group 
UBES - Uniao Brasileira de Estudantes Secundarios (Brazilian Union 
of secondary School Students) 
UDN - Uniao Democratica Nacional (National Democratic Union) 
ULTAB - Uniao dos Lavradores e Trabalhadores Agricolas do Brasil 
(Union of Tillers and Rural Workers of Brazil) 
Umbanda - Sincretic cult comprising Christian, African and Indian 
beliefs 
UME - Uniab I1etropolitana de Estudantes (Metropolitan Union of 
Students) 
UNAF - Uniao Nacional de 'Associa96bs Femininas (National Union of 
Female Associations) 
~~ - uniao Nacional de Estudantes (National Union of stUdents) 
UPES - Uniao Paulista de Estudantes Secundarios (Union of Secondary 
School students of the State of state of Sao Paulo) 
USHIINAS - Brazilian-Japanese steel consortium based in Ninas Gerais 
VARIG - Empresa de Via~ao Riograndense (Brazilian private commercial 
airline) 
VASP - Viac;ao Aerea Sao Paulo (state O1med airline of the State of 
Sao Paulo 
Vila t'lili tar - Army garrison outside Rio de Janeiro 
Voto de Cabresto - Bridle vote 
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This chapter provides a schematic description of what, for 
the purposes of this thesis, are significant features of the 
Brazilian populist historical bloc,l namely the political and 
ideological incorporation of the subordinate classes to the state, 
and the integration of the interests of all the people under the 
leadership of an induatrial-oligarchic2 power bloc.3 
In this chapter we search for the roots of populism back into the 
1930s and describe its nature after the downfall of the Estado Novo. 
in 1945. Although the chapter is not concerned with a.n historical 
review of populism, it aims to emphasize some of the features which 
in the early 1960s were called into question by different social 
forces. 
Until 1930, the Brazilian state was led by an agrarian-
commercial oligarchy, in which the coffee planters of &fo Paulo and 
related commercial exports interests had been dominant.4 This oli-
garchy formed a power bloc of agrarian interests, agro-export and 
import business within a neo-colonial context and was marked by 
the deformities of a 'client-dominant' class.5 
It was under the political and ideological tutelage of this oligar-
chic power bloc, and also under the influence of British commercial 
supremacy in the last quarter of the 19th century that the industrial 
bourgeoisie was formed. 6 
Throughout the 1920s, new regional economic centres were 
consolidated, founded on new economic bases, such as the agrarian 
Rio Grande do Sul and industrial Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. 
Banking, much of which had developed from ~rian interests, was con-
centrated especially in Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais. 
These economic changes forced a shift of political power to the . 
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south-east, away from the traditional agrarian and commercial centre-
north and north-east, and from the landed elites to new urban groups.7 
These changes paved the way for the rise of such public figures 
as Getulio Vargas, JoS:o Daudt d 'Oliveira, Oswaldo Ara.nha (:Rio Grande 
do Sul), Vicente Galliez, Valentim Bou9as, Ary Frederico Torres (Rio 
de Janeiro), Roberto Simonsen, Teodoro Quartim Barbosa (sao Paulo) 
and Euvaldo Lodi (Minas Gerais), entrepreneurs and politicians who 
dominated an era.8 
Urbanization and industrial development exerted disruptive 
pressures on the narrow framework of the oligarchic state. Well 
into the nineteen twenties, through the delicate S~o Paulo-Minas 
Gerais state government combination known as the 'coffee and milk 
agreement', a form of 'civilian Bonapartism,9 which gave its name 
to the period, the oligarchic power bloc attempted to fend off the 
challenge of the bourgeoisie and surmount the crisis of the oligarchy 
and of the coffee sectors in particular. The crisis of oligarchic 
domination allowed for increasing pressures from the industrial 
fraction, which acquired supp~rt from other social groups, especially 
the middle classes. 
The industrial fraction formed a bourgeois bloc which strove to re-
define the power relations within the Brazilian polity, a ~sk 
eased by pressures experienced by the oligarchic economy as a result 
of the capitalist crisis of 1929.10 
The emergent bourgeoisie did not, however, do away politically 
or economically with the former landed ruling classes in order to 
establish its presence in the state and it even accepted the tradi-
tional values of the landed elite.ll Whether it did not have suffi-
cient political or economic strength or lacked the will or the need 
to demolish the rural political bastions and socio-economic fabric 
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of the oligarchy is irrelevant to this thesis. What is significant 
is that the industrial bourgeoisie achieved political identity 
vis-a-vis the oligarchic power bloc and established at the same 
time with landed interests, in particular the agro-exporting sectors, 
a new 'class compromise' in power. It is precisely by this twofold 
action that the emergence and consolidation of the bourgeoisie must 
be understood, for their umbilical ~tachment to the oligarchy was to 
have significant historical consequences, being at the root of what 
has been termed the 'state of compromise,12 institutionalized by 
the constitution of 1934. The government of Getulio Vargas would thus 
have always to manoeuvre within a complicated network of short lived 
conciliations between conflicting interests. None of the groups 
participating in the mechanisms of power - the middle classes, 
sectors linked to agro-export, industry or banking - could establish 
political hegemony, and were unable to present their own particular 
interests as the general interests of the nation. 13 This unstable 
equilibrium among the dominant groups, and more to the point, the 
incapacity of any of these groups to take control of the state for 
their own sake as well as being the expression of the whole of the 
propertied interests, constituted a typical element of Brazilian 
politics throughout the decade, expressing the crisis of oligarchic 
political hegemony which was marked by the Revolution of 1930. 
Although industry and the agro-exporting interests established 
a 'state of compromise', theirs was an uneasy co-existence, and the 
period was marked by continuous crises from 1932 onwards, which 
led to the establishment of the Estado NOVO, in 1937.14 
To the industrial bourgeoisie, which was now asserting its economic 
might, both articulated dissent within the dominant classes, such 
as was expressed in the civil war of 1932 or the fascist (integralista)15 
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upsurge of the mid-1930s, which impregnated the nationalist ideology 
of that period, were unacceptable. Moreover, organized reaction 
from the subordinate classes, such as the communist 'putsch' of 
1935, the constitution of a Black Nationalist Front16 in the mid-
1930s, or the rise of the Alianca Nacional Libertadora17 had to 
be quelled. Industrialists realized that they required strong 
leadership in order to discipline the national effort and to exact 
and administer appropriate class and regional sacrifices for the 
consolidation of an industrial society.18 
The 'state of compromise' forged in the socio-political pro-
cess of the early 1930s was then reshaped by the experience of a 
new 
and 
state, expressed through corporatist forms of association19 
supported by authoritarian forms of domination. 20 The Estado 
Novo emerged because the industrial bourgeoisie proved unable to 
lead the oligarchic components of the 'state of compromise' or to 
impose itself upon the nation by consensual means, so as to build 
a socio-economic infrastructure for industrial development. 21 The 
Estado Novo guaranteed the economic supremacy of the industrial 
bourgeoisie and sl~ped the basis of a bourgeois historical bloc, 
concentrating national energies anQ mobilizing resources legiti-
mated by military notions of national order and progress 22whose 
interests in industrialization mutually reinforced those of indus-
trialists. Under the aegis of the Estado Novo the industrialists 
and the landowners became allies. However, convergence of interests 
did not dissolve into an identity of interests.23 Conflicts and 
tension underlined their relationship and this element of mutual 
competition made it possible, if not necessary, for the bureaucratic-
military apparatus of the Estado Novo to play an intermediary role24 
which favoured the continual interference of the Armed Forces in 
the political life of the nation. The very interference of the 
bureaucratic-military ap:paratus in political life, while securing 
the cohesion of the system, became a disrupting factor in attempts 
at long-term political institutionalization.25 
The inter-dependency of the industrial and landowning sectors 
was marked by four phenomena. First, the demand for industrial 
products arose in part from the agro-exporting sector.. Secondly, 
the inputs for industrialization were mostly bought in foreign 
centres , with the incomes obtained from exports. Thirdly, the 
agrarian sectors were producers of raw materials for the incipient 
local industry, as well as developing agro-industrial enterprises. 
Last, but not least, there was some degree of interpenetration of 
agrarian and industrial sectors, both as a result of family ties 
or through joint enterprises. It is also important to note that 
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the entrepreneurial power bloc operated in the economic and political 
s:pace opened by the decline of British commercial and industrial 
interests vis-a-vis the competing American and German interests. 
Industrialization had the specific character of 'import-substitution'. 
This type of industrialization effort was reinforced by the relative 
marginalization of foreign interests due to the depression years 
and the consequent occupation of these interests in the Second 
World war~fort.26 
Under the aegis of the Estado Novo occurred the first stage 
of formal nationalization of the economy with the creation of state 
enterprises, mixed autarchies and the establishment of national 
control over certain strategic productive areas like mining, steel 
and oil. The state became an important producer of infrastructural 
goods and services and :paved the ground for the private industrial 
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development of Brazil.27 The state also served industrial capital 
by creating a series of mechanisms aimed at re-organizing the 
economy, giving priority to the process of capitalist expansion 
and transferring resources from other sectors to industry.28 Indus-
trialization was also stimulated by the vital metamorphosis of; non-
productive consumption by landlords throughout the country into 
money capital in the industrial centres.29 This was accomplished 
by the banking. network, which greatlyecpanded in the early l~Os 
and was connected in part to the landed sectors and to industry 
by commercial and family ties, reinforcing the inter-dependency 
of the oligarchy with industry. 
The reshaping of the class-convergent polity during the Estado 
B2!2 involved new forms of class articulation and class ,domination.30 
Corporatist thought, which conceived the socio-economic formation 
as a network of 'functional' economic and political groups, result-
ing from a necessary and even 'natural' division of labour, strongly 
influenced the ideology and action of the dominant industrial-
banking power bloc.3l The industrial-banking power bloc redefined 
the channels of access to the power centre, through the establishment 
of a series of mechanisms for policy formation and decision-making 
which amounted in effect to an institutionalized 'mobilization of 
bias,32 against displaced agrarian interests.33 Industry expressed 
its demands without political intermediation, introducing itself 
directly into the state apparatus. 34 The Executive became a strong-
hold of industrializing interests, open to the demands of the 
Confederacao Nacional da Industria and the Confederacab Nacional do 
Comercio,35 while for the agrarian interests which had lost their 
privileged position, orderly communication with the state machinery 
was established through the Institutos, which were boards of 
representation of the commodity producers.36 A National Economic 
Council was formed, where the industrialists were the first, and 
until 1$46 the only occupational groupS to take full advantage of 
the corporatist opportunities.37 
The Estado Novo also stimulated a 'national' policy-making 
process, attempting to subordinate regional leaderships and bring-
ing about administrative reforms which aimed at modernizing the 
state apparatus, and at controlling foreign capital in favour of 
local enterprises.38 Moreover, the Executive launched a major re-
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formulation of the state bureaucracy, creating DASP, the Administra-
tive Department of the Public Service. Besides its significance 
for administrative modernization and for centralization, DASP also 
had two other effects. It affected the practice of clientelism 
and patronage by wresting the bureaucracy fro~m the control of the 
oligarc~. By controlling the state bureaucracy DASP in effect 
transferred patronage facilities to central government, effectively, 
though not exclusively, enabling the industrial bourgeoisie to 
indulge in paternalistic and cartorial practices.39 
A significant factor in the Estado NOVO's role in industrialization 
was the participation of middle-class professionals and military, 
alongside the entrepreneurs themselves, in the administrative state 
apparatus.40 The participation of the military enhanced 'national-
istic' discourse, which was equated with the private industrial 
development of the country.41 However, despite the importance of 
'political society,42 encompassing the bureaucracy and the military, 
and the latter's convergence of interests with industrialists, 
industrial development was guided by policies which were charted 
by the industrial-banking bloc in the centre-south of the country.43 
In the name of the defence of 'social peace', the Estado Novo 
also intervened in the 'regulation' of the labour force, through 
the enactment of 'labour laws', thus meeting a basic requirement 
in the process of accumulation. The establishment of a minimum 
wage in 1939 allowed a levelling of wages at the 'lowest' feasible 
rung of the scale, i.e., at SUbsistence level, for the urban labour 
force. Given the relative scarcity of qualified and semi-qualified 
labour, the establishment of the minimum wage prevented the market 
forces from establishing wages of equilibrium at higher levels which 
would have tended to inhibit the easy~pansion of capitalist indus-
trialization. l J.4 Moreover, this policy produced two significant 
benefits favouring capitalist accumulation: Firstly, this policy, 
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by determining wages institutionally, allowed for effective economic 
calculus, while productivity increases were not incorporated into 
wage rises. Secondly, a significant effect of the imposition of a 
minimum wage was to co-opt the working class, showing the 'acceptable 
face of corporativism'. The state was projected and perceived as 
the protector of the poor, with Vargas as the paternal figurehead. 
As the Second World War approached its end, some substantial 
changes occurred.45 
Working class unrest, stemming from miserable living conditions, 
came to a head in tha mid-194-0s, despite the existence of tame trade 
unions, which over the years had channelled their grievances. New, 
independent trade unions were formed in the most industrialized 
state, outflanking the structure of control of the Minister of 
Labour and Justice, Alexandre Marcondes Filho. National unions 
came into being, such as the Unifying Movement of Workers and the 
Confederation of Workers of Brazil (CTB) in 1944. In the precarious 
'civil society,46 of the mid-1940s the renaissance of the left, 
which had been smashed by the Estado NOvo, and in particular the 
growth of the Communist Party allied to incipient working class 
organizations seemed to the bourgeoisie to be a serious threat 
beyond their means of control. In such a climate of uncertainty, 
entrepreneurial associations began to hold national conventions 
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and congresses in order to rethink their post-war role. The most 
important of these was the First Conference of the Productive Classes 
of Brazil, held in Teresopolis, in May 1945. The conference was 
called jointly by the Federation of Commercial Associations of 
Brazil and the National Confederation of Industry, and was presided 
over by Roberto Simonsen. About 600 rural, commercial and industrial 
associations from~ery state in the country attended the conference. 
After five days of meeting, an Economic Charte..r was produced, which 
cautiously proclaimed the wish of the participants to join in the 
construction of a new social order. The entrepreneurial 'Declara-
tion of Principles' was premised on the association of freedom and 
private enterprise, qualified by 'precepts of justice' and 'unavoid-
able limitations imposed by the fundamental interests of national 
life' for whose realization the bourgeoisie acknowledged a certain 
necessary ,degree of interference by the state. 
Moreover, the resolution of the conference called for the 'harmonious 
development of all regions', a guarantee ibr men from city and 
countryside of a salary allowing them to 'live with dignity', 'the 
necessity for economic planning' and a recommendation that the state 
be given an increasing role in conservation, in agricultural develop-
ment, in the production of energy and expansion of transport, in 
tariff protectionism, in developing basic industries, in preventing 
the formation of cartels, in import controls, and, most important, 
in stimulating foreign investments, which obligingly with the end 
of the war effort had by the late nineteen forties renewed their 
active participation in the Brazilian economy.47 
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At this point, some remarks deserve to be made about the so-called 
'national' bourgeoisie which had so strongly developed under the 
aegis of the Estado Novo. A popular intellectual belief, fostered 
by the Communist Party and taken up later by nationalist intellec-
tuals, especially of the Instituto Superior de Estudos Brasileiros -
ISEB,48 had it that there were 'two bourgeoisies'. One was supposed 
to be entreguista, directly connected to transnational capital, and 
the other nacionalista, opposed to the action of foreign interests. 
The latter were sought politically and considered theoretically by 
the nationalist intellectuals as potential, if not actual allies 
of the working classes and of those sectors Of the middle classes 
opposed to imperialism, because of the industrialists' expected 
policy of strengthening local centres of decision-making and because 
of their alleged view of the state as an instrument of opposition 
to foreign penetration. Nationalist intellectuals also ascribed 
to these industrial and financial 'national' sectors' 'progres-
sivist' goals. In particular, industrial sectors were assumed to 
be interested in some form of redistributionist nationalrevelopment 
and in supporting a refomist stance a gainst archaic agrarian 
structures. 
However, the expected nacionalista-entreguista confrontation was 
premised on an erroneous appraisal, assuming structural antagonisms 
where only conjunctural conflicts existed. The Brazilian industrial 
bourgeoisie might have shown a duality of trends in its growth, 
one being of direct association with multinational interests and 
the other of indirect links to secure foreign know-how.49 But it 
had one nature, and that was that of capital. In so far as the 
Brazilian bourgeoisie developed itself and the country's economy, 
the 'national' industrialists were not so much the vital force of 
Brazil as the agents of the country's integration in the interna-
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tional dominant productive system, i.e. capitalism. 'Entreguismo' 
of a party or a sector of the bourgeoisie exposed its conjunctural 
relation with a specific transnational pole of influence, namely, 
the subordination to '!he hegemonic nation, the United states, but 
it disguised the systematic structural commitment of the whole of 
the bourgeoisie,50 and this commitment would be critical. 
The assumptions of nationalist politicians and intellectuals alike 
about the purported national-reformist stance of the national bour-
geoisie corresponded to the ideology of national-populist rather 
than to the interests of the industrialists. The Brazilian bour-
geoisie was certainly national, though not necessarily nationalistic. 
The entrepreneurs at their national convention in 1945 adopted 
as their political slogans several demands whiCh were obviously 
directed towards the middle and working classes, reflecting the 
growing feeling among the dominant classes that at least in the urban 
centres change was expected. Among the slogans adopted were the 
calls for 'fight against pauperism', the ~crease in national 
income', the 'development of the :productive forces', I ecrmomic 
democracy' and 'social justice,.57 
It was becoming clear to the dominant classes that new forms of 
government had to replace the coercive measures of the Estado Novo. 
Popular disaffection had to be pre-empted, by absorbing their leader-
ship and achieving the bureaucratization of their demands, through 
instruments of pacific repression such as those provided by the 
patrimonial and cartorial state.52 
Furthermore, the anti-fascist tide brought in its wake a middle-
class reaction against the authoritarianism of the Estado Novo. 
This was particularly evident in the behaviour of the Armed Forces. 
The Brazilian government, which in the early stages of the· war had 
wavered between a neutralist and pro-Axis position while senior 
officers such as General Goes Monteiro and General Eurico Dutra 
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showed public sympathy for Germany, came out now in favour of the 
allies and even sent a contingent to Europe, the F6rca Expedicionaria 
Brasileira - FEB, which participated under the direction of the 
Americans in the campaign of Italy. The result of this :pa.rticipatim 
was a close alliance between Brazilian officers and those of the 
United states and a whole set of close personal friendships which 
persisted and were even reinforced throughout ~the next two decades. 
Many of these officers were taken to the United states, from where 
they returned with new ideas about industrial development and poli-
tical organization of the country. Strongly anti-Vargas, whom 
they saw as the~ader of a neo-fascist regime, the officers plotted 
against him.53 The high point in the reaction against Vargas was 
the formation of the Democratic Front, encompassing a wide political 
spectrum in what seemed an alternative political convergence to the 
one in power. 
Vargas himself realized the need for change and attempted to 
shift the socio-political basis of the Estado Novo to an alignment 
formed by the working classes and the industrial bourgeoisie, seek-
ing to constitute a centre-left labourite polity with nationalist 
undertones. National elections were scheduled for December 1945, 
for which Vargas stimulated the creation of two parties, the Partido 
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Trabalista Brasileiro - PrE, based on Marcondes Filho' s trade-union 
machine, and the Partido Social Democratico - PSD, which had nothing 
in common with its European namesakes and was based on the state 
interventores and oligarchic political bosses, the coronais.54 
Vargas' opposition :fOrmed the Uniao Democratica Nacional - UDN, a 
broad alignment of anti-Communist, anti-nationalist, anti-Vargas. 
(and later anti-populist) positions, which found its constituency 
mainly in the middle classes and was led by liberal professionals, 
entrepreneurs and politicians. Vargas also granted a political 
amnesty and began to woo the urban working classes and the Communist 
Party with measures of socio-economic reform and political paxtici-
pation, in order to organize his own power base. Moreover, and 
most significantly, Vargas was laying the grounds for the constitution 
of a new polity. New socio-economic forces and socio-political 
demands had to be accommodated. Limited class convergence in power, 
associational corporatism and the authoritarianism of the Estado 
Novo were integrated and synthesized into a national formula for 
'development' which attempted to establish a bourgeois hegemony 
from the mid nineteen-forties onwards under the general name of 
populism. 55 Through populism, the Executive sought to establish 
a scheme of national political limited mobilization of the urban 
masses, based upon a state-controlled trade-union structure as well 
as on the institutional support of the PSD and the PTE. Both these 
parties, although vague in their programmatic appeal, were effective 
machines of ideological domination and social control, the first 
one operating as the party of power, the second having the role of 
the party of legitimation of the prevailing order. After years of 
authoritarianism and executive predominance, populism favoured the 
re-entry into the political scene of the professional politician 
alongside the party-political activities of the industrialists and 
bankers, in a re-activated Congress. Nevertheless, the privileged 
position which the industrialists had gained in the Executive 
through the corporatist structure of association was preserved, 
although checked by Congress. 
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Vargas' strategy was'viewed with a1.arm by the dominant classes 
and with suspicion by the middle classes, for it could only enhance 
Vargas' own charismatic appeal to the working classes and his role 
at the helm of the state as a political intermediary. The mobili-
zation of the working classe~ however limited, was feared by the 
dominant classe~ for it could then have provided Vargas with the 
necessaryffipport for the establishment of a relatively independent 
Executive. Such an Executive was anathema to the indus..trialists 
and oligarchy alike, and would have put Vargas~ove the control of 
the Armed Forces. Moreover, Vargas' strategy entailed the develop-
ment of the economy along a nationalistic and etatiste-distributive 
path. All these reforms, however, were perceived as the remnants 
of the unwanted excesses of the Estado Novo which the industrialists 
and others aimed to curb. For the national industrialists were by 
now seeking to strengthen their links with multinational interests 
in their search for capital and technology. 
Before Vargas was able to consolidate such a strategy and form a 
new power bloc, the Army, spearheaded by the FEB officers, moved in 
and ousted him, supported by an alignment of local industrialists, 
the oligarchy, middle classes and, last but not least, multinational 
concerns which had renewed their interests in Brazil.56 
Although Vargas end his purported policies were not accepted, the 
entrepreneurs adopted his political model and the party system he 
had fostered. The passage from the Estado Novo to the populist form 
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of domination and articulation of interest was eased by the fact 
that the same political and economic elite which had commanded the 
deposed regime remained in power after the removal of Vargas from 
office, and under their direction the first national elections were 
promoted. Moreover, continuity was underlined by the fact that 
the Constitution of 1946 left practically intact the institutional 
framework of the Estado Novo.57 
The elections were won by General Eurico Gaspar Dutra, Vargas' 
former Minister of War, heading a PSD slate with the support of 
the PTB and the endorsement of Vargas, against Brigadier Eduardo 
Gomes, the candidate for the UDN. Rather surprisingly, the Commu-
nist Party, which had been legalized shortly before and contested 
,the elections on its own, won the same percentage of votes as the 
PTE. 
Under the guise of liberal democracy with which the Dutra regime 
was clothed, many of the central features of the Estado Novo remained, 
especially the privileged position of the industrialists in the 
Executive and authoritarian relations of the dominant classes 
towards the working classes. But some important changes did take 
place, especially the political revival of Congress. Its elected 
Chambers were used, within certain limits, as tribunes from which 
the political debate reached society at large.58 
Although General Dutra was elected through the PSD-PTB party 
machines and had been endorsed by Vargas, he soon showed that. his 
policies differed greatly from those of his predecessor, particularly 
with reference to his stance on nationalism and working-class parti-
cipation. 
Dutra's change of tack was symbolized by his bringing into the 
cabinet some of the outstand~ng UDN figures, such as entrepreneur 
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Raul Fernandes, who became his Foreign Minister. Dutra's government 
was strongly influenced by entrepreneurs, who kept hold of the key 
administrative posts in an almost exclusive manner. The government 
favoured economic laissez-faire po1icie~ and after experimenting 
for a short period with pluralist politics, advocated strong poli-
tical control of the subordinate classes.59 
The economic policies of Dutra's government clearly favoured free 
enterprise. state organizations were dismantled and the trend 
towards nationalistic and etatiste development was reversed. Both 
the Dutra government and the UDN in particular, looked upon the 
possibilities of building a special relationship with the United 
states, and consequently the economy was re-opened to foreign capital 
in very favourable conditions. Furthermore, under the aegis of 
Dutra the government established both the Superior War College (ESG) 
~to which anti-Vargas and pro-UDN officers flocked, and a joint 
mission with the United states government, the Comissao Mista Brasil-
Estados Unidos, to study the Brazilian situation and outline a pro-
gramme of economic development for the country.60 
Initially, the means of domination and the tactics whereby 
the entrepreneurial-oligarchic power bloc which supported Dutra's 
government attempted to exact political consent from the subordinate 
classes and impose consensus among subaltern fractions of the domin-
ant classes were primarily paternalistic. DUring the unrestful 
years of 1945-1946, the Federation of Industries of the State of 
Sao Paulo - FIESP and the Centre of Industries of the State of sao 
Paulo - CIESP, were engaged in two related efforts to placate the 
growing demands of the workers. 61 The FIESP and CIESP urged their 
members to contribute 10 the establishment of Commissions of Effici-
eney and Social '-Tell-Being, with the aim of dispensing paternalistic 
services, mainly selling foodstuffs and clothing at cost prices. 
The FIESP/CIESP also set up a Commission of Relations with the 
Public, an agency intended to modify the demands of workers by 
means of public relations and indoctrination, and so defend the 
interests of Paulista private industry. To that effect, in June 
1946 Dutra, in response to personal urging of Roberto Simonsen and 
Morvan Dias de Figueiredo, leaders of the FIESP and of the National 
Confederation of Industries (CNI), signed a decree creating the 
National Service of Industry (SESI), whose long-tern goal was to 
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combat the resurgence of autonomous organizations among the working 
classes and to construct an attitudinal and ideological basis for 
a capitalist industrial society.62 Several months later, reinforcing 
the efforts of the entrepreneurs, Morvan de Figueiredo became Minister 
of Labour, Industry and Commerce, 'bringing together' as it were, 
in one cartorial cabinet post the control over~the worker and the 
expression of the entrepreneurial interests, making it the capitalist 
ministry par excellence. 
However, the impetus of working-class organization and expansion of 
its political awareness made' this type of manipulation rather 
difficult. The first signs of the 'Cold War' coincided with the 
Communist Party making another show of force in the state elections 
of January 1947, retaining its position as the fourth largest party 
in terms of the popular vote. Moreover, the Communist Party dis-
placed the UDN to become the third party in terms of the popular 
vote in the very important industrial state of Sao Paulo and it 
succeeded in returning a najority of members of the municipal 
assembly in the federal capital itself. The fragile 'civil society', 
a legacy of the Estado Novo, was not an appropriate structure of con-
tainment of the working classes, and made the institutionalization 
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of the regime a difficult task. 
Furthermore, the PTB showed itself to be no match for the Communist 
Party, , either ideologically or organizationally.62 That same year, 
the Communist Party was declared illegal by a court decision at 
the request of the government. General Dutra also dissolved the 
Confederation of ¥lorkers of Brazil- CTB, and interfered in the 
affairs of 400 trade unions because of their alleged attachment 
to the already outlawed Communist Party, besides carrying out a 
purge of state functionaries. 
This renewed disruption of autonomous working-class expression 
resulted in authoritarian measures within the populist polity. 
Nevertheless, a measure of consent and consensus was built on the 
credence in the democratic equality of all citizens, except for 
those stigmatized as 'communists', the illiterates, who were totally 
excluded from the electoral process, and the rural working population, 
under the yoke of the coronel and clientelistic practices, which 
prevented their recruitment into parties. In short, it was an 
urban - and very selective indeed - democratic equality that was 
upheld by populism. 64 An 'exclusionary' system had been created. 65 
Moreover, the populist stronghold of the Ministry of Labour, the 
pel ego structure and the populist political parties were responsible 
for the incorporation of the social forces created by modernization 
into the body politic as well as for the disaggregation and con-
formity of the working classes66 and for the legitimation of the 
capitalist state of affairs. 67 
In 1950 elections were held, with the Communist Party illegal 
and the unions still under intervention. Vargas was the candidate 
for the PTB, in alliance with the Partido Social Progressista, 
headed by Adhemar de Barros, 68 the archetype populist bo'ss 
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of industrial Sao Paulo, where the PSP controlled the working popu-
lation. Vargas was opposed by Brigadier Gomes heading the UDN who 
had the support of Plinio Salgado, the former Integralista leader 
heading the Partido de RepresentaQao Popular - PRP. The PSD ran 
with its own candidate. 
Vargas campaigned enthusiastically throughout Brazil. Al though he 
modified his emphasis according to his audience, there were several 
strands to his programme. He promised to renew the drive for 
nationalistic industrialization with state backing which the Dutra 
regime had compromised. He inveighed against inflation, fiscal 
management and the lack of real progress in earnings for urban 
workers, promising a renewed drive to protect the proletariat with 
social welfare measures. In spite of his emphasis on social reform, 
he was largely silent on 'rural issues and sparse, almost negligible, 
references were made to agrarian reform and the lot of the peasant. 
This was because of his hope to catch votes from the local PSD 
bosses, the rural coroneis. Pursuing the PSD vote, Vargas reached 
agreement in Minas Gerais, the centre of PSD politicking (pessedismo), 
with a rising young politician, Juscelino Kubitschek, who was running 
for the governorship of the state. Vargas supported his election and 
hy' a quid pro guo was able to make inroads into" the PSD vote. 
Despite his commitment to nationalistic industrialization and 
his defence of Brazil's right to own and develop her own oil and 
mineral resources, Vargas made it clear in his campaign that he 
would welcome foreign investment, showing a degree of continuity 
with his own past attitudes and manoeuvring in such a way as not 
to anger those interests which had strengthened their positions 
under Dutra. Although he stretched out his hand to the American 
government and private investors, in a bid for reconciliation and 
with an eye on a similar programme of development to the Marshall 
Plan, Vargas made it plain that he would steer the country clear 
of siding with the Americans in their military involvementinKorea, 
countering the support which the Dutra government had hinted at. 
Vargas was returned to office with a clear majority by a 
populist bloc which extended from north to south of the country, 
reuniting politicians from the most diverse parties comprising 
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the traditional alignment of local entrepreneurs, agrarian interests 
mainly of the south, and the urban working classes. 
Vargas formed his cabinet with a heterogeneous set of appointments, 
many of them entrepreneurs and of oligarchic background reflecting 
the composition of the populist bloc which had supported him, as 
well as the set of policies he was intent on pursuing. 
Against popular expectations, he gave the PTB only one sea.t, that 
of the critical Ministry of Labour, underlining the post's central 
positions for working-class manipulation and the PTE's role of 
legitimation. The PSD obtained most ministries, proving itself 
to be the party of power. Vargas appointed as his new Minister 
of Agriculture Joao Cleofas, a conservative UDN leader of Pernambuco, 
a state where rural poverty was most scandalous and where the UDN 
resembled the PSD, thus paying off the support he had received 
from the rural oligarchy. The strong embrace of the PSD and the 
apparent snub to the PTB implied not only a more conservative set 
of policies than those promised during the electoral campaign, but 
it also had the effect of allaying military fears of a 'syndicalist'-
style republic, of which Peron seemed to be the prototype, and it 
suggested a willingness to work with the PSD Congressional majority. 
During the second Vargas administration, the polity underwent 
significant changes. Congress became stronger and politically more 
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significant, and stood side by side with the Executive as a locus 
of interest articulation. Congress represented the locus where the 
different fractions of the ruling classes had the possibility of 
sharing government with the dominant power bloc. It was an institu-
tion basically regulated by conciliations and alliance~as it exer-
cised a degree of control over the Executive's policies. The interests 
of the president's electorate at large were echoed through the alli-
ance of PSD/PTB in Congress, and the interests of his immediate 
constituency through the economic policies of the Executive. 69 In 
the class convergent populist policy, control of the Executive became 
the central political issue. It favoured intense personalization 
of political life and was at the root of the various crises of this 
period. 
Congress had a dual representation role. For one, through the PSD/ 
PTB alliance, popular pressures were aggregated and channelled. 
Parties could pressure the system, structure their alliances and 
gain popular support for their bids for power through Congress. On 
the other hand, the landed classes, who did not suffer greatly under 
Vargas (nor under Kubitschek for that matter) once the system of 
authority and property remained untouched in the rural areas, expres-
sed their political demands also through Congress. In spite of 
the consolidation of relations of industrial wage-labour and the 
economic pre-eminence which the entrepreneurs had gained throughout 
the 1940s, industrial-banking supremacy was not translated into 
national political and ideological hegemony. 'General Cafe' (who 
had diversified into banking and industry) and its subaltern agrarian-
commercial forces were still 'in office'. The rural interests 
remained economically powerful and politically active with a crucial 
role exerted through the congressional system, keeping the Chamber 
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of Deputies and the Senate as a locus of routinization of demands 
and of aggregation and institutionalization of popular pressures, 
reflecting the growing political participation of the middle and 
working classes. 
'!be second Vargas administration was divided into three periods. 70 
In the first phase-; it was characterized by a strong entrepreneurial 
presence, an anti-inflation policy and enthusiastic pursuit of 
financial aid from the United States. This phase was terminated 
in mid-1953 under the combined pressure of the trade unions and 
assorted nationalist groups. The government' failed to - -con t r 0 1 
inflation, and the benefits 0 f foreign aid remaihed unfulfilled._ 
In IiI i d - 1 9 5 3 the cabinet was reorganized, and a second phase 
began. Although Vargas kept his options open both in relation to 
the industriaJ-oligarchic bloc and to the United States, by appoint-
~ 
ing Oswaldo Aranha, Vicente Rao and Jose Americo de Almeida, he 
strongly appealed to labour as a pressure group. Vargas replaced 
his Minister of Labour with Joao Goulart, a young PTB political 
figure from Rio Grande do Sul, who was his political protege and 
who took on the job with a much more radical approach. This second 
phase, which reflected the growing political and ideological polari-
zation on nationalist and labour issues, went hand in hand with 
growing opposition to Vargas, and, by.the same token, to Goulart, 
by the -A r m y, culminating with the famous Colonel's memorandum 
signed by over eighty influential officers in February 19.54, which 
led to the dismissal of both Goulart and the Minister of War, nation-
alist and pro-Vargas General Estillac Leal. The third phase,inau-
gurated under considerable military pressure strongly supported 
by entrepreneurs and the American government, was in reality a 
long succession of defensive and ad hoc manoeuvres by Vargas, 
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heavily attacked in Congress and through the press by such politicians 
as Carlos Lacerda,71,the UDN firebrand of Rio de Janeiro, and this 
phase led to the coup and to his suicide in 1954.72 
Under the presidency of Vargas, the strategy of capital accumu-
lation and industrialization was based on two main financing devices: 
the maintenance of exchange policy and control of exchange rates 
transferring part of the surplus from the agro-exporting sector to 
the industrial one, and the relative containment of real wages, 
softened in its effect upon the workers by the function of the 
state and private enterprises producing subsidized goods and services, 
thus partially transferring buying power to the salaried workers. 7) 
Vargas attempted to impose a nationalistic policy of capitalist 
development, supported by a combination of state and private indus-
trial enterprises. 74 
This policy materialized in the highly controversial creation 
of Petrobras75 and the formulation of a general developmental policy. 
which aimed to combine economic growth with social democracy.76 
Moreover, the kind of polity envisaged by the Executive led by 
Vargas involved the reiteration of a proposition which had already 
been defeated once, namely, an administrative and policy-making 
state apparatus relatively free from the exclusive hold of the dom-
inant classes, supporting national industrialization, together with 
the curbing of multinational interests while striving for the imple-
mentation of an industrial-working class bloc backed by the state 
and accommodating the agrarian interests. However, as seen earlier 
on, the local entrepreneurs, far from being hostile to multinational 
penetration, even favoured it.77 Entrepreneurs put the emphasis of 
the nationalistic campaign on the question of industrial production 
on Brazilian soil rather than on the origin of the capital or the 
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technology involved. The entrepreneurs also shied away from a 
state-led form of nationalistic development. The process of concen-
tration of capital would develop instead hand in hand with a process 
of internationalization of the economy. 
Furthermore, the political and economic arrangement env.isaged 
by Vargas raised another serious problem. Multinational interests, 
which were re-entering the Brazilian economy after their withdrawal 
during the Second World War, would be left without adequate repre~ 
sentation in the channels of policy formation. Multinational interests 
would aggressively seek to change this situation, together with 
local interests who feared the political ascendancy of Vargas, and 
with reactionary forces appalled by the social democratic measures 
with which Vargas seemed to threaten them. Overthrown by another 
military coup in 1954, Vargas refused to resign and committed suicide. 
In so doing he explicitly condemned what he saw as the anti-national 
conspiracy of reactionary forces supported by imperialist interests, 
a condemnation to which his testament-letter bears witness. 78 
Vargas' suicide in 1954, and the subsequent direction of the 
economic policies by Eugenio Gudin79 as 11inister of Finance in Cafe 
Filho's presidential interlud~ opened up a radically different period 
in terms of economic policy. Government policy explicitly favoured 
multinational corporations who would agree to import industrial equip-
ment for the production of those goods given high priority by the 
administration. In 1955, Cafe Filho's government issued the famous 
Instruction 113, of the Superintendency of Money and Credit-SUMOC, 
allowing multinational corporations to import equipment at 45 per 
cent below the tariff level and exempting them from providing the 
foreign exchange 'waiver' for importing machinery, an advantage not 
enjoyed by Brazilian-owned firms. 80 
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Cafe Fi1ho's brief governmen~supported by an informal centre-right 
alliance of entrepreneurs, politicians of the National Democratic 
Union.- UDN, and the Social Progressive Party - PSP aimed at the 
containment of the working classes and the stimulus to the penetra-
tion by multinational interests, through a political understanding 
with coffee and financial sectors. Despite its efforts, what was 
for a short while a UDN-1ed power bloc was defeated in the subsequent 
elections by an effective alliance of PSD and PTB politicians, 
trade unionists and entrepreneurs. This alliance was headed by 
the Jusce1ino Kubitschek-Joao Goulart slate. The PSD/PTB alliance 
broadly corresponded to the formation of a 'national front' - not 
its actual name ; which was a loose coalition of social forces 
expressing the desire for a process of national development based 
on the expansion of industry in Brazil. The ~SD/PTB alliance incor-
porated the industrial bourgeoisie, a sector of the commercial bour-
geosie specialized in the trading of locally produced industrial 
products, and the progressive middle classes (liberal professionals, 
managers) as well as urban politicians and trade unionists. 51 Goulart 
campaigned for what seemed to be the continuity of the more etatiste, 
nationalistic and reform-oriented policies of the second Vargas 
administration, of which Goulart was the heir-apparent, while 
Kubitschek campaigned on an ambitious planning and development pro-
gramme. However, the Kubitschek administration, although apparently 
based on the same correlation of political forces as the Vargas 
regime, implemented a policy of development which resulted in a 
drastic change in the pattern of accumulation, reinforcing a pattern 
of 'associated development ,82 by the realization of the so-called 
Plano de Metas, from 1956 to 1961.8) Moreover, Kubitschek's strategy 
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of development led to a redefinition of the role and function of 
the state machinery and in its relation with civil society, finally 
e~~usting the possibilities for the combination of political forces 
that were its original base. 84 
Under the cover of Kubitschek's developmentalist policies 
entered the technological package for the incipient industrias de 
~ (dynamic industries)"such as automobile and shipbuilding, 
chemicals and pharmaceutical, machinery and electrical goods, paper 
and cellulose, providing the economic matrix for the renewed develop-
ment of an associated bourgeoisie. 85 The recourse to foreign techno-
logy and managerial techniques as well as transnational financial 
resources was expected to be a solution to the problems of lack 
of primitive accumulation and a shock treatment for an agro-exporting 
economy suffering from a relative scarcity of machinery, equipment 
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and know-how. 
Kubitschek's policies of development exacerbated the transformations 
that were already being experienced in the Brazilian socio-economic 
formation, such as the greater sophistication of the internal market, 
increasing size of the enterprises, more complex production, the 
expansion of the basic industries,87 the' trend towards urbanization 
and metropolitan concentration, intensification of sectoral dispari-
ties, and social and regional inequalities. 88 
Moreover, Kubitschek's policies of development set the conditions 
for the economic pre-eminence of multinational and associated oli-
gopolistic capital. The internal relations of Brazil were at this 
stage the result of a combination which was 'original' and in a 
certain sense unique, namely, the populist class convergence and 
form of domination interacting with transnational monopoly capital. 
However, problems arose at the institutional level, as the 
political and administrative inadequacies for such a concentrated 
and centralized model of development became evident. 
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Congress initially supported Kubitschek through the PSD/PTB alliance, 
giving credibility to his programme of 'state-led' development, 
while the government represented the interests of the parliamentary 
majority. 
But once the Executive had embarked on its policy of modernization, 
Congress consolidated its political presence with a conservative 
attitude towards the Executive and the industrializing interests 
it represented, on account of the logic of alliances and the need 
for conciliation, the politics of clientelism, the traditional 
interests and the rural oligarchy represented therein.89 
In this respect, the practio~s of the populist polity made Congress 
a conservative locus, slow and inappropriate for the articulation 
of the multinational and associated interests favoured by Kubitschek's 
government. Congress also allowed for the denunciation of multi-
national penetration 4nd the particular conditions under which it 
was achieved, as well as being a locus where representatives of the 
working classes made themselves heard and participated in the 
control of the Executive's policies. 
Another serious political shortcoming consisted in the cart 0 rial 
state's basic inability to function usefully because of an entrenched 
petty bureaucracy and higher administrative echelons which responded 
to traditional interests,together with a vast number of 'more or 
less parasitical functionaries assigned to more or less useless 
public jObs,.90 Multinational and associated interests had to look 
elsewhere to produce economic policies conducive to their consoli-
dation. Kubitschek provided the appropriate structure. In effect, 
with the implementation of the Target Plan, and as a requisite for 
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its realization, a whole range of planning and consulting bodies 
and executive commissions of working groups (Grupos Executivos) were 
set up.91 They amounted to a 'parallel administration' co-existing 
side by side with the traditional Executive and duplicating or super-
seding the old unserviceable bureaucracies. This- parallel administration, 
staffed by directors of private enterprises and entrepreneurs with 
professional qualifications, the so-called tecnicos, and by military 
officers, allowed the multinational and associated interests to by-
pass traditional policy-formation channels and decision-making centres, 
thus side-stepping the structure of representation of the populist 
polity. In effect, it meant to incorporate into the populist polity 
exclusive channels of industrial policy-making which allowed for 
the co-existence of local and multinational capital. Moreover, 
the new interests would avoid the populist levers of control and 
authority, such as Congress, and the public criticism which could 
have been levelled at the multinational and associated interests by 
opposing parliamentarians, because the agencies making part of the 
parallel administration wer~ not only shrouded in administrative 
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secrecy but operated under1the cover of an ideological veil of 
'technical rationality', and 'apolitical expertise' w hi c h 
made them -unaccountable to partisan or private pressures. 
Furthermore, by using the mechanisms of 'mobilization of bias' and 
avoiding public scrutiny, the parallel administration was able to 
favour or bloc~ according to its choice, the access to finance 
and technology of different groups and corporations. 
However, there was one weakness in the scheme. The parallel 
administration's efficiency depended largely on the positive atti-
tude and goodwill that the Executive showed towards its functioning. 
For the multinational and associated interest~ therefore, the- political 
---------------
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command bf the. state andthe~occupation of bureaucratic posts in 
the administration became necessary. 
Under the Plano de Metas occurred what can be considered to 
, 
be the second stage of 'formal nationalization' of the economy, 
'with the state be in g established as the direct producer of 
infrastructural strategic goods and services and it becoming an 
indirect controller of substantial mechanisms of economic policy. 
However, the state's role as developer effectively concealed the 
real dominance of capital. Despite the state's impressive presence 
in the economy, it did not 'orient' the new structure of production. 
Rather , it was transnatiOJlal capital, which, 'having penetrated the dynamic 
sectors of the 'economy, controlled ·the proce;ls of capitalist expansion. 92 
state intervention in the economy, beyond the allocation of public 
resources for private activities, was largely discouraged, if not 
condemned outright, by the big entrepreneurs. The figure of an 
omnipotent state was never thought 'of politically, nor was it a 
:part of the ideological perspective of, the national industrial 
entrepreneurs~93: Moreover, the state's already considerable economic ) 
influence eliciteu a traditional entTepreneurial fear of an increas-
ing interference in capitalist affairs. 94 
Reassertion of the absolute necessity for private ownership of 
means of production became a central battle-cry of both the entre-
preneurs and even of the military.95 
The development policies under Kubitschek also meant 
transformations of the social division of labour, through the 
creation of a large industrial working class, the greater urbaniza-
tion of the country, the expansion of tertiary activities and the 
formation of new segments of salaried functionaries. Populist 
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politics, with its characteristics such as c1iente1ism, cartorialism 
and paternalism, served for a short term to reproduce ideologically 
and recreate politically the belief in a neutral, benevolent state, a 
myth which was to be shattered in the early 1960s.96 Through populist 
politics the ruling classes also attempted to preserve the lack of 
socio-po1itical differentation which was the hallmark of the previous 
regimes, seeking to block the emergence of autonomous working-class 
organizations. The attainment of such objectives was reinforced 
by authoritarian measures, such as keeping the ban on:the ~ammunist 
Party and the restrictions on autonomous trade unionism. However, 
the industrializing drive of the Kubitschek administration went 
ahead, swiftly increasing the number and concentration of the work-
ing class in the big urban centres, thus modifying the political 
and ideological centours of the regime and es~ab1ishing the pre-
conditions for the disruption of the populist po1ity.97 By the 
late nineteen fifties, class struggle kept breaking through the 
corrupt institutional political structure controlling the working 
class with its rhetoric of nationalism and its'demagogue~yabout 
. 98 economJ.c progress. 
I 
tndustrial development and urbanization had transformed the working 
classes' psychology and collective consciousness, weakening the 
ideological hold that the dominant classes had over the subordinate 
ones. Furthermore, Peasant Leagues, which had emerged in the mid-
1950s, mobilized the rural workers, and the first attempts were made 
to trade-unionize the rural labouring masses. The late nineteen 
fifties witnessed the flourishing of trade-union activities and 
working-class organizations, as well as intense student mobilization 
and intra-military debate, largely polarized on the issue of 
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nationalism, and with distributionist undertones. The mass of 
industrial workers and even of peasants had to be finally recognized 
as political contenders,,} although as usual not 'legitimate ones from 
the perceptional stance of the dominant classes. It was not by 
chance that under Kubitschek the notions of internal military 
security were concretized; it was Kubitschek himself, addressing 
the Superior War College, who was to urge the latter to dedicate 
itself to' the study of the potential subversive threat of social 
forces unleashed by modernization against the established order. 
The emphasis on consent pressed by the Kubitschek administration 
should not be taken to imply passivity on the part of the bourgeoisie. 
In fact, the ,growth of the repressive state apparatus, its re-
organization and the crucial ideological and operational shift of 
the Armed Forces' orientation from national territorial defence to 
counter-insurgency and internal warfare, as well as the intermittent 
use of coercive measures, were a feature of this period, and 
the pluralistic and liberal rhetoric of the mid-l950s should not 
be allowed to obscure this. 
Towards the end o:f Kubitschek's administration , it was clear that 
his 'model of development', in spite of its aChievements, had 
reached its, limits, and the government itself implicitly admitted 
this by openly adopting a policy of 'problem-postponement,.99 Tacti-
cal postponement was visible; it consisted in transferring the 
accumulating unsolved problems to the next administration. Strate-
gical postponement consisted in having bought a truce with the 
reactionary landed sectors, while allowing for growing imbalance 
between the urban-industrial and the rural-agricultural systems, 
and increasing regional imbalance, with the economic strengthening 
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of the centre-south at the expense of the rest of the country. 
strategic postponement also involved allowing the political institu-
tions to function mainly through their politics of clientele, blur-
ring the meaning of the political parties and rendering them 
inoperative and incapable of reaching programmatic coherence. 
By the early 1960s, the populist class convergence in power 
and the populist form of domination were to be challenged by two 
divergent social forces which had been brought forward in the con-
centrated industrialization of the 1950s propitiated by the Kubitschek 
government, itself under the aegis of the industrial-oligarchic 
power bloc. 
These two fundamental social forces were the multinational-associated 
interests and the fast growing and increasingly unruly industrial 
working classes. Together, though opposed to each other, they under-
mined, by the early 1960s, the myth of the neutral state developed 
by the Kubitschek administration. 
The m~inational and associated interests were economically pre-
eminent by the end of the Kubitschek period and during the Quadros 
, ' 
administration, as shall be seen in Chapter II. To side-step Con-
I 
gress and popular pressures alike, the multinational and associated 
interests stimulated the creation of a parallel administration which 
provided exclusive representation of their interests. Moreover, 
these interests were endorsed by the anti-populist and anti-popular 
ideals of the ESG, whose modernization values were roughly congruent 
with those of the multinational and associated interests, as .shall 
be seen in more detail in Chapter III. 
In the meantime, the industrial working classes, as part of the so-
called popular classes,lOO made of Congress an increasingly effective 
platform for the expression of popular interests in direct opposition 
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to the industrial oligarchic bloc, and against multinational and 
associated interests. 
With increasing nationalistic and reformist demands being pressed 
against the Executive and backed by the government, and with Congress 
also functioning as a locus of regional and local intexests, it 
became imperative for the multinational and associated interests to 
have political command of the state administration. This was partly 
achieved with Janio Quadros' accession to power. Under great pres-
sures, he attempted to solve the contradictions of the regime by a 
'civilian~Bonapartist,IOI gambit after only seven months in office, 
as shall be seen in Chapter IV. His resignation misfired and Goulart 
unexpectedly became president, leading a national-reformist bloc.I02 
A radical and highly unfavourable situation unfolded for the multi-
national and associated bloc, which launched a campaign, as shall 
be seen in Chapters V, VI, VII and VIII, to find a new political 
arra~~ement to express their blocked interests. This campaign 
encompassed the whole of .the dominant classes, including the so-
I 
called 'national' bourgeoisie, from which so many politicians and 
intellectuals and even military officers expected a nationalistic 
! 
and reformist stance. Contradicting such expectations, the 'national' 
bourgeoisie would passively assist and even actively support the 
fall of Goulart, in practice condemning his distributive and nation-
alistic socio-economic alternative and helping - in spite of them-
selves - to anchor the Brazilian state firmly to the global strategy 
of multinational corporations. 
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the form which attempted to conceal the class supremacy of this 
power bloc, it also allowed for a political space in which the 
working classes were able to express certain of their grievances 
and to develop organizational forms which attempted to bre~~ 
the ideological and political populist straightjacket. See 
Chapter IV of this thesis for further discussion on populism. 
For some suggestive analyses of populism, see Michael Lee Conniff, 
Rio de Janeiro durin the Great De ression 1928-1 : Social 
Reform and the Emergence of Fouulism Ph.D. Dissertation, Stan-
ford University, 1976); Regis de Castro Andrade, op.cit.; Popu~ 
lism and the Conceptualization of Popular Ideologies - Transcripts 
of 1978 Conference, University of Toronto - LARUStudies, Vol.III 
No.2/3, Special issue; Ernesto Laclau, Politics and. Ideology in 
Marxist Theory: Capitalism, Fascism, Populism (London, ~~, 1977), 
cont/ •••• 
pp.143-199; Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Ideo1ogfas de 1a Bur-
guesfa Industrial en Sociedades Dependientes (Mexico, Sig10 
XXI, 1972); and Francisco Weffort, 'E1 Popu1ismo en 1a po1ftica 
Brasi1ena', in Brasil Hoy, op.cit. 
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56 Varga~ removal. from office had been helped by US Ambassador Adolf 
Ber1e, when he set off the train of events leading to the over-
throw. See Arthur Schlessinger, A Thousand Days (USA, Dell 
Paperback, 1967), p.66. 
57 M. Campe110, op.cit., p.64. 
58 Regis de Castro Andrade, op.cit., pp.26-27. 
59 Osvaldo Trigueiro do Vale, 0 General Dutra e a Redemocratisa9ao 
de 45 (Rio de Janeiro, Civi1iza9ab Brasi1e ira , 1979). 
60 See Octavio Ianni, Estado ••• , op.cit., pp.84-97. 
On the formation of the ESG and its political significance, see 
A. Stepan, op.cit., Chapter 8. 
61 On the FIESP and CIESP, see P. Schmitter, op.cit., pp.180-203. 
62 The specific objectives of SESI were 'to stu~y, plan, and 
execute, directly or indirectly, means that contribute to the 
social well-being of workers in industry and similar objectives'. 
Although its immediate function was to lower the cost of living 
by providingthe.workers with various benefits, it ~ttempted to 
to dampen political protest 'by stimulating the sentiment and 
spirit of social justi~e between the classes'. The long term 
goal was to layout the 'attitudinal and ideological basis for 
a capitalist industrial society'. SESI aimed at the 'social 
education' of workers in small groups, providing 'a clear com-
prehension of their duties before the community' and showing 
them 'the possibility of a profound betterment of their economic, 
social and moral conditions ••• without the necessity of a revolu-
tion or a break in the traditions of our Christian civilization'. 
Simonsen's view went well beyond crude indoctrination. Workers 
were also to be instructed in ~heir rights under the labour laws 
with lawyers put at their disposal' and workers' leaders had to 
be taught organizational teChniques while their associations 
had to be financially assisted. Only a strong, well organized, 
well-informed labour movement coUld ensure the kind of social 
peace Simonsen envisaged as the basis of an industrialized 
Brazilian society. The entrepreneurial strategy also involved 
the social education of employers, 'to explain to them the social 
function of private property, to habituate them to the necessary 
limitations of economic power and political power for the reali-
zation of a capitalist democracy'. P. Schmitter 1971, 185-186. 
Among participants in these courses was a young teacher, Janio 
Quadros, who in 1961 became president as the candidate of big 
enterprises. See Chapter IV of this thesis. 
63 Alberto Pasqualini, a major ideologist of the PTE and one of 
Vargas' closest collaborators in the creation of the party in 
their home state of Rio Grande do Sul explained that; 'I am not 
a man of the left or the right. I am certainly not a socialist: 
conti •••• 
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I just think the bourgeoisie should give a little. There is a 
lot of selfishness among the rich. It seems to me the bourgeois 
are growing steadily blinder and deafer.' R. Bourne, op.cit., 
p.148. 
64 F. H. Cardoso, Ideologias ••• , op.cit., Chapter II. 
65 S. Huntington and C. Moore, op.cit., p.510. 
66 E. Erickson, op.cit., Chapters II, III and IV. 
The intense internal migration from countryside to city of 
workers without political tradition, accounting forihe 'rural-
urban' composition of the working class, explains much of the 
political naivete of the Brazilian industrial masses. See 
Octavio Ianni, Crisis in Brazil (New York, Columbia University 
Press, 1970), p.51. 
67 Through the ~lego structure were set up among others the National 
Confederation of Industrial Workers (CNTI)~ the National Confed~ . 
eration of Commercial Workers (CNTe) , in 1946; the National 
Confederation of Land Transport vlorkers (CN'rI'), in 1953; the 
National Confederation of Workers in Credit Establisr~ents 
(CO}ITEC) in 1958; the National Confederation of Workers in 
Marine, River and Air Transport (CNTF~~) and the National Con-
federation of Workers in Communications and Publicity (CONTOP) 
in 1960. 
Further control was exercised through the spoils system which 
kept the labour unions dependent upon the~Ministry of Labour via 
the management of financial resources. O. Ianni, op.cit., p.51. 
68 On the ideology of Adhemar de Barros, a shrewd politician and 
entrepreneur and owner of Carbonifera Brasileira, S.A., see 
Guita Grin Debert, Ideologia e Populismo (Sao Paulo, T.A. Queiroz 
Editor Ltda, 1979), Chapter III. 
69 On the relations between Executive and Congress, see Sergio 
Abranches, 0 Processo Legislativo: Conflito e Conciliacao na 
polftica Brasileira - M.A. Dissertation, University of Brasilia, 
Mimeo, 1973, pp.1-15, and Celso Lafer, 0 Sistema Politico Brasil-
~ (S~o Paulo, Edit6ra Perspectiva, 1975), pp.62-68. 
70 See R. Bourne, op.cit., pp.160-161. 
71 On the ideology of Carlos Lacerda, see Guita Grin, op.cit., 
Chapter V. 
72 An appraisal of this phase and of the key issues involved is 
to be seen in Moniz Bandeira, Presenya ••• , op.cit., Chapters 
40-42. 
73 Francisco de Oliveira, A Economia da Dependencia Imperfeita (Rio 
de Janeiro, Graal, 1977), pp.79-8O. 
74 For discussion on the nationalistic trends of the second Vargas 
administration between 1950 and 1954, see O. Ianni, Estado ••• , 
op.cit., pp.98-123; Gabriel Cohn, Petroleo e NacionalisrnP(Sao 
Paulo, DlFEL, 1968); Medeiros Lima (ed.), I Jesus Soares Pereira, 
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petroleo Ener ia. Eletrica, Sideru ia: A Luta pela Emanci a ao 
Rio de Janeiro, Paz e Terra, 1975; Moniz Bandeira, op.cit., 
pp.323-365; John D. Wirth, The Politics of Brazilian Develop-
ment (stanford, stanford University Press, 1970). 
R. Bourne, op.cit., pp.161-164, G.Cohn, op.cit. 
Helio Jaguaribe, 'Political Strategies of National Development in 
Brazil' - Studies in Com:parative International Development, 
Vo+ume III, No.2, 1967/68, Social Science Institute, Washington 
Uni versi ty, st. Louis, 11i.ssouri, pp.31-32. See also R. Bourne, 
op.cit. 
On competition and collaboration of these interests, see P. 
Evans, op.cit., pp.131-143. 
78 M. Bandeira, op.cit., pp.363-365; R. Bourne, op.cit., pp.185-197. 
79 Eugenio Gudin was a director of Com nhia For a e Luz Nordeste 
do Brasil (Brazilian Electric Power Co. , Electric Bond & Share 
Co., EBASCO (I.T.T.), Emtresas Eletricas Brasileiras, Cia. 
Paulista de ForQa e Luz AMFORP) and Standard Oil. He was ~lso 
a leading economist at the Fm1daQao Getulio Vargas. 
80 Frank Ackerman, 'Industry and Imperialism in Brazil' in ~ 
Review of Radical Political Economics, Volume III, No.4, Spring 
1971, pp.17-21; Nathaniel Leff, Economic polic -Maki and 
Develo~ment in Brazil 1947-1964 (London, John Wiley, 19 8 , 
pp.59- 6; R. Newfarmer and W. Mueller, op.cit., p.97i M. Bandeira, 
op.cit. pp.365-372. 
81 Helio Jaguaribe, Problemas do Desenvolvimento Latinoamericano 
(Rio de Janeiro, Civiliza9ao Brasileira, 1967), p.12. 
82 An account of the pattern of associated development propitiated 
by Kubitschek and of his political period is to be found in: 
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o. Ianni, Estado ••• , op.cit., pp.124-164; Carlos Lessa, 15 
Anos de PJlitica Economica no Brasil (Sao Paulo, Unicamp,~975); 
Maria victoria de Mesquita Benevides, 0 Governo Kubitschek: 
Desenvolvimento Economico e Estabilidade Pol£tica (Rio de Janeiro, 
Paz e Terra, 1976), pp.199-240. 
84 F. de Oliveira, op.cit., pp.83-84. 
85 By 1959, the total number of American based corporations operat-
ing in Brazil was more than 400.- ESG document Tg-IO - 59 - p.17. 
The local industrial concerns showed a marked trend towards 
linking themselves with multinational oligopolistic companies. 
See Nelson de 11ello e Souza, op.cit., pp.28-29. 
It is then not surprising to learn that one-third of the US multi-
national corporations originally entered the Brazilian market 
by acqUisition rather than by risking new investment. Moreover, 
cont/ •••• 
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between 1960 and 1972 one-quarter of all growth in US firms' 
assets was due to takeover. Furthermore, there is a.shift in 
the sectoral choice of penetration by US direct investment. 
While in 1929 the US investment occupied 6P~ of commerce, 
services and others and only 24% in manufacturing, leaving l~ 
for extractive and primary sector, in 1950 the figures are, 
respectively, 3~, 44% and.l?J0, with investment in manufacturing 
showing a marked tendency to continual growth. 
By 1929, the book value of US direct investment was 194 million 
dollars, by 1946 it reached 323 million dollars. By 1950 it 
was 644 million dollars and 953 million dollars by 1960. . 
See P. Evans 'Continuities and Contradictions in the Evolution 
of Brazilian Dependence', in Latin American Perspectives, Issue 
No.9, Spring 1976, Volume III No.2, p.44. 
86 F. de Oliveira, A Economia ••• , op.cit., pp.85, l16~117; M. Bandeira, 
op.cit., p.375i H. Ferreira Lima, 'Capitais Europeus no Brasil', 
in Revista Brasiliense No.4, Ma,rch/APril 1956, pp.45-64. 
87 The outcome of Kubitschek's policies was impressive. Industries 
for which more than 50 per cent of the total supply had been 
imported in 1949 became key growth centres for the industrial 
sectors. Between 1949 and 1962, the chemical industry provided 
14.8 per cent of all growth, followed by transportation at 14.4 
per cent, metals at 11.3 per cent, manufactured foods at 10.8 
per cent and textiles at 8.9 per cent. The share of total growth 
produced by multinational corporations was estimated at 33.5 per 
cent of the 1949-1962 expansion in manufacturing and L}2 per cent 
of the import substitution industry growth. 
R. Newiarmer and W. Mueller, op.cit., p.97. 
88 In 1955 Roberto Campos spelled out, with remarkable frankness, 
what was to be the rationale of the Kubitschek era: 'Optir~ for 
development implies the acceptance of the idea that it is more 
important to ~aximize the rate of economic development than to 
correct social inequalities. If the rate of development is 
rapid, inequality can be tolerated and. corrected with time. If 
the rate of development falls because of inadequate incentives, 
the practice of distributive justice (justica distributiva) 
becomes a sharing of poverty. Obviously, this does not mean 
that one can leave uncontrolled the predatory instincts occa-
sionally present in certain capitalist sectors. It merely impl~s 
that, at our stage of cultural evolution, preserving incentives 
for the growth of output ought to have priority over measures 
aimed atEs redistribution.' As quoted in Thomas Skidmore, 
Politics in Brazil 1 0-1 64: An Ex eriment in Democrac (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 19 7 , p.3 7 fn. 
89 C. Lafer, op.cit., p.89. 
90 H. Jaguaribe, Political Strategies ••• , op.cit., p.40 Contrary 
to neo-Weberianarguments,the development of governmental bureau-
cracies did not have implicit in it norms of universalistic 
treatment of similar cases in accordance with a code of rules. 
Rather, they incorporated the old ascriptive system of patronage 
of family and friends. See C. Lafer, op.cit., p.67. 
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91 Entrepreneur Antonio Carlos do Amaral Osorio, who was to play 
a very important part in the events that led to Goulart's down-
fall, later observed that Kubitschek's industrialization 'gener-
ated a series of problems within the economic, social and political 
structures. In the field of public administration, (industrializa-
tion) reverberated with the creation of a series of parallel 
organizations within the state ••• in order to fulfil the neces-
sities arising from the economic and social problems that were 
accumulating. ' See L. Martins, op • cit., p .136. 
92 See P. Evans, Dependent ••• , op.cit., Chapters IV and V. 
93 F. de Oliviera, op.cit., pp.39-40. 
94 C. Lessa, op.cit., p.65. 
95 In the early 1960s, the alternatives of state-led nationalistic 
development.or association with foreign interests and integrated 
development reappeared as a critical dilemma. The position 
against the state was firmly argued by influential military 
figures, such as Marshal Ignacio Jose ver!ssimo, who by then 
was an important anti-populist activist. At a meeting of the 
FIESP 11arshal Verissimo warned that 'When Brazilians witness 
without a flick of the eye the action of the State becoming the 
overlord of iron by means of the Volta Redonda complex and the 
Vale do Rio Doce company; the overlord of the railway transporta-
tion by means offue Rede Ferroviaria Federal. the big shipbuilder 
through Loide, ITA, Navega9ao do Prata and~Navega9ao da Amazonia; 
the overlord of a whole series of economic activities through 
the Institutes of Salt, Pine, Coffee, Sugar and others; and, 
moreover, becoming the owner of radio stations, newspapers and 
taking over electric energy enterprises and becoming the sole 
producer of oil, and having factories producing alkali, auto-
mobiles, food-stuffs, shoes etc.; when Brazilians witness all 
those things without getting disturbed, then Brazilians are 
commi tting moral "harakiri" (sic).' Marshal I. verissimo, 
Speech at FIESP, quoted in 0 Estado de Sao Paulo, February 20, 
1963. 
96 On the role of ISEB, the Instituto Superior de Estudos Brasileiros, 
in the development of such a belief, see H. Beneyides, op.cit., 
pp.24l-243. 
97 The industrial workers increased from 450,000 in 1930 to 2,100,000 
in 1960, almost doubling from 1950 to the end of Kubitschek's 
period. See General Edmundo Hacedo Soares - ESG Document C-25-6J, 
pp.22-23. 
98 On the ideology of development as consolidation of a hegemonic 
process, see Hiriam Limoeiro Cardoso, La Ideologia Dominante, 
(Mexico, Siglo XXI, 1975). 
99 H. Jaguaribe, Political Strategies ••• , op.cit., p.37. 
100 On the notion of popular classes, see Francisco C. Weffort, 
Classes populares e politica, Ph.D. Thesis, Faculdade de Filo-
sofia, Ciencias e Letras da Universidade de Sao Paulo, 1968, p.l. 
conti· •.. 
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On the notion of masses, see F. C. Weffort, 'po1ftica de 11assas', 
in po1ftica e Revo1uQao Social no Brasil, ed. by O. Ianni et 
al., pp.17J-178. 
101 On the Bonapartismo Janista', see He1io Jaguaribe, Economic 
and Political DeveJ.opment' (Cambridge, Hass., Harvard University 
Press, 1968), p.1~ 
See also Carlos Estevam Martins, Brasi1-Estados Unidos dos 
Anos 60 aos 70 - Paper for the Seminar on Political Relations 
betHeen Latin America and USA, Instituto de Estudos Peruanos, 
Lima, Peru, September 1972. 
102 The term-nationa1-reformist bloc designates the loose combination 
of political forces represented in the circle surrounding 
Goulart and favouring policies of nationalistic industrializa-
tion with strong state backing, agrarian reform with land distri-
bution, nationalization of natural resources, social welfare 
measures, and neutralist or Third World aligned foreign policies, 
strong curbing of multinational corporations and expropriation 
in many cases. 
It is worth noting that Joao Goulart, ten years, later, reiterated 
the same pattern of cabinet composition and imp1ementatiop of 
policies as that followed by Vargas. This eventually 'led to 
Goulart's own.downfal1, after h~ had forfeited. the support of 
the dominant classes as a whole. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Chapter I singled out the basic elements constituting the 
populist form of domination and association. It showed how this 
form supported the structural class convergence in power, and also 
pointed to the rise of multinational and associated capital within 
the industrial-oligarchic historical bloc. 
This chapter is concerned with the ascendancy which the 
multinational and associated interests gained vis-a-vis the 
populist economic interests, 1 favoured by the developmentalist 
policies of J. Kubitschek which also gave rise to a process of 
economic and political differentiation within the populist 
historical bloc. 
The Second World War can be regarded as a historical water-
shed which marked the economic consolidation and political sup-
remacy of monopoly capitalism in the industrial and financial 
centres. 2 The new forms of capitalism, which were realized at 
a global level by means of a complex and contradictory articula-
tion with the various national social formations had the multi-
national corporations as their basic organizational form. 3 
Brazilian late and dependent capitalism was to be both trans-
national and oligopolistic, subordinated to the centres of capi-
talist expansion. 'National' capital which had ruled with 
Getulio Vargas, would coexist meaningfully only in its associated 
form, or in state owned enterprises. 4 Even in the latter form, 
transnational capital would still playa central part, through 
the state's joint ventures with multinational corporations and 
through the multinational partial control of the shares of 
,Brazilian state enterprises. 
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Multinational penetration and Integration of Industry 
The changes in the international division of labour 5 and 
the penetration of a multinational bloc, led by US-American 
interests, in the Brazilian economy gave rise to new economic 
and political relations, namely: a) an increasing economic con-
~ 
centration and centralization of capital 0 with the predominance 
of big integrated industrial and financial units; and b) a process 
of oligipolistic control of the market. 7 
The growing economic weight and relative political impor-
tance of the Brazilian multinational and associated power bloc 
in the early 1960s is made very clear by the data provided by a 
seminal research study carried out at the Institute of Social 
Sciences, IeS, of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro. 8 
The IeS study surveyed and listed 276 economic groups with 
capital assets of over 900 million cruzeiros each. 
221 of these groups ,which had capital~.of over 900 and 
less than 4,000 million cruzeiros, were known as the 'millionaire 
group'. The remaining 55 groups, each with capital assets of 
more than 4,000 million cruzeiros were called, for purposes of 
identification, the 'multimillionaire groups'. These 55 groups 
which held a strategic role in the Brazilian economy occupied the 
leading positions of the principal sectors in which they operated, 
controlling a substantial part of the production and circulation 
of goods. 9 More than half of these groups had their headquarters 
in Sao Paulo, approximately one third of them in Rio de Janeiro 
and a small proportion in Minas Gerais. 
The IeS study examined a sample of 83 groups drawn from the 
estimated total of 221 millionaire units. Of the 83 groups, 
54 (64.~/o) were 'national' and 29 (34.~/o) multinational. Of those 
54 national groups, 25 (4~/o) had share-links with multinational 
groups. If those percentages are generalized to the universe of 
the millionaire groups, a total of 221 groups, they would shovT 
144 'nationals' (65.1%) and 77 multinationals (34.9%), of which 
43 (55.2%) were non-US-American multinational groups. 10 Out of 
a total of 144 'national' groups, only 78 had no clear-cut links 
with multinational interests. The classification by value of 
capi tal of the millionaire groups shovTed the following picture: 
TABLE 1 
~ -
Value of Foreign % National % 
capital groups groups 
-
- - - --- -- -~ 
900 to 
1.500 mil. 19 65.5 15 27.7 
I 
1.500 to -I 
3.000 mil. 10 34.5 34 62.9 
3.000 to 
4. 000 mil. I -- --- 5 9.4 
~ 
Source: T. dos Santos, 1969, 52-53 
(In 1962 the value of 1 dollar increased from 100 cruzeiros 
to 200 at the end of the year) 
Al though national groups in the millionaire range "ere 
numerically preponderant, they suffered from a lesser capacity 
for competition, they Here constrained by technological dis-
advantages and they had to operate 'l>ri thin oligopolistic markets 
controlled by multinational companies. Furthermore, 58% of the 
50 
transnational millionaire groups and 37.5% of the non-US-~\mericans 
vrere part of the predominant nucleus of the market of their 
principal product. Ten groups Hith an outstanding position 
(8 US-Americans and 2 other multinationals) 'Here the biggest 
producers in their respective markets. 11 North-American trans-
national capital '..ras pre-eminent vri thin millionaire mul ti-
national groups. The US-Americans represented 13 groups (48'"/a) 
51 
and the other countries 16 (5~/o) of the total of multinational 
millionaire groups. The Americans also represented 4~/o of the 
total of multinational interests and 15.~/o of the total of both 
national and multinational millionaire groups. 
Of the 55 multimillionaire groups found in Brazil, 31 (56.4%) 
were multinational and 24 (43.6) were local or 'national', of 
which 62.5% had variable links with foreign groups. Of those 
24, only 9 (37.5%) had no stock ownership by multinationals or 
relevant links with multinational interests, and 2 of them had 
interlinking directorates with multinational corporations. 12 
Multinational supremacy appeared even more intense once a com-
parison was made of the differences between the total amount of 
capital of multinational and local groups. Nineteen 'national' 
groups (7~/o) out of a total of 24 had between 4.000 and 10.000 
million cruzeiros in capital; 18 multinational groups, (5~/o of 
the total) fell into this category. In an intermediary position, 
between 10.000 and 20.000 million cruzeiros, there were 3 
national groups (14%) and 10 multinational (3~/o). In the 
highest range of more than 20.000 million there were 2 national 
groups (lO.~/o) and 3 multinational ones (l~/o). Txansnational 
capital tended to predominate in the range of higher capital 
assets. 
Within the multinational multimillionaire groups, the US-
Americans held a pre-eminent position. Fifteen out of a total 
of 31 groups were US-Americans. The remainder consisted of 4 
German, 3 British, 2 French, 1 Canadian, 1 Anglo-Dutch, 1 Dutch, 
1 Argentinian, 1 Italian, 1 Swiss and 1 Anglo-Belgian-US-American. 
US-American groups comprised 4~6 of the multinational multi-
millionaire groups and made up 25% of the total of national and 
multinational multimillionaire groups taken together. 13 
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The composition of the universe of the multinational 
millionaire and multimillionaire economic groups, added to the 
'national' groups (linked or associated through share o~mership 
with foreign interests) constituted 68.4%, 189 groups out of a 
total of 276 economic groups with more than 900 million cruzeiros 
as capital assets. The conclusions that can be drawn are clear. 
Big 'national' enterprises. and their controlling~oups were 
predominantly multinational, closely bound by technological 
dependence or financially integrated with multinational groups. 
The big 'national' enterprise was mainly an associated concern. 
This process of internationalization would be pushed even further 
after 1964. 
Oligopolistic control of the market was due mainly to two 
elements: a multinational preference for selected sectoral 
penetration and technological and financial integration. Up to 
the 1950s, transnational capital had been established in services, 
extraction, commercialization of agrarian products and to a lesser 
degree in industrial enterprises. Through the Plano de Metas, 
multinational concerns in Brazil redirected their investments 
to other sectors and expanded the local economy solidly into 
manufacturing, in what has been termed the 'second stage of 
import-substitution' .14 This process was clearly seen in the 
pattern of US investments. In 1929, one half of US investments 
was in public utilities. Mining, petroleum and trade constituted 
26%. By the end of the war, manufacturing was on a par with 
public utilities, each with 3~/o, and the rest being trade, 
mining and petroleum. By 1950, manufacturing was already 44%; 
it climbed to 54% by 1960 and reached 68}6 in 1966. 15 
54 
By the early 1960s, 78.1% of the multimillionaire groups 
were directly involved in industry, and the preference that 
foreign (mainly American) capital showed for the industrial 
sector was quite clear. In comparison with multinational 
groups, the local multimillionaire groups were outstanding 
in import-export business, in banking and the non-durable goods 
industry; they were equal to the foreign interests in the in-
vestment sector and their position was approximate to multi-
national groups in basic industries, where the state had pre-
eminence. 'National' groups had a definite disadvantage in 
distribution, industrial services, durable goods and heavy 
h . 16 mac ~nery. 
Multinational groups clearly preferred the industrial 
sector. Among the 55 multimillionaire groups, the following 
division by sectors of principal activity was found: 
TABLE 3 
Hillionaires Nultimillionaires 
Foreign National Foreign. National 
SECTORS No % No ~6 No % No % 
J., 
Industry 25 86.2 40 74.1 26 83.9 17 70.8 
Cormnerce 2 6.9 10 18.5 4 12.9 3 12.5 
Banks 2 6.9 4 7.4 1 3.2 4 16.7 
-
Total 29 100.0 54 100.0 31 100.0 24 100.0 
Source: T. dos Santos, 1969, 54 
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The distribution of the multimillionaire groups per sector 
of activity and type of control in the early 60s was as follows: 
T.AJ3LE 4 
Sector of Activity 
Non Industrial 
(export, import, financial 
societies, services) 
insurances and banks 
Industrial 
Non Durable consumer goods 
Durable consumer goods 
Heavy Machinery 
Basic Industries 
Total 
National Multinational 
8 (33. '/0) 6 (20.796) 
8 (33. '/0) 5 (17. 20/0) 
1 (420/0) 7 (24.196) 
1 (420/0) 4 (13.9'/0) 
6 (25%) 7 (24.1%) 
24 (100'/0) 31 
- Sources: ICS Study in L. Martins, 
1976, 437. 
ICS Study in F. H. Cardoso -
Cebrap No.8 - p. 59. 
In the millionaire range such trends were reinforced. 
Twenty five out of 29 (86.~6) of the foreign groups were in the 
industrial sector against 35 out of 54 (64.8%) of the national 
groups. 17 
The highly integrated technological production of trans-
national capital also had a bearing on its market position. 
Technological integration favoured the trend to concentrate in 
specialized sectors of activity, thus allowing multinational 
companies a deeper integration, and they tended to dominate the 
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market in their competition with 'national' economic groups. 
The latter were mainly dispersed in several and varied sectors 
of production, not related technologically, as is shovm in 
Table 5. 
TAJ3LE 5 
Multimillionaires Millionaires 
,'Foreign National Foreign National 
Strictly 
I 
Specialized 5 - 11 - ! 
I 
Varied Activities , 
related horizon- , 
tally and specia-
lized ·20 11 9 2 
Vertically related 
activities and 
little diversifi-
cation 5 5 ~ 4 -
Diversified 1 5 5 -
Very diversified - .3 - 52 
--
- .. _ .. _._-
Sources: res Study 1965 
T. dos Santos, 1969, 54-56 
Besides the technological integration and specialization of 
production, another index of the integration of multinational 
groups compared to 'national' groups is the relationship between 
the number of enterprises and the volume of capital. 
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TABLE 6 
I 
I 
National Multinational I 
I 
Groups Enterprises Capital Groups Enterprises Capital I 
I 
24 506 219.000 31 234 306.000 
millions millions 
Average per enterprise: Average per enterprise: 
432 million 1.307 million 
_ .. -
Figures are in cruzeiros. Source: T. dos Santos, 1968, 448 
Among the sample of 83 millionaire groups, 10 multinational and 
only 2 national groups were foremost or sole producers of the 
sector in which they carried out their principal activities. Two 
national groups had enterprises occupying the second place in the 
sector of their principal activity; 3 groups had enterprises among 
the principal ones controlling the market in which they operated 
and 1 group had effective monopoly of its principal sector. 18 
National millionaire groups also operated in an oligopolistic market, 
or one of imperfect competition, in spite of not having leading 
positions like their multinational counterparts. 
Fourteen out of the 29 multinational multimillionaire 
groups operated in an oligopolistic market; 4 groups (all US-
American) functioned in conditions of quasi-monopoly and 9 
performed in a market with imperfect competition, (or mono-
polisticcompetition); 5 of them operated in markets of con-
centrated monopolistic competition, i.e. where one group con-
trolled more than 5~~ of the market, and 4 operated in mono-
polistic competition without concentration. 19 The degree of 
control of the market by multinational multimillionaire groups can 
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be observed in Table 7. 
TABLE 7 
Degree of Foreign % U.S. % Others % 
control groups Americans 
Over 
9<Y/o foreign 10 34.5 6 46.2 4 25.0 
Great 9 31.0 6 46.2 3 18.8 
Neditim 4 13.8 1 7.6 3 18.8 
Little 6 20.7 - - 6 37.4 
Total 29 100.0 13 100.0 16 100.0 
Source: T. dos Santos, 1968, 448 
Over 65% of the multinational groups operated in areas of 
activity where they had total or near total control of the market. 
The US-American groups operated in sectors where they had a com-
plete or near total control (92.4%) of the market. None of the 
US groups acted in sectors where there was 10\", control of the 
market by multinationals. 
Seventeen (58.&/0) of the multinational groups (less than 
one fifth of the total 83 multimillionaire groups of the sample) 
occupied the core of the market and only 12 (41.~6) were outside 
it. The situation of the local millionaire groups was different. 
Only 8 (14.~6) had a position of control in the market in which 
they operated, and 46 (85.~6) were out of it. Even so, one should 
remember that almost a half of the 'national' groups had relevant 
links with multinational ones. Eleven (84.6%) of the US-Americans 
were either the predominant nucleus, being the only producers or 
.-
I 
! 
I 
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first producers' in the millionaire group. 20 Additional evidence 
of the tendency by multinational groups to establish the 
oligopolistic control of the market can be obtained from 
Table 8, which shows the degrees of monopolization in the 
Sao Paulo based metallurgy sector. 21 
TABLE 8. Oligopoly in the metallurgical industry of Sao Paulo 
Branches of Number of Part of Eroduction cor-
Activity EnterErises res~onding to the three 
biggest enterErises (0/0) 
Metallic structures 8 76 
Agrarian tools 9 97 
Ploughs 17 76 
Electric motors 9 86 
Refrigerators 8 91 
Washing Machines 6 82 
Scales 19 74 
Lifts 6 99 
Source: T. dos Santos, 1969, 38 
Big business, multinational and even 'national' dominated 
the economy. 22 Multinational interests predominated in the 
secondary sector, the most dynamic one. Through their oligo-
polistic control of the market, multinational companies dic-
tated the pace and orientation of the Brazilian economy. In the 
capitalist centres, finance capital reigned supreme in the circle 
of American hegemony. US capital, holding only 0:'b of overseas 
investment in the first quarter of the century, had risen by 1960 
to a position of pre-eminence, owning close to 6~/o of all foreign 
investments. Meanwhile, the share of Great Britain, France and 
the Federal German Republic fell to 3~t. 23 
co 
A report by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the 
Department of state, produced in early 1963, provided an impor-
tant over-view of US private investment in Brazil. By indicating 
the 'character of the large US private investments in that country 
in terms of its size, location and company origin', the report 
aimed at serving 'to place this significant factor in Brazil's 
economy and in US-Brazilian relations in its setting'. 24 
According to the report, foreign private investments in Brazil 
totalled approximately 3.5 billion dollars. US interests were 
the largest single group of foreign investors, with about one 
third of the total foreign capital. Unlike the pattern of US 
investments in many other Latin American countries, public 
utilities and mining enterprises in Brazil represented a 
relatively small portion of private US holdings, while the largest 
US investments were in machinery manufactures; automotive, 
appliances. The bulk of US investments in Brazil was made by 
top-ranking US multinational corporations organized locally 
under Brazilian law in order to gain administrative and tax 
adv~tages. Sometimes these corporations were organized with 
a name which was not readily identified with that of the parent 
company in order to gain a local identity. 25 These investments 
were mostly in industries whose production was geared for the 
middle cla~consumer market, not so much for export. It was this 
much needed internal market that was consolidated after 1964, by 
favouring the middle layers to the detriment of the industrial and 
rural working classes, 
The report of the Department of state listed four general 
categories of economic activity in which all foreign private 
capital in Brazil was to be grouped. These were: 1) basic 
industry and heavy manufacturing; 2) light industry and 
processing; 3) non-manufacturing activities; and 4) public 
utilities. In three of these categories US interests predomi-
nated through their locally organized Brazilian subsidiaries. 
The above mentioned report also indicated that United States 
capi tal comprised about 4076 of foreign investment in basic 
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industries, followed by Federal Germany with 15% and Great Britain 
with 11%. 3~/o of the foreign investments in Brazilian light 
industries \vas of United States origin; Argentina representing 
about 1'/0 of foreign capital in this sector and Great Britain l~/o. 
The United States had invested about 4~/o of private foreign money 
in finance and trade, with l~/o each coming from Great Britain and 
26 France. 
The research memorandum provided a more detailed examination 
of the areas in which US investments predominated among foreign 
capital. In the category of basic industries and heavy manu-
facturing, which attracted about 4~/o of all private foreign 
investment (approximately 1.4 billion dollars of a total of 
3.5 billion dollars), US investments accounted for about 45% of 
the total foreign capital. The major sectors in \vhich US funds 
had been invested were: a) automotive, appliances and other 
machinery manufactures, where US investments constituted over 
half of the foreign investments of approximatelyS30 million 
dollars. :Next came Federal German and British interests. US 
automotive manufacturers in Brazil were General Motors, Ford 
Motor Co, ltlillys Hotors and International Harvester. Important 
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tractor and road equipment companies were Caterpillar, Fruehauf, 
Le Tourneau-Westinghouse and Hyster. Major automobile parts 
manufacturers included Bendix, Clark Equipment and Armsted 
industries (ex-American Steel Foundries). The largest US 
investors in machinery and appliance manufacturing were General 
Electric, IBM, Singer Sewing Machine, RCA, Timken Roller and 
Muncie Gear Works; b) the steel and metals industry sector was 
dominated by Belgian investments, followed by Japan. US capital 
represented about 15% of the total foreign private capital, an 
estimated 275 million dollars. Next came Canadian and West German 
interests. US metallurgical corporations included among others, 
the Gillette Co and Revere Cooper; c) the largest US investors 
in the mining and petroleum sector were Bethlehem Steel in the 
former and Standard Oil, Texaco, and Atlantic Refining in the 
distribution of the latter. US investors had invested about 
65% of all foreign private capital, which totalled about 
200 million dollars. Next came British and Italian interests; 
d) in the cement and glass sector France had the most important 
interests, with about half of the 125 million dollars of total 
foreign investment, followed by the United States and Switzerland. 
Pittsburgh Plate Glass with French association and Corning Glass 
were the most important US corporations in glass manufacturing. 
Lone Star Cement and Dolphin Shipping, the latter associated with 
an Italian company, were important US cemen~ producers. 27 
In the category of light industries and processing, which 
accounted for approximately 1.1 billion dollars (one third of the 
total foreign investments) US capital which represented over one 
third, was distributed as follows: a) chemicals, pharmaceuticals, 
plastics, with 420 million dollars of foreign investment, 
4~b of which was invested by US companies. Among the most 
important were Union Carbide, Celanese Corporation and Eastman 
Kodak. Other foreign investments were mainly French, German 
and Swiss; b) in food processing, US interests were second to 
British in the size of their investments, with Argentine capital 
(Bunge & Born mainly) in third place. Of a total of 240 million 
dollars of foreign capital, the US held about one fourth of the 
investments. Corn Products Company, International Packers and 
Anderson Clayton were the most important US corporations; c) in 
textiles, foreign interests invested about 165 million dollars. 
This sector was led by British and French interests, while the 
US represented about l~b of the total. J.B. Martin and Ranch 
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River Wool, associated with French interests were prominent US 
corporations; d) in rubber, wood and hides, out of a total of 
150 million dollars of foreign investments, the US accounted for 
5~/o followed by Italy and Great Britain as the source of capital. 
The US giants were Firestone, Goodyear and B.F. Goodrich; 
e) multipurpose industrial concerns included corporations 
engaged in a wide variety of activities, both industrial and 
commercial. The investment group Bunge & Born was the leader 
in the sector, with US corporations accounting for about one 
third of the total of 92 million dollars of foreign capital. 
Anderson Clayton was the largest of the US interests, folloi'Ted 
by United Shoe 1'1achinery and Minnessota r.Uning and Hanufacturing; 
f) paper and cellulose accounted for about 70 million dollars of 
foreign investment, with the US representing 7~6 of it. The most 
important corporations were Champion Papers and International paper.28 
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In non-manufacturing activities, which included finance, 
retail trade, publicity, real estate and aa~iculture, about 280 
million dollars were invested, of which about one third was from 
the United States. a) in banking and finance, the US led foreign 
investment, with about 25% of the total 152 million dollars. 
Canada was second, followed by Great Britain, France and 
Federal Germany. Large US financial interests included the 
First National City Bank and the First National Bank of Boston~ 
while a number of manufacturing corporations overlapped into the 
credit and investment areas, such as General Electric, Bethlehem 
Steel and Eastman Kodak; b) in retail trade, the US interests were 
the largest among the total of 80 million dollars of foreign 
investment with about 55%. Great Britain was next. The largest 
US corporations were Sears Roebuck, Pittsburgh Plate Glass 29 
and Singer Sewing Machine; c) in publicity, real estate and 
agriculture, the total foreign capital was about 50 million 
dollars, of which US interests represented about 4~/o. Esteve 
Brothers and King Ranch 'vere among the big US investments in 
agriculture, McCann Erickson in publicity. 30 
In the sector of public utilities US private investments 
had only a small part. Here the Canadian holding Company, 
Brazilian Light and Traction - Brascan 31 accounted for about 
85% of the total foreign investments. The major US utility 
interests which accounted for most of the rest of foreign capital 
were American and Foreign Power and International Telephone and 
Telegraph. 
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The Department of state report also provided a listing of 
the largest US firms in Erazil, wholly owned or with predominant 
us capital. These were, in decreasing size of approximate amounts 
of capital and reserves, from 60 million dollars to 10 million 
dollars: General Motors do Erasil S.A., Ford Motors do Brasil S.A., 
Esso Brasileira de Petroleo S .A., 32 vlillys Overland do Brasil 
S.A., General Electric S.A., FSr~a e Luz de Minas Gerais - EBASCO 
(Morgan Group), 33 Industria de Pneumaticos Firestone S.A., 
, 
Industrias Reunidas Vidrobras, Texaco Brasil S.A., International 
Harvester l1aquinas S.A., Champion Cellulose S.A., Union Carbide 
do Brasil S.A., Industrias Anderson, Clayton & Co - ACCO, Bendix 
do Brasil Ltd, Cia. Goodyear do Brasil, Cia. Paulista de F&~a e 
Luz (American Foreign Power), I.T.T., Caterpillar do Brasil S.A., 
Refina~oes de_Milho (Corn product Co), IBM do Brasil, Cia. Energia 
Eletrica da Bahia (American & Foreign Power) Sears Roebuck S.A., 
Cia. Atlantica de Petroleo S.A. (AtlantiC Refining Co), 
B.F. Goodrich do Brasil S.A., Swift do Brasil. 34 
One might stress at' this point- that important teclmo-
entrepreneurs and entrepreneurs who were linked to most of the 
above mentioned corporations as well as the other companies that 
appeared in the research memo were to be found in key posts with 
the organized ideological, political and military efforts of the 
bourgeoisie to topple Joao Goulart's executive. Many of these 
corporations, some through their subsidiaries and others directly 
or through class associations were also important financial 
contributors to the campaign which led to the brerucdown of the 
populist regime. 
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other Aspects of the Process of Concentration 
The process of industrial concentration was accompanied by 
an extreme concentration of land ownership. From 1950 to 1960 
the number of large estates dropped from 2.3~/o of the total 
agrarian establishments to 0.9~6, while they controlled as much 
as 47.2~/o of the land. 35 (10.4~/o) of the agrarian establishments 
controlled 79.9~6 of the land). Agricultural commerce was 
connected with a great part of the banking structure. 
In the banking sector, the process of concentration 
determined that between 1958 and 1963 the number of bank agencies 
increased from 3.937 to 5.943, while the number of head offices 
decreased from 391 to 324. These figures gain added significance 
if one considers the high degree of interpenetration between the 
directories of the big banks, their joint operations and the 
share of cash-flow and financial operations controlled by single 
establishments of the biggest 30 banks. The 30 biggest banks 
held 3.563 agencies out of a total of 5.943. Those 30 banks 
handled 2.736.632 million cruzeiros in deposits, out of a total 
of 3.398.737. Twenty five banks were private and 5 were owned by 
the state. Ten were based in Sao Paulo, 9 in Minas Gerais and 5 
in Rio de Janeiro. 36 Banks became central agents of the process 
of concentration and accumulation. 37 
The general process of international economic concentration 
and centralization had another aspect besides the process of 
monopolization of the market. Economic concentration operated 
also at the financial level and was realized through the process 
of integration between enterprises and by the control of a single 
group over a number of enterprises and different branches. The 
process of integration between enterprises took place especially 
through transnational holding companies - the financial organizations 
that coordinated the share control and operations of a certain 
group of enterprises. With national capital, this integration 
had the characteristics of an interfamilial organization, under 
the leadership of a family head. This was the case in 
oligopolistic groups such as Ermirio de Moraes, Bueno Vidigal, 
Q,uartim Barbosa, Villares and Matarazzo, among others. The 
national groups were controlled by family groups who dis-
tributed the shares and the positions of management among 
themselves. By the early 1960s, of the multimillionaire 
national groups, only three did not follow family structures, 
err 
7 being formed by the reunion of isolated entrepreneurs and only 
12 groups could be considered as being led by managers. From the 
55 multimillionaire groups, 28 (50.2;6) possessed stoci~ in the 
firms they integrated, mostly being national groups of local 
origin, not immigrants. The multinational groups operated through 
direct share control of their enterprises. Transnational capital 
sought to preserve securely the financial control of its enter-
prises. }3 In the case of the multimillionaire multinational 
groups, they had 80 to 9~6 of the control of the shares; only 3 
had minority control. The multinational millionaire groups 
showed a similar tendency. 
No other formation is more representative of the process 
of capitalist integration (internationalization, organizational 
centralization and financial-industrial fusion and inter-
penetration) occurring in the mid-1950s and early 1960s than 
the gigantic Atlantic Community Development Group for Latin 
America - ADELA. ADELA was formed in 1962, out of the recom-
mendations of a think-tank committee chaired by the vicepresident 
of Standard Oil' of New Jersey (Rockefeller Group) and the vice-
chairman of FIAT (Agnelli complex). 39 ADELA was set in motion 
by NATO parliamentarians and US senators, amongst whom US based 
Council for Foreign Relations members (then senators) Hubert 
Horatio Humphrey and Jacob Javits played important roles. 
ADELA was registered in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg in 
September 1964. It operates in Latin America through an 
operations office in Lima, Peru. 
By the end of 1972, ADELA shareholders included around 
240 industrial companies, banks and financial concerns (which 
are listed in Appendix A) from 23 countries. Because the 
organization is financed by some of the biggest international 
industrial and financial complexes in the world, it possesses 
considerable resources and channels of information. ADELA is 
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also capable of exerting powerful pressure on host governments. 40 
Its functions are to explore investment opportunities for the 
multinational corporations and by engaging local partners to 
create a favourable climate for investments, a political role 
formerly interpreted by national governments. Moreover, it 
aims to develop a strategy of penetration through direct 
investments, technical assistance and managerial expertise, 
market analysis and functional communications with local foci 
of power. ADELA also aims at the realization of contracts with 
international financial institutions, and to extend its activities 
practically to all the economic sectors. 
The list of multinational corporations included within 
ADELA provides a very good impression of the power behind 
the organization. AJ)ELA is a supranational body for inter-
national marketing. But not only this. Besides being a 
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~ELA also took up the role of mediator between inter-
national financial institutions and Latin American countries, 
in the planning of the development of the latter. An Annual 
Report of 1968 no. ted' that ADELA had, together with the 
International Finance Corporation - IFC, and the Interamerican 
Development Bank 'continuous contact and a free exchange of 
information, in order to avoid duplicity of efforts in 
developing areas and to share jointly the analysis of the 
opportunities for investment'. With the International Finance 
Corporation, ADELA has had an increasing number of common projects, 
including joint ventures in big investments. 41 IFC was founded 
in 1956, on a similar basis as ADELA. IFC invests on its own or 
jointly with other multinational corporations some of the big 
associated groups and public enterprises in Brazil. Its 
operational network is as follows: 
r - - -- - - - - - - srupo Ped Igel, Brasil---, 
Phillips Pecr-
1----o1eum, USA I 
I 
r --Petroquisa, Brasil---., 
I : ' I 
I I 
I I 
I I 
I 
I I I 
H.adna 
i ..... U'\.V l "'Mining 
I Moreira Sales. , 
, Brafil----' 
t+ 
,ULTlW'ERTlL r --
",Up<) !)umon t-
Villares ,lusil 
Holderbank 
linanciire, Claris 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I , 
talo:Ab, Brasil 
I 
I 
~~nteiro Aran!la, 
---I Brasil 
I 
~labio rrmao5,3rasil 
8rasil 
Source: Guia L~terinvest, 1973: 723 
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It is interesting to note that companies involved in 
ADELA and those linked to IFC would be in the forefront of the 
campaign against the Goulart government, as financial backers 
and through their managing directors operating as political 
activists. 
Monopoly capital, mediated through the penetration of 
multinational corporations, redefined the international 
division of labour and established a new and key productive 
centre and organizational bloc within the Brazilian socioeconomic 
structure. The industrialization of Brazil was to be integrated 
and subsumed by multinational corporations within the strategy 
of global capital expansion, underlining the new degrees of 
internationalization, centralization, and concentration of 
capital. Transnational monopoly capital gained a strategic 
place in the Brazilian economy, determining the pace and the 
direction of industrialization and stipulating the form of 
national capitalist expansion. 
The trend towards denationalization, concentration and 
sectoral predominance of multinationals increased fundamentally 
after 1964, once the economic and political conditions for this 
upwards swing were imposed. In this process, US-American capital 
established its supremacy among the multinational interests. 
The 'ownership' of Brazilian economy by foreign interests was 
by 1969 a fait accompli. Multinational companies controlled 
37.~/O of the steel industry; 3~~ of the metallurgy; 75.~b of 
chemical and petroleum products; 81.5% of rubber; 60. ~6 of 
machines, motors and industrial equipment; 10~6 of automobile 
and trucks; 77.5% of vehicle parts and accessories; 39.8% of 
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naval construction; 71.4% of highway equipment; 78. ff}'6 of 
steel furniture and office equipment; 49.1% of electrical 
appliances; 37.1% of leather and furs; 55.~b of food products; 
47. C13b of beverages; 90.696 of tobacco; 94 .1~6 of pharmaceutical 
products; 4l.OJ/o of perfumes and cosmetics; 29.3% of textiles. 42 
In a study prepared for the Subcommittee on Multinational 
Corporations of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
United States Senate, Richard Newfarmer and Willard Mueller 
say that the high penetration of multinational investments in 
the Erazilian economy and its concentration in key economic 
sectors gave rise to significant industrial denationalization 
and they mention that corporate decision making in the foreign 
dominated industries seems to have been effectively transferred 
to home offices in nations abroad. 43 In their estimation, about 
7OJ/o of the 7 billion dollars of foreign investments in Erazil 
in 1972 is in manufacturing, three major industries, - trans-
portation, chemicals and machinery - accounting for over three-
quarters of all US net fixed assets and over two-thirds of sales 
in manufacturing. "Moreover, a handful of multinational cor-
porations in each industry control the bulk of these assets 
and sales. American and other foreign firms account for 158 
of the largest 500 non-financial enterprises in Brazil in all 
sectors. In manufacturing, they account for 147 of the 300 
largest firms. More importantly, multinational corporations 
control 59 of the largest 100 corporations in manufacturing 
(the top 100 own over three-fourths of the assets of the 300 
largest)". 44 Consequently, Newfarmer and Mueller drew attention 
to the fact that in only three industries did private Erazilian 
corporations enjoy a similar position of pre-eminence: 
non-metallic minerals, wood and paper products, and food 
manufacturing. State enterprises were predominant in steel 
production and petroleum refining. (In steel production state 
enterprises have associated with multinationals). Moreover, 
they point out that "Denationalization is intertwined with 
industrial concentration as multinational corporations generally 
are located in concentrated markets. Manufacturing generally 
is quite concentrated: in 176 of 302 industries, the four 
leading plants produced more than 50 percent of the value of 
production. Foreign firms owned three or four of the four 
leading plants in 32 industries, which accounted for 26 percent 
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of industrial production. When combined with the industries in 
which at least two of the leading four plants belonged to 
multinational corporations, foreign firms were leaders in 66 
industries, comprising 44 percent of manufacturing production. 
Foreign firms are associated with higher average concentration 
than are national firms, since they operate more frequently in 
oligopolistic industries". 45 Thus, with nearly half of industry 
under multinational control, the US Senate report noted that multi-
national corporations conduct themselves as "a critical 
determinant of Brazilian economic performance". Noreover, the 
report continues, "as many foreign firms are oligopolistic, 
denationalization is linked to concentration in product markets. 
Market concentration confers additional power on those multi-
national corporations freed from the discipline of the com-
petitive market place. If denationalization and product market 
concentration continue to rise, the Brazilian economy ".Till find 
itself increasingly vulnerable to the pO'ver of foreign decision-
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makers in the home offices of multinational corporations". 46 
Conclusion 
The sheer economic weight of multinational interests in the 
Brazilian economy, became by the late 1950s, a central political 
factor. But in order to advance its particular interests, multi-
national capital relied not only on its economic pm-Jer but also 
developed its own organizational expertise and political capacity 
to influence 'p 0 1 icy in l? r,a z i 1 • Such expertise and 
capaci ty vTere embodied in a political, military, technical and 
entrepreneurial intelligentsia, i.e. the organic intellectuals of 
multinational and associated interests and the organizers of 
Brazilian capitalism. They I'Jere in effeot the poli tioal corporate 
power structure of transnational capital, vThioh evolved in the 
prooess of insertion and oonsolidation in Brazil of multinational 
oorporations. As noted previously, from the mid-1950s oD'lvards, 
the multinational and associated interests grew fast and steady 
and by the early 1960s had become 'vi thout any doubt the 
economioally dominant foroe. Laoking politioal leadership 
which \'Tas in the hands of the populist interests, and excluded 
from associational representation by the ruling olass oonvergence, 
the organic intellectuals of the oligopolistio bloc vTould attempt 
to bypass the traditional politioal and administrative ohannels 
of articulation and aggregation of demands. The nevT interests 
aimed at effectively breaking or pre-empting the populist 
associational oorporativism, by establishing nevI looi and foci 
of economio pOiver '.vi thin the state a:pparatus and nevT forr:1s of 
class cornmunication vlith the decision-making centres. 
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This chapter has attempted to show the economic dominance 
of multinational capital in the Brazilian economy. In the next 
chapter we intend to look at the agencies and agents created and 
utilized by multinational and associated interests as well as 
the formation of new political actors that responded to the 
development in Brazilian society. 
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38 T. dos Santos, op.cit., 1968, 450-451. 
39 Newfarmer, and Mueller, o~.cit., 97. 
40 Luciano }lartins, Na'1ao e Corpora'1ao I,1ul tinacional, 
Rio de Janeiro, Paz e Terra, 1975, p~. 81-85. 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
Annual Report ADELA, in L. Hart ins, op. cit., 83. 
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Chapter III: The corporate-political pm'fer structure of multi-
national capital and its associated interests 
B 
Introduction 
stimulated by Kubitschek's policies of development, the multi-
national and associated interests grew fast and steadily. By 1960 
these interests had become the economically dominant socio-economic 
force. At the same time this process 1,oTaS taking place, a new set 
of sociopolitical agents emerged in the Brazilian economy ~~d 
polity. These sociopolitical agents formed a civilian and 
military modernizing apparatus in charge of the productive affairs 
and political management of the multinational and associated 
economic bloc. 
This chapter is concerned 1,oTi th the structure of the political 
class pm-18r of the multinational and associated bloc, which ivas 
represented in an entrepreneurial, 1 technobureaucratic and 
milit~J intelligentsia, composed of three modernizing-
conservative 2 social agents. 
In the new phase of dev~lopmen~ these three groups, all organic 
intellectuals,J were: 
a) the directors of multinational corporations and the 
directors and owners of associated interests, mrulY of 
whom were professionalJlfqualified; d 
b) private managers, technical experts and. state executives 
\-Tho "Tere part of the technobureaucracYi and 
c) military officers. 
This chapter also examines the political support that the 
multinational interests received from their own governments, as 
',vell as the assistance which the political organizations of the 
dominant classes of their O'im base countries gave to multinational 
companies and associated interests • '0 • 1 III .J.-Ir2.Zl~. 
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Finally, this chapter attempts to show the basic organizational 
forms of multinational ruld associated class action, expressing 
the development of their class consciousness. Since the neH 
economic bloc, in spite of its economic ascendancy, lacked 
poli tical leadership, the neii interests ,.,ere thus excluded from 
associational representation by the ruling industrial-oligarchic 
class convergence in power, It ,.,as left to the organic intellec-
tuals of the multinational and associated bloc to create and form 
administrative-political structures capable of providing a 
parallel representation of interests and nevI forms of class 
association outside the established channels, This chapter 
aims to highlight how the multinational and associated interests 
attempted to bypass the traditional political and administrative 
channels of articulation of interests ru1d aggregation of demands, 
by establishing ne"1 loci of economic power vlithin the state 
apparatus and new forms of cOIT'Jllunication vli th the decision-
making centres, This chapter is then, a synchronic presentation 
of social and political agents and their forms of articulation 
and organization for economic action, rather than a diachronic 
exposition of the events that r:J.arked the period, 
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I. The organic intellectuals of the nevi economic bloc 
Entrepreneurs and technoentrepreneurs 
The obvious SOl.U'ces of multinational and associated power lay, 
as seen in Chapter II, in their technological strength and command 
of capital resources. However, the vlOrld-vTide process of 
ac·cumulation and armexation, amounting to the formation of 
'global monopoly capital' meant not only the concentration of 
production and centralization of capital 5 but also the con-
centration of corporate-political power. 
, 
o As Giovanni Agnelli, 
chairman of FIAT and co-founder of .AJ)ELA remarked: "In a sense, 
the network of multinational companies represents in embryonic 
form the central nervous system of an emerging global economic 
order". 7 
The structure of such a central nervous system ,'laS 
established 'tli thin the national social formations of the host 
countries themselves. Hultinational corporations created or 
favoured in their host countries local 'elites', organically 
linked by sociocultural ties, standards of livinG, career 
aspirations, shareholding interests and economic-political 
attitudes. lli1 international leadership of entrepreneurs and 
directors of boards was established. These Heredependent on" the 
transnational centres and detached from their Dim country's 
pressing social problems and basic solutions. "As members of 
an international bou.rgeoisie, they were concerned about growth, 
but not about national independence". S 
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In spite of their economic dominance, the strateGY of 
transnational monopoly capital in Brazil and of local industrial-
financial concerns to express their interests at national state 
level was not limited to their economic imposition. It rather 
depended upon their political action. Control over the policy 
of the enterprises vTas ensured by the utilization of Brazilian 
directors and professionals who accumulated influential state 
q 
functions and provided political support through their positions. / 
Their activities, which were related to macro-mar!:eting were 
geared to ensuring favourable political conditions for pro-
duction az:d ,,,ere determined by the mul tLlational companies' 
national policies. These professionals and entrepreneurs also 
accumulated directorships of different multinational and 
associated companies, thus being able to ,,,ield considerable 
economic pressure in the :(ubi tschek andJ,uadros administrations. 
Politically important examples of this accumulation of director-
ships by native entrepreneurs 'Ilere such multinational directors 
as Antonio Gallotti, Joao Baptista Leopoldo Fibueiredo, 
Paulo Reis Nagalhaes, '''ho ,,,ere to become political articule-tors 
of their class against the populist regime and the popular 
social forces, and of whom 'I'1e shall hear more in the follOl'ring 
chapters. (For their connections and links, see Appendix B) . 
other influential entrepreneurs vrere Joao Baptista Pereira 
Almeida Filho, l?Joao Pedro Gouveia Vieira, 11 Hanoel Ferreira 
Guimaraes, 12 and Jorge de Souza Rezende, 13 directors of many 
companies 'tThich, in the early 19603 "Tould provide furlds for the 
political operations of the multinational and associ9,ted bloc, 
or '''hose co-directors vTere leading figures in such political 
action. As for the professionals, the so-called tecnicos 
m 
or technocrats after 1964, their professional qualifications 
and expertise, as economists, engineers, administrators, 
lav~ers, etc., should not obscure the fact that these men 
held positions in the boards of directors of the big 
companies. These social agents are hereafter designated 
as technoentrepreneurs, so as to underline their entrepreneurial 
function in their 'vider 'neutral' roles. Their presence in the 
state political and bureaucratic apparatuses was largely 
instrunental for the establishment and development of an 
integrated industrial-financial-state complex of production 
and domination, which too. k r·o 0 t in the early 1950s and 
expanded enormously "lith the Kubitschek administration. One 
of the initial roles of the technoentrepreneurs was that of 
organizing and structuring their own corporations. Hmvever, 
~ 
they also became the vanguard of the capitalist class, 
systematizing particulax interests in general terms, i.e., 
mrucing them 'national'. The technoentrepreneurs with other 
directors and mmers of the multinational-associated interests 
formed a bourgeois modernizing-conservative economic bloc, vThich 
constituted an opposition to the populist industrial-oligarchic 
economic structure and polity. These tectL~oentrepreneurs Here 
to be central figures in the bOLrrgeois reaction against the 
popular upsurge of the early 1960s and key articulators of their 
class in the struggle for state pm·ler. 
The Techno-bureaucracy 
The multinational and associated pOvler bloc included not 
only influential shareholders and enterprise directors, but 
their executives, - administrators, managers and technicians -
and their techno-bureaucratic network of influence within the 
state apparatus_ The leading technicians and administrators 
of the companies installed in Brazil were immediately 
responsible for the combination of economic and managerial 
factors affecting production. These technical experts and 
administrators did not possess any degree of autonomy and did 
not form a proper part of the multinational oligopolistic 
bourgeoisie; rather they represented it. They were the 
bearers (trager) and legitimators of the internationalization 
of the economy. 
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For the purpose of articulating their interests, the 
multinational and associated interests constituted with the 
technobureaucratic structure a series of entrepreneurial-
bureaucratic rings of power 14 which diminished initially and 
later displaced the influence of traditional politicians in 
the formation of economic policy_ They were able to sponsor a 
true 'parallel administration', free of popular scrutiny and 
populist control during the Kubitschek administration (which 
is examined in more detail when discussing the techno-
entrepreneurial agencies). 
The technobureaucratic network of influence within the 
state apparatus was formed by the upper layers of the public 
administration and the technical experts of state enterprises 
and agencies who had operational links and interests with the 
multinational and associated power bloc. These state 
executives secured for the multinational and associated interests 
the channels of policy formation and decision making, organizing 
public opinion. They extended the capitalist rationale of 
private enterprise to the solution of national socioeconomic 
problems, and provided the public counterpart to entrepreneurial 
macromarketing in the guise of limited planning and technical 
recommendations. 15 Such a technical intelligentsia, umbili-
cally connected to the entrepreneurs, both by interests and 
congruence of values, placed the emphasis on scientific 
management, prescriptive public administration, formalization 
and routinization of tasks. 16 The technobureaucratic network 
expressed the twin aspect of the process of oligopolistic 
control of the market, i.e. an entrepreneurial approach to 
developmental problems and the very statement of those problems 
in capitalistic terms, exemplified by the vlelllmo1.m development 
policies of Juscelino Kubitschek. 
In the analysis of the 'basic factors' affecting the 
rhythm of development, public figures who~nfluenced the 
ideological mainstream of deyelopment placed the emphasis on 
the evolution of the entrepreneurial rationality and on the 
leading role of private enterprises in the process of growth. 
For tecl1noentrepreneur Eugenio Gudin, the ideological mentor of 
a ,{hole generation of entrepreneurial political economists such 
as Roberto de Oliveira Campos, Hario Henrique Simonsen, Antonio 
DelfimNettoand Octavio Gouveia de ]ulhoes, all the emphaSis 
was to be given to organizational and technical innovations 17 
which were then introduced by the multinational corporatio~s. 
Those values "lere persistently disseminated and refined by the 
entrepreneurial organic intellectuals, through seminars and 
conferences for the 'elites', at the Superior 'dar College, as 
well as in commercial and industrial associations, clubs of 
social prestige and cultural centres, and finally through the 
creation of action organizations which became the foci for 
.L.' • • d 1 . 1 t·· t . 18 uDe~r ~ eo og~ca ac ~v~ ~es. 
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By its very nature, capitalist concentration, with its 
large scale multinational production which was both regionally 
diversified and integrated and which utilized the mobilization 
of enormous resources in capital, specialized expertise and 
complex equipment, made it necessary for the oligopolistic 
power bloc to have accurate information for efficient macro-
marketing. Planning had successfully resolved production and 
retailing problems at corporation level in the mid 1950s. 
By the end of that decade, indicative planning was urged by 
influential economists, military, technical experts and 
entrepreneurs as a necessary national endeavour. 19 Indicative 
planning was presented as an important factor in capitalist 
development, an element of societal guidance and macroeconomic 
policy supervision, and the arguments for its institutional-
o· 
... 0 
ization were hotly debated in entrepreneurial class associations, 
at the Superior War College and in govermental think tanks. 20 
Planning was a necessity for monopoly capitalism for another 
important reason. It was intended to serve two immediate 
purposes: firstly, to select themes, issues and policies, 
and secondly, to determine the acces~ of fractions or sectors, 
to bureaucratic decision-making centres. 21 These aims '-Jere 
secured by the allocative aspect of planning. By the late 
1950s, Colonel Golbery do Couto e Silva, the most politically 
able and theoretically. minded of the 'cold warriors' fighting 
for a secure entrepreneurial development of Brazil, stated the 
point in a precise manner. For him, it was "necessary to 
avoid, at all costs, any incoherence of the whole in order to 
guarantee the non-existence of conflict between different 
objectives, which would in the end impede their simultaneous 
attainment or preservation and would destroy the system as 
such".22 
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Furthermore, it was as a calculated allocation of 
resources 2~ that planning was upheld by the entrepreneurial 
classes. The implementation of indicative and allocative 
planning meant to intervene in the process of the accumulation 
of the potential of the multinational-associated interests, 
serving primarily the purposes of maintaining the complex 
social system in balance (stabilization policies) and channeling 
limited resources and savings to both potential industrial 
bottlenecks and crisis situations. Simultaneously, indicative 
and allocative planning served to induce new performance 
characteristics through changes in some of its structural 
relations, the so-called 'points of germination' .24 The 
technoentrepreneurs were then able to control the 'evolutive 
march of the process' .25 At the same time, the projection 
of planning as a state device, which was engineered by tec~~o-
crats supposedly void of particularistic interests and class 
determinations, helped to quell criticisms and pressures from 
both the ruling populist bloc and from the subordinate classes. 
Noreover, planning ''las necessary as the institutional device 
that concealed interest relations from the reach of the public2~ 
In fact, indicative ~d allocative planning, or entreprer.eurial 
rationalization of the nation's human and material resources 
(\'lhere the nation would be the object; the state, the agent 
and the multinational-associated bloc, the 'elliptic' or 
concealed subject) would become one of the pillars of the post-
1964 regime, "lhen planning was to become a dimension of the 
'rationalization of the interests of the dominant classes and 
the expression of those interests as National Objectives' .27 
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To accomplish indicative and allocative state planning, 
government policy had to qe f 0 u n de dupon' a clear . entre-
preneurial rationality in policy formation and decision 
making, removed from populist socioeconomic considerations 
and largely disregarding popular aspirations. Of course, 
this demanded a strict control of the state apparatus, 
unquestioned planning for economic growth and encompassing 
institutional change, action orientations and resource mobil-
• .1.' 28 l.za"l.on. In the absence of indicative planning as a cabinet 
policy and at ministerial level, oligopolistic mobilization 
of bias, directed research, pre-conceptual standpoints and 
agenda building, would determine the representation of 
economically predominant interests from the mid-1950s onwards, 
throughout Kubitschek's parallel administration. 29 
The endeavour to introduce the modern concepts of 
indicative planning and capitalist rationality was to some 
extent achieved from 1951 to 1953 by the ::Brazil-U. S. llIixed 
Commission for Economic Development (established in December 
1949) and ",hose recommendations and projects 'dere published 
in 17 volumes in 1953-1954. 30 The ::Brazilian team ioJ'as 
composed of the technoentrepreneurs: Roberto Campos (Economic 
:Hatters); Axy Frederico Torres (President); Lucas Lopes 
(Technical Q,uestions); Glycon de Paiva (Geological and lUning 
!ilatters) ; and Valentim ::Bou<ias (Financial Hatters). 31 
Roberto Campos and Glycon de Paiva were also members of the 
commission which wrote the report, together with the technical 
expert, Paulo de Assis Ribeiro and Colonel Hario Poppe de 
Figueiredo, of the Superior 1dar College. In the wake of 
the recommendations of the Comissao l-1ista, a series of agencies 
and public bodies was subsequently set up, of "Thich the 
National Eank for Economic Development (ENDE) seems to have 
been the crucial one. 32 The ENDE was set up in order to 
give financial support to private investors. Eeneficiaries of 
EillE moneta~J aid were mostly multinational companies, for 
whose establishment in Erazil the bank provided the financial 
backbone. The first economic director of the ENDE was Roberto 
Campos, while Glycon de Paiva became technical director. Campos 
was appointed president of the ENDE under Kubitschek. Other 
technoentrepreneurs 'vho occupied key positions in the policy 
making structure of the ElIDE throughout the period "Tere the 
technoentrepreneurs: Octavio Gouveia de Eulh5es, Lucas Lopes, 
Jose Luiz Bulh5es Pedreira, and Helio Beltrao. 33 
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The ElIDE played a major role in the economic policies of 
Kubitschek's internationalized industrial development. Along 
with other techno-bureaucratic agencies and the executive groups, 
they became the new loci of power for the multinational and 
associated interests. It was indeed the analysis of the 
mixed BlIDE/CEPAL and ESG think-tanks in 1953-1954 ,{hich 
provided the guidelines for Kubitschek's Plano de Netas (Target 
Plan)g 34 Un<ier the heading of the Target Plan \'Tere subsUTIed 
the attempts to introduce the kind of entrepreneurial rationality 
in policy-making ',Thich the large-scale operations of trans-
national capital required. The plan established priorities for 
investing national public resources in five key sectors: energy, 
transportation, foodstuffs, basic industries and education. 
The policy allls in tb.ese five key sectors 'Ile-:::e translated into 
30 goals or t targets t, and the foundation of E::cas1lia was envisaged 
as the symbol of a new epoch. 
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l-!ultinational interests vTere refracted in governmental 
decision-making as national developmental needs through the 
development targets. Class power was in this process 
internalized in the state, under the guise of technical 
rationality, necessity and expertise (all neutral:m connotation), 
legitimated by executive groups and technoentrepreneurial 
agencies. 11oreover, under the aegis of technical 'rationality' 
entrepreneurs justified their underlying decision-making process 
as well as the choice of developmental policies. The 'fifty 
years in five' slogan, with which Kubitschek exhorted the 
Erazilian people, expressed the technoentrepreneurs' sense of 
urgency. Nilitary officers ''lere engaged in planning commissions 
and think-tanks, as vTell as in the newly created administrative 
bodies together with leading technoentrepreneurial figures. 
The Armed Forces, imbued ivi th the ideolog'J of order and progress 
were hitched to the wagon of industrial grovnh, a process of 
development inspired by transnational interests and guided by 
the state, where the military provided the efficiency oriented 
action and the much needed legitimation which the ideology of 
35 
'national security' demanded. 
To accomplish state planning, specialized personnel were 
required, in the persons of the tecnicos. They vTere to be 
drawn from the ranks of engineers, economists and la"\vyers, 
professionals who were not, in general, informed by social 
considerations, but by entrepreneurial rationality, efficiency 
and private profit. These tecnicos ,'lould mostly thrive in 
an orgru1ized entrepreneurial oriented industrial development, 
while reinforcing the demands and pressures for the implement-
ation of nationally organized marketing. Planning for specific 
ends would establish 'an area of independent action' for 
the planner in the 'hlilight zone vlhich separates the 
politician from the bureaucrat t • 36 
The demand for ~ualified personnel would stimulate the 
multiplication of technical centres throughout the 1950s. 37 
Within the framework of the Target Plan, education meant the 
formation of a stratum of technical. experts. :By 1959, the 
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Executive Group for Teaching and Technical Improvement - GEEAT 
was set up, as part of the parallel administration. 
As a conse~uence of the ideological and political stance 
which considered that the stage of development reached by 
:Brazil re~uired the techni~ue, expertise and managerial knowhow 
which had been evolved in the international centres of capitalism(8 
several schools of public and business administration and 
governmental technobureaucratic agencies were also set up. 
Their double aim was to prepare cadres for private and public 
administration as well as to establish policy recommendations 
and provide legitimate analysis of the economic and political 
situation, i.e., to operate as entrepreneurial-governmental 
think tanks. Among them \'lere the Escola de AdministraQao de 
Emnresas (School of :Business Administration) foundedin1950i the 
Instituto :Brasileiro de AdministraS20 de Bmpresas (:Brazilian 
Institute of :Business Administration); the Insti tuto S;J.perior 
de AdministraQao e Yendas (Higher Institute for Administration 
and Sales); the Office for Economic and Social Planning - EPEA, 
forerunner of the current Economic ~nd Social Planning ~nstitute 
- IPEA; the Centres for Hanagerial Training set up in Rio and 
Sao Paulo under the auspices of the American Hanagement 
Association39and last but not least two key ideological centres: 
the :Brazilian Institute of Economy - IBRE and the Gettilio Vargas 
Foundation - FGV f Ilhich had been created earlier on. 
By the early 1960s the influential IBRE had Eugenio 
Gudin as its president, and Gouveia de Bulhoes as its vice-
president. In its Comissao TIiretora were Roberto Campos and 
Alexandxe Kafka. IBRE 's Centro de Analise de Con,iuntura 
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(Centre for Analysis of the Conjuncture) was led by Jose Garrido 
Torres, while the Eguipe de Estudos da Renda Nacional (Team for 
Studies of National Income) was under the supervision of Julian 
Tlagalhaes Chacel. 
During the same period, the FGV was staffed by president 
Luis Simoes Lopes, also head of the TIirecting Council; Gudin 
was vice-president; Rafael da Silva Xavier and Alim Pedxo, 
Executive TIirectors; and the Executive l1embers were: Jorge 
Oscar de Mello Flores; Jo8:o Carlos Vital; A+berto Sa Souza 
de Brito Pereira; Rubens TI'Almada Horta Porto, vTho also served 
as executive in the state mining complex ~ - Companhia Vale 
do Rio TIoce, (a joint venture with Cia. Sul America Capitalizapao, 
to which Mello Flores viaS linked) and vTith ~ - The Social 
Service of Industry; and Jose Joaquim Sa Freire Alvim, who by 
1963 also served as president of the IBGE - Brazilian Institute 
of Geography and Statistics (the state's data centre). Other 
councillors were technoentrepreneurs Brasilio t'lachado Neto, of 
the National Confederation of Commerce and of other Commercial 
Federations of Sao Paulo; Ary F. Torres; Cesar Reis Cantanhede 
e Almeida and Carlos Alberto de Carvalho Pinto. l'Iost of these 
technoentrepreneurs had by the mid - 1950s and early 1960s 
important oligopolistic linkS, as well as being members of 
several technoentrepreneurial private agencies and governmental 
bodies such as BlillE. 
The Rio based FGV, jointly with the :Brazilian L'1sti tute of 
Economy and the Centre of Analysis of the Conjuncture produced 
9Con,iuntura Economica' (Economic ConjuncRrre), an influential 
monthly on economic affairs. The publication's director was 
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Jose Garrido Torres; Denio Nogueira vTaS its chief editor. Its 
editorial staff included Antonio Abreu Coutinho, Eduardo S. Gomes, 
Alexandre Kafka, :Basilio Martins and Estanislau Fischlo\·ri tz. 
The multinational and associated interests ,·rere strongly 
represented in tile structure of tecr ..... 'YJ.ical think-tanks of the 
early 19608. :By 1962, most of the above mentioned techno-
entrepreneUI's as \'Tell as those technical e:merts)f I3RE and 
FGV ,·rere part and :parcel of the ideological and tice political 
decision-making apparatus of the multinational '3.nd associated 
interests in their campaign against the popUlist class con-
vergence snd its executive, or took part in vari::-us 'Jays in the 
organized political action of the bourgeoisie to topple tlw 
regine in 1964. 
The Hili te.ry Office-rs 
A small group of officers 1.Ti thin the l!..rr:led Forces 
"ras another categoT'J i'ihich, since the end of the Second 1.1orld 
:Ilar, had become a nodernizing-conservative cl;.l.ster in the 
process of development. Some of the leading fi€,Lrres can 
be traced historically from their COr:lr:lOn ideological 
and military experience throughout the Italian caI'1:!;laign 
and reinforced after\'rards by Anerican schooling. Their 
COIIL':lon experience vras later continued by their affiliation 
to particular political parties, I:lainly the UDN, the 
National Denocratic Union, and to a minor degree, the PDC, the 
Christian Demooratic Party, and by their organization as an 
ideological and political stronghold in the Superior'ldar 
College - ESG, of i-lhich they i-lere co-founders. Among others, 
this group included the then middle rank officers Golbery do 
Couto e Silva, Orlando Geisel, Ernesto Geisel, Aurelio de 
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Lyra Tavares, Jurandir Bizarria Mamede, Heitor Almeida Herrera, 
Edson de Figueiredo, Geraldo de Menezez Cortes, Idalio Sardenberg, 
Belfort Bethlem, Jogo Bina Machado, Liberato da Cunha Friedrich, 
Ademar de Queiroz and generals Cordeiro de Farias and Juarez 
TB:vora. 
These military officers shared a high degree of value con-
gruence with the technoentrepreneurs, many of i'Thom i{ere regular 
lecturers at the ESG, vThere they imbued the school vTi th their 
own developmentalist values. AmonG them it is vlorthvlhile 
recalling Lucas Lopes, Roberto Campos, Eugenio Gudin, Octavio 
Gouveia de Bulh~es. SJme prominent figures of the entre-
preneurial class associations 'dere also able to put across 
their case for capitalist industrial development through their 
lectures and publications. The ESG cluster shared '<lith the 
multinational and associated interests both the outlook and 
sense of urgency to transform the pace and direction of the 
process of grO\.rth in the direction of an industrial capitalist 
society. 
But it i-laS not only a question of congruence of values 
that bridged the positions of entrepreneurs and some of the 
militaX"J officers. It is important to note that already in 
the mid-1950s and even more so in the early 1960s, military 
participation in private business vlaS a fact, although not as 
vadespread a phenomenon as their participation in techno-
bureaucratic agencies or as their presence in tl"'.e board of 
directers ef multinatienal and asseciated cerperatiens after 
1964. l1ilitary efficers were impertant directers and share-
helders ef private cerperatiens, 40 as exemplified by the 
cases ef General Riegrandine Kruel and General James I-Tassen 
(Eletronica I{ruel S.A.); General Paule TassO' de Resende 
(Heinhes Riegrandenses SM,TRIG SA - :Bunge & :Bern greup); 
:Brigadier EduardO' Gemes (Kesmes Engenharia S.A.); General 
Jea~uim RibeirO' Henteire (Cia. Carbenes Celeidais C.C.C. -
\velney Atalla Greup); General Edmu..."'1de Nacede Seares e Silva 
(Yelks\vagen, 11e sbla S.A., :BancO' 11:ercant il de SaO' Paule, 
Light S .A., l1ercedes :Benz); General Euclides de Oliveira 
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FigueiredO' (Industrias Qulmicas e Farmac8uticas Schering S.A. -
Schering Cerperatien and Assis Chateaubriand Greup); General 
Ademar de Q,ueirez (:Bakel Ind. e Cem. Q.uimica - Chemische I'lerke 
Huels A.:B./Ralph Resenberg Greup)jAdmiral AlvarO' AlbertO' da 
1-letta e Silva (Rupturi ta S.A. ExplosivDS - SDciedade 
Financeira PDrtuguesa); General Juracy Hontenegro Nagalhaes 
(Ericsson de :Brasil - Enskilda :Bank/1:1allenberg family). 41 
The ide.elegical rappDrt between :Brazilian military and 
entrepreneurs and their shared understanding ef the ways and 
means fer industrial grDvrth vTas inscribed in the :Brazil-USA 
Hilitary agreement ef 1952. Sectien 515 ef its 'lavl Df 1·1utual 
Security' stated the urge to' enceurage 'the eliminatiDn Df 
barriers and to' previde incentives fer a firm increase in the 
participatien Df free private enterprise in the development Df the 
resources ef the fereign c·o.untries ••• (and) ••• to' discourage 
as far as pessible, and vii theut interfering in the enact:nent 0': 
the aims ef this law, the practice ef menepely and cartel which 
prevails in certain ceuntries ••• " 42 :Bearing in mind the 
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oligopolistic practices of multinational capital, the provisos 
of the l1ilitary Agreement directed against national state control 
of strategic resources, had, by the late 1950s, an ironical, 
if not cynical ring. Brazil was swiftly becoming a 'penetrated 
polity'. 43 
Two vehicles were crucial in the process of education and 
training. One was the Escola Superior de Guerra - ESG (Superior 
War College) whose thoroughly prepared yearly class trips to 
the USA crowned a year of directed L~formation. The other was 
the political complex of US-Brazil military 8~eements, among 
which stood out the Hili tary Assistance Program - l1AP, and the 
Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement. 44 Through these vehicles 
political-ideological indoctrination neatly overlapped with 
'technical' information, combining both into one enc~psulated 
norm which identified the military mind of the Americas I'lith 
the hegemonic mili tar; centre, as viell as vIi th a particular 
form of socioeconomic development. 45 US-~~erican officers 
helped to establish the ESG, 'tlhich vIaS Jco be the Brazilian 
equivalent of the US National 1:lar College, 1.."'1 1946-1947. The 
ESG, \.,rhich had started operations in 1948, \.,ras officially 
inaUo~ated in 1949. lUnerican officers remained on the 
regular EGG staff until 1960 ~~d until at least 1970 the US 
kept a liaison officer \.,ri th faculty status OYl its premises. 
Together with Braziliar staff officers, the US officers 
"propagated the idea of a US-Brazili8J.~ partnersl:.ip against 
Commlmism". The US officers reinforced this orientationj 
"and after 1947 together with the continual US pounding of 
Latin America at all levels to be alert CliO the c:'anger of 
Comrm:mism, they may have supported aD. expa:..'lsio:1 of the 
Brazilian military's definition of COEill11.L.'1.ism anG. its 8.J.J.::~iet;:r 
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'\>lhere it 'tlas perceivedl1 • The position of the US officers in 
:Brazil after the Second 'Horld liar was propped up by transfers 
of military hardware.. As observed by Raymond Estep in his study 
on the military in :Brazil, l1the United states, however, may also 
have furthered the split in the military between those most 
associated with the ESG and the nationalists who sought a more 
independent foreign policyl1. 46 
The ESG subsumed on :Brazilian soil the dominant inter-
national 'manichean' beliefs of the 'Cold \lar'. As an insti-
tution, the ESG encouraged ·withl n .t.h.e ·Armed 
Forces norms of associated development and entrepreneurial 
values, i.e., multinational industrial chartered growth ~~d a 
technically steered state. This state was to be made secure by 
political authoritarianism subsumed in the doctrine of national 
security. .American ideologies of 'nation-building' IIere dis-
seminated to the :Brazilian Armed Forces, a trend reinforced by 
entrepreneurial indoctrination. 47 
The ESG operated and disseminated a closed belief system 48 
based on an acceptance of social, economic and political 
assumptions, rarely made explicit beyond the static vision of 
a society divided. eternall~r betvleen elite and masses. This 
belief system reproduced itself within a particular socio-
economic formation, "'lith permanent and even natural relations of 
private property and appropriation as its 'raison d'etre'. 49 
This line of thought excluded theoretically and avoided 
practically any structural transformation 50 but allowed for 
conservative-modernization. This approach also excluded the 
presence of representatives of the working classes, or even of 
the middle layers as regular or guest lecturers at the BSG. 
The case for development at the ESG '.'las propoUl'lded only by 
entrepreneurs, technoentrepreneurs, politicians to a lesser 
degree and foreign guests, both civilian and mi1itar'J. 
The ESG, as a nodal centre of indoctrination for the 
military of a particular form of national development and 
security based on the premises of hemispheric capitalism was 
also instrumental in establishing organic links betvleen 
military and civilians, both throughout the state apparatus 
and in private enterprise. 51 Industrialists and technoentre-
preneurs linked ;,dth the multinational structure transmitted. 
and received training in political management and entrepre-
neurial goals at the Superior 'dar College. As observed by 
Ce1so Furtado, the outlook developed by these industrialists 
and technoentrepreneurs 'Has Quite different from the liberal 
or populist orient2.ti.on of elite groups th2,t had been able to 
come to pO'lteJ:' tr...rough elections. Sh2.J:'ing tl-... eir military 
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count erpaJ:'ts, ideology of national secu.:::oity, these businessmen 
vie ... red. discipline and hieraxchy as the essential components of an 
industrial system. 52 
An example of the extent to ;,vhich the ~SG socialized the 
most varied political actors within :Brazilian 'civil 8.nd 
politic2.1 society' can be obtained by exawining the composition 
of one of its turr.las (classes), that of 1955. T:!:1e Honoris C2.1.18a 
graduates of the Superior \Iar Course - CSC- - '-'Jere signific8ntly 
Roberto Campos and General Orlando Geisel, Hhile the Honoris Causa 
graduates of the Intelligence Course .. ·[ere Genercvl GolbeX"J, 
General Lindo1pho J'erraz :2ilho, Colonel NeiTton Faria FerJ:'eira 
~~d Colonel J08.0 Baptista Figueiredo, son of General :uclides de 
Figueiredo and nephei'T of entrepreneur J08.0 Baptista Leopoldo 
Figueiredo. The class of 1965 had 130 students. 30 of them 
went to the Course of General Staff and Cow~and of the 
Armed Forces. The participants ivere all military. 87 went 
to the CSG and 13 \vent to the Intelligence Course - CI. Those 
students who came from military and civilian state agencies 
and autarquies were distributed as follows: 
Table 9 
Nilitary Hi1itary Civilian Civilian 
from from from from 
Civilian r·U1itary Hilitary Civilian 
:Bodies :Bodies :Bodies :Bodies 
Courses 
CSG 13 30 
- 44 
CI 
-
8 5 -
---1...-
Source: List of Students - :SSG, 1965 ~ 
About 62 percent of the participants \vere military. 53 
:By 1975, the ESG had instructed 1.294 civilians and 
1.621 of the mi1itarJ, while ADESG, the association of former 
ESG alumni disseminated its doctrine to more than 25.000 
civilians and milita~J. 54 Furthermore, ESG-P~ESG introduced 
their te:ds as basic study material in other military training 
and educational centres and civilian courses, notably the 
unive~sity based programme of civil education. 
As for the 1~ilitarJ Assistance Program, Ambassador Lincoln 
lC3 
Gordon acknO'.vled@:ed that it \'ias 'a major vehicle for establishing 
close relationships vrith personnel of (the) armed forces' and 
that it Ivas a 'highly important factor (in) influencing (the 
:Brazilian) milita.ry to be pro-United. Sta-ce3'. 55 In order to 
preserve the 'specifically pro-American orientation of (the) 
officer corps (of the) Brazilian Armed Forces', Gordon 
recommended that the supply of military equipment should be 
used to increase the influence 56 vThich 'our friends in the 
military' have 'on shaping the regime', 57 as well as fending 
off possibilities of linlcages vii th other countries, 110reover, 
lC}4 
General George Robinson }lather, head of the American Delegation 
and commander of the US Army section of the r1ixed rUli tary 
Commission Brazil-USA, and Chief of the l-1ilitary Assistance 
Program, explained in his address to the ESG, at the beginning 
of 1964, that the principal threat to 'dhich Brazil vras exposed 
was that of "communist subversion and indirect ar,3'gression, rather 
than direct aggression, from outside the Hemisphere", 58 Thus, 
the MAP had, in General l·'Iather' s vie'\v, as a fundamental goal 
(objetivo primordial), to " ens1.U'e the existence of sufficient 
military and paramilitarJ native forces, to combat comm1.Ulist 
inspired subversion, espionage, insubordination and other 
threats to internal security, vIi thout direct military inter-
vention by the United states and other forces of the free 
1tTorldl!, 59 Against the backgTound of intense political 
mobilization occurring in Brazil during the early months of 
1964, General r·~atl-;,er's address seemed to be a loaded message, 
Direct influence of military officers through schoolinG Has 
also a means of shaping and consolidatipg the attitude of the 
Brazilian Armed Forces, Until the be;-ir..niDg of 1964 appro~d-
mately 4,000 officers and NCOs underlvent traini::lg .:1.n selected 
schools in the 150 strong circ~it of US-American based military 
centres, in addi tioD to others 'ilho 1,Tent to the tJ:'2,inL'lg cer:~:;es 
. 60 
of .the Panama Canal Zone, 
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One result of the close cooperation between civilian and 
military and between US-Brazilian Armed Forces and security services 
was the growing conviction within the Army that they ought to play 
a 'moderator' role in conflicts between fractions of the dominant 
classes. 
The myth of the societal moderating power of the Army has been taken _ 
up and legitimated in historical writing by many students of Brazilian 
politics. But the moderator role was contradicted by the partisan 
political identification of military officers. Despite the app&-
rent unity displayed by the Armed Forces and their belief in restrain-
ing factional political attitudes for the sake of corporate survival, 
the political activity of the military officers overrode institu-
tional cohesion, even to the point of resulting in overt confronta-
tions within the military organization. Officers in Brazil have 
been divided politically along the spectrum of right-wing parties 
and centre-right ideologies, in a broad identification with the 
'people', at whose centre were middle class values and dominant 
bourgeois norms. Partisan identification was so widespread that 
many of the central figures of the 1961-1964 military conspiracy 
as well as those of the post-1964 administration were party poli-
tical leaders, had been electoral candidates for Congress and the 
Presidency or had publicly identified with certain parties of the 
centre-right, basically the National Democratic Union - UDN, the 
Christian Democratic Party - PDC, and the Social Democratic Party -
PSD. 61 
However, although a politicized and heterogeneous military has 
been the norm, value-congruence with what can be broadly called 
the 'masses' of Brazil has been ideologically excluded by schooling 
or politically condemned by the military hierarchy. ConseQuently, 
not all civilian political actors have been alloued by the 
'r~les of the moderating gWJe' to appeal to their milita~J 
'counterparts'. 62 The Brazilian Labour Party - PTB - had no 
significant cooption policies '.'li thin the mili tar'J nor_ made any 
significant impact upon them. vThen PTE leader, J08.0 Goulart, 
becar.1e president, he follovred the unvlri tten rt.lles of the tIDN-
PDC-PSD civilian-military relations and strove to establish 
a similar relationship "ri th the Armed Forces. He also 
attempted to rebalance the stro!1gly tIDN ar.,d right-Hing PSD 
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biased mili ta~J structure i'1hich had been consolidated in -the late 
1950s and early 1960s. In doing so, he Has seeking support for 
reform policies through a 'dispositivo militar' leaning strongly 
tOvrards labour. Em-rever, u n 1 ike K ubi t s c h_ e k who had done 
the sase thing before him, but with UDN/PSD oriented officers, 
Goulart was -strongly condemned for illegitimately' tampering :with 
the Army hierarchy. 
L'1 yractice, Goulart ',ras breaking the naTr::M and exclusive liilli ts 
of civilian-mili tar'J relations, l1..'1covering them for '.That they 
really Here, i.e. constitutionally sanctioned military 
Bonapartism. Nevertheless, and in spite of historical evidence, 
the myth of the moderating role provided ti1.e rationalization for 
military authoritarian control of the polity after 1964. 63 
II. Solidari ty of interests aJnong the ne
'
J economic bloc 
The basic .')rganizational forms by c.rhich the multinational 
and associated bloc ex)ressed their CODmon interests, broke 
or pre-empted the associational corporativism of the populist 
poli ty. The bloc pushed fOr'tfard their demands for change and parti-
lC7 
cipation eatabiishing three different political structuxes. 
These political structures were: 
A) Technoentrepreneurial agencies, such as CBP and 
CONSULTEC; 
B) Refurbished entrepreneurial class associations (FIESP, 
CIESP, and the American Chambers of Commerce); class 
associations expressing the new sectoral industrial 
activities of the Brazilian bourgeoisie (ABDIB) and 
new general entrepreneurial class associations 
(CONCLAP) ; 
C) Action groups of the modernizing-conservative entre-
preneurial interests, the most important of them being 
IBAD. 
A) The Technoentrepreneurial agencies 
Private tecbnoentrepreneurial agencies were created along-
side the governmental teclmobureaucratic institutions. These 
technoentrepreneurial agencies (escritorios tBcnicos) were a 
logical consequence of the entrepreneurial mlareness of the 
need for planning, technical expertise and efficient adminis-
tration, which specialized agencies seemed able to provide. 
They had the ostensible function of providing necessary 
technical expertise and advice, and the execution of feasabi-
lity studies as \'fell as legal counselling. The teohnoentre-
preneurial agencies were also consultant firms for the multi-
national and assooiated interests, which .rere penetrating a 
new market and having to deal vii th Hhat seemed a complicated 
populist legislation and an intractable bureaucracy. Some of 
the relevant agencies are listed belo,v. 
Technoentreureneurs 
Juan Missirlian 
David Beatty III 
Octavio Pereira Lopes 
Lelio Toledo Pizza 
Paulo Ayres Filho 
Frederioo Augusto Sohmidt 
Eduardo Caio da Silva Prado 
Jogo Batista Isna--d de 
Gouveia 
)~J Frederico Torres 
Luis Simoes Lopes 
Luoas Lopes 
Joao Baylongue 
Paulo Harlo Cerne 
Oswaldo Zanell.i 
Jose Carlos Leone 
Anibal Villela 
Milton Cesar 
Efraim Tomas Bo 
Teohnoentreureneurial agenoy 
T.O.C. - Teenioa de Organizaqao e Consultoria 
Teonioa de Avalia9~es e Pesquisas VALIT Ltda. 
(Delteo S.A./Delteo Corporation) 
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IDeRT - Insti tuto de OrganizaQa:o Ra.cional do T:ra.balho 
ECRA - Eureau de OrganizaQgo P~oional Aplicada Ltda. 
(Instituto Farmac6utioo Pinheiros) 
Estudos Tecnioos Europa-E:ra.sil S.A. 
(S.A. des Chaux et Cereents de L~argue et du Teil; 
Societe des Ger~~oes et Participations Finanoieres; 
110= et Co; Potasse et Prrldui ts Chimiques S.A.; 
Soc. Gene:ra.le Maritime; Faorique de Produi ts 
Chimiques de Tha.'1n et de H.llhouse; Sooiete des 
Produits Chimiques des Terres Hares). 
Technioal Assistanoe & Administ:ra.tion 
(Graoe Maroantil Ltda.) 
E.T.A. - Estudos Teonioos e AdcinistraQao S.!. 
(Cie. Finanoie:::e et Industrielle Intezooontinentale 
COFICO; Sooiete d'Etudes de Partioipations et 
d 'Enterprises Industrielles SEPES; N. V. Handel 
Industrie Transport tfutsohaftig liTHA). 
I.P.T. - Instituto de Pesquisas Teonologicas 
CETAP - Compo de Estudos Tscnicos, Adr!linistraQao 
e ParticiDacoes 
(Banque de l'Indochine - holciing of Companhia de 
Estanho Sao Joao del Rei; Cia. Estanho ~tL'1as do 
Brasil) 
J.R.B. AdministraQao e OrganizaQao 
Cia. AlianQa Comercial e Industrial e SerTiQos 
Tecnicos 
Jose Carlos Leone e Associados - Con~~ltores 
Industriais 
BEL~STEC - Sociedade Brasileizoa de ServiQos Tecnicos 
e Economicos Ltda. 
Escrit6rio Tecnico de AplicaQao ao Brasil do Ponto Dr 
(Vega Engennaria e Conercio S.A.; Investor in 
~lineraQao de .~anto S.A.) 
S.A. Brasil Europa Estudos e ParticipaQoes 
(In t. 3aha::1as; The Royal 3a.n.l<: of Canada) 
CONSEI1P - Consul tozoes de Empresas 
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By fulfilling these functions, the technoentrepreneurial 
agencies were part of the first stage of collective consciousness, 
that in which reforms were sought by individual members of the 
class in relation to their private interests. But they also 
bridged the passage to the increasing solidarity of interests 
among the multinational and associated bloc, and thus expressed 
a second stage of collecti va consciousness, that in which solida-
rity of interests is expressed in the search for common economic 
reforms through the machine of the- sta te and wi thin the limits cf the 
existing regime. 
In reality, the technoentrepreneurs' technical role encom-
passed a wider political function, that of acting as power 
brokers within the parallel administration. The technoentre-
preneurial agencies provided a very important link in the arti-
culation of interests of the multinational and associated bloc. 
It was through the various technoentrepreneurial agencies that 
the multinational and associated bloc established the earlier 
mentioned bureaucratic-entrepreneurial rings in their interaction 
with the state administration. These rings \Jere able to advance 
their concrete economic interests and to secure reforms within 
the limits of the existing populist historical bloc, by out-
flanking the corporatist associational struct~res. In this 
respect, one of the most interesting and politically important 
teChJl0entrepreneurial agencies ,vas the Consorcio Brasileiro da 
Produtividade - CBP (Brazilian Consortium for Productivity). 
The CBP "Tas am 0 n g the most active and authoritative 
agencies advocating the introduction 0 f plarming tecl'..niques 
in private and public enterprises, as ,{ell as in pub 1 i c 
administration. 
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In the late 1950s, the CBP interacted vTi th the state 
apparatus and the parallel administration through the BNDE, 
whose president at the time was Roberto Campos. The CBP had 
offered its services as an advisorJ technical agency for speci-
fic studies. 64 Other state agencies were interested in the 
CBP's services. 65 Among them "Tere the Executive Group of the 
Automobile Industry - GEIA, the Brazilian Oil Institute, the 
Industrial and Agricultural Credit Agency (Carteira de Credito) 
of the Banco do Brasil, the Income Tax Office. The CBP also 
offered its services to municipal authorities, such as the 
Council for Economic Development of the MUnicipality of Santo 
Andre. Class associations 'Here among the CBP's clients, such as 
the National Centre of Industrial Productivity - CE}WI, of the 
National Confederation of Industry, the Industrial Federation of 
Rio de Janeiro. The CBP also i-lOrked vri th state governments, 
seeking contact vTi th prominent political and bureaucratic 
figures of the states such as Cid Sampaio of Pernambuco, 
General Juracy Magalhaes of Bahia, Carvalho Pinto and Jose 
Bonifacio Coutinho Nogueira of Sao Paulo, Tancredo Neves and 
Eneas N6brega Fonseca de Assis of Minas Gerais. 66 In the state 
of Minas Gerais, the CBP established "rorking relations i,ri th the 
Companhia Agr:Lcola de Minas Gerais - C.A1:IIG, the Japanese-Brazilian 
state joint venture US DrrNAS, the Frigor!ficos de Minas Gerais -
FRllrrSA, the Rede Mineira de Viac;ao, one of the raihTaY systems 
of Minas Gerais, and FARENG. The CBP also sought the support of 
individuals of prestige for its contacts ivi th the private and 
public companies and agencies, such as UDN leader and entrepreneur 
Herbert Levy and Colonel Macedo Soares, Hho \'Tas considered by 
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the CEP members to be a 'great apologist of productivity'. 
In the same period, the CEP established \<lorking relations 
with national oligopolistic enterprises, such as 'Totorantim S.11.. 
(Jose Ermirio de I':oraes group), commercial groups such as 
Cas a Jose Silva and expanded considerably its connections with 
the multinational bloc. 
The CEP \<las also a type of umbrella organization for a 
number of technoentrepreneurial agencies, pulling their resources 
together. Some of the individuals and agencies that integrated 
the CEP Ivere: 
* Alfredo Goulart de Castro FiL.'1o, of ORG1'J'lEC S.A.; 
* Afonso Campiglia, director of the ]epartment of 
Productivity of the Federation of Industries of 
Rio de Janeiro; 
* Alvaro Porto Hoi tin..'1o, of Racionaliza<;ao-AcLl:-linistrcJ.iao-
Auditoria, 'l-Tho "ras also a d.irector of SENAC, the 
NationalServioe of Commercial Apprenticeship; 
* Cesar Cantanhede, of Organiza90es Servi90s Hollerith, 
1tThere he "lvas linked to V. Eou<;as; he "I;as also presiclent 
f 0 ' - ~ nh ' ~, t' p~, ~ ~ o rganlza<;ao e .r!Jnge arla >:) ."~.; execi.'_ l"Te 0.;. vne ...:'G'T; 
* Joao Carlos Vital and his tean of tec'b..nical experts, to 
',Ihich "I';as linked the technoentreprer>eur Helio Eel trao; 
executive of t11e E'GV; 
* Paulo de Assis Ribeiro a.'l.c1. his team of tech.'l.ical experts; 
* Paulo Accioly de Sa, director of Or7aniza ao-Ra,cionaliz2. ao-
?lane.iamento, ORPLAlT :3 .A. (once the presicient of the C::SP • 
* Rubem ]'Almada H. Porto, member of I]ORT and founder of 
Agir Edito~a, ffi1 important outlet and printing house for 
the organic intellectuals in 1962-1964: executi-re of 
the ?G"T7' , 
Horeover, the follovring vIere also part of the CEP netvrork: 
Roberto da Silva Porto, C. T. Javes, HumberJco Forto, OSHalc.o 
Zanelli, Paulo Hario Cerne, Fernando Lacerda de Araujo, r:ario 
Lorenzo Ferna..'1.dez, Luiz da Rocha Chataignier, Jose Gomes 
Coimbra Jr. and Pedro "TTelno Tavares de Lyra. At the suggestion of 
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Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, both vlanderbil t J;uarte de Barros and 
Paulo's brother Carlos de Assis Ribeiro, of General Electric do 
Brasil, were incor:porated into the c:BP, as well as t"lO other 
technoentre:preneurial agencies: Geofoto, which dealt in mineral 
survey, and Henry l'Iaksoud' s technical team ,Hidrologia. 67 
Indeed, the c:BP counted u:pon some of the most distinguished 
and well-equi:p:ped technoentre:preneurial agencies and a most 
pOlverful network of political, bureaucratic and entre:preneurial 
contacts. HOI"ever, in spite of the dissemination of conservative-
modernizing capitalistic values, the populist polity in \vhich 
they were expected to be established 1 e d to con sid era b 1 e 
frustrations for the 'rationality' seeking power bloc. By the 
early 1960s, bourgeois a\vareness of populistic sociopolitical 
and ideological constraints 'tlas reaching ne1,ol stages. The 
technoentrepreneurs had to acl:nowledge that, in order to 
impleQent a particular form of 'national planning', they 
needed to ensure social peace and hold political command, i.e. 
to control the state. The technoentrepreneurs 1,olould then ta..1{e 
part in the organized action of the bourgeoisie to bre~z the 
class convergent populist polity and take state pm'Ter in 1954. 
CONSULTEC: a C8,Se study of 1:Jureaucratic-entrellrenelxrial 
entrenchment 
By far the most outstanding and successful technoentre-
preneurial agency and a bureaucratic-entrepreneurial ring in 
its O\o[i1 right was the Sociedac1.e Civil de Flanej2Iilento e 
Cor..sultas 'Tlec:1icas Ltd8,. - CONSULTSC, also 1:n0lVL1 as COE-::Jar..hi2. 
Sulamerica:..'1.a de Ad:ninistragao e Estuclos Tecn i cos. CONSD1':2SC 
'tTas outstanding for the professional Quality of its members, 
successful for their political weight and. active 'aCL'1linistrative 
advoc2.cy', their \'lidespread penetration into the techl1o-
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bureaucratic channels and their connections ''lith the power 
cluster of multinational and associated concerns to vThich 
their individual m~mbers belonged. 68 
CONSULTEC: The Technoentrepreneurial agency 
CONSULTEC provided channels to bypass both the traditional 
corporativist state agencies of interest articulation and 
congress. By establishing direct connections with state 
agencies, it avoided public scrutiny and the need to be account-
able to popular demands or other pressures. 
CONSULTEC's activities ranged from advisir~ on loans demands 
made by multinational companies to the BNLE, to the ~.'Triting 
of public speeches; from preparing law 
l' r 0 j ec t s, decrees and regulations, to securing commercial 
agreements. CONSULTEC even prepared the p~ogramme presented 
by Prime rTinister Tancredo Neves to Parliament in 1962, 69 as 
vlell as the Government's plan on oil for which the technoentre-
preneurial agency was also chosen by the Prime IIinister. 70 
CONSULTEC's technobureaucratic position and individual 
economic links ,.;ere especially useful to the mining, oil, enerlS'J 
and transport interests vThich they served as consultants. 
CONSULTEC had a crucial role in the BlmE-Sm':OC-CACEX, the key 
agencies for multinational and industrial gro~/rl;h during the 
Kubitschek years. A survey of loans conceded by the BNIiZ and 
of the recommendations and economic studies which inst~cucted 
those loans showed that more than 5O;~ of such evaluations 
(pareceres) ~Nere sponsored by CONSULTEC. 71 
That entrepreneurial interests handled through CONSlJ"LTEC 
,.;ould meet ,'lith obvious success is clear once the individuals 
who made up the team alJ.d their teclli'1obureaucratic positions are 
knovm to us. 72 
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Some of the most important members of CONSULTEC were: 
* Roberto Campos 
* Vitor da Silva Alves 
Filho 
* Miguel Osorio Almeida 
* J.~. Mello Flores 
* Frederico Heller 
* Edmar de Souza 
* J.L. Bulhoes Pedreira 
* Eduardo Silveira Gomes 
* Admiral Aniceto Cruz 
Santos 
* Denio Nogueira 
President of BNDE; member of . 
GEMF - Executive Group for the 
Export of Iron Ore; member of CDE; 
roving ambassador under President 
Janio Quadros and Ambassador to the 
United States under President Joao 
Goulart; lecturer at the Superior 
War College - ESG. Throughout his 
political career, Campos has been 
linked to Hanna Mining, Bond & Share, 
Camargo Correia Construtores, 
Mercedes Benz and Banco de Desen-
volvimento Comercial. 73 
Director of BNDE. 
Minister for Economic Matters at 
the Brazilian Embassy in Washington 
and Itamaraty official. 
Executive of FGV and director of 
Banco Hipotecario Lar Brasi1eiro, 
Sul America Se os Mec£nica 
Pesada S.A. ~ Westinghouse, Cia. 
SiderUrgica Belgo Mineira, 
Schneider et Cie., S.A. de la 
Challeassiere) and Sulacap. 
Economic Editor of 0 Estado de 
Sao Paulo (Julio de Mesquita 
Filho's national newspaper). 
Head of the Administration Sector 
of BNDE. 
BNDE counsellor; director of COPLAN, 
the governmental Planning Commission; 
director of the Federal Railway 
System-RFF; and of the Hanna Mining 
Complex. 
SUMOC advisor and editor of 
'Conjuntura Economica'. 
LLoyde New York and Comissao 
Marinha Mercante (Merchant Navy 
Commission). 
FGV, Con.iuntura Economica and 
Head of Cabinet of Gouveia de Bulhoesj 
lecturer, Superior War College. 
* John Cotrim 
* Gabriel Ferreira Filho 
* Mario Henrique Simonsen 
* Augusto Tito de Oliveira 
Lima 
* Harold Cecil Polland 
* Jacinto Xavier Martins 
* Teodoro Onega 
* Joao Batista Pinheiro 
* Mario Abrantes da Silva 
Pinto 
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Director of Centrais Eletricas de 
Furnas. 
Lawyer of BNDE. 
Head of the Economic Council of 
the National Confederation of 
Industry (CNI), executive and 
lecturer at FGY. 
R. Campos' relative. 
Cia. Metropolitana de Constru~oes; 
Banco Portugues do Brasil; Unitor 
S.A. Com. e Ind. de Soldas Eletricas. 
RFF 
Rio based National Institute of 
Technology. 
Itamaraty official, GEMF and 
director of BNDE. 
Director of the Department of 
Mineral Production; Technical 
Advisor of GACEX and GEMF; member 
of the Comissao de Estudos e 
Projetos Administrativos, of the 
Presidency (Commission for 
Administrative Studies and Projects). 
* Alexandre Kafka FGY; International Monetary Fund 
and National Council of Economy; 
Lecturer, Superior War College. 
* J. Garrido Torres sm-mc, BNDE, FGY, Conjuntura 
Economica; Interamerican 
Development Bank and National 
Council of Economy; Lecturer, 
Superior War College; banker 
* Helio Schlittler Silva Advisor to BNDE's directorship. 
* Joao Alberto Leite Barbosa Editor of Boletim Cambial· an 
economic pace-maker; editor of the 
economic section of 0 Globo (one 
of Rio de Janeiro based most 
influential national newspapers 
belonging to the Marinho group); 
vice-president of the Commercial 
Association of Rio de Janeiro. 
* Glycon de Paiva Cia. Vale do Rio Doce - CVRD, 
BNDE; lecturer, Superior War 
College; ADESG and multinational 
entrepreneur. 
* Mauro Thibau 
* O. Gouveia de Bulh5es 
* A. Abreu Coutinho 
* Lucas Lopes 
* Rodrigo Pessoa Lopes 
* Aldo Franco Maciel 
CEMIG - Centrais Eletricas de 
Minas Gerais. 
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SUMOC, GEMF; Lecturer, Superior 
War College. 
GEMF; Con,juntura Economica ; 
Division Head of SUMOC, in charge 
of the Balance of Payments Sector. 
CEMIG, CVRD, BNDE; Minister of 
Transportation under Cafe Filho and 
Minister of Finance under 
Kubitschek; Lecturer, Superior 
War College and Hanna Mining 
director. 
son of Lucas Lopes and son-in-law 
of Kubitschek. 
CADEX; head of SUMOC. 
* 
Other members were Alfredo Pessoa, Eduardo L. Gomes, 
Jose Cruz Santos, Jose Soares, Sarmento Barreto and Carlos 
Moacyr Gomes de Almeida. 
~ 
Linked to CONSULTEC were several other important bureau-
cratic and political figures, such as, Henrique Alves Capper de 
Souza (CACEX) and Arnaldo Walter Blank (CEXIM, Bethlehem Steel). 74 
From the list of names, it is clear that CONSULTEC was a classic 
example of bureaucratic entrenchment with the agency's personnel 
overlapping in state autarquies and agencies, multinational 
companies and public think-tanks. 75 CONSULTEC, so important 
in the parallel articulation of entrepreneurial interests 
throughout the1950~would, in the early1960s,be central in the 
effort to break the populist regime. Many of its key members 
would serve in the central policy and decision-making bodies of 
the entrepreneurial organic intellectuals in their two-fold 
capacity as entrepreneurial revolutionaries and advocates of 
capitalism within the state apparatus. 
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The core of CONSULTEC spawned a significant technoentre-
preneurial and political bureaucratic organization: !PEC -
Analise e Perspectiva Economica (Economic Perspective and 
Analysis). !PEC was formed by a group of economists, government 
administrators and entrepreneurs. As in the case of other 
technical agencies the three roles of the APEC members over-
lapped. These technoentrepreneurs intended to create a 
specialized publication of high technical quality which had 
the 'aim of defending public and private interests' (sic). 
Their decision was justified by what they perceived and pro-
claimed as the 'threat of ideologies and ideologues' that 
sought to place Brazil on a course they believed would lead to 
a totalitarian society. 76 !PEC was constituted under the 
guidance of and with the participation of Roberto Campos, 
M.H. Simonsen, O. Gouveia de Bulhoes, J. Garrido Torres, 
Aldo B. Franco, Admiral A. Cruz Santos, Glycon de Paiva, 
Lucas Lopes (president in 1964), F. Heller, A. Kafka, 
V.A. da Silva Filho, D. Nogueira, T. Onega, Edmar de Souza, 
Gabriel Ferreira Filho, A. Pessoa, J.O. Mello Flores, J. Batista 
Pinheiro, J.L. Bulhoes Pedreira, Carlos Moacyr Gomes de Almeida, 
Sergio Pinho Mellao, all of whom were in leading positions of 
the organization by 1964. 
As it developed, !PEC recruited from and linked itself 
to some key public functionaries and important entrepreneurs, 
thus becoming a sort of top forum of the modernizing-
conservative economists, ideologues and technobureaucrats. 
Among them should be included Raul Fontes Cotia (BNDE); 
Mircea Buescu; Ernane Galveas (BNDE); J~o Paulo dos Reis Velloso 
(EPEA); Ibere Gilson (director of COSIPA and vice-president of 
the Brazilian Railway System). 
APEC was based on an economic structure of 200 share-
holders, 11 many of whose members were interlinked through 
business association. At the height of its power it was 
composed of a team of over 150 tecnicos and collaborators of 
various kinds. (See the list of collaborators in Appendix D). 
Later on, it was to organize ASAPEC, a professional body of 
advisors on economic matters for private enterprises and 
public agencies. 
APEC was a source of important publications dealing with 
the economy, public enterprises and the role of private 
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capital in the development of the country, disseminating its 
view among entrepreneurs and shaping their ideological position. 
In this, APEC epitomized another facet of organized class 
efforts to win the ideological and political battle against 
the populist power bloc and the state apparatus at large, as 
well as directing its propaganda e f for t s against the 
intellectuals of the subordinate classes. Several of the 
APEC members were associated in different ways to the Superior 
War College, in the capacity of students, lecturers or occasional 
guest speakers, thus having an exceptional advantage in propa-
gating their views within the military. APEC members would 
acquire singular importance in the ideological and political 
campaign which the multinational-associated power bloc was to 
wage up to April 1964 and most of them would be part of the 
militant action of the organic intellectuals of the dominant 
classes against Goulart's executive. Together with CONSULTEC 
and CBP members they would have important functions within the 
post-1964 government, preparing studies and policy suggestions 
and as personnel in charge of the reshaping of the political 
economy of the new regime. 
CONSULTEC: The "entrepreneurial-bureaucratic ring of power 
CONSULTEC was crucial, among others, for the handling 
of the Hanna Mining Co. affairs in Brazil. Other important 
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clients were Brazilian Traction, Light and Power and Bunge & 
Born. 78 Its' 'technical' role and economic-political function 
was to be understood from the proceedings of the Parliamentary 
Inquiry Commission - CPI, of the Chamber of Deputies, established 
to investigate the activities of the Hanna Mining Complex in 
Brazil. Through CONSULTEC, the narrow economic interests of 
the Cleveland, USA-based complex, comprising close to 30 
companies operating in mining, metallurgy and related activities, 
were articulated in the broadest possible 'technical' sense 
within the state apparatus. 
According to General Antonio Bastos, former member of the 
National Oil Council and engineering coordinator for the Hanna 
Mining Co., the latter paid CONSULTEC three million dollars for 
one of the most important mining projects, that of Aguas Claras, 79 
(The reserves of the Minas Gerais iron ore region (Quadrilatero 
Ferrifero)had by then an estimated reserve worth 200 billion 
dollars). 
Contact was established for this project with CONSULTEC 
members, among others Kubitschek's Minister of Finance, Lucas 
Lopes, himself a director of the Hanna Mining Complex; and also 
with Roberto Campos (B1TDE), Mario da Silva Pinto, head of the 
National Department for Mineral Production in Brazil and 
l<'Iauro Thibau, of CEMIG, In a letter to General Nelson de 11ello, 
then Head of the 11ilitary Household of President J, Kubitschek, 
and Secretary of the Council for National Security (later Minister 
of War), Lucas Lopes communicated that "a group of planning, of 
which I am a consultant, was sought by representatives of 
Hanna Co., so as to obtain economic and technical orientation 
for the execution of a program of iron ore export". 80 And he 
added in a separate note: "The president (Juscelino Kubitschek) 
told me he would be grateful for all that could be done in 
81 favour of the ores of Morro Velho". 
For the exploration of the Morro Velho ores, Hanna Mining 
joined the Cia. de Produtos Aliment!cios Morro Velho S.A., 
directed by Fernando de Mello Viana Fo, of the Ferrostaal group, 
to form the Minera9ao Morro Velho S.A. As for the ores of 
Aguas Claras, General Bastos explained that the Hanna Project 
would be conducted by Mineraqao Aguas Claras S.A., a consortium 
of English, German, and American Steel Mills. 82 General Bastos 
forwarded the information that the Hanna project conformed 
~ 
ipsis literis to Document No. 18 of the National Council of 
Development. It is highly probable that, in reality, it was 
Document No. 18 which conformed ipsis literis with the Hanna 
project. After all, most of the individuals that had drafted 
Document No. 18 were CONSULTEC members and CONSULTEC members 
were Hanna Mining directors. 83 
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How did Document No. 18 emerge? On the 25th February, 1957, 
Kubitschek formed a Commission for the purpose of analyzing the 
problem of mineral ore export incentives. The commission in-
cluded the Ministers of Transportation and Agriculture, the 
secretary of the National Security Council, the secretary of 
the Council for Development, the heads of the Foreign Exchange 
Department (Carteira de Cambio) and the Department of Foreign 
Trade (Carteira de Comercio Exterior - CACEX), of the Banco do 
Brasil, the president of the Companhia Vale do Rio Doce, and 
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a representative of the mining entrepreneurs, under the presi-
dency of the Minister of Finance. The absolute majority of the 
members of this commission belonged to the cadres of CONSULTEC. 
The document was ready on the 8th August, 1957. Through the 
document, Hanna Mining, besides other facilities would be the 
recipient of: a) special and guaranteed favourable exchange 
rates for their operations; b) satisfactory security for the 
remittance of interests and royalties, keeping a coverage for 
minimum earnings; and c) the mineral ore would leave Brazil 
under the lowest price in the international market. The person 
directly responsible for the drafting of this document was none 
other than CONSULTEC member and Head of the Department of 
Mineral Production, Mario da Silva Pinto. To execute Document 
No. 18, the Minister of Finance, Jose Maria Alkmim (a PSD associate 
of President Kubitschek) submitted it to the latter who then 
suscribed in transforming the document into Decree No. 42.020 
on the lOth August, 1957, two days after being submitted. 
This decree also created within the Cuuncil for Development, 
the Grupo de Exporta,ao de Minerio de Ferro - GEMF (Executive 
group for the export of iron ore), which was responsible for 
the coordination of studies, agreements and negotiations dealing 
with mineral ore. Not surprisingly, GEMF was constituted by: 
Minister of Finance, Alkmim; the Secretary of the National 
Security Council, General Nelson de Mello; the secretary of the 
Council for Development, Lucas Lopes; the director of the 
Department for Export and Import of the Banco do Brasil -
CEXIM, J. I. Tosta Filho; the director of the Carteira de 
Cambio of the Banco do Brasil, P.A. Pook Correia; the director 
of the Department of Mineral Production, M. da Silva Pinto; 
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the director of the Federal Railway System, initially 
Geraldo Mascarenhas and later J.L. Eulh~es Pedreira; and the 
director of the ENDE, Roberto Campos. As coordinator of the 
GEMF I'ras placed J. Eatista Pinheiro, another COnSULTEC member. 
Other participants of the G~W were O. Gouveia de Eulh~es and 
A. Abreu Coutinho, both CONSULTEC members. 84 Moreover, for the 
development of its plans and projects, the Hanna ~lining Complex 
sought the help of individuals of recognized influence. The 
group that constituted the 'General Staff' of the Hanna ~ning 
Complex in Erazil included: 85 John vI. Foster Dulles, son of the 
US-American secretary of state J .'IV. Foster Dulles and nephe\{ 
of Central Intelligence Agency head, Allen Dulles. He served 
on the boards of directors of ~neraQao Aguas Claras. 86 Another 
influential and well-know~ name was Herbert Hoover Jr., son of 
the late US-Amer~can president and former under-secreta~J of 
state vnth General D.D. Eisenhower. As shareholder of St. John 
del Rey he came to Erazil in 1960, at a time ",hen Foster Dulles 
began to establish political contacts for the forthcoming presi-
dential elections Itlhere Janio Quadros 'tras a candidate. Hoover 
,{ould soon after become director of Hanna Nining Co. 87 
Among Erazilians, or locally based influential figures, 
Hanna Hining counted first and foremost upon Lucas Lopes, menber 
of the board of directors of the Hanna Mining Complex and of a 
munber of other im1Jorta...'1t corporations. 88 Other directors vTere: 
J.L. OOlhl3es Pedreira, of Cia. ~nera9ao Novalimense, £ilinera~a:o 
liB,nna do Era.sil Ltda., ~nera9ao Curral del Rey Ltda. and 
1tlineracao e.g-nas Claras Ltda.; Arthur Eer!::ardes Fill-_o, of r1inerc.H;tro 
Hannaco and :president of the Republican Party as Hell as director 
of other multinational concerns, 89 and Alberto Torres Filho, 
director of Ci a. Hineracao Novalimense, I"linera2ao Hanna do 
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Brasil Ltda., Pesquisas Hinerais Meco Ltda., !1inera~ao Curral 
del Rey Ltda., and Mineraxao Aguas Claras Ltda. A. Torres Filho 
was also director of a nill~ber of powerful multinational corpo-
rations and associated enterprises. 90 still, in an executive 
or advisory capacity ,vere linked the folloviing: E .M. Irving; 
Robert Clark Wallace; H.C. \·Jatson; Benedito Munhoz Carvalho; 
B. Novi tt vTeber; Pedro Maciel; Antonio Falabella de Castro; 
Roberto Campos; Dario de Almeida Magalhaes; IYIauro Thibau; 
M. da Silva Pinto; Vicente Rao (of Banco Franc~s e Italiano 
para a America do Sul); Jurist Francisco Campos; Jurist Pontes de 
Miranda and ~urist Orozimbo Nonato, minister of the Federal 
Supreme Court and one of the fOtlr jurists consulted for the 
Constitution of 1967. 91 Furthermore, Hanna had interlocking 
directora tes Ttii th some of the major financial, industrial and 
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commercial complexes operating in Brazil, including the 
Rockefeller group; the Hellon group (ALCOA); and l>1organ Guaranty 
Trust Co., (ITT and General Electric). 
Hovrever, in Ju..1'1e 1962, Gabriel Passos, Minister of Hines 
and Energy under the national-reformist government of Jo~o Goulart, 
ordered the cessation of the activities of the ITovalimense, a 
Hanna l1:i.ning subsidiary, as part of an attempt to curb the 
company's extraordinary corporate-political pOVIer. The 'Hanna case t 
had begun and ,·rculd be at the centre of discussion throughout the 
period of Goulart's administration. The case ,·ras to become the 
symbol of the 'en treguiste.-nacionalis ta' polarization of Brazilian 
poli tics, together vTi th the attempts to nationalize the Bond and 
Share interests in the State of Rio Gr~~de do SuI, by governor 
Leonel Brizzola. 
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The political action of the Hanna r1:i.niL'1g Complex would be 
felt in many more ways than through traffic of influence. In 
1963, for example, Hanna (along 'nth a Walter C. LaI,rson) funded 
a conference on 'The Politwal-Military Defence of Latin 
America' at Arizona state University's Eureau of Governmental 
Research. A participant in that conference, US Army Lieutenant 
Colonel Theodore \-Tyckoff, warned that the communists allover 
Latin America i,rere 'getting ready to strike .rhen the time is 
ripe' and that 'an anticommunist counteroffensive may provide 
a far better defence for free peoples and institutions t~~n any 
passive measures'. Hanna's contribution to this 'counter-
offensive' structured by the entrepreneurial elite, included the 
provisions of trucks for the Minas Gerais troups that launched 
the 'Revolution' of 1st April, 1964. 92 
E) The Class Associations 
New conditions for development in the 1950s, and the 
perception by the multinational and associated entrepreneurs of 
their common interests in the modernization of the country and 
the need for the establishment of appropriate channels for their 
increased penetration stimulated a rapid expansion of associat-
ional coverage, and experimentation with new forms of interest 
organizations. 93 The newly found solidarity of interests 
among the multinational and associated economic bloc was 
expressed by refurbished and new class associations, which 
provided active economic assistance and oriented the entre-
preneurial class on legislative, administrative, productive 
and wider political matters. Moreover, these class associations 
of modernizing-conservative entrepreneurs and techno-entrepren-
eurs functioned, in effect, as lobbying agencies, reaching 
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their highest political expression in their attempts at 
sharing government with traditional socioeconomic forces in 
the Quadros presidency of 1961. Most of the existing class 
associations, such as, the National Confederation of Industries -
CNI, the Commercial Associations and Federations of Industries 
of the various states were in the mid-1950s under new management, 
as the oligarchies of ageing merchants (often Portuguese), 
commercial bankers and local industrialists were replaced by a 
more aggressive, younger group of entrepreneurs, who were less 
tied to export and foreign commercial interests. 94 They 
represented instead the new forms of industrial and financial 
interests, both multinational and associated. 95 Moreover, the 
existence of these class associations expressed the higher 
stages of collective consciousness reached by the entrepreneurial 
interests. The corporate protection of their economic affairs 
gave way to the political advancement of their economic interests. 
Three of the most important foci of political pressure, 
where multinational and associated interests predominated were 
the renewed Federation of Industries of the State of Sao Paulo -
FIESP and its twin organization the Centre of Industries of the 
State of Sao Paulo - CIESP,- the Federation of American Chambers 
of Commerce of Brazil and CONCLAP, the National Council of the 
Producing Classes. 
FIESP/CIESP had been born in the late 1950s as the expression 
of the structural differentiation occurring within the dominant 
classes, when the industrialists left the Commercial Associations 
seeking greater representative specificity. By the early 1960s, 
FIESP/CIESP had become significant channels of representation 
for the big local industrialists, mostly associated vrith 
multinational corporations, as well as for some of the 
multinational concerns themselves. 96 Among the individuals 
and corporations represented in FIESP/CIESP by 1964 were: 
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*Rafael Noschese, president, Empresa de Minera~ao Esperan¥a. 
*Jose Ermirio de Moraes Filho, 1st vice-president, Grupo 
Votorantim. 
*Mario Toledo de Morais, 2nd vice-president, Cia. 
Melhoramentos de Sao Paulo Ind. de Papel; 
Cia. Universal de Fosforo British Match. 
*Lelio Toledo Pizza e Almeida, ~~G S.A. Auto Union 
Gmbh; Banco Novo Mundo. 
*Eduardo Garcia Rossi, Reila Refratarios. 
*Oscar Augusto de Camargo, Duratex S.A., Maluf Group. 
*Jorge Duprat de Figueiredo, Nadir Figueiredo Ind. 
eCom. S.A. 
*J. Soares do Amaral Netto, secret~J, Centrais de 
Concreto do Brasil. 
*Nelson de Godoy Pereira, treasurer, Cia.Luz e Forca 
Santa Cruz. 
*Daniel ~1achado de Campos, Commercial Association of 
Sao Paulo. 
*Egon Felix Gottschalk, S.A. Moinho Santista Indust. 
Gerais. 
*Georges Schnyder, Cia. Bras. de Constru~ao Fichet & 
Schwartz-Hautmont. 
*Gilbert,o Wack Bueno, Sociedade Tecnica de Materiais 
S.A. SOTEMA. 
*Joaquim Gabriel Penteado, Ind. e Com.Dako do Brasil S.A. 
*Luiz Rodovil Rossi, Auto-Comercio e Industria,ACIL ltda. 
*Humberto Reis Costa, Cia. Fia~ao Pedreira. 
*Cesar Augusto de Camargo Pinto, Anderson Clayton Co. 
- ACCO. 
*Peter Murany, P. Murany Ind. e Com. S.A. 
*Francisco de Paula Machado de Campos, SANJ3RA ~.Bunge & Born 
Banco Geral de Finan~as. 
*Mauro Lundberg Monteiro, Refinaria Naciona1 de Sal S.A. 
*Hernani Azevedo Silva, Cia. Bras. de Estireno; Cia. 
Comercia1 Brasi1eira S. A. - Grupo Simonsen; 
E1etro Meta1urgica Abrasivos Sa1te S.A. Carborundum 
International. 
*Wa1demar Clemente, Wa1ita S.A. E1etro Industrial; 
*Francisco de Salles Vicente de Azevedo, Porcelite S.A. 
Cerimica Sanitaria. 
*Antonio Carlos Pacheco e Silva, Arma~oes de A~o Probe1 
S.A. 
*Luiz Antonio da Gama e Silva, Cia. Prada Industria e 
Comercio. 
*Paulo Reis Magalhaes, Cooperativa Central dos Produtores 
de Agucar e A1coo1 - COPERSUCAR. 
Other central figures of FIESP were: Jorge de Souza 
Rezende; Jose Villela Andrade Jr.; Francisco da Silva 
Villela; Mario F. de Pierro; Theoba1do de ~igris; 
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Raniz Gattas; Mario Amato; Orlando Laviero; Fuad Haddad 
(representative of CIESP, Araraquara) and E. Pereira 
Lopes (representative of CIESP, Sao Car1os).97 
CIESP, which to a large degree overlapped with FIESP in 
its membership and goals, relied upon the energies of a number of 
people: 
President: Rafael Noschese. 
Consultative Directorship: A.C. Pacheco e Silva; Lucas 
Nogueira Garcez; Luiz Dumont Vi1lares; Luiz Eu1alio Bueno 
Vidiga1; Othon Alves Barcellos Correa; Paulo Quartim 
Barbosa and Sebastiao Paes de Almeida. 
P1enn~[ Directorship: Ga1.Edmundo de Macedo Soares e Silva; 
Luiz Antonio da Gama e Silva; Paulo N. Albright; Paulo 
Ayres Filho; Salim Abdalla Chamma. 
Honorary Presidents: Humberto Reis Costa and Jose Ermirio 
de Moraes. 
Executive Directors: Rafael Noschese; Jose Ermirio de 
Morass; Manoel da Costa Santos; Le1io Toledo Pizza e 
Almeida Fo.; Oscar Augusto de Camargo; Jorge de Souza 
Rezende; Jorge Duprat Figueiredo; Eduardo Garcia Rossi; 
Theoba1do de Nigris and Joao Soares do Amaral Netto. 
Fiscal Council: Paulo Reis Magalhaes. 
CIESP/FIESP had also two executive bodies: the Forum Roberto 
SiID~nsen and the Interdepartamenta1 Council for Coordination -
CONCIN. In the former were: President Rafael Roschese; General 
Macedo Soares e Silva and secretary Luiz Washington Vita. 
In CONCIN were: Eduardo Garcia Rossi; E.F. Gottschalk; 
Mario Amato; Mario Toledo de Moraes; Sergio Roberto 
Ugolini and Theobaldo de Nigris. 98 
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In order to provide political, economic and even technical 
assistance to their affiliates, the class associations 
established their own technical agencies. Among them were 
the Centro de Produtividade das Federasoes de Industrias 
(productivity Centre of the Federation of Industries), and the 
Assessoria Economica e Jur{dica of the Commercial Association 
of Sao Paulo, headed by Jose Luis Nogueira Porto, editor of 
the Sao Paulo based right-wing economic journal Digesto Economico 
(Economic Digest) and seconded by Antonio Delfim Netto. The 
Federation of Commerce of the state of Sao Paulo established 
its own Conselho Tecnico de Economia, Sociologia e Polftica, as 
the forum for debate of the organization of entrepreneurs. By 
1962, the Technical Council for Economy, Sociology and Politics 
of the FCESP was formed by: Alexandre Marcondes Filho; Antonio 
Delfim Netto; Antonio Gontijo de Carvalho; Ary F. Torres; 
Dorival Teixeira Vieira (also of Instituto de Pesquisas 
Economicas - IFill); Padre Felipe Nary Noschini; Flaminio Favero; 
Francisco Carlos de Castro Neves; Francisco Malta Cardoso; 
Geraldo Barbuxy; Horacio Lafer; Jose Frederico Marques; Jose 
Garibaldi Dantas; Jose Pedro Galvao de Souza; Jose Vicente de 
Freitas Marcondes; Jose~Luiz Anhaia Mello; Miguel Reale; Rui 
Nogueira Martins; Ruy Aguiar da Silva Leme (of Pontificia 
Universidade Cat61ica - PUC and Mackenzie University of Sao 
Paulo), Theotonio Monteiro de Barros Filho; Vicente Marotta 
Rangel (of Pontificia Universidade Catolica of Sao Paulo) and 
Washington Barros Monteiro. 99 Its president was techno-
entrepreneur Brasilio Machado Neto of the FundaQao Getulio Vargas. 
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Most of these organic intellectuals of the multinational 
and associated bloc, as well as these mentioned earlier in 
relation of FIESP/CIESP, would by 1962 be members of the 
political bodies set up to promote both the modernizing-
conservative interests and bring down the national-reformist 
government of Joao Goulart. 
The Federation of American Chambers of Commerce was the 
top political forum of the multinational corporations. 
Besides the U.S. American ones, many directors of European 
corporations were also represented in the Federation of American 
Chambers of Commerce. The Federation of American Chambers 
of Commerce listed among its individual 'Active members' by 
1964, the following entrepreneurs and professionals: 
*Paul Norton Albright (Vice-president in 1963 and 
president in 1964) - Director of Economic Affairs Committee 
- E.R. Squibb & Sons. 
*Frank N. Aldrich - 1st National Bank of Boston. 
*Rimhard S. Aldrich - Ind. Metal Forja~o S.A., IBEC -
Cia. Brasileira de Participa~oes. 
*G. David 110nteiro - l1cCannErickson Publicidade. 
*Joao Nogueira Lotufo - Y.N.C.A. 
*Joao da Silva Honteiro - COBAST - Light S.A. 
*Trajano Puppo Neto - 1st iJational City Bank of N.Y. 
*Fernando Edward Lee - Cia. Qu.lmica Duas Ancoras; 
S.A. l1arvin-Anaconda; Fios e Cabos Plasticos do 
Brasil-Anaconda Co; Goodrich do Brasil. 
*David Augusto 110nteiro - Multi Propaganda Soc.Ltda. 
*Rumberto Monteiro - RCA Electronica Brasileira S.A., 
CIBA S.A. Chemicals. 
*Fabio Garcia Bastos - Liquid Carbonic Ind. S.A. -
General Dynamics. 
*Relio Cassio Huniz - American Marietta S.A. Tintas. 
*J. Bastos Thompson - Cia. Patiz de Inversores -
Patifio Group. 
*Herman Moraes Barros - Banco Sul Americano do Brasil S .A. 
*G.E. Strickland - USABRA S.A. - Liquid Carbonic. 
*Dudley Gammon - Bank of America. 
*Luiz Biolchini - Banco Boavista. 
*P.H. Weisskopf - Pneus General. 
*Paulo Barbosa: Esso Brasileira de Petroleo S.A. 
*Vicente de Paula Ribeiro - Dominium S.A. - Cia. 
Patrimonial Serva Ribeiro. 
*Americo Oswaldo Campiglia - Fia~ao Brasileira de Rayon; 
Cimento Santa Rita. 
*Jorge de Assump~ao - Tecelagem Assump~ao. 
*Luiz de Fran~a Ribeiro - Cia. Brasileira de Caldeiras 
e Equipamentos Pesados. 
*Manoel da Costa Santos - Arno S.A. Industria e Comercio. 
*Oswaldo Trigueiros - ViaQf!o Aerea Riograndense - VARIG. 
*Edward Francis Munn - First National Bank of Boston. 
*A.O. Bastos - Perfumes Dana do Brasil SjA. 
*Gustavo W. Borghoff - Joseph Lucas do Brasil. 
*Guilherme J. Borghoff - Remma S.A. 
*Eldino da Fonseca Brancante -
*Juan Clinton Llerena - Moore }1cCormack. 
*Nelson Monteiro de Carvalho - Nattarazzo Group. 
1;0 
*Henrique Bayma - Cia. Brasileira de Rolamentos SKF-Sweden; 
Rupurita S.A. Explosivos. 
*Odilon Egydio do Amaral Souza - Sao Paulo Alpargatas. 
*Aldo Campos - Mobil Oil do Brasil. 
*Carlos Augusto Botelho Junqueira - Procon Engenharia Ind. 
e Co. Ltda. 
*Julio C.B. de Q.ueiroz - Procon Engenharia, InCl .• e Com.Ltda. 
*Lucien Marc Moser - CIBA S.A. Produtos Q.u{micosj 
Swiss Bank Corporation. 
*Luis Alberto Penteado -ESSO Brasi1eira de Petro1eo S.A. 
*Fernandd A1encar Pinto - F.A. Pinto S.A. Import & Export-
Westinghouse Electric Int. 
*Gera1do Danneman - Banco da Bahia S.A.; Cia.Te1efSnica 
da Bahia S.A. 
*Vitorio Ferraz - Cia. Fuller Equipamentos Industriais. 
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*Fernando Mbie11i de Carvalho - Cia. Gas Esso-Standard Oil. 
*Mario Antunes Azevedo - AMF do Brasil S.A.~uinas Auto-
maticas. 
*'Vli11iam Monteiro de Barros - Cia. Federal de Fundi~8oo -
Parsons & Whittemore. 
*Borge Lundgren - Bates do Brasil S.A. 
Furthermore, the follOWing entrepreneurs, who have been already 
mentioned elsewhere, were also members of the American Chambers 
of Commerce: J.B. Pereira Almeida Filhoj Jose Carlos de Assis 
Ribeiro; Paulo Ayres Filho; David Bee.tty III; Luiz Eduardo 
Campe11o; J.B. Leopo1do Figueiredo; Paulo Reis Magalhaes; 
Othon Barcellos Correia; Jose Haria Pinheiro Neto; Eduardo Caio 
da Silva Prado; ~~ Frederico Torres; Alberto Byngton Jr.; 
Oscar Augusto de Camargo; Alberto Torres Fe. and Jo8oo Batista 
Isnard de Gouveia. 100 
Of the three class associations mentioned above, the most 
sophisticated expression of dominant class political presence 
prior to 1964 was that of CONCLAP. The Council of the Producing 
Classes was established in 1955, as a national umbrella organiz-
ation providing a militant forum for the moderniZing-conservative 
entrepreneurial power bloc. CONCLAP was a powerful and most 
vocal pressure association for the neH socio-economic interests 
in the fifties, especially active from 1959 omlards and in Q,uadros' 
presidential campaign. From its foundation, the Rio de 
Janeiro branch sent forth a stream of overtly violent 
manifestos against the populist regime. Led by entrepreneurs 
Gilberto Huber, Jorge Behring de Mattos, Jorge Oscar de Mello 
Flores and Alberto Byngton Jr.,lOlCONCLAP steadily assailed 
'Communism' and carried out an intransigent defence of free 
enterprise, financial and monetary stability and foreign capital. 
CONCLAP also made public its implacable opposition to price 
control, the right to strike, job stability and government owner-
ship of virtually anything. 102 CONCLAP Rio encompassed the 
Commercial Association of Rio de Janeiro and the Centre of 
Industries of Rio de Janeiro, (two of its strongest supporters); 
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the Centre for Insurance and Capitalization Studies, the Association 
of Banks of the State of Guanabara, the Brazilian Association of 
Public Relations, the Brazilian Association of Propaganda, the 
Club for Retail Merchants Directors of Rio de Janeiro (Clube 
dos Diretores Lojistas do Rio de Janeiro), the Association of 
the Employees of Commerce (AssociaQao dos Empregados de Comercio) 
and the Association of Real Estate Owners, among others. 
CONCLAP Rio members were also closely linked to the Superior War 
College, many being former students and lecturers at the milit~J 
institution. Jorge Behring de Mattos, President of CONCLAP Rio 
up to 1963, was also president of ADESG, the Association of 
Ex-Alumni of the Superior vlar College. 
CONCLAP militants and the leaders of similar class associations 
such as the Commercial Associations of ~linas Gerais, Rio Grande do Sul 
Pernambuco and other industrial centres constituted, together \"ri th 
FIESP/CIESP and the Federation of American Chambers of Commerce, 
a top forum of political and economic interests which provided 
the infrastructure to the class action of the bourgeois 
po\.,rer bloc in the period of 1962-1964. They vTOuld be in the 
forefront of the ideological, political and military struggle 
against Goulart's executive and the popular forces, reunited 
under a new militant organization. 
In earlier pages, we described the form in which the 
directors of individual corporations interacted and overlapped 
with the members of the technoentrepreneurial agencies and 
established bureaucratic-entrepreneurial rings. However, 
multinational corporations, besides affiliating themselves to 
1:13 
class associations of a general character, also established 
sectoral associations in the mid~1950s, such as the Brazilian 
Association of Machine Industries - ABIMAQ, the Association of 
Machines, Vehicles and Autoparts Industries- A~NAP, and umbrella 
organizations such as the Brazilian Association for the Development 
of Basic Industries - ABDIB. ABDIB, which was established in 
1955, brought together the principal producers of industrial 
equipments and related materials. By 1960, the total amount of 
registered capital of the 28 corporations making up ABDIB reached 
more than 12 billion cruzeiros, ranging from 20 million to 2.25 
billion, between the smallest and the biggest company. 
The central aims of ABDIB were 'to orient the planning and 
distribution of services to the associated industries, by means 
of contacts with the state pOvTers and foreign enterprises', and 
to 'maintain a section of technic::.l studies, for the examination 
of national and foreign projects,.103 An imp,:>rtant breakthrough 
in the attempts by ABDIB to 'contact the state powers' and 
secure services for the interests it represented was its inclusion 
as the basic member and sole executor for the Grupo Executivo 
da Industria Mecanica - GEIV~ (Executive Group of the Heavy 
134 
Mechanical Industry). GEIMAPE had been created by Kubitschek 
to plan and programme the diverse lines of production related to 
heavy industry. Multinational corporations and associated 
interests were able, through their participation in GEIMAPE to 
by-pass the populist power structure, by establishing themselves 
as a class association within the state apparatus. Furthermore, 
the members of GEIMAPE included, besides the representatives of 
ABDIB, the president of the BNDE, the president of the Tariff 
Commission, the executive director of SUMaC, the director 
of CACEX and the director of the Carte ira de Cambio of the Banco 
do Brasil. All of these bureaucrats were also members of 
CONSULTEC. Another bureaucratic-entrepreneurial ring had been 
established. By this device, policy-making in this most 
sensitive area of the Brazilian economy was implemented by 
CONSULTEC members and formulated jointly with ABDIB. 
By 1964, the ABDIB members vrere: 
*ARMCO Industrial e Comercial S.A. (ARMCO Steel Corporation) 
- Braz Sergio Olivier Camargo. 
*ARNO S.A. Industria e Comercio (ARNO Group) - Felipe Arno 
and Manoel da Costa santos. 
*ASDOBRA Instala~oes contra Incendio. 
*Babcock & ivilcox Caldeiras S .A. - Alberto Torres Filho. 
*Bardella S.A. Industrias l1ecan~cas (Bardella Group/J.M. 
Voith Gmbh Maschinenfabrik Heidenheim) - Antonio Bardella, 
Aldo Rossetti. 
*Industria Eletrica Brovm Boveri (Brovm Boveri Baden/Castor 
Investment Ltd., Canada) - Antonio de Carvalho Aguiar. 
*Industria Mecanica Cavallari S.A. (Cavallari Group) 
*Cia. Brasileira de Material Ferroviario COBRAffi1A ~S.A. 
Ind. Votorantim,; Cia.Melhoramentos Norte do Parana; 
American Steel Foundries; Klabin Irmaes Ltd.; Banco 
Paulistano S.A.; Banco Mercantil de Sao Paulo) - Luiz 
Eulalio Bueno Vigidal; Luis Carlos Vidigal Pontes; Gastao 
de Mesquita Filhoj Gastao Eduardo Bueno Vidigal. 
*Cia. Brasileira de Caldeiras e Equipamentos Pesados 
(Combustion Engineering Inc./Thyssen Group, Germany) -
Brigadier Franklin Antonio Rocha; Ludwig Haupt; Luiz 
da Fran~a Ribeiro; Angus C. Littlejohn. 
*M. Dedini S.A. MetalUrgica ( Dedini Group) - Mario Dedini. 
*Empresa Brasileira de Solda Eletrica Ltda. EBSE - iTidal 
Dias; Naria Candida Soares; Carlos da Rocha Soares; 
Alvaro Coelho da Rocha; Jose da Rocha Soares. 
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*Fabrica Nacional de Vagoes (Barcellos & Cia.Ltda./Cochrane 
S.A. Adm, Ind. e Com/Semavi S.A. Comercial) - Othon Barcellos 
A. Correa. 
*Cia. Brasileira de Constru~oes Fichet & Schwartz Hautmont -
Justo Pinheiro da Fonseca; Carlos Schnyder. 
*Bopp & Reuther do Brasil Valvulas e l1edidores Ltda. 
*General Electric S.A. (International General Electric Co./ 
Banco Financiador S.A.) - Jose Carlos de Assis Ribeiro. 
*CONFAB Cia. Nacional de Forjagem de A~o Brasileiro -
Antonio Carlos de Bueno Vidigal; Marcos Vidigal Xavier da 
Silveira. 
*Industria e Comercio MetalUrgica Atlas ~.A. (Comercial e 
Mineradora Santa Helena S.A./Interjame Administra~ao/Cia. 
Bandeirante de Terrenos e Constru~oes) - Ermirio Pereira de 
Morais. 
*!1aterial Ferroviario S.A. }1A.FERSA (Grupo de Companhias de 
Seguros/Cie. Industrielle et Agricole de vente a L/Etranger 
CIAVE/Sudafin Commerciale S.A., both of Switzerland). -
Jacy do Prado Barboza Junior, Americo Cury. 
*Mecanica Jaraguc1 S.S. (Theodor \-lille, Sao Paulo Comissaria; 
Deilmann Bergbau Gmbh - Germany; Empreendimentos Ind. e Com. 
Hanseatica S.A.) -Gunther Paul Kunze; Juergen Leisler Kiep. 
*LaminaCiao Nacional de Metais - Francisco Pignatari. 
-J(-Mecanica Pesada S.A. (Cia. S:LderUrgica Belgo Hineira; 
SulAmerica Capitaliza~ao S.A.; Schneider Westinghouse-France; 
Escher-vlyss Gmbh-Germany) - Jorge O. Hello Flores, Joao 
Pedro Gouveia Vieira. 
*S.A.White MartinS(Union Carbide Corp. Electric Furnace 
Products) - Joao Baptista Pereira Almeida Filho; Guilherme 
Bebbiano Martins. 
*Sanson Vasconcellos Co. e Ind. de Ferro S.A. (Ajax Corret-
ores de Seguros, Internacional de Seguros) - HenriqueSanson. 
'''"Nordon Industrias 11etalUrgicas S.A. (:E1tablissements Nordon 
Freres, France) - Alfred Nordon; Raymond S. Haenel. 
*Haquinas PiratiningaS.A.(Clark Equipment) - Jorge de 
Souza Rezendej Einar Kok; David Beatty III; Luiz Carlos 
Horaes Rego. 
*Maquinas Agr{colas Romi S.A. (Grupo Romi). 
136 
*Cia. Industrial Santa Matilde - Jose Luiz Pimental Duarte. 
*Cia. SiderUXgica Nacional - Admiral Lucio.Meira. 
*Sociedade Tecnica de Fundi¥~es Gerais S.A. SOFUNGE 
(Fabrica Nacional de Vagoesj SEMAWI S.A. Comercial e 
Agr{cola,Cochrane S.A. Agricultura, Administra~ao Com.e 
Ind., Barcellos & Cia) - vlilton Paes de Almeidaj Eduardo 
Simonsen,j Eduardo Garcia Rossi; Frederico Luiz Gaspari. 
*A~os Villares - Luiz Dumont Villares •. 
*Equipamentos Industriais Villares S.A. - Luiz Dumont 
VillaresjJoao Baptista Pereira Almeida Filho~ 
*IBESA Industria Brasileira de Embalagens S A. - Luiz Eulalio 
Bueno Vidigal; Antonio Carlos de Bueno Vidiga~. 
*SBE Sociedade Brasileira de Eletrifica~ao S.A. (Societa 
Anonima Elletrificazione SpA/S.A. Finanziaria Holding, both 
of Italy) - Demosthenes r1adureira de Pinho. 
However, the bureaucratic entrenchment achieved by these corp-
orations was made uncertain by the coming:into government of a 
national-reformist executive in 1961. Consequently, most of the 
ASDIB companies, on their mID, or through the Sao Paulo based 
class associations, vlould appear as financial contributoxs to the 
class action of the multinational-associated bourgeois bloc and 
most of the technoentxepreneurs and managers of these coxporations 
would be militant members in the 1962-1964 campaign to attain 
state power. 
Transnational sup~ort 
Another element in the pm-ler structure of multin?.tional 
corpoxations has been the support which they received from the 
gove:r:'rlY.'ents of theix own base countries, who '-lere ready to put 
pxessure on the relatively fragile Brazilian government and 
economy, by imposing political arrangements in line \'lith their 
own interests.104 Diplomatic intervention on behalf of 
U.S .-American based corporations vias prolific in the period 
immediately preceding the coup, as was obvious with the 
inter~sts of Hanna Mining Co., and I.T.T. 105 In the case of 
I.T.T., in particular, Robert Kennedy, as his brother's special 
envoy to Brazil in 1963, accompanied his pressures on behalf 
of the U.S.-American multinational with the threat of a cut-off 
of economic cooperation. This caused the Brazilian regime to 
surrender to the demands of I.T.T. and to give to the multi-
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national corporation so much money for its 'broken down properties 
that had been nationalized that it became a joke on the floor of 
the Senate and among foreign policy analysts to discuss how much 
had been obtained out of Brazil by the sheer invoking of Kennedy's 
willingness to intervene directly in Brazilian political life~106 
However, neither multinational companies nor foreign 
governmenwwere relying on diplomacy for the advancement and 
consolidation of their interests. 107 U.S.-American entrepreneurs, 
in concert with their government, attempted to influence and 
mobilize the local business community and other groups active or 
potentially active in the Brazilian political process. lOS 
This was done mainly through class associations in the United States, 
such as the American Economic Foundation, the Committee of Enter-
prises for the Implementation of the Alliance for Progress;09the 
Latin American Information Committee - LAIC,the Business Group 
for Latin America - BGLA;lOthe Committee for Economic Development 
- CED(which lobbied the Rio based entrepreneurial community) 
and the Foundation for Economic Education (which lobbied the Sao 
Paulo based entrepreneurial community);ll The LAIC, the CED 
and the BGLA evolved in 1964-1965 into the Council of the Americas, 
vlhich subsequently became the Council for Latin America. 
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The CED, particularly important in its connections with 
entrepreneurial organizations in Brazil, overlapped with the 
Business Council, another class organization of the U.S.-American 
entrepreneurs, which has been operating as an advisory body to 
the Department of Commerce and, although it rarely had made 
public statements, it convened top entrepreneurs on a regular 
basis for off-the-record informal discussion among themselves 
and with government officials. 112 
The CED has been especially close to the Council for 
Foreign Relations. Its president, Alfred C. Neal has been a 
Council director, as have been other trustees. The CED has 
played a similar role to that of the Council for Foreign Relations 
in the formulation of policy options, but has also been concerned 
with domestic issues in the United States. The CFR has been 
solidly based in the United States, as a central link binding 
U.S.-American foreign policy formulations to the corporate upper 
class 113 
. In view of the pattern of concentration of foreign 
investment in the hands of a limited number of U.S.-American firms 
(as early as 1957, 45 firms accounted for almost three-fifths of 
all direct U.S.-American foreign investments), the big business 
represented in the CFR takes on an ~dded significance. 114 
The CFR has in the past 10 years consistently provided a 
substantial proportion of the policy makers who have made, and 
continue to make, United States foreign policy. The CFR has 
also taken a leading role in formulating general directions and 
foreign policy options. The CFR through its membership, as well 
as through more formal ties, has also been centrally connected 
to organizations involved in the moulding of U.S.-American 
public opinion on foreign policy issues. 115 The CFR has 
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overlapped throughout the past hlo decades with other class 
organizations, such as the Atlantic Council, the Free Europe 
Committee, the l1iddle East Institute, the National Committee on 
U.S.-China Relations, the African-American Institute and the 
Council for Latin America - CLA, which, as mentioned earlier, 
was formed by multinational corporations which were originally 
part of the Business Group for Latin America, the Committee for 
Economic Development and the Latin American Information Committe~~6 
The CFR has interlocked also with influential American think-tanks, 
which played central roles in policy_making. 117 
The links with the intelligence community of the United 
States were very strong as well, as was confirmed by the case 
of the Central Intelligence Agency. Since its inception in 
1947, the directorship of the CIA has mostly been in the hands 
of a leading member of the Council for Foreign Re12~tions, as 
exemplified by the appointments of Allen W. Dulles, a CFR director, 
and those of John McCone, Richard Helms, William Colby and George 
Bush, all of them CFR members. 118 The Council for Foreign Relations 
has long been the CIA's principal 'constituency' in the American 
public. When the CIA has needed adequate fronts for its cover 
companies or for other special assistance, it has often turned 
to Council members. 119 
By 1962, some of the most powerful multinational corporat-
ions members of the CED, LAIC, BGLA and the CFR, with direct 
interests in :Brazil, were involved in other forms of pressure 
than diplomacy and lobbying of the Brazilian government. The 
multinational corporations were offering financial support in the 
organized political action of the :Brazilian modernizing-conserv-
ative organic intellectuals. In the case of CED, LAIC, EGLA 
and AEF, in particular, they 'ITere offering not only financial 
li.p 
support but ideological and political support as well, to 
their Brazilian counterparts and, in effect, intervening 
directly into the Brazilian 901ity, through their subsidiaries 
and associated concerns. 
From Economic Solidarity to Political Activism 
c. - The Formation of Action groups: IBAD 
Multinational and associated interests contemplated other 
forms of interest representation besides controlling the parallel 
administration or lobbying the executive. They vashed to share 
political government and shape 9ublic opinion, and did so 
through the creation of political and ideological action groups. 
The first of such action groups to gain national notoriety in 
the late 1950s \'las D3AD - Brazilian Institute for Democratic 
Action (Instituto Brasileiro de A9~O Democratica). 120 
IBAD, described as an 'industrial group of moderates and 
c.onservatives' by US-American Ambassador Gordon 121 ,·18.s formed in 
the late 1950s, at the time of the foundation of CONCLAP-Rio. 
IBAD ·Has set up with the alleged and ambiguous pUI'?ose of 
'defending democracy'. The overt founders '·Jere: Lauro Beer, 
Barthelemy Beer, Lauro Barros, Odemir Faria Barros and Aloisio 
Hanner. 122 Hm-lever, there ','laS another version of the fJunding 
of I3.AD. Guanabara Governor Carlos Lacerda, '·Then coming out 
publicly in support of IBF~, recalled that, soon after Jo~o 
Goulart's assumption of office, he had been SOU&~t at Palacio 
das Laranjeiras, the governor's headquarters illld residence 
in Rio de Janeiro, by a group of men, representatives of the con-
servative classes. They were Rui Goses de Almeida, of the Associacgo 
Comercial do Rio de Janeiro, and the American Chambers of Cor:rmerce; 
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Zulfo de Freitas Mallman, of the Federation of Industries 
of the State of Guanabara and Jorge Behring de Mattos, of 
CONCLAP and ADESG, the Superior War College a.lumni association. 
These three men communicated to Lacerda that the Brazilian 
economic forces would organize immediately to 'defend democracy, 
I 
the effective institutions and the regime. There, declared 
the governor of Guanabara, was born IJ3AD. 123 
Members of the Superior Council of the Productive Classes 
CONCLAP, the American Chambers of Commerce and other significant 
class associations, were prominent partici~ants in IBAD's 
activities, as were ESG members and relevant figures of the 
traditional class associations of Rio and Sao Paulo. It was 
alleged that the headquarters of the National Confederation of 
Commerce - CNC was used as the locale for IBAD reunions. 124 And 
it was there that the founding group met. 
The initial group was constituted by former integralista 
Marshal Ignacio de Freitas Rolim, instructor of the Superior 
War College, entrepreneur Jorge Behring de liIattos, president of 
CONCLAP and of the entrepreneurial association Centro de 
Industrias da Guanabara, entrepreneur Alberto Byngton Jr., 
president of CONCLAP in 1963, entrepreneur G. Borghoff, of the 
Commercial Association of Rio de Janeiro and the Federation of 
American Chambers of Commerce, and Ivan Hasslocher, former 
integralista, general director of IBAD, who was considered to 
be the U.S.-C.I.A. liaison agent for Brazil, Bolivia and Ecuad~~~ 
Horeover, IBAD itself was denounced for being one of the C.I.A. 
Rio station's main political operations, being basically an 
t · C . t l·t· 1 t' . t· 126 an ~- ommun~s po ~ ~ca ac ~on organ~za ~on. 
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At first, IBAD did not have a very visible impact. It 
operated rather in a low key fashion, seeking support for its 
goals from the most diverse quarters, to prepare an infra-
structure for future action. By October 1961, it had 
established firm contacts with Joao Mendes da Costa Filho of 
the Aoao ])emocratica Parlamentar - ADP, "Thich became an IBAD 
outlet in Congress. Through IBAD, the organic intellectuals 
of the entrepreneurial classes \'lere active in establishing links 
or mobilizing entrepreneurs and milit~J personnel, and holders 
of public offices, as well as the general public. IBAD lobbied 
and penetrated the legislative and the governatures, intervened 
in national and regional electoral affairs, and supported 
particular trade unions. It promoted certain peasant and 
syndicalist leaders, student movements and middle-class pressure 
organizations. It synchronized its activities vTi th para-military 
organizations such as HAC - Anti Communist Movement, }1J)J3 -
Brazilian ])emocratic Movement (not to be mistaken with the homon-
imous political party created in 1966), OPAC - the Anti-Communist 
Organization of Parana, cum - the l1ilitary ])emocratic Liberating 
Crusade, with whom IBAD shared interchangeable or overlapping 
personnel, techniques and resources. 127 It also linked itself 
with the Catholic lay organization Centro ])om Vital, where 
Gustavo Cor~ao, the extreme right-vTing Catholic intellectual 
'/las an important leader and provided an important link ",i th the 
right-wine technocraticJ)pus ])ei. According to Jose Arthur 
Rios, one of the IBAD intellectuals, IBAD did not act alone, but 
as a front in which the Parliamentary ])emocratic Action - ADP 
participated, led by fum Bahia landowner and deputy, Joao Hendes, 
and the Brazilian ])emocratic Institute - I])B, presided by P])C 
128 deputy, Gla.dstone Chaves de 11ello. 
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Multinational and associated interests ostensibly through 
CONCLAP and other class organizations, but covertly through IBAD, 
intervened in the presidential elections of 1960 supporting the 
candidate of their choice, the former governor of Sgo Paulo, Janio 
Quadros. lEAD leader Hasslocher had been prompted by Gladstone 
Chaves de Mello, political counsellor of the Popular Movement Janio 
Quadros t~9give support for Quadros' campaign.130 !BAD achieved 
uppermost notoriety throughout the Goulart presidency, particularly 
during the electoral campaign of 1962, where it served as a major 
conduit of massive funds for electoral tampering and coordinated 
the political action of ideologically compatible individuals, 
, t' d 't' 131 assoc~a ~ons an organ~za ~ons. By 1962, !BAD had spawned 
two channels with separate purposes. One was the Democratic 
Popular Action - ADEP, a political action of the Rio de Janeiro 
C.I.A. station, vThich handled electoral campaigns and lobbying, 
The other was Sales Promotion Inc (Incrementadora de Vendas 
Promotion S.A.) of which Hasslocher was owner-director. 
Promotion S.A. played the role of a publicity agent for radio and 
television space in all Brazil for IBAD and ADEP. It had the 
function of disseminating the political ideas of IBP~, as well 
as being a funding agency for discrete and covert activities. 
IBAD, ADEP and Promotion S.A. shared office and administrative 
personnel, The national executive (colegiado) of ADEP 
comprised Ivan Hasslocher; Antonio Silveira Leopoldino, of 
.A:DEP Minas Gerais and ex-cabinet officer of Janio Quadrosj 
General Joao Gentil Barbato; Vicente Barreto, director of 
Cadernos Brasileiros~32 Baimundo Padilha, UDN-Rioj General 
Edmundo Macedo Soares; Haria Castorino de Brito and Helcio 
Jose Domingues Fran9a. Its national leade:.:.' was A])P president 
Joao Mendes, according to his advisor Francisco Lampreia, 
manager of Promotion S.A. and Erasilia based .AIlEP regional 
secretary. .AIlEP also acted in the national scene through 
well equipped offices scattered throughout the country, 
generally directed by retired Army officers, mostly generals 
and colonels, whose action was covered in Congress by the 
Parliamentary Democratic Action - .AIlp. 133 Other central 
civilian activists in the IB.AIl/.AIlEP/Promotion S.A. network 
were: 134 Padre Leopoldo Erentano, one of the organisers of 
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the famous right-wing'March with God and for the Family' of 1964; 
SenatarPadre Galazans - UDN Sao Paulo; Padre Vel1oso; Fabio 
Alves Ribeiro; Fructuoso Osorio Filho; Carlos Lavinio Reis, 
of Promotion S.A.; Adeildo Coutinho Eeltrao; Luiz Carlos 
Hancini; Gabriel Chaves de Hello, of 'Maquis I, a right-1iling 
publication; Gladstone Chaves de Mello, brother of Gabriel, 
directorof'Centro Dom Vital and deputy for the PDC; Denio 
Nogueira; Floriano da. Silveira Naciel; Fernando Mbielli de 
Carvalho; Jose Candido Moreira de Souza; Peter Nurany, 
secretary of .AIlEP Sao Paulo; Nilo Eernardes, secretary of AIlEP 
in Sao Paulo; Yukishigue Tamuxa; Hamilton Prado, of ~. 
Antartica Cervejaria e Eebidas; Arruda Castanho; Angelo Zanini; 
Fulvio Gentil; Wanderbilt de Earros; J.Irineu Cabral, of the 
Erazilian Rural Federation; Arthur Oscar Junqueira, president 
of the Caixa Economica Federal of Guanabara; Jose Arthur Rios, 
of Sociedade de Pesquisa e Planejamento and PUC lecturer; 
Eudes de Souza Leao, of SAl."'ffiRA, ADESG and ESG; .I\rmando Fillardi; 
Claudio Hasslocher, brother of Ivan and manager of Promotion S.A. 
of Sao Paulo; Herculano Carneiro, lawyer; Edgard Teixeira 
Leite, of Escritorio Tecnico Agricola; Eugenio Gudin and 
General Menezes Cortes, the UDN leader of the House of 
Deputies. 135 
By July 1962, as the political build up for the crucial 
congressional elections of October was reaching its peak, 
ADEP restructured almost all of its statutory attributions, 
which were transferred to the Department for Political Action 
of IBAD.136 By then, IBAD had coordinated with another 
important organization, the Institute for Research and Social 
Studies - 1PES. Hasslocher himself was a member of lPES.137 
Their overlapping in personnel, their common financial sources 
and their symbiotic action were so strong that it led 1PES 
leader Jorge Oscar de Mello Flores to comment that ~1PES merely 
agglutinated with IBAD".138 He might as well have said the 
same of the interaction of 1PES with the technoentrepreneurial 
agencies, the ESG military and ~lltinational ~nd associated 
entrepreneurs. 
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CONCLUSION 
Transnational monopoly capital formed a new power bloc 
based not only on its volume and its degree of concentration 
and its integration of capital, but also on the quality of its 
administration and political organization, and its oligopolistic 
infrastructure.139 With monopoly capital establishing its 
economic pre-eminence, the differences between big industrial/ 
financial complexes of national or associated character and 
foreign capital were blurred. Transnational and big national 
business, as one power bloc, attempted to outflank the economic-
political constraints of populism and eroded the traditional 
polity. As it assumed the leadership over the principal sectors 
of the economy, the multinational and associated bloc organized 
pressure groups and class professional feder~tions, techno-
entrepreneurial agencies and bureaucratic-entrepreneurial rings to 
seek governmental expression for its interests. However, the 
economic leadership of the multinational and associated power 
bloc "Tas obviously incompatible with the political dominance of 
the traditional bourgeoisie and oligarchic sectors. Monopoly 
capital, in spite of its economic supremacy, was also confronted 
with interests of more archaic structures, who, although they 
had lost their commanding influence in the economy, i'Tere still 
powerful economic groups. Their power lay in the network of 
linl<s within the dominant classes articulated by the agro-
exporting sectors, still the major producers of hard currency. 
1,1oreover, the traditional latifundia, given its hold over large 
sectors of the rural population, remained a powerf'u.l factor of 
political containment, '''hile the commercial groups engaged in 
services or in speculative activities thrived in an inflationarJ 
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economy. These groups combined represented a strong limiting 
force to the domination of big capital, in so far as they 
obstructed the drive for capitalist modernization and rational-
ization of the polity and econowJ. Furthermore, the traditional 
interests restricted the capacity for autonomous decision-
making of monopoly capital at executive level, by basing their 
pplitical leadership in part on the mobilization of the working 
masses. Ey contrast, the multinational associated interests 
viewed government as a question of planning, manipulation and 
popular control. For them it "las to be a 'technical' regime, 
with authoritarian overtones, in view of the strong demands 
which transnational capital was to make upon the working classes 
and traditional interests alike. 
There was a clear po\'ier asymmetry between the economic 
-dominance of the multinational and associated bloc, vlhich had 
consolidated in the Kubitschek-~uadros years and their lack of 
political leadership. Such an asymmetry impelled the multi-
national and associated po",er bloc to seek extra constitutional 
political solutions. In Samuel Finer's terms, the multinational-
associated power bloc sought the 'maximization of satisfaction' 
by other processes than those of the market, and attempted to 
'manipulate the whole environment, creating conditions where 
the market would be rigged in their favour' .140 
The decisive element in critical historical situations, 
according to Gramsci, is class power organized in its civil 
and milit~J forms. Such class pO\-.rer is long prepared for a 
critical period, allowing itself to advance when the situation 
is deemed favourable and necessary. A situation is favourable 
only in so far as such agents of state domination &"Q class 
action exist and are thoroughly prepared. 141 It is in this 
sense that one can speak of the state as a class construct. 
In this process, particular class values become social norms; 
political and ideological class organizations become state 
organic authority and force, and it is in this sense that one 
can speak of a class 'becoming state'. In this process, the 
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organic intellectuals are crucial, as an elite of the class 
politically organized and idologically shaped, representing and 
implementing the strategic preparation for action of a class, 
a preparating which allows that class to reduce the imponderable 
to zero. That such preparations are strategically inspired 
is made clear in Brazil by archetypical figures like Marshal 
Cordeiro de Farias, an outstanding political figure in the 
critical events of 1922, 1924, 1930, 1932, 1937, 1945, 1954, 
1955, 1961 and finally in 1964. lfJ:arshal Cordeiro, once head 
of the Joint l1ilitary llIission Brazil-United States, when himself 
referring to the creation of one of the most important state 
apparatuses, the Superior I'lar College, declared that: "In 1948 
we planted oaks. ide did not plant spring cabbages. Spring 
cabbages flower fast, but once. Oaks take time, but are firm. 
vfuen the hour of need came, we had the men, the ideas and the 
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means." 
T,.,..o periods can be singled-out from the political and 
ideological process whereby multinational-associated interests 
and its technoentrepreneurial political and military intellectuals 
took over the control of the state. The first period, employing 
Gramsci's expression, was one of molecular transformism' • In 
this period bureaucratic-entrepreneurial rings, tec~~oentrepren-
eurial agencies and military centres ,·rere created and linl(ed up 
programmatically, forming together the incipient organic 
intellectuals of the multinational associated power bloc. At 
the same time, the populist historical bloc showed signs of 
political exhaustion. 
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'Molecular transformism' spans roughly the period between 
the creation of the Superior War College (1948) and Janio Quadros' 
resignation (1961). It involved the historical and the 
organizational preparation of class pOiver. This p~ocess is 
marked by the various failed or frustrated attempts of the 
modernizing-conservative bloc to gain access to political power. 
The first attempt was the interlude of Cafe Filho, who becaLle 
president after the death of Vargas, supported by a UDN/techno-
entrepreneurial combination. The next attempt was under 
Kubitschek's presidency, through the formation of para-political 
channels of access to power centres, as a rationalizing device 
to short-cut political :processes and allovl for the entrenchment 
of the multinational and associated bloc in the bureaucratic-
entrepreneurial rings, i-ri thout breaking the populist convergent 
polity. However, the shortcomings of a PSD/technoentrepreneLlrial 
combination supported by the UIlN and the ESG I,rere soon laid bare. 
The period of 'molecular transformism' is concluded by the 
second attempt at seizing :power through legislative/electoral 
means and seeking to generalise the modernizing-conservative 
:proposals ivhich ,-rere finally frustrated by Q;uadxos' resignation. 
Thereafter, the ultimate efforts of the emerGent multinational 
power bloc were to influence parliament, cabinet ministers 
and the military to act \fithL'1 the constitutional arrangement 
and thi-lart Goulart I s executive I s attem}?t to act on its moffi. 
::But by then, it \{as already a "Hide manoeuvre of containment 
vri thin a broader caJ:1paign toward.s a coup d I etat. 
However, before the coup actually took place, the 
modernizing-conservative values germinated within the different 
forms of class pOi'ler were expressed through the varied bodies 
of civil society: class associations (CONCLAP, FIESP/CIESP), 
political action groups (IB.~), the various private techno-
entrepreneurial agencies (CONSULTEC, CBP). The modernizing-
conservative ideol06J also penetrated into political society 
through the state bureaucratic-entrepreneurial rings (BIIDE, 
FGV) and through the 'Executive Groups'. 
For a period of almost ten years, the emergent power bloc 
had aimed at ace 0 m m o-d a t ion wit h the populist power 
bloc. It had also sought partial reforms.of 
the state machinery, toe n\l5 u re multinational and associated 
participation in legislation and administration, and had 
supported populist domiira'tion of the subordinate classes. 
The various political actors operating in the bodies and agencies 
described in this chapter had in common their aversion to any 
substantive inte~Tention of the popular masses in state life 
and a basic commitment to an associated modernizing-conservative 
socio-economic model of entrepreneurial development. For the 
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dominant multinational and associated economic groups, the problem 
of the state was seen in terms of "linning politico-juridical 
equality \'li th the populist ruling groups. 1tlhen the party-
political and administrative channels did not succeed in attaining 
the necessary reforms forwarded by the modernizing-oonse~Tative 
bloc and the multinational and associated interests perceived 
the growing difficulties in containing the popular masses i'lithin 
the populist p01i ty, the emergent pOi'ler bloc resorted to other 
means. The various organizations of civil and political society 
were brought together as the expression of class collective 
consciousness by the organized core of the multinational and 
associated bloc in its militant stage, jointly developing 
ideological and political formations capable of realizing 
their strategic objectives, translating their aims into 
political action and establishing themselves securely in power. 
This was the second phase, that of the1transformism1of entire 
groups of the bourgeoisie, who passed over to the militant 
modernizing-conservative camp. The second period runs 
throughout Goulart's three years in government, from 1961 to 
1964, during which time the new socio-economic forces in their 
quest for political pm-Ter attempted to divest the executive 
from its authority and to vtrest from the popular forces their 
foothold in the conduct of state affairs. 
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Footnotes - Chapter III 
1 The term entre:preneur is being eD:ployed as a generic 
concept to include industrialist s, bankers and 
commercial businessmen. The term entrepreneur is also 
used thrcubnout the thesis as a translation of the 
Portuguese ,{Oro emoresarios. The term is used by the 
Brazilian industrialists, bankers and commerce businessnen 
themselves i'Then referring to their class associations and 
members. For a methodological and theoretical discussion 
on the use of the term entre:preneur, see Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso, Emnresario Industrial e Desenvolvinento Economico 
no Brasil, Sgo Paulo, DI?EL, 1972. For a :political and 
historical discussion, see Eli Diniz, Emnresario, Estado 
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e Capitalismo no Brasil: 1930-1945, Rio de Janeiro, Paz e 
Terra, 1978; Eli Diniz and Rena to Raul Boschi, EmDresariado 
Nacional e Estado no Brasil, Rio de J2neiro, Forense 
Universi taria, 1978; Luciano },Iartins, 'Fomaoao do Empresariado, 
Industria~, in Revista CivilizaQao 3rasileira, No. 13, ~fuy, 
1967, especially pp. 103-112. 
2 For tre a:pplication of Barrington Noore's conce:pt of 
'conservative-modernization' to the Brazilian situation, 
see Otavio Guilherme Velho, Cauitalismo Autorite.rio e 
Camoesinato, Sao Paulo, DIFEL, 1976; Luciano l:brtins, 
Pouvoir et Develounement ~cononigue: Formation et ~volution 
des Structures Politiaues au Bresil, Paris, 3ditions 
.Anthropos, 1976; Fabio Vanderley Reis, ~Solida:!'iedade, 
Interesses e Desenvolvimento Pol{ticd, in Cadernos do 
Denartame::lto de Ciencia Pol{ tica, No.1, I'.Iarch, 1974, 
I'linns Gerais, Universidade Federal de ULnas Ge:rais, Fabio 
1Janderley Reis, Brasil: 'Estado e Sociedade' em :pers:pectiva, 
in Cadernos de Denartar:iento de Ciencia Pol{tica, No.2, 
Decenber, 1974, Ninas Gerais, Universidade Federal de 
Minas Gerais. 
3 G~dmsci provided a :pertinent theoretical guideline to 
help us to understand the process ~'Thereby the 2.gents of 
Brazilian modernizing capitalism ' .. Jere for:1ed. He states 
that "Every social group coming into existence on the 
original terrain of an essential function in the "Torld 
of economic production, creates together "Hi th itself, 
organically, one or more strata of intellectuals "Hhich 
give it hor;wgeneity and an avrareness of its o;,m function 
not only in the economic, but also in the soc~al and 
political fields. The ca:pitalist entre)renecIT creates, 
alongside himself, the indus trial tecr.nician, the 
s)ecialist in political economy, the organizers of a 
nel'T culture, a new legal sys te~, etc. It (:".[Uintin Hoare 
and Geoffrey NO'Hell-Smi th, Selections frmn the Prison 
Uoteboo1:s of Antonio Gransci, London, La-IF..ceDce cc '\Tishart, 
1973, p. 5. For a discussion on the function of the 
organic intellecttlals, see Haria Antonietta Hacciocchi, 
A Favor de G'Y'8,msci, Rio de Janeiro, Paz e Terrs., 1976, p. 202. 
4 A common practice in Brazil is that key me~bers of the 
board of directors of important multinationals are also 
shareholders, thus giving them a direct interest in their 
enterprises. They are different from managers, vTho also 
sell expertise as 'ITell as ordinary labour, but have no 
mmership of the means of production. 
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5 Rerbet de Souza, 'Notes on \"orld Capital', in LARU, Vol. II, 
No.2, February 1978, Toronto, pp. 51-64. For de Souza, 
'The multinational corporation is a microcosm 'I"here 
global organization for production is at its highest level; 
systems of organization of the ,,,ark force, communications and 
information systems, finance system, and control and admini-
strative systems, all exist in function of the global activity 
of 'I'Torld capital'. 
6 For a theoretic8.1 insight underlining these ass'U.I2ptions, 
see V. 1. Lenin, Imnerialism~ The hig:hest Stage of Cani talism 
Vol. 22, Collected 'dorks. London, Lm-r..c'ence & 'ilishart, 2nd 
Printing 1974. pp. 275 and 322. 
7 Giovanni Agnelli, Summary of the Hearings before the Group 
of Eninent Persons to Study the Impact of l-fultinational 
Corporations on Development and on Internatiom:.l Relations, 
Uni ted Nations, Ne'N York, 1975, quoted in Herbet de Souza, 
op.cit., p. 55. 
8 Jan Knippers Black, United States Penetration of Brazil, 
Hanchester, !--Ianchester University Press, 1977. p. 80. 
9 This tecl~~ique secured for multinational oligopolistic 
interests superior conditions of competition in contrast 
'Ni th looal enterprises, , .. There forms of direct property 
control and personal management exerted by family heads 
and close relatives still nredominated. See Teotonio dos 
Santos, 'El Nuevo __ Ciaraoter de la Denenclencia ~ in La Crisis 
del DeSB.::'rollismo la !:Tueva Denendencia, Jose I1atos 1'le.r 
ed. , Instituto de Estudios PerQanos, "~gentina, .~~orrortu 
Editores, 1969, p. 50. 
10 To illustrate the point about the accl.1TIlllation of 
directorships, it is ,·.rorth,,,hile to exar:tine the connections 
and links of these entrepreneurs. 
J .B. Pereira Almeida Filho "ioTaS a pr:jffiinent Lleuber of the board 
of directors and, in r.'lany cases, also slc.&reholder of the 
follO'.-ring corporations: 
Union Carbide do Brasil (Union Carbide Corp/Electric Furnace 
Production) 
Kibon S.A.: Industria de Alimentos Gerais (Gener21 Foods) 
S .A. 1:Thi te Nartins (Union Carbide); 
:Ha tional Carbon do Brasil S.A. Ind. e C om. (Union Carbide/ 
Electric Fuma ce Prod.) 
Bendix do Brasil; 
:Beecler Rootes; 
Laboratorio Leo do Br2.sil S .A.; 
Laboratorios Hiles do :Brasil Ltcla. (rUles L2.b. Pana..'l1erican 
Inc.) 
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Eletrol-ietalu.xgica Abrasivos SaIto S.A. (Carborundu.m Co. N.Y.); 
Carborundum S.A. Industria de Abrasivos; 
Guaira S.A. Ind. e Com.; 
Tri-Sure S.A. Ind. e Com. (American Flange Hanufacturing 
Delm-rarej:Bueno Vidigal indus trial and financial [STOUp); 
CardOBrasil S.A. Fabrica de Cardas (Comagri S.A.); 
Equipamentos Ind. Villares S.A. (Villares Industrial and 
financial group) 
IndUstria de Alimentos Gerais; 
Industria Lages Comercial e Agricola ~Olinlcraft/Squibb) 
Distribuidora Paulista Lavadoras Automaticas; 
ESJ3IC; 
Cia. Agr1.cola da F'azenda Monte Al to; 
-Cia. Agr1.cola Rancho Queimado; 
Fazenda do Sul; 
John Povrell S.A.; 
Sta. Adelaide; 
SHco do Brasil S.A. Ind. Hetalu.xgica (The Steel IIllprovenent 
and Forge USA/American Brake Shoe Co.); 
Tampico; 
Ascoval S.A. Automatic S\dtch; 
- . Robert Shayl Fulton Controles do Brasil; 
Olin1craft S.A. Celulos e Papel (Linson S.Ji. Ind. e Con./Squibb 
Hathiesson Int. Corp.) to I·rhich Santa Catarina governor and 
entrepreneur Irineu Bornhausen Has linked; 
Lutcher S .A. Celulose e Papel, to '([hich Jose Eug-enio de 
Maced.o Soares '\>laS linked; 
Brasmac Ind. e Com. S.A. ('I'iickman Hach:i,.ne Tools Ltd. 
Grea t :Bri tain) ; 
Sher.rin l:lilliams do Brasil S .11.. Tintas (The Sherl'rin idilli20ms 
Co. , Cleveland); 
Ideal Standard S/A Industria e Comercio; 
DOi·rdell do Brasil - Dovldell & Co. Ltd., London, Com. e Exp. 
S.A. ; 
Agencia Had. tima Dickinson (Dickinson Brothers); 
Ideal Standard S.A. (American Standard); 
JJ-IF do Bmsil S.A. (American l1achine & Foundry Co.); 
Fruehauf do :Brasil (:B'ruehauf C Or? ora tion); 
Companhia de Holas No-Sag (Lear Ste~::;ler Inc.); 
Intelcom Eletronica (Notorola Inc.); 
Relogios Brasil S.A. (Talley Indust:cies /Eduardo Garcia Rossi); 
Squibb IndUStria 1~:Lmica (E.R. SQuibb & Sons, S.A. - Beeclmut). 
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12 11.1 though M. Ferreira Guinaraes had extens'ivl? interes.ts in Minas 
Gerais, he "ras also a leader of the Associ2.9aO Comercia1 do 
Rio de Janeiro. He 1iTas a nesber of the follo\'ring director-
ships: :Bane 0 de Hinas Gerais S.A.; Cia. Forc;a e Luz de lUnas 
Gerais (:Bond & Share - Morgan GroUl); Phi]ips do :Brusil; 
Organiza90es Ferreira Guinaraes; Cia. Estanho Sao Joao del 
Rey; Cia. SiderUrgica :Belgo !1ineira; Cia. Cruzeiro do SuI 
Capitalizac;ao; Panair do :Brasil; Banco Lcvmdes; :Mesbla S.A.; 
Cia. Imperial de Segurosj Cia. Tecelagem e Fiac;ao ~lineira; 
Cia. Tecelagem e Fiac;ao :Barbacena; Siderurgica Hanessman. 
13 Jorge de Souza Rezende belonged to the FIESP and the 
National Council of Economy - CNE. lie y~s a member of: 
Cia. Brasi1eira de Armazens Gerais, (Sanbra-Eunge & Born); 
Serrana de Minerac;ao S.A.; Quimbrasil S.A. (:Bunge & Born); 
Carborundum S.A.; Cia. de Naquinas Hobe.rt-L'ayton do Brasil; 
EquipaNentos Clark Piratininga S.A. (Clark Equipnents Co.1 
!~quinas Piratiningas S.A.); Linkbelt-Piratininga Trans-
portad'Jres Industriais Ltda. (Maq. Piratininga/Linkbelt 
Engenharia Ind. e Com. Ltda); ~.raquinas Piratininga S.A. j 
Automatic Sprinklers S.A. (Joaquim H. Nascinento A. Gama, 
Automatic Sprinklers of Venezuela); Brinquedos Bandeirante 
S.A.; Asdobra Instalac;13es Contra Incendios S.A.; Pirelli S.A. 
Compo Ind. Brasileira; Henry Simon do Erasil S.A. IndUStria 
e Comercio (H. Simon Holdings - GB). 
14 The term bureaucratic-entrepreneurial rings is being used 
very r:ruch in the sense in ,·rhich Fernando Henrique Cardoso 
uses 'aneis buroc~aticos'. See Fernando Henrique Cardoso, 
Autoritarismo e DemocratizaQao, Rio de Janeiro, Paz e Terra, 
1975, especially Cha~Jter V. I have added the qualification 
of entrepreneurial to Cardoso's concept for tHO reasons: 
the first is that BOSt of these top 'bureaucrats' ,,,ere entre-
preneurs themselves. in spite of occupying bureaucratic 
positions. The second and perhaps more significant, is that 
these rings seem to be more per:sanent th..an has been suggested 
by Cardoso, favourinG, alnost exclusively, particular 
entrepreneurial interests ag2.inst other sectors of civil 
society. Their rationale is influenced in a greater form 
by their regular entrepreneurial connections, ratl1er than 
by bureaucratic norms of behaviour or contings::1t short-lived 
economic links. 
15 For the politics e~d ideolcgy of the tecnicos, see Carlos 
Estev:am lful'tins, Tecnocracia e Cavi talismo, Sao Paulo, 
Editora Brasiliense, 1974, pp. 78-131; 146-156; 195-214. 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso, 'Aspectos Polf ticos do Plane,jamento 
no Erasil, in 0 Hodelo Politico Erasileiro, edited by 
F.R. Cardoso, Sao Paulo, DIP3L, 1973, pp. 83-103. 
16 Arthur Jerald JolL~son, Brazilian Bureaucracy and Politics: 
The Rise of a Ne1,,, Professional Class, 'University of Texas, 
Ph.D. Thesis, 1977, p.157. For nethodological oonsiderations 
about planning, see John Friedmann, RetmcldDf Ar.lerioa: A 
Ther:ry of Transacti ve PlarmiD6, Nm'l York, A:''1ohor Press! 
~oubleday, 1973. 
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17 Eugenio Gudin, Analise de Problemas Brasilei~os 1958-1964, 
Rio de Janeiro, Editora Agir, 1965, p. 221. 
18 In these 'rationalizing' endeavours, the multinational and 
associated technoentreyreneurs ,·mre not alone. According to 
Lincoln Gordon, US American Ambassador to Brazil during the 
Goulart presidency, "the Unites states undertook in 1949, 
follovling President Truman's famous 'Point IV', a large 
scale increase of our programme of technical assistance. 
The concepts of technical assistance, one should mention in 
passing, vlere based largely on the experience in La tin il.1ne:ri. ca 
initiated by President Franklin Roosevelt end by Mr. Nelson 
Rockefeller in 1939" Lincoln Gordon, ESG Docu,'11ent C 41 - 62. 
(Ny translation, RAn). 
19 Roberto de Oliveira Campos, /A Experiencia Brasileira de 
Planejamento', in Hario H. Simonsen and Roberto Campos, 
A Nova Economia B-('8.sileira, Rio de Janeiro', Jose Olym:pio 
Edi tore, 1974, pp. 48-60. In a letter to his friend, umr 
leader, Herbert Levy, the technoentrepTeneur, Paulo Sa, 
'\·rhen introducing his technoentre-preneurial asency, CBP, 
and the activities it had been carrying out, explained that 
~If in the Russia of the Soviets (sic) plans are a function 
of the state bureaucracy, in the free countries ':le believe 
that the plans have to be confined ',d thin the general s:rstem 
by '.-Thich all the matters of govermJ.ent sh0uJtl be ca:cried out: 
through contract with pri vats' entities (particulares}, 
_sui table, capable and honest, under the indispensable state 
control. The technical agencies escrit6 ios) that comprise the 
Consortium, gu¥antee those qualities". llY translEtion, 
rum). Pa~o Sa to Herbert Levy, Rio de Janeiro, 27th January, 
1959, in Archive Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, Rio de Janeiro. 
20 Indicative planning vras essentially tantamount to inco1lT91ete 
planning and it reaffirTIed the absence of national -planning 
for truly designed social -policies. See Roberto Campos, 
:'aconomia., Planejamento e J:Tacionalisno, Rio de Janeiro, A?EC 
Editora, 1963; see also Roberto de Oliveira Campos, 
Pl ane.lamento do Desenvolvimento Economico cle :?8.ises Sub-
desenvolvidos, ESG DOC1.1.'11ent I-16-53; Oct2.vio Gouveia de 
Bulhoes, Problemas do Desenvolvimento Economico, ZSG Docunent 
I-8G-54j Colonel 1LYltonio Carlos da Silva Huricy, 
Plane.ja::lento Governa::ental, :SSG Doou.-sent C-29-56; Colonel 
Jos~ Sinva1 N. Lindenberg, Plane.l2,Ge::;to do Porb.lecimento 
do Potencial Naoional, ESG Docuoent C-29-59. 
21 The ver-J expression - planning of National SecU-..">"i ty - is 
quite explicit. 'PlanninG means orientation, ordering, 
rationalization of the enserlble of aotions that envisage 
dete:'.'I!1inate 0'o2.1s. It presupposes tile e:ciste~ce of reS01.1TCeS 
or Deans to be used, and also the ;')ro;nosis of ::->cstacles, 
lv-hen not of antagonis!:ls. On the other l":and, plannin8; iL"'1?lies 
a :;uicLed searc!'" of kno~,rledse ••• ane.. consists, above all, 
of a system of cl~oices or ciecisions, successive and 
hierarchical, behreen diverse alten12,tives (lines of pod tive 
action)'. Colsnel Golbery do Couta e Silv.a 'Do Pl8.nej~~ento 
para a Seguran<;a Nacional', in Cadernos Br~'_sile:'ros Ho. 4-
October-Decenber 1960, pp. 38-39 (Ny tr8Jlslation, RAIl). 
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The kernel of the post-1964 ServiQo Nacional de DlfornaQoes 
(National Intelligence Service - SNI) and its future ~~bi­
licel connection 'Ivi th the 11inistry of Planning Here itIylied 
in such a statement by the authoritative vievl of General 
Golbery. NRationalization, intentionality, decisions or 
choices, hierarchical scale, all of this r2ving in mind a 
complex of intimately related. actions; that is the essence 
of all and any planning". Colonel Golbery, idem (Ny 
translation, R~). See also Colonel Decio parneira Escebar 
o Planejamento da Segure.nca Nacional - ESG Document A-34-53; 
Lieutenant Colonel Golber'J do Couto e Silva, Plane,ja;:lento 
da SeguranQa Nacional - ESG Document C-83-54; Lieutenant 
Colonel Golcery do Couto e Silva, Plane,je.Dento da Segu.:rania 
Nacional, ESG Document C-3l-55; Colonel Golber'J do Couto e 
Silva, Plane.iamento da Seguxanca Hacional: Concei tos 
Funda0entais, ESG Document C-30-58. 
22 "A.nomy or totalitarianism - this is the diler:una presented 
to the society of our days, if lye are not able to formulate, 
in precise and secure terns, democrc.tic plarminG as a yosi tive 
synthesis of such 'dialectical opjJosition'''(sic). Lieutenant 
Colonel Golber'J do Couto e Silva - Plc:.ne.lc,sento Estra te,cico, 
Rio de Janeiro, Conrpanhia Edi tara A.:-::ericana, 1955, in 
:Biblioteca do Ezerci to, Vol. 213, p. 24. (Ny translation, R/J). 
23 J. FrieQ~ann, ou.cit., p. 52. 
24 Roberto Campos, A Exneriencin ••• , on.cit. pp. 53-55. 
25 See Fortalecimento do Potencial Hacional - Pl.?ne!ja~::ento, 
Document Ho. 1 Course: Doctrine of He. tional Security, in 
ll'ES/ADESG Semnsr fo:!:' Entrepreneurs, i·Ii thout date, !PES 
Archives, Rio de Janeiro. 
26 General Golbery eX'91ained in his '.rri tings be form in ',;hich 
particular interests articulate and are 2ade gBneral. For 
General Golbery, the systen of objectives l:.2.d to be such 
that: "none 8f t~1em can be deduced iroD the others, ensnring, 
therefore, the highest possible decree of 10gic2.1 independence, 
in spite of recognizing the interrelation resultinG' fron the 
COl1E1on origins in i·Thieh they are conceived and formulated 
(genetic interriependence) and of the . ;--e:'lero.l integra ted ai::l 
i'Thich all envisage (teleological interdependence)". 
Colonel Golbery do Couto e Silva, Do :?12':'1e,jal:lento ••• 
o'.).cit., p. 38 (Ny translation, JJ\.D)o 
27 Nike :Burgess a.nd Daniel '!lolff, Brazil: '£1 Concepto de Pede:!:' 
en La :Sscuela Superior de Guerr8.~ in Cue-demos PolJ~ ticos, 
Hexico, Ediciones '2RA, April/June No. 20, 1979, p. 100. 
See 8.1so Esboeo de urn Pro{Q?ama de Governo - 0 Sentido do 
Planeja::J.ento }l'1.L-:1a Economia Democratica, DOCleento de 
Trabalho No.5, from the Hinistro E:;:traorc.ino.J:'io paro. 0 
Planejo.'::1ento e Coordena9ao Econonica, for the ::ieli...'1iao 
Ninisterial de 4 de junho de 1964, pp. 2-3. (:::tesel"'ved, secret) 
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28 J. Frie~~ann, oD.cit., PI'. 61-70. 
29 These interests and values of the entre:9::cene1.ITia1 comrrruni ty 
lay behind the quest for change of cho.nne1s of conm1'U!lication 
and negotiation be'tl·reen entreyreneurs and goverrl.r:lent from 
the early 195 Os om-lards. The forma ti on of t grup os exe eu tt v os t 
under ICucitsehek and the famous 'bilhetinh0s' of Jsnio Quaclros 
,.,ere t\·ro dispar2. te outputs and outcomes. According to 
Alexsndre de Barros, "The old bureaucracy ',,[8.8 not :preyared 
to oper2.te under the neiV' system, but it could not simply be 
disbanded. The chosen option \vas to keep the old bureaucracy 
and set up a 'ne,v' one ;,Thich could opere.te on a different 
bssis and, so to speak, deflate this old buree;ucro.cy in 
terms of pOHer, o.t least in those policy are2.S for \'1hich 
a ne,'l bureaucracy had been set up", Alexandre de Scmza 
Costa Barros e.nd Angelina tl£~ria Clleibub Figuei:::-edo. 
Report on "The Cre2.ti on of V,-TQ SOCi21 P<'on,"'r2::;1"1es: The FG'I'S 
2.nd the PIS: jl. Brazilian Ce.se Sttldy on the Dissev.in& tion 
8.nd Use of Social Sciences Resea-"ch for Govern::':8nto.l 
Policy }fuking", project coordinated by the Deve10pnent 
Center of the Organization for Econonic Cooperetion and 
Development, Preliminary Version, 1975, Rio de Janeiro, 
pp. 25-26. 
30 One should also recall other attempts L~de et planninG and 
entrepreneurial rationalization of production, such as the 
American Technical Commission (Cooke Hission) of 1943; 
the SALTS Plan, of 1948 and the ?rog"'.car:lm8 of the Nixed 
Brazil-United St2.. tes Commission, also knoim as Xbbink 
}!ission, in 1948. See J.A. Johnson, ou.cit., pp. 165-175. 
It is interesting to note that the Brazilian co-:president 
of the Abbink !'Tission '.'laS Octavio Gouveia de Bulhoes, 1;Tho 
;,lould be present in most of the plannin~ ex)eriments 
of the 1950s. In the yarticular case of the Aobink Hission, 
it studied ''1m t ~.'lere considered to be the oTi tical 'Joints 
('Jontos de estran:7Ulamento) of the Erazilicm economy, ':Thioh 
determined tDe fee.sibHi ty of the esteblisl'h'":len t of a dyr18.nic 
industrial capitalist stete. See Octavia lenni, Estado e 
P1anifioacion 2conomica em Bmsil: 1930-1970, Buenos Aires, 
~Borrortu Bditares, 1971, pp. 71-91. 
31 It is interesting to note the entr8~Jreneurial lin~';:s of 
these 8n,rly 'tech..rJoentrepreneurs t, \'Those p'J.blic roles ',lere 
useful to their private activities. Ary F. Torres ;ms 1inl:ed 
at the ti..'1l8 to the Sffo Paulo financial 8ncl industrial grou:ps, 
:Bueno Vidiga1 and Souza Aranha. Valenti:.1 3(;1..19as 'iTGS 1in~:ed 
throughout his political career to US 3ethlelle:.1 Steel, r.;:r:;:, 
Panair, Cia. Sidft do Brasil, King 3.anch do Email, AneriC2,n 
Ean~( ~rote Co., Coca-Cola, Cia. Erasilei::ca de Hate:::-ia1 
Ferroviario - CO:BR.4..SIlA, Servic;os Hollerith, lTatio:Ge.l C2.sh 
Register, Cia. Naciona1 de !~quinas Conerciais, Goodyear 
T::rres, Ferroenrunel, L'nobili2,:;cia Santa Cruz, Listas 
Te1efonioas Brasileiras and Addre S3 o [,'2'a):h-Hul ti::;'2'8.ph do 
Br2.sil. Roberto C11l"1pos has been lin~:ed to Ronn2. 11ini~b,Olivetti) 
:Bond and She,re, Car.1..'3.rgo Correia, iilercede s Benz, B2.noo de 
Desenvo1vimento Conercial. For Glycon de Paiva's econoL'lic 
links, see Ap:pendix B. 
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32 For an accoUnt of the Brazilian experience in Planning, 
see Robert T. Daland, Brazilian PIQDning~ Develoument, 
Politics and Administration, The University 'of North 
Carolina Press, 1967, Chapter II; O. Ianni,Estado ••• , op cit., 
Chapters III and rv; R.A. Amaral Vie:'ra, Inte::::-vencionisno 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
e Autoritarismo no Brasil, Sao Paulo, DIFEL, 1975, pp. 15-110. 
See also Roberto de Oliveira Campos, Planejamento do 
Desenvolvimento, oneai t., for a p8.rticipant observer's viel'! 
of the planning rationale. A critical account of Erazilian 
state planning is provided by Lucio Km-TD.rick, Estrategias 
do Planejamento no Erasil, Cadernos CEERAP, No.2, Sao Paulo, 
1970. 
Helio Eel trao i-las direotor of COSIGUA, (the Guanabara steel 
p:civate and State joint Venture), Hesbla S.A. (the giant 
retail store) and CREDIBfuiS Financieira do Brasil S.A. (to 
"Those board of directors belonged 1.1al ter Ho::ceira Salles, 
Augusto Frederico Schmidt, Helio Cassio lfuniz de Souza, 
Henrique de Botton, Teodoro Quartim Barbosa, Helio Pires 
de Oliveira Dias). 
See Luciano ~hrtins, Pouvoir ••• , on.cit., especially 
Cha)ters VII and VIII. See also Franoisco de Oliveira, 
A BconoDia da Denendencia Imuerfeita, ~o de Janeiro, 
Graa1, 1977, p. 84. 
A list of milita~J offioers in a~~inist::cative Josts QDQer 
Ku'ci tschek can be f OD..."'1d in 11s.ria Victoria e.e Hesoui ta 
Eenevides, 0 Governo Kubi tsc1;.ek: Desenvolvine:;,to Economico 
e Sstabi1idade politica: 1956-1961, Ri~ de JGneiro, Paz e 
Terra, 1976, pp. 187-188. 
J. Frie~~ann, on.cit., p. 11. 
Foc::' an account of the e2::ergence and for.r:1B. tion of the 
tecnicos and technical institutions, see Nathaniel Leff, 
Economic Policy H2king and Deve10ument in :3::::-az; 1: 1947-1964 
USA, John Hiley & Sons, 1968, pp. 143-153. 
Octavio Ianni, Estado ••• , op.cit., es)ecial1y Cha::oter V, 
Industrializi9ao e Interdependenoia. 
39 J .R g ':lhi taker Penteado, 'Prepara~ao de Executivos no ?(;ds~ 
in Eoletin Nensa1 ]?ES, No.3, Ano 1, J'u1y 1964, Rio de 
Janeiro, p. 3. 
40 After 1964, "'hat H8.mrcring has co.l1ecl va1ue-in..~erence, Le. 
the occupation of mam,':gerial posts in wultinationcl 2nd 
associated corporations by nilitar,y officers 2.::1d the 
identification of rJili ta~J personnel '\-ri .Jeh the Goals and 
metllOds of pri va te enterprise, inc_ics, ted a trend t·::;'da::cds 
the conso1id2:':;ion of an industria1-mili tar~r C0891ex, '.There 
civilian and military industris.1 cor.cerns '..rent into 
associ2tion 2Dd joint ::oroduction 2.nd ,-,There ::::ff:'cers of the 
Ar:::ed Forces ':Tere employed by DrivQte c:J::7Joratio!1s 0.3 '::o12ce 
men t. See N. t'Tanwaring, The Hili tary. in Brazilian Politics, 
41 
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Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Soience, 
University of Illinois, 1968. 
General Juracy NegalMes he.s been 8. director of the 
following corporations: 
Carlos Simas 
General Luiz Cabral 
de Henezes 
Antonio Gallotti 
CORPORATIONS 
Ericsson do Brasil 
(Ensldlda Bank) 
DELTEC S/A Inv. Credo Fin. 
(Chase Hanhattan Bank) 
S.r"JrRU 
(Bunge & :Born) 
H.R.. Grace 
Sbro Paulo Light S.A. 
Rio Light S~o 
Cia. Com. de Desenvolvimento 
(D3LTEu) 
l'Ionteiro Aranha Enc;enharia 
Comercio e Industria 
Cia. L'1dustrial Sao Po.ulo e 
Rio 
CISPER 
(Casper-O\ien illinois) 
Etileno de Aratu S .A. 
NetalUrgica Natarazzo S.A. 
l/:liranda Estancia S.A. 
Ag-ropecuaria 
Before 1954, Generel Juracy Hegal:0..2""es heel been lin::ed to 
the Cv?J) and to Petrobras. He '.-ras also llilitar'J Attache 
in the USA in 1953-1954. He becane governor of the State 
of :Bahia in the 12. te 1950s. After 1964, he participated 9.S 
director of Fundo Crescinco, a financial cOD'Jlex. 
42 Osny Duarte Pereira, A A ..'1tinomi2, do ;\corclo Hi1itar" Bl"'8sil -
]§!, Associa9ao Erasileiro. de Juristas Democra ticos, 
15th April 1963, p. 24. 
43 11 ••• Latin ~"erican oountries are all, to an important 
extent, "'That have been called 'penetrated systems': 
in \'Thich non-menbers of a national sooiety partici:pate 
direotly and authoritatively through aotions taken 
jointly \'Tith the sooiety's members, in either the 
allocation of its values or the mobilization of support 
on behalf of its goals ", Gordon Connel-Smi th, quoting 
James N. Rosenau, in Carlos A. Astiz, edt Latin A~erican 
International Politics: Ambitions, C8.P8.bilities and the 
National Interest of Nexico, Brazil and lU'i';entina, 
USA, University of Notre Da8e Press, 1969, 1'. 10. See 
also James. N. Rosenau,/Pre-Theor~es an~ Theories of 
Foreign Policy~ 1966, in R. Bany Fe.rrell (Editor), 
Anpr0aches to COmDarative and International Politics 
Illinois, North,.,estern University Press, 1966, p. 28. 
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44 See General George Robinson Bather, As RelaQoes Hilitares 
entre 0 Brasil e Os E.U.A., ESG Doc~ment C-02-64. 
45 See en this matter J. Knipper Blaok, op.cit., espeoially 
Chapters VIII and IX. Also Gayle Hudgens l1a tson, Brother 
Sam and the Goulart Golue, mimeo, University of Texas, 
Texas, 1977: 5-6. 
46 Raymond Estep, The military in Brazilian Politics 1821-1970, 
1971: 3, 40-45 and 169. Dooumentar:? Rese2.rch Division, 
Aerospace Studies Institute, Air University, HaXi.,e11 Air 
Force, Alabama. Documenta~J Research Study AV 20 470 ASI. 
See also Paulo Sergio Pinheiro 'A JSG Faz Trinta Anos 
(Como :Sste: Velba)', in ISTO E, No. 140, sa:o Paulo, 29th 
A.ugust, 197'9, 1'1'. 20-21, especially Document No. 832.2 
23/5/1947 of the US Department of State. 
47 The ESG '.-ras one of the :rain foruns i.,here entre-preneurs had 
the opportunity to indoctrinate officers of the various 
services and chosen tecnicos on the rationality of an 
associated entrepreneurial model of development, through 
discus sions and writings tha t 'dere, in mos t cases, ClLo.S sified. 
The development of the poli tic;:d ideology of the entre-
nrenet1xial orC2.nic elite VTas accoIT')lisied 'wer a ':)eriod cf 
ten "/ee::::s. The :SSG/ }J)3SG platform' se:::,ved 8.S a lab':.r8.tox"'J 
of ideas and testing ground for projects, cackfeeding e. 
crucial contricution to the shapinG' of this ideology. 
These ideas \·rere further developed and reinforced in fOJ:'DD.l 
and informal centres such as t:le diffe~ent class assoc:'ations, 
and later reshaped and refined at the Instit;).te for Resecc'ch 
and Sooial Studies, ll'.r:.;S, See Ch2.)ters V and VII. l'Joreover, 
the entrepreneurial va:cguard of the ::::ul ti::::2.tional and 
associated interests had been promoting over a mnber ,')f 
years, through AD~~SG, a series of c:rcles of conferences on 
the role of the enterprises and the entrepreneurs in 
development. 
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48 "As bases da doutrina da ESG nao estao em discussao, sao como 
o dogma da Igreja, antecedem a Institui9ao" (Conversation 
with Permanent Teaching staff member of the ESG.- name with-
held), September 1976, Rio de Janeiro. 
49 The internalization of such beliefs can be observed in a 
significant public address delivered by the influential 
Lieutenant Colonel Octavio Costa, to a gathering of 
entrepreneurs in Rio Grande do Sul. "The contrast between 
entrepreneurs and military is that they direct their 
enterprises and their preoccupations principally towards 
the tasks of development; we (direct our preoccupations) 
towards the tasks of national security. However, all 
converge in the search of the Brazilian nation's well-
being. We, by operating in the restricted circle of the 
state activities and you, in the unlimited field of free 
enterprise, the basis of the long standing and fruitful 
undertakings. We soldiers seek to provide order, so 
that you entrepreneurs, by risking, creating, producing, 
multiplying, can give us progress". (Hy translation, RAD), 
in 'As For9as Armadas e as Classes Empresariais', 3rd December, 
1964, in Revista Militar Brasileira, N01603, Rio de Janeiro, p.46. _.-
50 The doctrine of Development and National Security, as 
developed at the ~SG, was based on a set of value judgements 
within which 'neutrality' loomed large. However, political 
and economic interests, i.e. extratheoret~cal instances 
and demand~ imposed on the doctrine its problems and solu-
tions. These interests, then, constituted the doctrine's 
real (practical) aims and limits. See Burgess and Wolff, 
on.cit., pp.98-100. 
51 The notions of planned associated capitalist development 
were disseminated at the ESG by technoentrepreneurs such 
as Roberto Campos, Eugenio Gudin, Lucas Lopes and Glycon 
de Paiva; entrepreneurs such' as Jorge Behring de 11attos, 
G. Borghoff, Eudes de Souza Leao, A. C. Pacheco e Silva; 
and military officers such as Poppe de Figueiredo, Heitor 
Herrera, Golbery do Couto e Silva and A. Bastos. After 
all, the ESG drew its legitimation from being a Superior 
vI ar College, teaching a Higher H ar Course. Thus, their 
values could only be disseminated throughout the Armed 
Forces in so far as they were couched with strictly mili-
tary 'neutral' proposals. After 1964, the ~SG enjoyed a 
free hand in the dissemination of its ideological material. 
According to Lieutenant Colonel Octavio Costa, the unity 
of th.ought of the Armed Forces "resul tava de uma longa e 
lenta preparaqao doutrinaria que, emanando da ESG, se 
tripartia na orienta9ao das Escolas de Comando e Estado 
Maior das FOrQas Singulares e se ramificava pelas escolas, 
bases, arsenais, estabelecimentos e quarteis" , in 'Com-
preensao da Revoluqao Brasileira', No.597, set./Out. 1964, 
p.69, A Defesa Nacional, Rio de Janeiro. See also A.C. P 
Pacheco e Silva, 'A SeguranGa Nacional e a Guerra Fria', 
in A Defesa Nacional, Vol. L1-9, No. 576/577/-, 1962, 
pp. 26-27. 
10 
52 J. Knipper Black, op.cit., pp. 80-81. 
53 These figures tally i'li th the figures provided by Alexandre 
do :Barros in his study of the composition of the ESG student 
body, according to tbeir origin, from 1950 to 1964. 
See Alexandre do Barros, The Changing Role of the state in 
:Brazil: The Tecl<.n acre. tic Nili t2.ry Alliance. Paper for 
presentation at the Sixth Annual Heeting of the Latin Anerican 
Studies Association, Atlanta, Georgia, 25th-28th l1arch, 1976, 
mimeo. 
54 Burgess and Vollf, op.cit., p. 90. In spite of the nu.rnbers, 
civilians trained by the ESG had a relatively minor impact 
on the post-1964 administration. See Alexandre de Souza 
:Barros, The :Brazilian Military: Professional Socialization, 
Political Performance and State Building, Ph. D. Dissertation, 
University of Chicago, 1978. 
55 Phyllis R. Parker, 1964. 0 Papel dos Estados Unidos no 
Golpe de Estado de 31 de HflrQo, Rio de Janeiro, Civilizactao 
Brasileira, 1977, p. 121. The Jornal do Brasil of 20th December, 
1976, reproduced and translated a confidential telegram for 
limited distribution sent on 4th }~rch, 1964, by ~rnbassador 
Lincoln Gordon to Thomas IvIann. The telegram read: "Our HAP 
(Hili tary Assistance Programme) is a hiGhly important f2,ctor 
' .. Thich influences the military to be pro-Uni ted States and 
pro-Occident, and its importance in that secto2:' is groHing. 
Fartraining and supply of material, th~ I{~ is an essential 
vehicle to establish close relations i'li th the officers of the 
Armed Forces". (My re trans la tion, RAJ)). 
56 Lincoln Gordon, Telegram 8214 to Dean Rusl(, Secretary of the 
Department of State, 14th January, 1963, PQO de Janeiro. 
In JFK Archives, National Secrui ty Files (Ex-Secret, 
Declassified in 1977), p. 1. Economic and militarJ~ aid from 
1946 to 1966 l<~s been in the order of aloost 2.8 billion 
dollars, including AID loans and g-.cunts. According to 
US ~~.Jnerican, Haj or General James '.1. Totten, :Brazil Has the 
recipient of approximately balf of the 'assistance I ~"iven to 
Latin A.rnerica. Najor General Janes '.F. Totten, ~'~s Relacoes 
Hili tares en tre 0 Brasil e Os Es tados Unidos, ESG Doc'U.r.1ent 
Cl ~5 ?--) -OJ. 
57 Lincoln Gordon, Telegram 8261 to Dean ~l.lsk, SecretaX"'J of 
the Department of State, 15th JanuGry, 1963, Rio de Janeiro. 
In JFK Archives, National Security Files (:Gx-Secret, 
Declassified in 1977), p. 1. 
58 General G.?,o I-lather, op.cit., pp. 12, 16-17. Brazil received 
through the :progra,wne of :public security in 1963 and 1964, 
alone, 75 million dollars. In P. Parker, op.cit., p.122. 
:Brazil received 206 million dollars in US-ilIrreric2-TI mili t2.ry 
aid through 1963. In Carl Oglesby and Richard Sha~l, 
Containr:1ent and Chanr-;e, Ne',·[ York, HE.cHi1 lan, 1967, p. 83. 
59 
60 
General G.R. Mather, op.cit., pp. 16-17. Aid to Latin 
American police was stepped up in the early 1960s, and 
under the umbrella concept of Internal Security Training, 
the Armed Forces developed their capability for 'civic 
action'. Internal Security Training included 'training 
in counter-guerrilla operations and tactics, counter-
insurgency, intelligence and counter-intelligence, public 
information, psychological warfare, civil affairs and 
mili tary government, rid:. control and jungle warfare'. In 
addition to the foregoing training, which, for the fiscal 
year of 1962, took 936 specialist students from Latin 
America, mobile training teams, funded under the Military 
Assistance Programme, were scheduled to visit Latin 
American countries. They were to provide training in 
lts 
riot control, military police, counter guerrilla intelligence, 
psychological warfare and civil affairs. (}~ underline, RAD). 
In 'Summary of Training for Latin Americans in US Military 
Schools and Installations', 1961. Declassified 3rd Septembe~ 
1978. Document attached to Hemorandum for the President, 
by Roswell L. Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defence, 
11th September 1961, in JFK Archives, National Security 
Files, p. 11. Declassified 11th October, 1977. 
Throughout 1961, approximately 5,200 personnel from Latin 
American countries were programmed to attend some 6,500 
courses in US military schools. Throughout 1962, that 
number was to increase to 5,600 students and 7,000 courses. 
It is interesting to note that career patterns were 
significant in shaping the ideological and political 
attitudes of the Brazilian officer corps. This career 
pattern included their participation in the Brazilian 
Expeditionary Force - FEB, in Italy (second World War), 
their participation in the permanent staff of the Superior 
War College, graduation from its courseti, attendance at 
foreign schools, particularly those of the United States, 
and the permanent intense interaction of US-Brazilian 
officers. The emphasis placed on hemispheric association, 
especially on a close relationship with the United States, 
and the rejection of a nationalistic stance in favour of 
multinational integration were attitudes largely reinforced 
by this particular career pattern, corresponding to that of 
the ESG founding clus,ter" The ESGideology also fostered the 
belief in the righteousness of economic policies favouring 
concentration, as well as that through capitalism, Brazil 
would be transformed into a powerful nation (BraSil potencia) 
steered by a technocratic, and authoritarian, style of politics. 
Such career patterns correlated with their role at the centre 
of the political campaign against Goulart and their subsequent 
location as the military core group of the post-1964 admini-
stration: 6~b were of FEB; 7~b had been permanent staff 
members of SSG: 100% attended military schools abroad and 
8C% did so in the USA. Alfred Stepan, The I1ilitary in 
Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil, Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 1971, Chapter XI, especially pp. 236-246. 
61 PJnong these officers must be mentioned: Brigadier Eduardo 
Gomes, opposition presidential candidate for the UDN in 
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1950 against Getulio Vargas; General Ju:cacy l-bgalMes, UDN 
party leader and influential political figure in Rio de 
Janeiro and Bahia; General r'fenezes Cortes ,'Tho ','las an 
influential UDN cadre; PDC General Juzrez Tavora, opposition 
presidential candidate in 1955 against J. Kubitschek and 
cabinet minis tel' v'li th Cafe Filho; PDC Colonel Nei :Braga, 
ex-ohief of Police of the state of Parana, ex-prefeot of its 
oapi tal city Curi ti'ba, ex-governor of t}18 t state and 
closely related to Parana banker and entrepreneur 
Leonidas L. :Borio. General Cordeiro de Farias sho\T8d 
olear sympathies for the PSD, vri th "Those' southern and northeastern 
political bosses he had close links dating from his period 
as 'political com.":lissar' (interventor )in the reoon, in the 
1930s and governor of Pernambuco in the cid-1950s. 
62 'dhen, in be early 1960s, trade unions D.nd othe:r 
popular organizations beG'8l1 to appe8,1 to soldiers, HCOs 
and a handful of higher r2.nkin 15 officers in an attempt 
to "Tiden the circle of civilian interlocutors ,'li th the 
mili tary, this appeal was condemned as outright subversion of 
hierarchy. On the other hand, '·Then the dominant olasses 
appealed to their high-ranking 8ilitary counter:?a:rts, 
action 'I1aS si,riftly taken in the defence of tt.e consti-
tutional order, over the legal stand of the :rr'esident and 
the coun d'etat of April 1964 I'laS carrieci out as a 
salvationist action. 
63 For the notion of ConsU tutional :Bon2,:)artism, see 
A. Gransoi, o'P.cit., :p, 212. Intere:.;tiucly ::mmgh, it 
1'las tecDnoentre:preneur, Eugenio Gudin, ~Tho, 'cy 1961, 
voiced the necessity for the 'reeste.blishClent I of the 
Poder Hode-(',?cior, su,sges ting the. t t~!is role, '.'Thiah had 
'ceen ascribed to the Emperor during the nineteenth aentu:cy, 
should be taken up by the ArrJed Fo:rces, E. Gudin, op,cit" 
p. 223. 
64 Letter from CJ3P to Roberto Ca1'J.pos, 13th Ap:ril, 1959, 
Rio de Janeiro, in Paulo de Assis 3iceiro Aral1ive, 
Rio de Janeiro. The State '..ras not .:oerceived anynore 
as a sim:ple distributor of patronage, It h2d. to 'becoI:le 
a responsible and efficiency-oriented. D?chiner-y, for 
aapi to.lism to develop. Clearly, the orf,'rmic intellectuals 
of the modernizing-conservative co.pito.list bloc ','lere 
becoming aloJare of the shortcomings of the populist acbini-
stration and polity. 
It is Horth noting that the Paulo de Assis Ribeiro Archive 
is extre:::Jely rich in similcr corres:;loncience 1iith other 
s ta te ['_~-;encie s 2.nd officials A.nd in cOl'responde:'Jce over 
joint projects 'IIi th the state ad:Jinistrdion a~d ths big 
local and nul tinC', tional ente~.)rises. 
170 
65 See Letter from CBP to J. Hendes de Souza, Director of 
the Carteira de Credi to Agrlcola e Industrial, 16th !'larch, 
1959; Letter from Paulo sato Herbert Levy, 22nd January, 
1959; Boletim Info~ativo No. 8 1 - CBP (for internal 
circulation of 11th July, 1958; :Bole tin Infor::12.tivo No. 8 2, 
of 17th July, 1958; Boletim Infornativo No.8 of 
24th July, 1958. All these documents are to be found in 
Paulo de Assis Ribeiro Archive, Rio de Janeiro. 
66 CBP did not rely solely on the intrinsic 'rationality' 
formula of their services, but vTould also engage the 
'help' of state bureaucrats by offering them a percen~Qal 
share of participation in the' profi ts to be made ivi th a 
state agency, if a definite deal 'fTas pulled -off. See in 
this respect, Appendix C for the correspondence be"b.'Teen 
Eneas Fonseca, of the Secretaria das FinanQas of llinas 
Gerais and CBP, vThere the former ':Jas)ffered a 'Y;b payoff 
on the value of realized business. 
67 Ridrologia chan[)"8d its naEle to Hi6.ross:."Vice. H. lIaksoud 
is the present ovmer of Visao, the most influential cu:crent 
affairs publication of tne entrepreneu:cial classes, issued 
in Sao Paulo, vri th national circulation. Its generc;.l 
editor is Octavio Gouveia de Bulh8es. 
68 See Leoncio Basbaum, Hist6ria Sincera de. ~enublica de 
Janio (.ladros a Costa e Silva 1 61 1 6 ,::,n,l.blished and 
not released by Editorial Fulgor, Rio ~e Janeiro, pp. 153-
166. Also Osny Duarte Pereira, Ferro e L~dependencia, Rio 
de Janeiro, Civiliza~ao Brasileira, 1967; Jornal do Brasil, 
2nd Decer:1ber 1964 and 'Tribuna de. L"n-prensa., 19th Nover::ber 1964 
and 18th December, 1964. 
69 See Osny Duarte Pereira, Gpem Faz as Leis no Brasil?, 
Pio de Janeiro, Civiliza~~o Brasileira, 1963, pp. 53-56. 
70 Leoncio 3asbaum, oD.cit., p. 161. 
71 Leoneio Basoaum, op.cit., p. 157. 
72 The information has been assembled. from different sources 
mainly L. Bascaum, oD.ci t., Osny Duarte Perei.:::'s,, ou.ci t., 
Jornal do Brasil and TribLL~a da Ir~T)-('e·:)s2.; and publicr:tioDs 
of the d.ifferent state aGencies to "Ihieh these COHSULs:'EC 
members belonged. It is interestins to note that by the 
mid-195Gs, one fifth of the shares of CG~TSU1T:SC \'rere con-
trolled by ODe Earle !,1s,nny Erlich and t:':e :::'8st \'.'8re held 
by six l<.:noim representatives of A,7:lerican ente:r.']rises. See 
i;,lerner Haas, Jean :Bernet arld Roland. Bossart, LnvGst::Jent in 
Br3.zil, also titled Os Investinentos :Sstr,mc'eiros no Brasil, 
85:0 Paulo, 1960. 
73 After 1964, R. CaTIPos founded a financial complex 
nmSTBiUTCO and DlVESTCRED. AmonG the teclmoentrepreneurs 
and bankers ''l'ho joined Canpos in this enterprise "rere, 
Sergio Paulo NelULo, Jose :Bonifacio Coutinho 1Togueira, 
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Edmar de Souza, Francis Vernon Queen, Antonio Abreu Coutinho, 
Emma.nuel \fui taker, Plinio Salles Couto, SebastH!o Ferraz de 
Camargo Penteado and J0E10 :Baptista de Carvalho Athayde. 
74 See Hario da Silva Pinto, 0 Controle do Comercio Externo 
e 0 Desenvolvimento Economico do :Brasil., Rio, 1962. 
Section of study prepared by CONSULT3C for Harvard University •. 
Jorge Schilling, Director of the Estrada de Ferro-Central do 
:i3"rasil ,'laS also a member of COHSULTGC. 
75 P. Scbmi tter has studied this si tue,tion l..mder the Dar:'.e of 
the 'pantou.flage phenomenon f • See P. Sol1n1i tter, Interest, 
Conflict and Political Change in Erazil, Stanfo~, Stanford 
Universi ty Press, 1971, p. 298 and also his Cha~')ter XII. 
See Appendix :B for the multinational linl~ of rzny of its 
menbers. 
76 Ernane Ga1veas , in 'In troductiod to ,p2Ec, 1962-1972 , 
Rio de Janeiro, 1972. 
77 One of the important shareholders 'iW.S OSi'Taldo :Benjamin de 
Azevedo, an IJ?l:lS affiliate and front Llan for nul tinational 
concerDS. 
78 In: :Bresil - Pouvoir et Luttes de Cle,sses, Te:ctes re'Jnis par 
G.II. }I2..:tei, Paris, Editions Oujas, 1966, p. 38. 
79 Jomal do Brasil, 14th June 1960. See Osny D. Pereira, 
Ferro ••• , o~.cit., pp. 95-96. 
80 For Lucas Lopes f letter of April 1960 to General ~'Telson de 
Hello and nemorandum, see Jomal do Br2.sil, 2nd Dece:C:lber, 
1964, p. 13. 
81 In Osny D. Pereira, Ferro ••• , on.cit., pp. 105, 129. 
82 General A. :Bastos, Letter in 0 Globo, 24th June, 1960. 
83 Osny D. Pereire., Ferro . .. ' , op.cit" Pp. 111-112 • 
84 Osny D. Pereira, Fer:::'o . . . , on.cit., :9P. 128-129 • 
85 Tbis infomation ':2.S D.sseL:olec1 fro::1 Osn.;:;, =.1. Pe=~'ei:::'2., 
FeTTO ••• , on.cit., :9:9. 488-490; ~7. Hc'.as et a1. on.cit., 
Honiz J3andeira, PresenC;2 c1c>s :Ssts.clcs Unic10s no 5J::'e . .::;i1: 
D ' ~, 1 '·1' + . ':l~ ·1 J . 0" ~ . ~ ; 0lS ;:;·eGU os c~e .r i S l.'JrlC1, .LU 0 u.s el12lTo, =-ill":'l~2..~C 0 
3:C:Jsile:'T3., 1973, Obc~)t8I' :CLI o.nc_ )~'). 386 L'.i:c:' ";'27; 
lI.:miz J32.ricleire., 0 G()Ve:cno Jcf10 GCJuL.-·~, Rio de J~:.neiY.'o, 
O ~v~l'~n ~ TI~~r~l ~~~ 19r/'~1 010' ~- TTT. ~~~ t'+ '-0 _ '" )."_" ... '1,_.0 ..o~ ,..:; __ e~_G., , "10.) v<::Y.' ____ , __ "'_s 0 08_<::,., 
I'fouI':'" 0 Dolcn no Brasil, 3.io de J<:''..L''1Gi:c:o, 1956; J. K:.'1i):?e:c:s 
31:::.02c, OD. ci t., IJ}). 86-90; G. H2. ttei, 0'). ci t., 1'). 77; 
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Brazil: Hanna's Immovable Mountains, in Fortune, USA April, 
1965, pp. 55-64; Edie Black and Fred Goff, The Hanna 
Industrial Complex, NACLA, USA, 1969, pp. 3-10. 
86 Raymond F. 1ukesell et al. Iron Ore in Brazil: The 
Experience of the Hanna Mining Co., pp. 345-364, in 
Raymond F. Mikesell et ale Foreign Investment in the 
Petroleum and Mineral Industries: Case Studies of Investor-
Host Country Relations, USA, John Hopkins Press, 1971. 
87 R. F. Mikesell, idem, p. 353. Hanna I1ining h~d also been 
a political factor L.'1 the USA, vThere the Cleveland based 
complex included the third largest US iron ore producer 
(Hanna), the fifth largest steel company (National Steel), 
the largest coal producer (Consolidation Coal) and the 
third largest automobile producer (Chrysler), vThich vTas the 
fifth largest US corporation. This industrial complex 
"l'TaS one of the buhlarks of rdd-'Ilest Republican political 
pOvler, connected to George Humphrey, secretary of the 
Treasury in the EisenhovTer administration and to John J. 
McCloy, chairman of the Rockefeller controlled Chase 
11aOOa ttan Bank. 
88 Some of Lucas Lopes t economic connections vTere: 
Linkages 
F.A. Sievart 
J .R. Fragos a 
O.C. Fletcher 
F.A. Sievart 
O.C. Fletcher 
A. Torres Filho 
Benedito Munhoz 
Carvalho 
A!:'.aro Lanari 
Joa~uim R. 
Lanari 
Comnanies 
'- Aluminio do Brasil ~ 
S.A. 
(ALD:rlIIITUH LTD. 
A1CA1'ir) 
-Aluminio }lIinas Gerais 
S.A. 
(ALTJ1ImnO DO BR.;\_SIL 
S .A.) 
- Cia. de Minerar;l'to 
Nova Limense 
-Lanari S .A. -
Indu~tria e Con:rci0 
(-CAR:l.L:\. S .A. Admin. 
e Part. 
-Soc. Com. Agropecuaria 
Part. Admin. 
ITA.PR'lAVA 
-Soc. Agr. de Part. 
e Admin. APA Ltda. 
-Com. Admin. e Part. 
JAPURA) 
LinlrJJ.ges 
R.C. Hachado 
T • V. da Cos ta 
R.C. Nachado 
ToV. da Costa 
Robert Clark 
i,-Tallace 
Cassio Umberto 
Lanari 
-Saint Mousson Financiere 
. (Bank Fina-Suisse) 
- ALCOllINAS 
. (Alcoa-Mellon Group) 
-Minera9ao Brasileira 
- Cia. Financiere Eternit 
- Philbro-j'·1iner 
Linkages 
Luiz Sim5es Lopes 
Comnanies 
- Horro do N1quel S .A. 
Minera9§:o Ind. e Com. 
(r,m'lERAQ1W SERTA,NEJA 
S.A. 
Cia. ESTAi'lliO S,..tro ,rOliO 
DEL HEI /Cia. ESTANHO 
MINAS DO EHASIL 
IE NICKEL S .A.) 
LinJr.ages 
Holf \'!einberg 
Nathan 
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Stefano Cattaneo 
Octacilio 
Gualberto 
- CIVILIT Ind. e 
Artefa tos de Cimen to 
Armada S .A. 
Lucien Hare Moser 
Lucas Nogueira 
Garces 
Max Graf 
- ETERNIT do Erasil Octacilio Gualberto 
-Cimento Amianto S.A. 
-ITT - Standard Electric 
-Cia. de Cimento Nacional 
de l1inas 
89 A. Eernardes Filho 1,.;ras also director of Eletror~;ar Industria 
Eletrica Brasileira and linked to The First National City 
Eank of New York, the Royal Eank of Canada, Cia. Empreen-
dimentos Administra~§:o e Investimentos, IEEC, DELTEC, 
Banco do Comereio and I'lestinghouse Electric, corporations 
th..a t played an important part in financing activities, 
of a subversive c}1~racter, against the ~gover.nment of 
Joao Goulart, and the popular movement. 
90 A. Torres Filho also served in the board of directors of: 
All American Cables, Cia. Radio Internacional do Brasil, 
Grandes Hoteis S.A., Transunion A.':lericana l:"gencias S .A. , 
Sabin St. Germain Inter A.~erica Inc., (all of the US based 
Norgan group), Cia. Industrial S!'!:o Paulo e Rio - CISPER 
(Owens Illinois Glass Co.), Cia. Geral de Hinas (A. Byngton 
Group), Brazilian Bauxite Co. Inc. a...'1d SClUth1;Testern Hetals 
Inc., Cia. Neridional de Hinera~2o (US Steel Oorporation), 
Babcock e.nd iJilcox Caldeiras S .A. Great Britain, Cia. 
Eletroquimica Pan Americana (Ha tte.razzo group), Naegeli S.A. 
Ind. Qu1.micas (l1arietta do Brasil, :Hartin Narietta 
Corpora tion and Comapa S • .1... of tile Naeg'eli Group). Nost of 
these corporations played an important part in financing 
activities of a subversive character against the 
government of Joao Goulart and the popular movenent. 
Some of the directors of these compenies I'lere also personally 
involved in political action. 
91 See Osny D. Pereira, Um TIese.iio a Di,snidade Naciona l , 
Rio de Janeirc,Civiliza9ito Brasileira, 1967. 
92 J. Knippers Black, on.cit., p. 87. 
93 P. Schmitter, op.cit., pp. 194, 438. See also pp. 150-152 
for the process of associa tional expansion and poli tici-
zation. 
94 P. Schmitter, on.cit., p. 195. 
95 For example, the new president of the Federation of 
Industries of Guanabara (then Federal Distri,ct), vThich 
was separated administratively and politically from the 
CNI, vras Zulfo de Freitas Hallman, i·rho himself ,{as 
associated vIi th European industrial interests (as can be 
seen in Appendix B). Zulfo de Freitas ~fullwzn also 
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revived the Industrial Centre of Rio de Janeiro. Horeover, 
vThen Daudt d 'Oliveira, an old industrialist and president 
of the Commercial Association of Rio de J2.!leiro, failed 
to impose his r.and-picked successor in 1952, a nevr group 
seized control, led by Rui Gomes de Alr1eida, I1ho '.'Tas 
related to industrial and financial EuroDean and North-
A~erican interests (as can be seen in Appendix B). Similar 
shifts in leadership, organizational vitality and technique 
occurred "'Tith the stro Paulo class assooiations, \'Thile, in 
subsequent yea r s, new industrial organizations were 
established in Rio Grande do Sul, Parana and Pernambuco. 
~fhen the Confederation of Commercial Associations of 
Brazil - CACB, Has finally set up, its :president, Rui Gomes 
de Almeida, claimed that it was the largest ne"ti'Tork of 
similar associations in the count~J, agg£egating the 
interests of 1. 340 associations, a total inflated by the 
inclusion of a large number of forei;n associations by I·ray 
of the Federation of F02':'eign Chambers of COIlI1:lerCe in Brazil, 
'.-Those president I·ras also Rui Gomes de Almeida. 
96 Boletim Info:r::t.£'. tivo - FIESP/cIESP No. 748, Sao Paulo, 
5th February, 1964. VolUI:J.e L.,'(XXII. 
97 For further info~2ation on their economic co~~ections and 
links, see Appendix B. 
98 For further information on their economic connections and 
1in1:s, see Appendix E. 
99 Other influential figures lin::ed. to the CT,SSP throughout 
the latter years yrere: Alfredo Buzaid, .lI .• O. Ca...r-rpiglia, 
A.c. Pacheco e Silva, Antonio Gontijo Ce,:r;v2.lho, Egon Felix 
Gottschalk, Jose J3::mcinhas, Lucas Nogueira Garces and 
Roberto Campos, many of \{hom ':[ere mili te,nt L1e,Dbers of the 
organized action of the bourgeoisie aC;'finst the rw.tiOD2.l-
reformist executive. In ProbleT:l8,s Br2.si 1 eiros Ho. 88, 
Decec.lber 1970, SESC publication, p. 2. 
The Digesto Economico was the official organ of the Commercial 
Association of Sao Paulo. 
100 For the comprehensive list of individuals and corporate 
members, see Appendix E. The Federe.ticn of Anerican 
Chambers of Commerce i'<'as the representative body of 
corporations that wade part of the Latin Arlerican 
Information Committee, the Business Group for Latin 
America and the Committee for EconoDic Deve10pBent. 
Host of the members of the Federation of Anerican 
Chambers of Commerce listed, had Llore economic linl::s 
than the ones mentioned. For furtner inforuation on 
their economic connections, see Appendix B. 
101 See Appendix B for further infoI'J!1.a tion on economic 
connections. 
102 P. Schrnitter, OF.cit., p. 197. COlTCLAP S§:o Paulo seems 
to have furnished a cover for clandestine conspiratorial 
activi ties against the Goulart gave rnnent, "\-Tillle publicly 
taking a stand for parlie.me:ltarian institutions. 
103 L'ldus tri2. :Brasileiro, de r'Equines, C2. talogo BANAS, 1960, 
Sao Paulo, pp. 15-17. 
104 T. dos Santos, El Nuevo Caracter, ou.cit., p. 75. 
The cut in loans and credits to G'Julart's goverm1ent, as 
'>Tell as the US Gove:rn:went' s policy of selective and 
intensive aid to p8.rticular governors and policies in 
the period betiofeen 1962 and 1964, knOlm as the building 
of 'isl2.nds of sanity' i,rere clear exe.NPles of t:b..is 
political intromission of a foreicn G''')vernrnent in the 
internal affairs of Brazil, acetted by ~tinational 
corporations. 
105 See Telegram from Ambassador Lincoln GGrO.on to the US 
Secreta~J of State, No. 1964, 9th April, 1963, POF, 
in JFT.l Archives. 
106 J. Kniypers :Black, op.cit., p. 79. 
107 :Business organizations have maint2.ined 211 effective lobby 
on foreign policy issues throuGh institutions like the 
Council on Foreign Relations and similar organizations. 
US foreign policy-nal{ers have heeded tne requests of 
these business organizations. See Richard. He'.-rfa:-c::er 
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and \lillard Hueller, Renort to the Subconrni ttee on 
Nultinational COrDorations, Conulittee on Foreign Relations 
of the United States Senate, August 1975, :9p. 152-153. 
For an insight into the Business C:mncil of Latin iL"1erica 
Oyera tions, see their role in Chile in Thomas POi1ers, 
I In siele the Department of Dirty Tricl:s~ in The A tlan tic 
:Boston, August 1979, Volur:Ie 244, No. 2, ~J? 33-64. 
108 J. Knippers Black, op.cit., p. 80. 
1,6 
109 It is i...'1teresting to revie,., the list of corporations "Ihose 
directoX'S constituted that Committee. They ilere: 
1) Grace Line; 2) Caterpillar Tractor Co.; 3) Godfrey 
L. Cabot; 4) The Anaconda Co.; 5) Standard Oil; 6) Y.l2..rshal 
Erdnan; 7) Koppers Co., 8) University of North Carolina; 
9) Sea.:r:s, Roebuck and Co.; 10) 'dillys Hotors; 11) Aluminium 
Co.; 12) Ford Motor Co.; 13) James C. Horelland and Son Co; 
14) Johns Nanville International; 15) International Ninerals 
and Chemical Corp; 16) Food Hachinern 17) General Foods 
Corp; 18)1.lhirlpool Corp.; 19) Chase HfJ11Mttan Bank; 
20j The Pillsbury Co.; 21) Pan Anerican 1dorld AiY'l.\Tays; 
22 pJ.Qerican ~fuchine; 23) The First Easton Corp.; 
24 First National City Bank. See'Revista das Classes 
Produtoras ~ July 1962, in Osny D. Pereira, '0 Acoruo 
sabre a. Garantia de InvestiL1entos PTiv8,dos entre 0 Brasil 
e -()Ts.-E.s .. t.a~~os.Uniclos', fn Revista civiliz'agffo:l3'r~sil-ei ;a, Hay 
1965, No.2, pp. 114-115. Brazili8~ based directors of 
these companies 'Irould, by 1962, be p2.rt of the policy-
making bodies of the organized action of the class and many 
of these companies vlould become economio sup:porting 
entities of their political cau~aicn against the national-
reforBist executive. 
110 Acoording to fo:rmer US anbassador in Chile, Edl·rard Ko:::'ry, 
i·rhen President Kennedy and David Rockefeller both attended 
a Harvaru Universi ty Bo~~rd of Overseers meeting in 1963, 
Kennedy persuaded Rockefeller to org'3J.1.ize Ane:::,ic2n big 
bus:L'I1ess for the anti-0astro crusade .... David Rookefeller 
recruited 37 leading multinationals to form the Business 
Group for Latin A..m.erica. Robert Kennedy, tl1e Attorney 
Genera.l, systenatioally integr2.ted me::1bers of the Business 
Group into CIA progr2.J.ilDes. As an inducement to RQc~:efeller, 
President Kennedy pledged that he ,;o1..ud satisfy the fonJer's 
request for no-3.oss guara~1tees on 8.J."1.y futu:::oe investD.eDt in 
Latin iL'7lerioa. Edw'ard Korr'J, Ed"·Te.rd Korr'/, I The sell-out 
of Chile and the American Ta.."Cpayer~ in Penthouse, He.rch 1978, 
:po 72. According to Levinson and De Q<1is, durbg .::lost of 
the Alliance period, US policy-nakers have been advised 
by the Business Group on the vie'ors ';)f t:iS b'C..siness 
oonnuni ty '.d th resyect to the Alliance for PTogress. In 
1965, the Business Group expanded int:} the Council for 
Latin .~!erica - CLA., again led by Rockefeller and 
representing sone 224 corpoJ:.'ations, 9.:::rpro:d:lately 85)": 
of all US companies doinG' business in Latin .;\..:'.'.erica. 
CLA holds regular meetings 1.Q th state, AID, IBIID, IDB, 
CUJ? and other government agencies 1.Those ,'Torle may e.£,fect 
US business interests in Latin k~erica. Its board of 
trustees meets tvTO to three times a year fcJ:.' consul tati()ns 
,'Ii th US governnent officials in iJashington. The C)uncil 
for LO.tin il,f).erica also includes area subcon':li ttees 
correspond:LYJg to the State and AID des~cs :::'espm}8ible for 
particu12.r geographic areas - Brazil, Pe~l, 2.11d bcuador, 
Bolivia 8.:1d Chile, Central k.1erica etc. The subcon;ni ttees 
meet info:rmally "Ti th their State and AID c01.mter:9arts hlo 
OJ:.' three ti;:1es a year to exoha.n3B vie'\iS on econonic end 
political trends and investnent clin2.te. In JerorJe 
Levinson and JUHnDe Onis t Tbe Alli2.nce that lost its '.fay, 
A CJ:.'i tical Reuort on the ALPRO, Chicago, C"uad:::'angle Bool:s t 
1970, p. 159. See also Peter Collier and :David Horo'..Ji tz 
The Rockefellers: An American D~mast;y, He"T York, Signet 
Books, 1976, pp. 411-415. 
III Noman Blume, Pressure Groups and Decision-1:Jakin.o' in 
Brazil, Saint Louis, '.fashington Uni versi ty, 196771968, 
p. 211. These class organizations provided the 
opportunity for the capitalist class to get itself 
together, to 'Hork out ideas on the broad lines cf the 
correct foreign policy to adopt. These class orgBni-
zations also provided the opportunity to incorporate 
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into this consensus building operation, other individ~~ls 
,·rho ,{ere outside the capitalist class proper and '.-Those 
roles are important in implementing the policy, such as 
intellectuals, milita~J, politicians and bureaucrats. 
See Lm-Trence H. Shoup and Uilliam Hinter, Inperial 
Brein Trust, lie"J York, Honthly Revie,'T, 1977, p. 85. 
112 The CED and the Business Council both have 200 3embers 
and, in each case, 2q~ of these me:~lbers are ner::.bers of the 
Council for Foreign Relations. Several other lD:lerican 
entrepreneurial organizations are, in different 'irays and 
degrees, related to the C:FR. Among them, the National 
Association of Hanuiacturers, the lifctional Foreign Tmde 
Council, the National Industric:;,l Conference Board end the 
Cha.t:1ber of CODlllerce of the United States. Shoup and 
I'linter, op.ci t., p. 110. 
113 1.1. Domhof! in Shoup and Hinter, oP.ci't., Fore,'Tord VII .. VIII. 
'E.'1e inteno.l pOI'Ter structu.re of tl~e CPR e:c)ressed the 
pre-eminence of financial 6'1.'OU9S, )artic1.1.lo.rly of the 
Ne,v York based financial oligarchy, f.none the doninant 
classes in the United States. The :W';'Ter structure of the 
CFR has pointed to the pa:cticuls.r lse.dershi:9 :role :ylayed 
by the Horgan Group first, and in the last 30 yee.rs, to 
that of the Rockefeller G::coup, in a ::!9.ttern of infom.al 
coordina tion Hi thin a gener8.l frt~r.:e,'T':;rk of cooperation of 
the different groups, ro.t:ller tl12n of cle2.r-out oOI:1r.land. 
The centreli ty of the l'l'e,v York fin2ncie.l oliGSrciW in the 
Courlcil did not ir:1ply the cosplete exclusion of other 
fin2.ncial grou:?S, nor tlle lack of contact ',Ii th tl-:.em. 
In Shoup and ~11inter t s study, a piotv2'e of ne'b.J~:C~:s tjrinc 
n'U:Jbers of t~-:.e ;:1aj,')r corpore.tions tOg'2tller in coopere.ting 
finanoial inteTests, has energecl. T:-:.e ties consisted of 
interlockinC; directoTa tes, holdine of stoc~;:, loans 2.nd 
a Hide variety of other links. P1a;yinc; a proninent role 
in each group ,'Tere geneTally one or nore financie.l 
institutions, paTtic~1.larly the larc;e cODDercial banks. 
Shoup and I'linter, .QI2. cit., pp. 100-103. ;'l.cccrding to 
Shoup and I'linter, co~anies '.Ti th close Cou..rlOil interlocl:s 
"'Tere the Chase Han~2. tt8.D 3anl-::, Ci::.e::Jioal :B2nk, Bank of 
Ne'i! York, Equitable Life, Hetropolikn Life, Bobil Oil, 
Ku..1m, Loe'o, J)ebevoise, Plir.rpton, L:ro:1s 8.:.'1d Gates, Hil'o2-Y}l,:, 
TI'Teed, Hs,dly and HcCloy, St811Q3.rd Oil N.J. (3.00ke£e11e::c 
Group), J.P. HO:L'gan and Company, Ho:cgan Stanley, Nell York 
Life, Hutual of HeH York, Davis, Polk, US Steel, Ge:'1er2,1 
:Slectrio and 1311, tied 1,'li th the First HiJ. tiono.l City GTOUp, 
Fi::cst National City Bank, SheaI"JoD and Sterling, ITT 
(HorQ.?n Group), Brmm Brothers Harriman 2nd Co., (Harri'-1an 
Group), ~err-.1an Brothers, General A:-:1.Grican Investors 
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(Lehr:1an, Goldnan, Sachs Group) the Sullivan and CroTIn'Tell 
Group and EI Dupont de Nemours (Dupont Group). 
114 Shoup and }linter, 0Q.cit., pp. 97-99. In a list of 
firms ilTi th four or more council menbers as.directors 
or partners, Shoup and I'linter noted tbat, in the 
industrial sectors, US Steel had 8 meJ!lbers, IIIobil Oil, 
7 members, Standard Oil N.J., 6 members, IBN, 6 members, 
ITT, 5 mer.:lbers, General Electric, 4 J!lenbers, EI Dupont 
de Nemours, 4 members. In the commercial banking 
sector, Chase Hanl1attan Bank had 8 members, J.P. Horgan 
ili~d Co., 8 members, First National City BruU(, 7 members, 
Chemical Bank, 7 members, Brovm Brothers Harriman and Co., 
6 members, Bank of Ne,·r York, 4 mGmbers. A.mong the 
Life insurance companies, Equitable Life :il..s.d 9 menbers, 
He"r York Life, 8 members, Hetropolitan Life, 4 nenbers, 
Hutual of UeH York, 4 mer,1bers. From tne Investment 
Banks, Horgan Stanley had 6 members, Krum, Loeb, 4 ner1bers, 
Leb.san Brothers, 4 menbers. 110reover, it is l)ertinent 
to note that 200 US firms own over 75?~ of all US Foreign 
Investment, See Nevrfarrner and Hueller, O"P.ci t., p. 146. 
115 Shoup and Hinter, oD.ci t., pp. 278-279. 
116 The executive of CLA had, by 1970, 20 directors; ten of 
them ' .. Tere in the cm and one Has 2. CFR director. 
Shoup and Ninter, op.ci t., pp. 72-74. By 1972, the CLA 
incorporated, among others, in its steering COI1Jll ttee Hhich 
supervised the day-to-day operations, Richnrd S. Aldrich, 
J8.ck D. Neal, Esteban A. Ferrer, :Snno Robbing, Herbert K. 
Hay, Hichs.el D. Niller, Half Brent, Jos~ de Cucas and 
lJilliam :3. Barlm·l. The Council Executive COJl1.rU ttee for 
1972, elected by the Board of T~~stees consisted of: 
iJilliam E. Barlovr, Chairman of 
the Executive Co~~ttee 
John F. Gallagher, Senior Vice 
C1~airr:1an and Regi onal Vice 
Chairv.an for the Niddle 1;lest 
Captain John "vI. Clarl(, 3.egional 
Vice Ci1air:-:lan for the South,·rest 
Alfred \1. Eames, Hegional Vice 
Chairr::an for the 1:Test 
Charles J. Zi·rick, Hegional Vice 
ChaiJ.:::lan for the Southeast 
i.Tilliam H. Hickey, Council 
SecTetax"'J 
Joseph ';[. iJelsh, Council 
Treasuxer 
Alphonse De Rosso, Assistant 
Tree.s··).rer 
':l.H. Conzen 
Donald H. Cox 
He.rlm·, '.1. Gage 
Naurice F. Granville 
Jo1m D. Har]er 
Gilbert E. Jones 
Edgar F. Kaiser 
John R. Kimberly 
Thomas D. Lunpkin 
AUb"Llstine R. E2rusi 
R:)®..an Roc~-::e£'eller 
Dan Sey::1oux 
Jose de Cubas, Council 
P:resident c.nd Cho,i:rnan 
HenrJ R. Geyelin, 
Council Executive and 
Vice President 
David Rockefeller, 
HonoTary Ch2.i2T1an 
For infoTIl8.tion on the ::le!:lbers of the Boo.:rd of ':i:rJ.stees, 
see Appendix F. J...mong the staff of eLA '.,reTe: 
Enno Hobbing, Vice President; Dr. Estebru1 Ferrer, Vice 
President; Ralf Erent, Vice President and Senior Con-
sul tant; Jay Kingham, Executive Assistcmt; Jim I-forse, 
Director Academic & Institutional Relations; }lichael D. 
Hiller, 'dashington Director; Hunberto Cortina, Lima; 
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Herbert Huller, Euenos Aires; Jack E. ~Iyant, Rio de Janeiro. 
Jack I'lyant had been an A..r:JericD.n Enbassy official under 
Anbassador Lincoln Gordon, in the pel~od preceding the 
~ of April, 1964. 
117 By 1966, the Brookings Institution had 7 out of 22 
of its trustees in the Council (325~) and 2 vlere CPR 
directors; the Rand Corporation had 20 trustees, 9 in 
Council (45%) and 2 CFR directors; the Institute for 
Defence Analysis had, ~r 1969, 22 trustees, 9 in Council 
(41%) and 4 CPR directors; the Hudson Institute ~~d, by 
1970, 14 trustees, 8 in Council (5~~) and no CFR directors. 
The Council for Fo:;:.>eign Relations 2.1so i:<1terlocked "\d th 
the Foreign Policy Association (74 directors, 31 in 
Council); the National Planning Associa.tion (39 clirectJrs, 
8 in Council); the i~erican Universities Field Staff 
(32 directors, 8 in Council); and the .~~erican Assembly 
(20 directors, 12 in Council). 
118 Shoup and Hinter, o;p.ci t., ;po 62. Five of t:le eight 
menbers of the Rockefeller C01:mrission, established in 
1975, to probe the illeg2.1 do::::estic activities of the 
CIlI., Here Council for Foreign Relations ne:-.1bers. 
119 Victor Harchetti and J. Nar}-cs, rvl:.e CIA 2J1d the C'J.lt of 
Intel1 iqence, Nei'; York, Knopf, 1974, p. 267. 
120 Airgram to Department of State, froD. .ADe::dcan Consul in 
Sao Paulo, 16th August, 1963, p. 4. Ref: Congen A 404. 
Drafted by Datus C. Pro,)er NSF, in JFT( ~\rchives. 
121 rvelegram from .iL':J.bass8.dor Lincoln Gordon to US Secretary 
of State, 9th April, 1963, Control 7279 - POP, in 
JFK .iLrchi ves • 
122 ~. Ivan Hasslocher and CPI, 27th Novenber, 1963. 
Initial support C2De from such varied Clu8rters 2.8 th")se of 
Dam Helder Camara, Sergio He.cedo, C2.rlos Eeis and 
Francisco LaD?reia. 
123 (ESP, 10th ii..'J.gnst, 1963. 
124 P. Schill. tter, 0'0. cit., :po 278. 
125 J)e:::mty J08.0 Doria - 'nA]): ~Uiena<;2.o daS')oe:rania. N2.cional', 
• D 1 't' '.T • P . t 1 1 n "3 ~~ D 1 (" 1 lr1 .L 0 1 lca e l~e?'oClOS, ~ 0.1:' ,_/J, uc::.O ~ a1..LO. -)ee 3._S0 
Robinson Rojas, Estados Unidos en Erasil, Santiago de 
Chile, Prensa La tino2Jl1eric2.D[;' S .~'i.., 1965, y. Ill. 
126 Philip Agee, Inside the Cor.nany, London, Pen::''"1.lin, 1975, 
P? 321, 603. 
127 J. Knippers Black, op.cit., p. 72. 
128 J os e Arthux Ri os, 'Os Grup os de Pre s sa 0 na Guana bara' in 
COmDorta~ento Eleitoral no Erasil, edited by T. 
180 
Cavalc~nti and Reisky Dubnic, Rio de Janeiro, FGV, 1964, 
pp. 148-149. Jose Arthux llios '-72.S a lectuxer of sociology 
at Ponti ficia Uni versidade Ca tali en, a neBber of TIES, 
Na tional Institute of Higher Studies and of SPL.A.lT, a 
technical agency. Gladstone's brother, Gabriel Chaves de 
Nello, 'Ivas the director of Acao Denocra tica, IB..W' s 
ne\-rspaper, and the ooordinator of the radio-netvrork of 
IBXD. See Plinio de Abreu Ranos, Cono Agem os Grupos 
de Pressao, Rio de Janeiro, Editora Civiliz8Qao Brasileira, 
1963, pp. 54, 60-62. 
129 The Hovinento Ponular Janio Quad'Y'os m:"s one of the :::lost 
significant channels for aggT62;a ting diverse sectors and 
.individuals into supporting Quadros' oandidacy headinG a 
unified slate of the centre-right. The lIPJQ also 
provided ali n k with the popul3.r vote. The 'pa txon I 
of the HPJQ, Has ESG General Juarez Tavora and its honoraxy 
president i'laS Carvalho Pinto. Joao Ribeiro Dantas, 
director of the Diario de Noticie,s, of Rio de Janeiro, 
I-ras pre sident; ArthLU' Oscar Junqueira 1;las executive secre-
tary; Jose Aparecido de Oliveira uas political secretary; 
Prudente de Horais Neto ,·ms vice president of tl:e 
Politioal Counoil, jointly Hith Senator J08.quim Paxente. 
Councillors 'YTere, among others: Colonel Adil de Oliveira, 
Antonio Leopoldino, A<i.':1iral Auxelio LinDa,res, Deputy 
Br:L[;"ido Tinoco, Jose lqarecido de 0liveiro., Gladstone 
Chaves de Hello, General Joao Gentil B2.rb8.to, Helio Cassio 
r.:Iuniz de Souza, Jose Candido Horeim de S:J1..lza, Jose Luiz 
Noreira de Souza, Captain Jose Chaves L.':uneirl!o (an 
activist in the attempted coun of J2.o8.reacanga), Jose da 
Costa Porta., Minister Jose Pereixa Lira, Hajor Leopoldino 
F-.ceire, Peter Hurany, Colonel Salvadox Correa de Sa', 
Colonel 'Halter Peracchi Barcellos 8....-r:ld Vnnclick L. da 
Nobrega.. Colonel Henezes Cortes provided orl::,-'2.niza tional 
expertise. Host of these nilit8.ry, entxe:yreneurs, ,-rho 
vere affiliates of the above-L',enti::med class associations 
and ~rofessional politicians ,·muld, i...'1i tially, be part of 
the BAD structure, and la ter on, of the IISS struc-t-Gr8, 
as 03.Jl be seen in ChaptErs V, VI, VII and VIII. 
Carlos Casiilho Cabral, Temnos de Janio e OLltros Ten1) os , 
Rio de Janeiro, Edi t:)ra Civiliza.<f&O Bre.sileira, 1962, 
pp. 199, 279-281. 
130 Cados C8.stilho Cabral, Testimony 1:;X tl~e CPI of 
29th August, 1963, in OSSP, 30th AU6~st, 1963. 
131 Honiz Bandeir8., 0 G0verno ••• , op.cit., ~'). 67-74. 
132 Other i'if}.1.reS in the direction )f C2.dernos 3rc.si lei ros 
Here Jose Garrido Torres, Afranio Couti:n,.~o, Nuno Velloso, 
Luiz Oxlando Carneiro and Guimarges P.:::.cliE,a. 
133 
121 
Pol:Ctica e Neg-ocios, 26th August, 1963, Sao Paulo, p. 20. 
See also P. AgBe, op.cit., p. 618 and Jose Arthur Rios, 
on.cit., p. 149. 
134 The list of activists and related persons, as ':Tell as 
those of beneficiaries and recipients of various sorts 
of aid,i'lere drawn from :LPES, IE.AD and ADEP docUI!lents, out 
of the !PES Archive, Rio. Other pUblications consulted 
'Here: J. Y.nipper ::Black, oD.cit.; Eloy Dutra, IBlill Sigla 
da Corrupc;ao, 1963; Eduar Horel, 0 GolDe C08eQou em 
Hashington. 1965; P. Agee, op.cit.; Plinio de Abreu Ramos, 
Como Agem os GruDos de Pressao, 1963; H. Bandeira, op.ci t.; 
John F. Dulles, Un-rest in ::Brazil - Political Hilitary 
Crisis 1955-1964, 1969; Joseph A. Page, The ReV81ution 
too t never , .. ,as, 1972. Also consul ted i·rere nei-Tspapers, 
Jornal do ::Brasil, Estado de Sao Paulo, of 1962-1964 and 
politica e Negocios of 1962 and 1963. 
135 Elizabeth Carneiro Campos testified before the CPI 
investigating the activities of IBAD and IPES, tl18.t Cortes 
"Tas linked to Ivan Hasslocher, in~, 30th AUGu,st, 1963. 
IBAD/ADEP/Promotion S.A. also established a p'OHerful 
net..,ork of support throug.h.out the r1..1,ral areas x'1d in the 
capital cities of the north, northeast and centre-south. 
Among their affiliates and supporters ,-rere, Feruando Costa, 
director of DAD's medical service in the northeast; 
Salvador da Grasia (Porto Alegre - RGS); Ezeq.1.riel r.J:enezes, 
Aloio Borba, Hilton Nota Fernandes, HOI.len Pereira (all 
from Ceara); Geraldo Alonso; iiTober Lopes Pinheiro, 
AUgtlStO Alves R.ocha, 110 Fernandes Costa, Francisco 
Dant.s,s Guedes (all from Rio Grande do ll'orte); O::c:lando 
Paraim, Antonio Correa Oliveira, Adcildo Couticl~o Beltrao 
(all from Pernat-:lbuco); Ib Gatto Falcao, :!iveraldo Hacedo de 
Almeida (all from Alagoas); Jose Gregorio da Fonseca, 
(Vice Prefeito Tres Rios, ~ crucial operational place 
for the Bili tary coUP of 1964)and di:::.'ector of 'Correio 
Trirriense I, the ~l nei'!Spaper); Ker::an Nunes de He tos, 
Audalio Antonio Candido, Jo8:o Batista Teixeira Filho (all 
from Tres Hios); Nurilo Dantas, Jose Teixeira Hachado, 
Edson Br~sil, Fr2ncisco Costa Garcez (~ll fron Sergipe); 
Jo8:o Hendes Neto, Ger:r..ano Hr',chado, Oscar Cardoso, 
and Epaminondas Honcorvo (all froD :Bahia). 
136 Oscar Junqueira, Testimony to the cpr on D3.iill/IP.:::S in 
Q8SP, 14th October, 1963. 
137 'The CPI of IDAJ)~ i!l§E" 28th Se)tenoer, 1963. 
138 Jorg-e Oscarcle Hello Flores, flJBSCE, Rio, llth:Hay, 1962. 
Also Garrido Torres, IJ?ES CD, Rio, 11th H.9.Y, 1962. Joint 
executive neetinGs "lere a regttlar feature to ooordin~te 
political strategy and action. OD such occcsioDs, Hasslocher 
rnet Glycan de Paiva, General Golce~J do Couto e Silva, 
Jose Rubem Fonseca, Dario de Alneicle. 112.::;-al}1e'es, He.rold 
Cecil Polland a:'ld Gilbert Huber Jr., 8...'10DG ot?lers, 'iTho 
constituted part of the leadership of I?ES. See also 
IPES l'Jinutes CE, 30th AUgLlSt, 1962. IBAD functioned 
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at 271 i>Tarechal Ca,-nara, Apartment 801, in Rio de Janeiro. 
In the s~~e building functioned Promotion S.A. 
139 C. Hasenbalg and C. Erigagao, 'ForE.9~O do Enpresario 
Financeiro no Brasil', in Dados, PLio de Janeiro, 1971, 
pp. 81-84. 
140 SaDuel Finer, Private Industry and Political PO'\'rer, 
R2_YTIsay Nuir Lecture, Pall 11all Paraph1et, 1958, p. 19. 
141 Ao Gramsci, on.cit., p. 185. 
142 Intervie',T ',vi th Harsha1 . Cordeiro de Fa:cias, Rio de 
Janeiro, 16th June, 1976. See also General Cordeiro de 
Farias, 'A SeguranQa Nacional no Panorama Hundia1 da 
A tualidade', ESG Document C-01-61, pp. 19-20. Speaking 
at the ESG, General Cordeiro noted t:L1at: IISide by side 
'\dth chiefs and officers of tl:.e tlITee se:r:'Vices, 'de find 
here civilians, victors in their cUfferellt activities, 
lITho, after a year of joint vork, I1us'c d.epa::ct together, 
' .. ri th the clear I1ission of being conscious soldiers of 
tbis crusade vlhich is the implantation in our land of 
the postulates of National Security". Althou€h General 
Cordeiro recognized that, in its short existence, the 
ESG did not have enough tine to Itinfluence J3razi1 1t , he ,"'ras 
II convinced the.t the tiDe '.-.'ill come, end shortly, ;.1hen 
the ESG, because of the studies it accom:;'Jlisl:es, \-Ii thaut 
dOgDatic distortions, but foremost as a centre feT 
debates, ,-rill f.1Qr~': its exis tence ns the propeller of 
our progress ll • (Ny translation, RAD) Q 
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L'Yltroduction 
This chapter is concerned ',a th the perception 1 ':Ihich the 
dominant economic fractions had of the critical conjuncture of 
the early 1960s. The chapter also describes the conflicting 
interests and denands I-Thich were raised against the populist 
polity, by t"lvo :cain social forces: the multinational-associated 
socioeconomic interests and the mobilized vlorking classes, led by 
a national-reformist executive. 2 
MUltinational and associated interests ai2ed initially at 
sharing pO'Yler i,Ii th the populist class convergence in control of 
the state. Under Kubitschek's presidency, they succeeded in by-
passing the corporatist channels of articulation of interests, 
in the guise of a parallel administration and in forHarding their 
general de::lands through ne':T pressure associations. At the SaI118 
tiDe, they sup:ported the containDent ·'Jf tl"le po:pula:::- classes 
through forms sf limited political mobilization. Zubitschek's 
governnent also allowed for the integration of sectors of the 
urbm industr::'al ~.vorking classes ar:d the satisfaction of the 
middle la:rers, as ' . Jell as the t::-tal control 'Jf the rural 'dor~:ing 
:nasses. This 1ml tiple I conciliation' of interests and dive2.'se 
~')ressu:;::-es 'Ie.S ::1eve:;::- repeated to such 12.J.YJ. exte!:t ['.fter Kubitschekis 
]resideDc~r. In a 'day, the period rev881sd i tse1f as the fullest 
effective ezpression of populism, in coth socio-econoDic and 
poli tical res)ects. 3 However, by too. end of the 1950s, the st::ruc-
tural inconsistencies of the populist class converge:~ce began to 
surface. 
18i+ 
1. The Transition Period: from Lobbying Tactics to Government 
Kubi tschek' s PSD-led popUlist governnent cane to an end in 
1960. Janio Quadros' candidacy represented the last civilian 
electoral attempt by big capital at shari:'1g state pmfer 'di th 
the established populist bloc. i-Ti th Q.uadros' presidential term, 
the populist pact lvaS stretched to extremes, reducing the room 
for compromise behreen the dominant groups. 4 Nultinational and 
associated interests constituted, ,-Ti th the ag-.co-export sector, 
a modernizing-conservative bloc .. {hich attempted to gain the 
presidency through Quadros' o .. m brand of UDN-PDC led populism. 
This alignment had as much to do 'tTi th Quadros' open foreign 
policy as \'fi th the drive to regiment the masses and rationalize 
the economy_ 5 
'\'Tho. t gave the UDN-machine a Pyrric victor'! over the PSD 
fe-rces in the elections of 1960 '.vas not so much the natL.cral 
attrition of the past governing party, nor the action of the 
dominant economic groups, as the popular fascine.tion ,rith the 
grand Janista denagogJ. 6 The mood ':Tas cleverly propagandized 
by bill boards portraying Quadros i symbol, the orc1om, and his 
declared intention to S'ITeep the countr'J cles.n. Thus appeared 
in Brazilian politics, for a ver'J brief period, an element of 
electoral 'C2.esarism; 1.d th Quadros as dictator of the electcral 
ba ttle field. 'd~:ile Quadros vas elected on his pla-:;fom, his 
slate conpanion, l':Til ton Carnpos, the Hinas Gerais jurist, 
perceived as an expression of the tracli tione.l forces , .. Thich had 
domina ted the countr'J, ,Tas rejected by the popular vote for the 
vice-presidential seat. Instead, the vice-presiClenc:r '.'lent to 
J08.0 Goulart, the candidate of the PTE :ed coalition of forces, 
heir apparent to Getulio Vargas, elected massively on his 
reform oriented and distributionist public stance. 7 
Goulart's ballot ticket companion, General Henrique 
Teixeira Lott, the PSD-backed candidate for the ~residency, 
vms defeated. For the third consecutive time since their 
experience vath General Dutra's government after tDe fall of 
the Estado Novo, Brazilians had denied a Dilitary officer the 
presidency. 8 The verdict of the polls ;-TaS t:lat the masses of 
the ::Brazilian population, 'vThen consul ted, gave their support to 
a combination of social popular reforms, nationalistic develop-
ment and administrative austerity and efficiency. This 'das a 
far cr-J from the economic order envisaged by mul tina tional and 
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associated entrepreneurial interests and the notion of 'progress' 
upheld by the upper middle class. 
lim'lever, it Has not long bef'Jre it beCaDe clear that 
beneath the Janista rhetoric, other forces wd yolicies ':Tere at 
vlork. Once Quadros 'das elected, CClTCLAP presented hin "Iii tll an 
i::Qpor-tant dOC"LE:ellt, called 'Suggestions f~)r a Natione,l Polic:r of 
Developnent,.9 The document called for a reass8::-tion of private 
enterprise and foreign capital in the plwning of developnent, the 
curbing of popular mobilization and state intervention, the re-
defini tion of state functions, meaSl..:res against inflation and 
overhaul of the administration. It 'd8,S ~13,ncled in to -president 
Quadros by COITCLAP leaders, Eneas de Alneida Fontes and JorGe 
Beh::dng de Ha ttcs, ':Ii th the support of J .AQ 13ezerra de Hedeiros, 
Paulo Ferraz, Lair Bocaiuva Besso., J .B. Leopolclo Figueiredo, 
Lauro Carvalho, A. Xavier do. Sil'.7a, Osc2.r de Oliveira, 3:2.::d.l ton 
Fe c-:':ce ira , A. ?cibeir'=' Neto, A.J. Fe:creira D::'as, iI. Hilc:lac.es Sa 
F:c'eire de Souza, 2.nd lTei Lauda. The policy suggestions cf the 
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document inspired Quadros' government and were later to be 
basic tennets of the programme of the entrepreneurial classes 
in their anti-Goulart campaign. 
Q~dros appointed an executive that suited the modernizing-
conservative socio-economic forces. Important multinational and 
associated economic groups, the top entrepreneurial class 
associations, members of CONSULTEC and the core of the Superior 
War College were included in his cabinet, in the public adminis-
tration, and occupied the commanding posts of the military 
hierarchy. 
Included in his cabinet were: Clemente Mariani (:Banco da 
:Bahia, Light SA - Morgan Group), Minister of the Treasury; 
Arthur :Bernardes Filho (The Royal Bank of Canada, Westinghouse -
Mellon Group and :Banco do Comercio), Minister of Industry and 
-
Commerce; Walter Moreira Salles (Moreira Salles banking and 
industrial group, linked to the Rockefeller group) who was 
appointed ambassador to the USA; Oscar Pedroso Horta (Mellon 
Group) became Minister of Justice; Francisco Carlos de Castro 
Neves (FIESP), Minister of Labour and Caio Mario da Silva Pereira, 
a former Hanna Mining lawyer who became Consultor Geral da RepUbli~~. 
The administration appointed entrepreneur Joao :Baptista Leopoldo 
Figueiredo (American Chambers of Commerce active member and 
CONCLAP leader) as Head of the :Bank of :Brazil; entrepreneur 
Paulo Ayres Filho (FIESP and American Chambers of Commerce active 
member) became the Bank's director. The administration also 
relied on the expertise and advice of CONSULTEC members Lucas 
Lopes; J.L. Bulhoes Pedreira as coordinator for the Technical 
Advisory Commission to the President; Octavio Gouveia de Bulhoesj 
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Jose Garrido Torres aed Roberto de Oliveira Campos, ','1"ho also 
opera ted as roving &'J.bassador. Quadros' government "!;las supported 
militarily by ESG founders and ideolog~es, Colonel Golbery do 
Couta e Silva, as Head of Cabinet of the General Secretariat 
of the National Security Council, seconded by Lieutenant Heitor 
de Aquino Ferreira, Lieutenant Colonel Mario Andreazza and 
Lieutenant Colonel JoaoBaptista Figueiredo (nephe"r of the Bank 
of Brazil ~resident and son of General Euclidesde Figueiredo); 
Lieutenant Colonel "Halter Pires de Carvalho e Albuquerque of the 
Federal Service for Inforoation and COTh~terinforDation - SYleI; 
General Cordeiro de Farias, who presided over the General Staff 
of the Armed Forces, seconded by Colonel ETIlesto Geisel, as head 
of Army Intelligence and commander of the 3rasllia stationed key 
army ga~rison. 11 Furthermore, Quadros cow1ted on the support of: 
ESG-IBAD General Orlando Geisel, brother of Ernesto, wlw beca::J.e 
Head of the Ninisterial Cabinet and Chief of Staff of the Hinister 
of ;'Jar, Harshal Odilio Denys; General Idalio Sardenberg as head of 
Petrobras and General Ademar de Queiroz as Head of the Vila Hilitar 
the all i:r.rportant Rio de Janeiro garrison. General Ade::lar also 
becaI:1e subhead of the General Staff. 12 Another featu~e of this 
period '..ras the placing in key cOr.llnanding or opinion shaping posts 
of other officers '!Tho bac~-{ed the right '..ring le8.ders of the aI'Ded 
forces and fav::;ured a strong hand against the political organization 
of tile popular forces. ThL'.s, General Hugo Panasco Al vim 
becaDe assista::.'1t of the ESG; IBAD General Jo3:o Funaro Bley, 
director of the Social Service of the j\::::'ID;'/; Generg,l Sizeno Sa~~ento 
Has a::;Jpointed Head of Police of Sao Paulo; I3PJ) General Ignacio 
Rolim became Read of the Hilitary Club; SSG Genere,l Pedro Gerald.o 
cle Alr:leida, Head of t':"'ce J:'Iili tary Housenolcl of the President; 
ESG :Brigadier Carlos Alberto Buet de Oliveira Sampaio, Heao. of 
the Air Force School; IBAD :Brigadier Isrr~ Erasil, Head of the 
General Staff of the Air Force; ESG geopolitical ideologist 
:Brigadier Clovis Travassos, Director of Civil Aviation; and 
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IBAD General Decio Palmeiro Escobar went to the Department of 
Provision of the Army. :By appointing i'larshal Odilio Denys 
}1inister of the 1u:my, Admiral Silvio Heck as Hinister of the 
Navy and DAD Brigadier Gabriel Grun Hoss as Air Force r·1inister, 
Quadros topped his military support ivi th the right wing leade~'s 
of the Armed Forces. 
The Quadros presidency was a close expression of the new 
relation of social forces and neiv economic power groups, '.vi th 
policies matching the recommendations of entrepreneurial interest 
groups. 13 It is not by chance that for ESG officers, Jm1io 
Quadxos stood out positively among the succession of govern:c.ents 
elected since 1945. He seemed to the ESG cluster lithe negation 
of demago~J, and therefore, of populism; although a populist 
himself, he gambled his electoral ch~~ces against the heirs 
of getulismo, the left and the governmental dema!?,'ogyll ~4 This 
view s<1uared vli th that of technoentrepreneur Paulo Ayres Filho, 
for whom liThe Election of Janio Q,uadros as President, late in 
1960, could have strengthened the democratic position in :Brazil 
because of his correct vievlS on Brazilian problerr:.s. He 'Nas 
bent on establishing a regime of austerity and authority 
in public adIT~nistration, rationalizing governmental activities, 
ano. fighting inflation. In addition, he had secured a solid 
popular support 1tihich lent him unquestioned authority over all 
social and political groups, despite the fact that he had been 
opposed in his electoral campaign by the Commu..~ist Party ('Nhich 
supported ?1arshal Teixeira Lott)l~ 15 
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'vli th the passing of the first fe'll months of Q,uadxos' 
presidency, it became clear that the UDN-PDC led populist 
polity "laS unlikely to produce the popular measuxes of 
distributionist gro;..rth expected by the popular forces. 
Janio Quadxos had inherited both an economy weakened in part 
by Kubitschek's policy of foste~ing 'overheated' gro'Vrth, and 
a populist administration increasingly inadequate for the needs 
of the multinational bloc and local big capital. An American 
Embassy ref,ort, carrying an analysis by Herbert K. 1,1ay, its 
Treasurer Department Attache, concluded that the Banco do 
Brasil had practically no foreign currency and the Kubitschek 
Government had: virtually e::mausted all the II, ethical' and 'non-
ethical' resources it had at its disposal, to cover the deficit 
in the balance of payments, thus allo'lli:ng PJ:'esident Kubitschek 
to 188,'18 his post on 31st January in circumste.:c.ces of ap;::9xent 
liquidi ty". 16 QuadX'os 1das faced VIi th a legacy of :Jroblems, 
including most proininently soaring inflation, 'tlhich i{aS rur ..... "'1ing 
out of hand, agricultural stagnation, balance of payment dif-
ficul ties, as "rell as the e:L'lJaustion of the upper middle class 
consumer market for duxable goods. 17 
The economic picture was complicated even furt~er by other 
developments of a political nature. Under Kubitschek, the PTB-
trade union complex had been an uneasy part of the authority 
structure. After all, the F'!::B 'Has a state-created party and 
the unions had undergone purges during the administration of 
President Dutra. But beginning ',dth the revocation of the 
'ideological certificates' in 1951, the nat-uxe of trade union 
leadership began to change, a1 thou611 it -'u ook a 'tThile for the se 
chZi.l16'es to express themselves in national organizations. ',.rUh 
the active sponsorship of Kubi t schel:' s vice-pre8ider::~, 
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J08.0 Goulart, the ne\'l ideological forces beg'"'aJl to find organiza-
tional expression. national Horkers' congresses 'tlere held for 
specific categories in 1956 and 1957. In 1958, about twelve 
state-vlide vrorkers' meetings vrere held; in 1959 the number vrent 
up to fourteen and in 1960 to sixteen. By then, national con-
gresses of trade union leaders took up where they had been 
hal ted thirteen years before, only that now they vlere reorganiz-
ing themselves amidst an industrial i,rorking class \'lhich had 
increased its numbers several times and was relatively con-
centrated in regional terms. 18 The incipient trade union 
movement began to conflict in a serious 'day i-lith certain aspects 
of the vertical trade union structure, reducing the conditions 
that had allm'led for mass manipulation. 
In the eyes of the entreprene1..U'ial community, the trade 
union movement had become a factor of disruption by the time 
';:),uadros had reached the presidency, as certain unions and trade 
union leaders demanded social change. Furthermore, the represen-
tatives of multinational-associated interests and ~gro-export 
business, vrho had supported Q,uadros, but not Goulart, found 
themselves blocked in their un','lanted and electorally enforced 
governmental coalition 'tlith the PTE. They '.'lere unable, by 
the constraints of increasing popular participation in Tolitics, 
to form a stable entrepreneurial government. Horeover, Q,uadros 
faced the active resistance of oligarchic sectors "rithin the 
PSJ) and other minor parties, as 'l1ell as pm-Ter conflicts ',-rithin 
hhl own, 'Irhich blocked. his government in Congress. Quadros' 
failure to face up to the higher levels of middle class e:cpec-
tations coupled i-lith bureaucratic inadequacies also hindered 
the executive in carrying out the reforms required by the big 
business cOIlL'iTunity. Such reforms inyolvecl sacrifices by the 
'ITorldng classes and strong economic and political limitations 
to traditional oligarchic sectors and local middle industrial 
interests alike. 11ul tinational and associated interests 'Here 
being made aware of the impossibility of achie7ing the neces-
sa~J extensive overhaul of the econowJ and administration 
within a 'pluralist' society and electoral polity. Such a 
polity, though restricted, was open to conflicting interests 
and pressures, which, follOi"ing the common practice of the 
pOlmlist polity, had to be -:p art 1 y reconciled .19 Q,uadros 
tried to outflmL~ the populist strtlcture, first by bilhetinhos 
(handwritten decrees) meant to undercut the political a~d 
burea;u.cratic strong-holcl.s of inefficiency and traditional 
interests, and later by an advent1..U'ous and bold politico-
milit~J ga.m.bit. 
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In Au~~st 1961, after a mere seven months period in office, 
~uadros, based. more on llis purported charisma and less on real 
authority, resigneCi. in the hope of gaining a civil-J3onapartist 
mandate, through a midCi.le class recall to office. ~uaQros 
expected the support of e:ltrepreneurs a..'1.d the resolute backing 
of a military coalition that would enable him to impose econoraic 
and political solutions upon conflicting demands. And this, 
'Il/hile his vice-president was conveniently still on a good 'tlill 
and commercial mission to China. jJei ther the majoxi ty of the 
entrepreneurs, nor his Oioffi party bloc, 'w'ere ready to back him. 
Nor \>Texe key military Tlinisters Denys, neck and Grun l\Ioss reac.y 
to sign such a blar~ political cheque fox ~ exratic figuxe s~ch 
,- -'l_ 20 "" .l...l.. -, , as ~uauXos. ~.l.e vJ2,S no v re ..,urneu vo gov-exr..:;nen--c. 'l.'hexe \1aS, 
moreovex, extxeme popular indifference to his political fate. 
'dith Ja..'1io' s resi;nation, the :political field \'las left '.1iu.e 
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open yet again. The rather contradictoX"J UJ)N-led populist 
formula of the modernizing-conservative bloc vias thrOl'ffi into 
d.isarray, wit" h the flariks 0 f the regime apparently 
ope n to a nationalistic-reformist executive. Unexpected.ly, 
Goulart became president, contradicting the expectations of 
multinational and associated entrepreneurs and the right wing 
military structure alike. 'di th Goulart's assumption of 
government the multinational-associated bloc, which seemed to 
lose their privileged economic position, prepared to restrain 
popular demands and constrain traditional interests by the 
imposition of extra-political means. 21 Nultinational and 
associated interests began to articulate a civilian-liulitary 
bloc of caesaristic tendencies, vThich in the end, was to subvert 
both the populist political order and. contain the n2,tional 
n • t . t· 22 reIormQS asp~ra ~ons. 
II. T~e Rise of 2, ?Jational Reformist 3xecutive 
Goulart's succession to the presidency after Quadros' 
resignation 'tTas almost im.peded by an ill-prepared military 
6ambit. 23 The attempt to bar Goulart from stepping into office 
,'laS checked by a popular pOvTer bloc, led by -the middle indus-
tri2,l bourgeoisie, southern agTari2,n sectors and. the tradition2,l 
politicians \'Tho opposed themselves to the demands of :0SG 
military and multination2,l and associated interests. 2L~ ~ .';. 
compromse Has reached., anchoring the presiliency to a PSI' 
progTamme and ir:lposin; a :;Jarlialllenta:t:'J regime 'Ivh1ch effectively 
limited Goulart! s pO'tTer. 25 :;:he populist stl.l1ctuxe had been 
successful in curbing Goul2,rt and in containing the ~odernizin6-
conser"mtive bloc, Iiho then 'oegan to seel: other solutions to 
the impasse. 
After the coup fiasco of 1961, and favoured by the 
popular feelings expressed in that political conjuncture, a 
ne',.l balance of social forces vTas struck, vThereby Goulart' s 
executive ,.,as able to take a national-reformist tu:r:n, sup-
ported by the mobilized working classes against what increas-
ingly looked like a UDN-PSD power bloc. Goulart extricated 
himself from the parliamentary straightjacket by January 1963, 
rdhen :Brazil reverted to a presidential regime, led by a PTB 
power bloc seeking a plural society. 26 In this process which 
led to the return of the presidential regi~e, the incipient 
crisis of hegemony ,.,ithin the dominant classes vlaS laic:. b.9.Xe 
aIle.. Has partly reflected by the increasing difficulty in 
fOTI~ing workable cabinets. 27 
In his attempts at steering the :Drazilia::..'1 goverYl ..ment 
t~ough a reformist nationalistic path, Goulart relied on 
wider support tha::..~ that of the popular forces at large. The 
nationalistic-reformist stance vTas also favoured 'by the local 
small and middle industrial bourgeoisie, '.-Thich \>Tas geared 
tOvlards markets of 1m., purchasing power a.."'ld by the %"Tarian 
sector producing food staples for -the in.!cernal marl::et. - These 
sectors vIere attempti..'1g, th::cough a nationalistic a::..'1d reformist 
appeal to the masses, to 'diclen their social basis for their 
mill economic reasons. These sectors 'dere feelir:g the stress 
oi the concentrationist character of the process of capitalist 
eJ::}lansion in Brazil, "Thich st:'..Lmlatea. the deterioration of tl:e 
real salaries of the urban 'Iwrkinz classes. On the other h8.12d, 
the consumption of durable conseoer goods produced. by the ne',.; 
industrial sectors, (automobiles, electrodomestic appli~'1ces) 
'/las ensured. 'by tl1e V81.J' sarne concentrationist character of the 
economy, a..'1d by the ~dd.espreao. formation of the ne':T ty-picall;y 
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middle class occupations "Thich were functional to the ne\{. 
productive structure, the techno-professional bourgeoisie. 23 
13y attempting to rearrange the correlation of economic 
forces within the dominant classes, the industrial and 
~~arian sectors mentioned above objectively broke the 
traditional populist class convergence, as i'lell as its 
ideological-institutional frame'dork. 29 The attempts to 
reconstitute the ~razilian polity involved then the composi-
tion of a ne"T industrial-aa"'Tarian pOi'ler bloc supported by 
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urban ''lorking classes and mobilized peasa...'1.try. These economic 
interests aimed to constrain the :pOi<ler of transnational and 
associated capital, control agro-export business and the most 
recalcitrant sectors of the rural olig~chy. 30 This modernizing-
reformist industrial ru1d agrarian bloc fO~Uld its political 
expression in Goulart's :?T.B led executive. It gained the support 
of dissident factions of the 1J.DN, PSD and PDC, It '.'las also 
supported by ne'tl legal-rational organizations such as the 
Na tionalist Parliamentar'J Front - RNP, as "Tell as by a 
heterogeneous popular-militar'J nationalistic disDositivo, 31 
The national-reformist bloc also expressed itself thro~lgh 
the charismatic appeal, ideologically dis~arate, of popular 
political figures such as Francisco Jluiao, leader of the 
Northeastern Peasant Leagues; l1au:-co :Borges, governor of the 
~aria...TJ. state of GOias j journalist Heiva Horeira; Leonel 
13rizzola, gO'Ternor of Rio Grande do Sul; Sergio l .. ~agalhaes, 
the nationalist rr:iddle class leader; Almino Afonso, I!:iguel 
Arraes and ~![ax da Costa Santos. The ne','l pm'Ier bloc had the 
added support of intellectuals 0'[ international pres-
tige, such as anthropolocist rarci Ribeiro; economist Celso 
Furtado; educationalis~ Paulo Freire and sociologist 
Josue de Castro, 'Ilho .... Tere in a sense ideological 'commanders' , 
but i-li th no effective political army behind their statements. 
\Jhat i-lere the policies that distinguished Goulart's 
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power bloc from the previous populist governments and so 
infuriated the multinational and associ~ted bloc? Some of the 
measures taken by his government "Tere: 32 the la"l restricting 
remittance of profits by nmHinational companies to their 
headquarters, which to a degree checked the hea'IT'J (train of 
capital. 33 This meaS"l1.J:.'e also implied a more rigorous control 
of the activities of transnation8.1 capital in J3razil, by with-
ciJ:.'aiving its extraordinary privileges, gained \-lith the Kubitschek 
and QuaciJ:.'os administrations. Under those provisos, foreign 
capital was to be treated on equal terms vlith national capital. 
?oreib":l capital was defined as goods, machinery, a.:r:d equipment 
entering J3razil without the initial expenses of foreitSTI ex-
change and destined for the production 01 goOu.s 0:;: services, 
as 'tTell as investments in cash int:roduced for economic activi-
ties. The :ce ... " :regulations demanded that all forei€:,":'l capital 
entering the C011l1try had to be :registe:red i-li th SU:;:·IOC, as vlell 
as the repat:riation of capital ~"d remitt&"ce of p:rofits, 
diVidends, interests, amo:rtizations, royalties and payrnents 
for tecllnical assist~~ce. TIegistration of capital had to be in 
the cu::c:rency of the cou.r.try of origin. All deposits 2.broad. 
were to Je declared, ur.~e:r the penalty of bein.; consid.ered 
illesal, vIi th criminal 2.ction follmdng suit again.st the 
offendinz pa:rties. SUIICC ~'Ias given the po'tTer to control foreign 
exchange ope:rations. 3~n~s of count:ries placing rest:rictions 
on }3razilia.n barJ:s could have no mo:re than 3O;'~ of the voting 
share stock of national -oar..}~s. Annual retUl'l1 of p:rofi ts 
:remi ttecl ab:roao. could r.ot go be:'Jrol'"0.. lo;~ of :registered r.et 
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investments. Remittance beyond this figure '.'lOuld 'be con-
sid.ered as repatriation of capital, not more than 2C;~ of I'Thich 
could be sent abroad in anyone year. Frofits above this 
limit could be considered as supplementary capital and could 
not be remitted, but could only be reinvested in Brazil. 
Moreover, the limitations on royalty remittances forced 
the multinational companies to do precisely '.<That they had 
managed to avoid throughout the periods of Kubitschek and 
Q,uactcos, nanely to iIlYest capital in the country by havL1J.2,' to 
rein~lest their Oim profits. 34 Goulart I s administration also 
sought to establish state monopoly of oil imports and to ex-
propriate the five private refineries in Brazil, as I'Te'll as 
the revision of mining concessions to multinational corpora-
tions. On the laboux front i -: sought to read~u3~~ mi:r.i.:n1.L:::l 
",r&ges, reestablish the )"U.rchasin;· povTer of ';Torkers ar..c. 
employees, to establish' a policy of price control 
and't 0 supervise the distribution of' basic conswner 
,;OO(iS. The first timL', stage of A0'.;:'arian Reio:;:om ;'[8,8 also decreed. 
It established expropriation Hit h prior a:ld effecti78 cori;'-
pensation of non-cul tiv'a;-::;eo. e,re8,S locateo, '.d thin close rar...:;e 
0:: r8.ilro8.cl all.cl hig-l-:,1/rays. The §,'OVe2:'D.ment also aimed at the 
control and liI::i. tation of the '02,::.2: re'::'isco'.:Jlt ane. attempted other 
me3.S"iJxes to ~:'6'ht fin8.l~c~a.l speculatioll; 8JS ",.,ell as :ce-scali:ng 
~~he p8.:J":TIent 0: forei;1'l c~ebt it renegotiated 'Hi th t:'--~e crec'..i':or 
cO'.Jn-sries. 'l'his ~tel) fo~cei -sb.e uni teo. 2tates :iLancial cor:.-
r~1('i..J.~~i·~:T to accept -the sa=e cond~ ~ion3 2.8 :Sl~L'O~ea:1 crec1-i tol's. 
:?:..D.:'the:::::.ore, Goulart I co· Gover::::..:e::~, fol101.'ling ';;''...E"C'.rOS I initial 
at-teill~ts, fi::ceC2. a~ in~~epel1.d.er:t ;:01i. tiC2~:' lir.l.8 for ::re..z=-l 1:1i t:-:i!::. 
t~'1e Cr;2..ni3ation of _.;.r:erican St2vtes, the L7::i~e,:' ~!2.tions Sl.~~ 
1"rj_t~it~. otb.sr i.r:te::?::~-'..~-tioYlD.l o:r;'2.r.iz2,-::"o~;J. 35 ",,~ n~ 1" 'T ;:'0,,1 co 'c'+ ~.... ~>J.. _,), \.:i .• ~_c:..-..-l- u 
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proposed a restructuring of the tax system on the basis of 
income, an electoral reform allowing illiterates and soldiers 
the right to vote and the return of parliamentary eligibility 
to sergeants, and a re.t;orm of the educational system, extending 
to the popular classes. In other words, his was undoubtecq.y 
a r~formist programme which favoured popular participation. 
III. The Economic-Political Crisis of Populism 
Capitalist industrialization, which had been financed by 
the twin policies of association with foreign capital 36 and a 
steady increase in the rate of exploitation of the working 
force was immediately threatened by the nat~onal reformist 
executive and its programme for development. 37 Moreover, 
the expansionary macroeconomic policy which had propelled growth 
in the late 1950s began to falter in the early 1960s, against 
the background of a decreasing 'extractive capability~ Also 
inflation, which had been such an import~t mechanism for 
industrialization had run out of control. In a spiral of 
rising prices, inflation and wage increase demands, which 
stimulated speculation and short term investments seeking 
immediate high retu....-.ons, relevant medium . range planning and 
administrative efficiency were impaired. Furthermore, inflation 
had a double negative effect on the middle classes' incomes, straining 
their consumer capacity for manufactured durable goods, and 
affecting mainly the multinational and as~ociated interests 
which . manufactured in this sec tor. Inflation also 
hampered the saving capacity of the middle classes~ affecting 
resources Which "lere meant to be harnessed through private banks and. 
state agencies for the financing of private industrialization. 
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The existing form of accumulation, which engendered 
extreme concentration of wealth, low employment capacity and 
.. 
low wages, established socio-economic and regional bottlenecks •. 
ThesE' factors were to resUlt in political instability which then 
strengthened the cautious attitude of the entrepreneurial 
classes to further investment or expansion of their businesses. 
Political instability also reinforced among the entrepreneurial 
classes the feeling that the civilian institutional arrange-
ments were insufficient and incap~ble of containing the 
increased level of class struggle. Moreover, the heavy 
blows dealt by the government against foreign capital 
privileges also contributed to a reduction of the already 
small rate of multinatio~ investment and to the uneasy 
behaviour of big capital. 38 The situation worsened for the 
multinational and associated bloc with the government's pre-
occupation over improving popular living conditions, and 
implementing a more equitable distribution of the increased 
levels of productivity which came ,about with the techno-
logical changes of the late 1950s. Income distribution was 
attempted, in the form of higher wages and indirectly through 
governmental allocation of greater amounts of public resources, 
for free education, national medi9al care and health service, 
housing and :public transportation. The government also 
implemented a policy of price control on basic goods, while 
attempting to curb multinational,profiteering in such vital 
areas as pharmaceutical products. Against previous industriali-
zation policies which benefited the expansion of multinational 
corporations catering for a reduced market of high purchasing 
power, the national reformist government aimed at redirecting 
the type of production mainly towards foodstuffs, clothing and 
basio household applianoes. Thus the middle industries and 
agrarian seotors produoing basio oonsumer,goods for a large 
market of low inoome were also stimulated. For the multi-
national interests and the upper middle olasses, the 
politioally and eoonomioally 'easy' phase of the so-called 
import-substitution prooess appeared to have exhauste4 both 
its sooioeoonomio and politioo-civilian possibilities. In 
this sense, the Brazilian eoonomy was beooming what has 
been termed by right wing analysts a 'praetorian polity' 
and an eoonomy of 'soaroe resouroes', a rather euphemistio 
way of referring to the adverse politioal and eoonomio oon-
ditions for multinational-assooiated interests and middle 
olass demands. 39 
The relative deoeleration from the overheating of the 
Kubitsohek period was evidenced by several indi-
cations, s u c h as the reduotion of investments in leading 
seotors (durable oonsumer goods); the deorease in the demand 
for intermediate and oapital goods; the weakening of publio 
investment~ in the multinational seoto~s and the orumbling 
of the interindustrial oyole of demand. 40 
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The state enterprises responsible for the produotion and 
management of the infrastruotural seotors suoh as oil, steel, 
eleotrioity"ports, transport and oonstruotion, were the first 
to slow down. Thus, the 'ineffioienoy' of the state as e~tre­
preneur and oontraotorwas made apparent to its opponents. It 
was also in the publio seotor that many of the strikes ooourred, 
and wh~re some of the most artioulate politioal demands were 
raised. A vioious spiral of working olass strikes, and middle 
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olass disoontent developed. With the overall pace of 
'development' slackening, both the working olasses and the 
government oame under heavy attaok from the privately owned 
media and middle ola~s 'publio' opinion, ably orohestrated by 
the dominant olasses. Ideologioally the alternatives were 
olearly outlined for the popular bloo and the dominant olasses 
alike: national refo~st 'etatisme' or multinational-assooiated 
oligopolistio oapital. The populist sooioeoonomio struoture 
and administration, and the national-reformist exeoutive 
whioh were equated as a twin phenomenon were ~blioly oondemned 
by the multinational and assooiated power bloo. Redistributionist 
polioies were branded as 'romantic'; nationalization, tetatiste t 
polioies an~ sooially oriented produotion were branded as 
inefficient. 
Big oapital required the 'stabilization' of the eoonomy, 
involving mainly striot wage oontrol, measures to stem in-
flation and outs in publio expenditure for sooial services. 
Big oapital also required the reorientation of the eoonomic 
polioies towards inoome oonoentration, measures whioh would 
favour middle class growth as a oonsumer belt in the oyole of 
interindustrial demand ;nstead of the improvement of working 
olass living oonditions. The creation of a dynamio stook market 
was envisaged, enabling the multinational oompanies to penetrate 
the shareholding struoture of looal companies and begin a new 
stage in the takeover prooes~ under the euphemistio name of 
'demooratization of oapital'. The stook market was also to 
provide a very effioient form of drawing resouroes from the 
middle olasses, who were to be st~ated by government monetary 
faoili ties to invest their savings. Middle industries favoured 
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by Goulart's government, were to be excluded in the name of 
big capital's 'efficiency' standards, which condemned not only 
the sma~ler enterprises, but their particular consumer market 
as well. Compulsory levies through state agencies on working 
class earnings were also designed as a source,of pulling 
together resources for private capitalization. 
Moreover, capitalist industrialization, in the view of the 
multinational and associated interests could only prosper under 
the banner of entrepreneurial administrative order and political 
security. For the dominant classes and their organic intellec-
tuals, class struggle in a political system of internationalized 
policy and decision,making had to be confined within secure 
national boundaries. 41 
Familiar 1 in e s of argument have emphasized the 
-
'economic crisis' of the period and the 'exhau~tion' of the 
import-substitution stage of industrialization. It is 
interesting to note that beyond these arguments, other social 
phenome~ were perceived as being at work by th~ dominant 
classes. This was made clear by Roberto Campos. In an analysis 
prepared for the Ministerial Cabinet Meeting of 4th June, 1964, 
Campos explained that "Specifically, the paralysis of develop-
ment in ~963 was a consequence of climatic and sociopolitical 
factors". 42 Among the politico-institutional factors, Campos 
noted the following: "a) the constant political tension created 
by the disharmony between the Federal Executive on one side 
and the National Congress and State governments on the other, 
which gave rise to suspicions of ant i - con s tit uti 0 n a 1 
intentions (inten9oes continuistas) by President Goulart to 
remain president; b) the 'etatiste' (estatizante) trend which 
depressed and threatened private investors; c) Communist 
infiltration which threatened to subvert the social and 
economic order; and d) the successive paralysis of' production 
by the stri~e leaders, frequently with clear political 
objectives". 43 
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It was clear that in such political conditions, it would 
be very difficult to ensure valid economic planning, accurate 
production projections and engage the capacity of the state 
for accumulation and,arbitration in favour of the entre-
preneurial commun4ty. 44 Another phase of 'import substitution' 
was in the offing. With it came the pressures for the sub-
stitution of the government by a regime ab1e.to impose con-
sensus among capital and consent upon labour. 45 
What was the significance of the economic, social and 
political reforms attempted by Goulart's power bloc? First, 
it indicated that Coulart and his executive were objectively 
extricating themselves from the populist past which reconciled 
the various fractions of the dominant classes and manipulated 
the working classes. There was a clear stance against various 
fractions and sectors of the dominant classes, in favour of 
urban industrial participation, ~s well as in favour of the 
mobilization of the rural masses. Second, Brazil was being 
substracted from the sphere of influence of transnational 
capital, both by the internal measures to control the opera-
tions of the multinational corporations as well as by a 
foreign po1ioy which moved away from auto~tic hemispheric 
alignment even further than ~der Quadros. There was a third 
extremely interesting outcome. Goulart's power blcc attempted 
to shape a state which not only would have a nationalistic 
role, a part it had played in previous governments in discord 
with its real character, but would also have deve10pmenta1ist 
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and distributionist functions. However, precisely in the 
circumstances in which the state apparatus had to prove 
the reality of its alleged relative autonomy, what was 
revealed instead was its '~dden' inherent allegiance towards 
capital and against labour. Counterposed to the concrete 
reformist and national policies of the government, th~ class 
character of the state could not be concealed anymore. Its 
real political, and economi~ functions were uncovered for 
large sectors of the public. By forcing the political, 
military and bureaucratic institutions of the state to side 
with one part of the conflicting social forces, the true 
nature of social relations wit~ the populist form of 
domination was bec9~ apparent. Class relations lost their 
non-political form. 46 Since the Estado Novo, the first c1ear-
cut confrontation between the working c1ass~s and the political 
apparatus of the dominant classes had begun. 
Autonomous p () p u I a r m- 0 b i 1 i' z a t ion - . beg a n 
to put pressure on the dominant ideo1ogy,- uncovering the growing 
gap between nationalistic reformist discourse and its 
tion by ~he working classes, 47 and raising the level 
struggle. 48 With the rupture of the populist form of 
assump-
of class 
domination49 , 
the industrial-01iga~chic bloc felt it was losing politically what. 
it had lost already economically, i.e. the leadership of events. 
Disaffection then spread among the entrepreneurial and P91itical-
military supporters of Goulart, weakening his power bloc. The 
outcome of this process was that the sense of insularity of the 
executive was reinforced, by leaving it dependent on the 
mobilized workers, who remained the g9vernment's 801e and 
uneasy political 'mass for manoeuvre'. The perception of a 
relative autonomous executive able to rally to its command 
the subordinate classes, or worse, being swayed by them, 
prompte~ a political reaction of the whole of the dominant 
c1~sses. 
IV. The Perception of the Crisis of Authority 
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The 'normal' exercise of political domination in the 
'classic' phase of the populist regime, from 1945 to 1960, was 
characterized by a comb~tion of pluralism, force and authority, 
coercion and consent. These elements balanced each other 
out in various forms throughout the various presidencies, but 
without force being substituted for consensus, ,as was to occur 
in the post-1964 military authoritarian regime. 50 However, 
there was neither hegemonic consent,nor democratic pluralism, 
for the dominant classes banned the Communist Party, intervened 
and purged the trade unions, and left disenfranchized more thaJ? 
5~~ of the potential electorate on account of their illiteracy. 
In spite of these pol-i tical limitations, pop u 1 ism 
was implemented in such a fashion that the force of the 
dominant classes seemed generally supported by ~he consensus 
of a majority of the public with voice and vote. Centre-
right parties were able for a while to express popul~ beliefs, 
and the PTB forwarded some of the popular grievances. 
Between consensus and force, political forms of corruption 
and fraud were to be found: pe1eguismo, corone1ismo, paternalism, 
c1iente1ism, protection and apadrinhamento. 51 These political 
relations of domination were instrumental in the rapid 
industrialization process of Kubi~schek and Quadros, a period 
in which the exercising of hegemony was difficult. Coercive measures 
were at the base of what in fact ~'I'as a civilian-led poli ticaJ.ly 
authoritarian regime which cautiously used force. These 
cartorial and patrimOnial forms of domination expressed the 
attempts by the dominant power bloo to disartioulate 
antagonistio sooial foroes through the absorption of their 
leaders ang. disaggregation of their popular bases, leaving 
the forme~ alienated froIll"society -and the~'Iatter wi thout 
direotion. 
As seen before in this ohapter, during the Janista-
Janguista period, sooio-eoonomio and polit~oal oleavages 
within the dominant olasses were sharpened. The ruling 
artioulation of interests fragmented and the exeroise of 
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hegem9ny beoame diffioult, if not impossible, in entrepreneurial 
terms. The dtfficulties were expressed in the crisis of 
authority and the dissolution of the presidential regime, the 
orisis of popul~st insubordination and the rise of the 'masses 
for themselves'. 52 But until Goulart oame to the presidenoy, 
only '~heatrioal' manifestations of the phenomena were per-
oeived. 
The significanoe and extent of the crisis of authority 
and the disintegration of the institutional and ideologioal 
channels of control as well as the inability of the exis~ing 
party-system to divert popular discontent did ~ot escape the 
modernizing-oonservative organic intelleotuals. On the basis 
of one of the most comprehensive surveys of Brazilian society 
and its correlated eleotoral prooess, as well as a thorough 
analysis of the 1960 national eleotions using comparative data 
of previous elections, Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, of the teohno-
entrepreneurial agency CBP, and a very competent team of 
specialists observed that the funotional pre-requisites of the 
politioal parties were largely and inoreasingly unfulfilled, 
their social norms were weakening and their -estaCLished 
~olitica1 beliefs were under threat. 53 The significance 
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of this study was that it expressed the collective conscious-
ness which the multinational and associated power bloc had 
of the critical situation of the early 1960s. Their study was 
not an ex-post facto analysis. Instead, it was produced as an 
alarm call, indicating for the dominant classes that the 
electoral and institutiona1.system was in the medium run, 
blocked for their interests. 
Assis Ribeiro's study about party behaviour, inter-party 
alliances and the composition of the electoral slates made it 
clear to the modernizing-conservative organic intellectuals 
that what they regarded as the excessive number of registered 
parties in the e1eotions of 1962 (13 'national' parties) 
nullified their funot~on of reuniting people around a nomination, 
programme or dootrine. The oentre and centre-right wing parties 
which had provided the semi-competitive artioulation of interests 
and aggregation of pressures for the industria1-o1igarohio 
power b1oo, were failing in what Roberto Campos has oonsidered 
to be the central feature of a po1itioa1 assooiation: "uniting 
aspiratiOns, forming loyalties to the system,: disciplining 
protest- and regularizing the transfer of leadership". 54 
The party system's insuffioienoy was marked by their seotora1 
and factional oomposition, with petty al1ianoes and ~yzantine 
infighting making impossible any prinoipal1ed action. 55 
Sometimes what had been ooordinated at national levels was 
opposed at looa1 ones. 56 Aooording to Assis Ribeiro's s.tudy 
which strongly fooused upon the oentre-right wing parties, no 
ooherenoe in dootrine was demanded between the oandidate and 
the party. Once the candidate was chosen, he oonsidered 
himself free of any previous promises both in relati9n to 
the party and to the e1eotorate whioh had chosen him. Mandates 
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were viewed as personal patrimony. Alliances of important 
figures and factions within the parties were not constituted 
by ideological affinities. The determinant motive for party 
alignments, factional alliances and group agreements was 
perceived as being of a personal character or based on contin-
gent calculations of an opportunistic nature. Candidates of 
certain parties belonged to district and even regional direc-
tories of another party. In important elections candidates 
almost did not relate to the party under whose legenda (banner) 
they campaigned. Candidates were chosen and supported by a 
variety of alignments, whose composition was linked to the 
federal state area they formally represented (and which 
effectively nullified their national character). This led 
in turn to an enormous confusion in electoral propaganda, as 
well as to contradictions between the municipal or state 
levels of representation and the federal level. 57 It also 
meant the loss of political expression in party terms, a 
lack of programmes with a national dimension, and a lack 
of long range policy; instead regional power conflicts were 
expressed in utilitarian and short term alignments. FUrther-
more, Assis Ribeiro's study observed that the accepted 
practice of alignments vitiated the sense of any party 
programme, and, with the exception of the PSD, UDN and PTE, 
made a myth of the national dimension of other parties.58 
Another significant point for the multinational and 
associated bloc, to which Paulo de Assis Ribeiro's study called 
attention vIas that although there was a shar]? increase of 
economic power in the southern regions of the country, the 
industrial-financial urban centres remained politically under-
5° represented. / Premised on some sort of 'raison d' economie' , 
Assis Ribeiro's team concluded that by examinjng the areas 
of concentration around Rio and Sao Paulo, the population 
responsible for more than two thirds of the national income 
did not have the political power to choose one third of the 
representants, while close to only l~/o of the Brazilian popu-
lation producing approximately 40% of the domestic.national 
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60 income was not represented by even 10% of Congress. Counter-
posed to the economic dominance of big capital, local middle 
industrial interests and agrarian sectors controlled less of 
the economy than at the time of the Estado Novo, while 
accumulating a higher degree of political l~adership, in 
striking assymetry with their economic base. 61 The economically 
subaltern industrial-oligarchic interests steered the c'aun~ry, 
while transnational capital attempted to chart the economy. 
(By 1963-, Sao Paulo, the centTe' of oligopolistic,·industrial-
financial groups, produced 57-.2% of the federation's industrial 
revenue.) - The political unq.eT-representa tion of multinational and 
associated interests and 'their inability to steer the polity 
and chart, unchallenged, the course of de~lopment, contributed 
to prompt multinational extra-party action. 
Assis Ribeiro'S study also showed that there was a 
process of the 'pulverization of parties' which, together with 
candidates breaking away from their party programmes and the 
subsequent forced necessity to form expedient alliances and 
short term alignments,6~ produced unstable heterogeneous 
political conglomerates. In these, the naked language of 
numbers spoke,thus pre-empting the traditional conversa9oes 
(conversations among governors and.party leaders) and conchavos 
(political wheelings and dealings). Furthermore, what seemed 
critical was that along with this process of centre-right party 
decomposition, there was a consistent growth of the PTE to 
the detriment of the PSD and u:DN parties, polarizing politics 
by introducing ideological issues instead of merely expedient 
ones func~ional to the political survival of party and 
candidate. 6, 
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Assis Ribeiro's study also pointed to the tendency ~f the 
electorate to leave the centre of the political spectrum. The 
decline and insufficiency of traditional and manipulative 
parties as mechanisms,of social control and guided mobilization 
was becoming apparent. 64 This trend was confirmed by an over-
view of the percentages of the votes obt~ined by the major 
parties in three congressional elections. 
Table 10 
PSD votes u:DN votes PTE votes I 
-
I 1945 42.,;6 26, ,;6 10,1% 
I 
1954 22,0% 13,6% 14,99t 
1962 15.6% 11.2% 12.1% 
Thus, the three major parties that in 1945 obtain~d 78.~;6 of 
the votes, received seventeen years later only 38.~;6 o~ the 
votes, while party alliances obtained 41% of the votes. On the 
, , 
o~her,hand, b~ank votes w~nt up from 468.000 (4.~;6) in 1954, to 
2.149.111 (15.1%) in 1962. 65 
Assis Ribeiro's study observed that the ideological 
fragmentation of the parties was also underlined by the 
internal division of the centre-right parties representing a 
frustrated effort 'at adaptation of those parties or,certain 
groups within them to new demands of the electorate'. 66 
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Another significant point arising from the study was 
that the complex set of variables they had surveyed pointed to 
a relevant swing in the voting pa~terns of the electorate 
towards the PTB, in a first stage~7 A second stage, it was 
concluded, would see the electorate moving to other political 
formations, with a clearer definition towards the left, a 
natural outlet being the recently formed Nationalist 
Parliamentary Front 68 and the still banned Communist Party. 69 
Moreover, the study observed that political organizations 
leaning towards national-left policies were making a serious 
impression upon the electorate, with a concomitant polarization 
of politics leading to the formation of wide parliamentarian 
fronts which swiftly increased their prestige and importance. 
Two inter-party blocs arose: the Nationalist Parliamentary, 
Front - FNP, and the Democratic Parliamentary Action _ ADP. 70 
These conglomerates of representatives of several parties 
indicated the ideological undermining of certain parties and 
a concurrent politico-ideological resh~fle and re-orientation 
of important public figures and groups. The formation of these 
two fronts revealed not only the decline of the PSD-PTB 
alignment (and the pact of domination of which it,was a part), 
but also the eclipse of the UDN oppositio~ and the impossibility 
of an alliance PSD-UDN to work on its own. 
What seemed even more disturbing for the rural oligarchy, 
agro-export business and the multinational-associated interests 
alike was the capacity shown by the national-reformist bloc 
to reach more complex, politicized and ideologically defined 
formations, in spite of the nationwide rightawing attack, 
confirming the trends exposed by Assis Ribeiro's study. 
The Popular Mobilization Front - FMP was established, as an 
extra-parliamentary and nationally organized bloc, directed 
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'against transnational e'conomic abuse, rural oligarchic 
constraints and the administrative, cultural and social ~opu1ist 
structure , although paradoxically , it was based upon some of 
the traditional authority mechanisms, such as the ingr~ined 
local and regional loyalties and personalized politics. Its 
main strength came from the widest natio~l array of ~opular 
oriented ~olitical forces attained so far. The FMP included 
the National Parliamentary Front; the Peasant Leagues and 
rural trade unions; the General Command of the Workers - CGT 
and the Trade Union Pact of Unity and Action - PUA; the 
National Union of Students - TINE; the Catholic inspired 
Popular Action - AP and the su~~ort of national r~formist 
military officers and the illegal Communist Party. 71 
A further significant observation of the Assis Ribeiro 
study was that there was a consistent loss of grip on the 
rural vote, undermining the traditional PSD stronghold. 72 
The study also perceived that the eventual. vote of the 
illiterates would be consistently on the left, and it observed 
that granting voting rights to the illiterate~ represented 
a serious threat to the ~arties of the centre. 73 It was found 
that the illiterates or recently alphabetized people voted with 
the left, strengthening the general te~dency of the electorate 
to leave the big parties of the centre. The study also 
pointed out that the possibility of ra~idly alphabetizing 
great numbers of peo~le, though open to discussion from the 
point of view of permanent educa~ional planning could have 
immediate political consequences. The study observed that if 
the Paulo Freire method, for example, was to be adopted in 
large scale throughout the Northeast, the increase in the 
212 
percentage of politicized voters, although superficially 
alphabetized, would seriously disturb existing party relations. 74 
The overall political conclusions to be drawn from 
Assis Ribeiro's exhaustive study were quite obvious. The 
ruling polity and the dominant classes as a whole faced a 
basic crisis. The subordinate classes were outflanking the 
authoritarian-corporatist structure. 75 But the nature of their 
activities, primarily expressed in syndicalist terms, failed 
to promote an organic crisis. 76 Nevertheless, it was precisely 
this outburst of political activity among the subordinate 
classes that prompted US Ambassador Lincoln Gordon to denounce 
the 'internal aggression' of 'organized minorities' in his 
address at the Superior War College in 1962: "Are there not 
proofs everywhere of the systematic co~~unist infiltration 
in the universities and student groups, in the trade unions 
and the means of communications, in the public service and 
political parties?ft 77 
The political and ideological frailty of populist 
industrial~oligarchic civil society78 seemed such that the 
dominant classes ascribed, to what was a comparatively low 
degree of political mobilization and participation,79 a 
serious potential, a sufficiently severe threat for the bour-
geoisie to be rallied into aggressive action, or what was 
termed by them as a defensive coup. This feeling of insecu-
rity for the dominant classes was expressed by Jose Ulpiano 
de Almeida Prado, a member of the big agrarian and industrial 
bourgeoisie, a member of the Council of Commercial Associations 
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of the state of Sao Paulo and a militant representative of the 
modernizing-conservative intellectuals in their campaign against 
Goulart's government. For Almeida Prado warned that "Brazil 
is going through a moment of profound gravity, in which the 
acceleration~ its economic development is being fettered by 
powerful forces of disorganization".80 
Mass mobilization was primarily 'inorganic'. Nevertheless, 
the passage from anonimity to identity, from the economic-cor-
porative stage to that of political class-consciousness, even 
if mediated by Eelegos and only incipiently through the working 
classes' organic intellectuals, was already posing the "problems 
of the syndicate's role before the State and Party, the problems 
of the relationship between syndicalism and political society".81 
Horeover, the new levels of popular mobilization coincided with 
the lack of consensus among the dominant classes, where the mul ti-
national-associated bloc acted politically against the traditional 
ruling classes in <rder to displace them from state porTer. 82 This 
two pronged assaultS) on the populist political and socio-economic 
structure favoured the expanding insularity of the PTE-reformist 
executive, an autonomy which the Erazilian dominant classes had 
never alloned before, and would not again in this particular 
historical moment. 84 
Hhat was then becoming the political crux of the matter was 
that populism was transformed, in the midst of class struggle, 
from a form of manipulation (articulation cf consent), into a 
form of participation (expression of demands), to which new 
political action centres, other than the traditional parties, 
could now appeal. SS Noreover, it was through the socio-political 
structure of populism that the labouring urban social forces 
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struggled to become a political class. It was in the course of 
this very process that the historical limits and political short-
comings, or necessary 'economicism',86 of the working classes and 
their established leadership came to the fore. It was only when 
populism became a form of participation that the crisis occurred. 
This happened as populism lost a substantial part of its manipulative 
character and the traditional politicians lost their grip on popular 
feelings. The ideological premises of the pact of domination 
began to be acted out politically and the ruling ideological dis-
course began .to be implemented by subordinate class political 
practice. Such a political-ideological rupture of the pact of 
domination contained within it the threat of subversion denounced 
by the whole of the dominant classes and their auxiliary layers. 
To such an outcome 1fas the denunciation of Goulart's 'irresponsi-
bility' linked. Goulart, the big landowner and politician formed 
in the populist tradition, was condemned by the bourgeoisie as 
a betrayer to his class. Populism began to be widely attacked. 
The growing political discontent Hith their socio-economic condi-
tions and the ne1'l' demands of big capital pushed the working classes 
into political action, exacerbating the class struggle and in 
turn becoming an important factor in the 'recession' of 1963.87 
The struggle that Has unleashed was waged at the level of the 
relations of production of the industrial urban base and public 
services, with reverberations into the fabric of the social 
relations of domination. The labouring urban masses denounced 
the populist pact: they did not participate in the profits accru-
ing from the increased productivity88 and they also felt the 
deterioration of their former level of participation in the global 
national income. 89 The significance of such deterioration had 
been obscured by the intense migration of the rural masses into 
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urban working areas and occupations which provided a relative 
improvement in their living conditions. 90 The increase in the 
rate of exploitation was arrested only when the workers began to 
wield their political power.91 The struggle for socio-economic 
demands (luta reriridicatoria) unified the working classes. Rural 
workers, private and public employees added their demands to those 
of the industrial workers. 
The petit and middle bourgeoisie condemned the populist 
social compact for its 'exhaustion' and disruptive atmosphere. 
The professional bourgeoisie, the middle and upper cadres of the 
Armed Forces and the techno-bureaucracy condemned it for the 
relative depreciation in their salaries and the growing insecu-
rity in their status,92 which they felt was threatened by the 
growing mass movement and the incipient agitation in the lower 
echelons of their respective hierarchies. Much of this agitation, 
one should point out, was impelled by right wing ~ents Erovo-
cateurs interested in a show down with the government and popular 
forces. 93 The oligarchy in the countryside feared the mobiliza-
tion of the rural masses and was terrified by the spectre of 
Agrarian Reform; the agrarian bourgeoisie was feeling the pres-
sures on trade and feared its revenues would be used as subsidies 
for local industrialization 1'Thich was capital-hungry. The 
industrial and banking bourgeoisie felt the threat posed by the 
increasingly restless and organized working classes to their 
entrenched privileges.9+ The various fractions and sectors of 
the dominant classes moved towards a political reconciliation 
over their conflicting demands, reacting sharply and in a unified 
form td the' emergence of mass society', in what the dominant classes 
as a whole perceived as the erosioncr the capitalist order. 95 
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The politicians fell short of rejecting the rules of the populist 
pact which provided the soil upon which they existed, but con-
demned the government for rendering ineffective their political 
action of routinization and conciliation by allowing the working 
classes to be mobilized beyond their traditional means of control. 
The radicalization of the crisis, i.e. its development into a 
crisis of domination, prompted important changes within the sphere 
of the ideological evolution of the Armed Forces towards an inter-
ventionist attitude, within constitutional and thus, a 'legal' 
framework. The abandonment by military officers of positions loyal 
to the government of the day and to the president himself and the 
generalization of the interventionist96 attitude within the higher 
and middle echelons depended on several factors. It depended on the 
degree of manoeuvrability and control which military officers held 
over the lower echelons and their capacity for'sustained unity in 
action. The majority of the Armed Forces who had previously sat 
on the fence of the political-ideological dispute between the 
national-reformist and international-developmentalist factions, 
actively sought or consented in their majority to the formation 
of an anti-populist general staff, once their organizational 
prerogatives and values were attacked. The immediate stimulus for 
action came from their perception of the level of corporate and 
organizational 'deterioration' and their own declining material 
standa.rds of living. Nili tary intervention l-fas portrayed, acted 
out and perceived as 'salvationist action' legitimated by the 
doctrine of national security disseminated to a large extent by 
the Superior War College. 97Moreover, a large proportion of the 
military felt that the government had ceased to behave in a proper 
constitutional manner. 98 
Hith the political disaggreation of the populist historical 
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bloc, another significant problem appeared: the class convergence 
that had controlled the state and dominated society had to acknowledge 
its loss of power, or be convinced that it no longer held control. 
Classes, fractions and blocs are not hegemonic for an indefinite time, 
and their fall is far more than a matter of 'political decay t. The 
establishment cf the new .mul tinational power bloc in the state was not 
a mechanical phenomenon. It was not the mere 'reflection t of an econom:ic 
situation, but a true class enterprise. 99 The final blow to populism 
was consummated by a policy of de-stabilization, the largely covert 
action of the bourgeoisie against the executive and the organized sub-
ordinate classes. The purposeful action of the bourgeoisie involved the 
resolution of a problematic duality: the constitution of a new hegemonic 
or dominant system ~n embryo-state) , initially able to lead economically, 
but not able to govern, together with the eclosion of a crisis of political 
domination, unfolding a favourable situation for the political asser-
tion of new social forces. The emergent mul tina tional-associated pOWEr 
bloc would assert i tself initially by t scientifically' criticizing the 
policies of the populist historical bloc and involving public opinion 
in a crusade against 'chaos and stagnation, corruption and subversion' .100 
The vanguard of the powerful anti-populist and anti-popular 
bourgeois coalition located in the various techno-entrepreneurial 
agencies, bureaucratic-entrepreneurial rings, dominant class associations 
and ideologically congruent military , with the added logistical support 
of transnational forces, were articulated into one political-strategic 
action centre, the IPES/IBAD complex. Jointly with founders and gradu-
ates of the Superior T..tar College, they established the' cri tigue des 
armes,lOl and signified the poli tico-mili tary moment of bourgeois 
class action. The capitalist classes were to 'unify' under a single 
leadership constituted into the General Staff of the bourgeois:i. 0 and 
were to act under the banner of a single party of order, the Armed Forces. 
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The crisis of organic authority and political hegemony was to be 
solved by a pre-emptive entrepreneurial military strike, which 
aimed, in the words of one of its leaders, 'to hit at the adverse 
dispositivo before its disembarkation,.102 
When military intervention occurred, in response to the 
civilian incapacity to solve the crisis that was breaking down the 
political regime, as defined by the constitution of 1946, what 
apparently occurred was an historical moment of classic Bonapartism. 
But it was to be only a moment, and as such deceptive, in the 
unfolding of a process determined by the overall disposition of 
political forces. The forces that impelled what initially seemed 
a Bonapartist action were much more complex and settled than what 
was immediately evident and their raison d'etre went well beyond 
the so-called new patterns of military organization and ideological 
mobilization, or the folklore of political manoeuvring by central 
civilian figures competing for the presidency. What was considered 
to be by many civilians and military just a short-lived interven-
tion by the Armed Forces in the affairs of government, and not a 
political takeover of the state machinery, pointed to the forceful 
capacity of the multinational and associated bloc to articulate 
varied fractions and factions above their specific differences, and 
above and beyond their own understanding ofihe process. lOJ Nilitary 
intervention~sumed its ideological role of arbitration in a society 
portrayed as being riddled with 'chaos and corruption', in effect 
concealingEs dual significance: that of a class movement, strategi-
cally prepared and carefully evolved towards the contaiTh~ent of 
the popular forces; and that of being the political move of a 
dominant fraction attemptir~ to subdue the populist industrial-
oligarchic socio-economic forces. Through military intervention, 
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the emergent multinational-associated power bloc increased the 
level and quality of class warfare and imposed its own solutions 
tofue crisis, controlling political society and producing a realign-
ment of domination through a military authoritarian form of govern-
mente By shielding the bourgeoisie through their 'moderating' 
action, the military showed their true nature: class power prepared 
in advance withinihe state. 'Constitutional Bonapartism' gave way 
to a 'Poder Dirigente' in mufti. 
Donclusion 
The interaction of the contradictory interests and simul-
taneous demands of transnational capital and subordinate working 
classes established the critical political scenario of the early 
1960s, leading to the loss of cohesion of the populist historical 
bloc.105 The crisis of the populist historical bloc involved a 
twin moment in the interrelation of dominant-subaltern-subordinate 
social groups. The first moment consisted of the incapacity of 
the ruling power bloc to maintain the existing correlation between 
,dominant and subordinate classes within conditions of relative 
stability. Not being able to promote change, i.e. fixing socio-
economic limits and realigning political-ideological parameters, 
the -ruling power bloc alloHed a politico-institutional <risis to 
develop, which affected the Brazilian economy. The second moment 
consisted of the incapability of the ruling populist bloc to per-
petuate its hegemonic position within the whole of the dominant 
classes, i.e. the industrial-oligarchic interests were unable to 
defeat or curb multinational and associated socio-economic forces 
from seeking a. rearticulation of power. This situation amounted to 
an economic-productive impasse, realized by a crisis of political 
domination. 106 The crisis became organicl07 when the effects of 
economic-productive changes which had occurred with increasing 
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intensity since the mid-1950s onwards were translated into politics 
by two fundamental socio-economic forces, the multinational-asso-
ciated interests and the working classes which were undergoing a 
process of intense politicization. These changes led to the ideo-
logical and political confrontation of the classes and became a 
crisis of the populist form of domination m the early 1960s. 
The crisis of political domination came about as a combina-
tion of: a) the changing quality of mass struggle and the new levels 
of political organization of the subordinate classes. These events 
precipitated an institutional crisis which prompted the formation 
of a bourgeois front moving swiftly to pre-empt in a decisive way 
the budding working class movement; b) the active challenge to 
the populist polity, to the national reformist executive and to 
the incipient working class movement coming from the multinational 
and associated power bloc. The crisis of political domination 
was then realized by the purposeful, deliberate action of the 
multinational power bloc, which neither the ruling populist struc-
ture, nor the national-reformist executive nor the working classes 
108 
were able to fend off. 
The crisis of populism originated and unf'olded wi thin the 
matrix of class conflict and class struggle, effecting the integra-
tion of society and challenging the authority of the dominant 
classes as a Hhole. The incapacity of the populist regime to 
impose its ideological direction (ethico-political) was, in the 
last instance, the incapacity of the alliance in power to surpass 
by itself its OHn exacerbated contradictions. A historical conjunc-
ture was reached where a tryadic conflict (1. - populist historical 
bloc vs. emergent multinational and associated power bloc; 2. -
populist historical bloc vs. subordinate classes and popular-labour 
bloc; 3. multinational-associated power bloc vs. subordinate 
classes) became a dyadic struggle between the dominant class as 
a whole and the subordinate classes. This dyadic struggle was 
understood as a zero-sum confrontation between elite and masses, 
capable of overflowing the systemic constraints precisely because 
the dominant classes were bifurcated.l09 The politically and 
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economically dominant classes had but one common aspiration, almost 
a truism, - to remain dominant. Faced with urban and rural work-
ing class militancy, they were trapped in the horns of the populist 
dilemma: social reform or private accumulation. The community of 
dominant interests felt threatened by the action of the industrial 
bourgeoisie spearheading for a reformulation of the populist pact, 
and having to face the growing relative autonomy of the national 
reformist executive backed by its popular labour bloc. Unable to 
find adequate administrative and social expression for its growth, 
the multinational and associated bourgeoisie sought ne'l'T forms of 
~olitical actionmd social containment. The most enlightened 
fractions of the bourgeoisie foresaw the need to contain both the 
popular awakening and what amounted to 'immoral familism' by oli-
garchic groups and the incipient industrial-agrarian bloc, portrayed 
as narrow-minded business groups selfishly disrupting the community 
of interests of the bourgeoisie. As Paulo Ayres Filho, the entre-
preneurial leader observed, "It took the capitalists of Latin 
America a long time to realize that they were mortally threatened 
on two fronts. Once they did, however, their reaction was strong 
110 
and effective!" 
The political crisis gave rise to socio-historical criti-
cism (politico-ideological and military action), to the study of 
the period having as its subject wider social groupings, beyond 
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top political leaders and public personalities. It led to the 
understanding of the irreducible stI:uctural contradictions of the 
capitalist state in its populist form by the civilian and military 
vanguard of the modernizing-conservative entrepreneurial bloc. 
This meant that entrepreneurial ideologies and political indoc-
trination were converging to the point where an understanding of 
the needs for change was to be tran81ated into political action, 
while the traditional political forces still attempted to overcome 
the basic conflicts keeping them within certain historically 
exhausted limits. The 'cupula dirigente' of the populist histori-
cal bloc attempted to surpass those limits, lacking the understanding 
that it was reaching the political perimeters of the existing 
polity and not beginning anew within accepted areas of manoeuvre, 
confusing the birth pangs of monopoly capital i'li th the death throes 
of industrial-oligarchic populism. Thus, it opened the flanks for 
the coherent and viable political military strategy for domination 
of IPES/IBAD, who as the general staff of the multinational-associated 
bourgeoisie develope~ measured, planned and calculated action which 
led them to power. 
The IPES/IBAD comple;(, the subject of our follm1ing chapters, 
marked the passage from multinational-associated economic supremacy, 
to its positioning as a leading politicalfurce. It also signified 
the passage from :iDrmer attempts at reform within the law to a coup 
d'etat that was to change the constitution. The lPES/IBAD complex 
was not only the organizational and doctrinarian expression of 
the organic intellectua~s of the multinational-associated power 
bloc, but its de facto political supremacy. This supremacy fell 
short of political command of government for which they lacked 
the clientelistic structure of popular support and ideological-
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It was this elite, organically linked to the multinational 
and associated blocJwhich was to do away with the incoherences 
and indecisions of the populist state and clearly indicate the 
way ahead for Brazilian capitalism, in spite of opposition from 
right and left wi thin:its own rank and file. IPES entrepreneur 
Antonio Carlos do Amaral Osorio, of the Rio de Janeiro based 
American Chamber of Commerce, summed up this situation Nhen he 
observed that "Before 31st r;Jarch, 1964, the entrepreneurial classes 
struggled for the creation~ indispensable conditions for economic 
development, which had up to then depended upon a state trammelled 
by demagogy and vices originating from the past". "Only a Revolution 
could confront the multiple task of modernizing the Brazilian 
state, which involved dimensions of the most varied nature ••• " 
(It was) " ••• not only a question of re~orming the public admini-
stration, but ..... (it was) " ••• necessary to act in fields of more 
depth, actually those of the political organization, modifying 
aspects of the economic and social structures".112 
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attitudes about a more independent stance for Erazil in 
foreign affairs'. The question 'should Erazil side with 
the United States, with Russia or ,dth neither' was 
ans,,,ered as follows: In th the USA, 19% PIB, 46% PSD, 50% TIDN. 
Wi th neither, 46% PTB, 3&fo PSD, 45% UDNo 80 % 
favoured establishment of diplomatio relations viith the 
Soviet Union; 83% favoured increased trade and 74% favoured 
diplomatio relations with China. See LLoyd A. Free, 
SOIDe International Implications of the Political Psychology 
of Erazilians, Princeton, Institute for International Sooial 
Research, 1961, p. 16. This study .. ras -carried out by llTESE, 
Instituto Estudos Sociais e Economicos, a Brazilian research 
centre ,\·rhich did studies for IPES. 
36 On the association with foreign capital, which involved the 
influx of equipment and managerial expertise and the provision 
by the Erazilian state of exoeptional oonditions for the 
penetration of multinational corporation~ as a strategy of 
industrialization, see Celso Furtado, Analisis del 1,10delo 
Brasileno, Buenos Aires, Centro Editor de A~~rica Latina, 
1972, pp. 25-28. Also T,rerner Baer, A Industrializaoao 
e 0 Desenvolvimento Economico do Brasil, Rio de Janeiro, 
FGV, 1975, Chapter V: 0 Finanoiamento da Industrializa9ao 
Brasileira: Fonte de ~QUdos e Papel de InflaQao. F. de Oliveira, 
Critica ••• op.cit., pp. 36-40. 
37 On the steady increase in the rate of exploitation of the 
working force, supplying the internal surplus for accumulation, 
an inflationarJ economy that subsidized multinational insertion 
and the deterioration of popular living conditions, see F. de 
Oliveira, Critica ••• op.cit., pp. 40-50. A document prepared 
by the ~linistry of Planning after the COUD of 1964, asserted 
that among others, "the rate of capital fOrJ:lation seems to 
have been especially sustained by ••• the stimuli to import 
SUbstitution industrialization, by the structure of income 
distribution, by the good standards of entrepreneurial spirit 
and social mobility, and still reinforced by foreign loans 
and risk caDi tals. 1,1ha t refers to the incremental relation 
capital/product, in its favour acted the natural facilities for 
expansion of agricultural production, the concentration of 
transportation investments in motorways, the sequence of the 
process of import substitution and the absorption of foreign 
technology. The unattendance to which \'lere relegated, in 
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the last years investments in housing and other public 
services also ccntributed althou h in a sociall cruel 
form to imorove the relation ca ital roduct". My 
translation, my underline, RAD. In Documento de Trabalho 
~, pp. 1-2, Draft which prepared the ground for the 
establishment of the Banco Nacional de Habitacao, E}lli, 1964. 
38 Celso Furtado, op.ci t., p. 32. Foreign investment slm·red 
to a trickle, only nine million dollars in 1962, down from 
an average of 110 million dollars for the four previous 
years. Even so, US firms seemed to maintain their return 
on equity relatively vlell throughout the crisis period. 
Returns annually averaged 8.0.10 in 1960-62, fell to 5.1% 
in 1963-64 and then increased to 9.8% in 1965-67. 
Newfarmer and Mueller, op.cit., pp. 98,105. 
39 See A. Stepan, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns 
in Brazil, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1971, 
Chapter VI. Ronald M. Schneider, The Political System of 
Brazil, New York, Columbia University Press, 1971, Chapter I. 
40 For Francisco de Oliveira, investment levels fell, not because 
they could not be realized economically, but because they could 
not be realized institutionally. In Francisco de Oliveira, 
Crltica ••• , op.cit., p. 57. See also Maria da ConceiQao 
Tavares and Jos~ Serra, Alem da EstagnaQao, in M.C. Tavares, 
Da Substitui9ao de Importa95es, gp.cit., pp. 72, 170-173. 
See also Documento de Trabalho No.1, Ministry of Planning, 
Bras!lia, 1964, pp. 3-4. 
41 These points were emphasized by General Cordeiro de Farias 
in ESG Document C-01-61, pp. 17-18. 
42 "The former, because of their immediate impact, certainly had 
a very important role in the fall of the rate of growth, 
registered during the year: agricultural production viaS 
strongly affected by the draU&~ts in several regions, by 
floods in others and by fires and frost in Parana. Also, 
the production in several sectors of industry ivaS contained 
by the severe rationing of electric energy in the Rio-
Sao Paulo area, as a consequence of the drought. It must 
be said, en passant, that the lOiv growth of the real product 
was in part influenced by the reduction of the coffee crop 
in Parana, as a consequence of climatic factors. Being a 
commodity in over production, the decrease of the crop is 
not as dramatic as suggested at first sight by global 
statistics". R. Campos added that "it is common knowledge 
that the year of 1963 represented a period of general 
intranquility and growing deterioration of expectations. 
The galloping inflationary process, the successive strikes, 
the threats of private property confiscation, the enactment 
of the law of profit remittance, etc. became foci of 
depression of production and, above all, of investments. 
Some of these factors certainly contributed to the decline 
of the real product per capita in 1963". So much for 
his perception of the 'economic' factors in the crisis 
of 1963-64. Documento de Trabalho No.5, for Cabinet 
Meeting of 4th June, 1964, prepared by the Ministry of 
Planning. (My translation, BAD). 
43 Dooumento de Trabalho No.1, from R. Campos, Minister for 
Planning and Economic Coordination, to the President of 
232 
the Republic and Ministers of State, 23rd April, 1964. 
Exposition made at the first session of the Cabinet in 
Brasilia: "A Crise Brasileira e as Diretrizes de RecuperaQgo 
EconOmica" • 
44 See P. Parker, op.cit., p. 60. 
entirely without orientation in 
of the government, while at the 
indiscipline returned to public 
BAD). In Documento de Trabalho 
1964, op.cit., p. 3. 
"Private initiative was left 
relation to the intentions 
same time complete 
investments". (Hy translation, 
No.1, Hinistry of Planning, 
45 Octavio Ianni, Crisis in Brazil, New York, Columbia University 
Press, 1970, Chapter IX. See also A. Stepan, on.cit., pp.135-
142, 147-152. 
46 Francisco "'effort, 'Estado e Massas no Brasil', in 
Revista CivilazaQ80 Brasileira, No.7, Rio de Janeiro, 
1966, p. 156. Populism, in order to survive as a form of 
domination and as class convergent poli~y, could only do 
it as a 'discourse for liberation', i.e. as a programme for 
reform. In a sense, Goulart, even in spite of himself, was 
placed at the centre of a complex historical situation 
"There the boundaries of an alternative national-reformist 
sta te became blurred vii th the vicia ted integument of 
peleguismo, coronelismo and cartorial vices inherited from 
decades of elitist government. See, in this respect, 
Guita Grin Debert, Ideologia e Populismo, Sgo Paulo, 
T.A. Queiroz Editor, 1979. 
47 The form of politicization of this period determined the 
'blocking' of a socialist ideology. Entrepreneurial 
developmentalist nationalism replaced Marxism. See 
Leoncio Martins, Conflicto Industrial e Sindicalismo no 
Brasil, Sao Paulo, DIFEL, 1966, pp. 191-192. In this 
conjuncture in which nationalism is revigorated, "the 
popular masses pressure the State in the sense of 
establishing a reformist policy, 1fhich should be linked 
both to clipping the political bases of the conservative 
sectors (a~rian reform) and to the combat of foreign 
interes ts (of vThich the take-overs (encanmacoes) and 
nationalizations are examples)". (:Hy translation, RAn). 
Eliezer Rizzo de Oliveira, As ForQas Armadas: Pol{tica e 
Ideologia no Brasil, 1964-1969, Rio de Janeiro, Editora 
Vozes, 1976, p. 50. 
48 Francisco Weffort, Pol!tica de Massas in Pol!tica e 
RevoluQ~o ••• op.cit., p. 165. As Rizzo de Oliveira 
pointed out, drawing on "'effort's arguments, "The 
political actions of the popular sectors become oriented 
by the belief in a 'democratic state of the people at 
large', capable of confronting the action of the 
reactionary groups. These, in turn, see the State as 
revolutionary and become radically opposed to it". 
(My translation, BAD). Rizzo de Oliveira, op.cit., p. 51. 
49 Oliveiros S. Ferreira, 'A Caracteriza9~0 do Sistema', 
OESP, 17th October, 1965. 
50 The difficulties enccountered by the dominant classes in 
ruling by consent and consensus especially after 1946, led 
to a crisis affecting the whole of society in its multiple 
relations of domination, in what a paper produced by the 
Instituto de Pesquisas e Estudos Sociais defined as "a 
permanent crisis of constitutionalism, \"hich, in spite 
of manifesting itself intermittently, does not lose that 
character" • (My tmnsla tion, RAD). !PES - Document on 
Constitutional Reform, lOth January, 1962, Rio de Janeiro. 
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In !PES Archives, Rio de Janeiro. The first clear sign of 
such crisis within the dominant classes was Lieutenant 
Colonel Golbery do Couto e Silva's 'Manifesto dos Coroneis' 
(Colonels' Manifesto), of 1954. See ~ 19th January, 1979. 
51 The coronel and the pelego had the 'function of screening 
the aspirations existing in society so t~zt only some of 
them transform themselves in demands, those that are 
c ompa ti ble 'Ivi th the s truc ture s of domina ti on f, Luciano 
Nartins, Pouvoir et Developpement :gconomigue, Paris, 
Editions Anthropos, 1976, pp. 134-135. See also 
Peter Flynn, Class Clientelism and Coercion: Some 
Mechanisms of Social Control, in Journal of Commonwealth 
and Comnarative Politics, July 1974. 
52 For the expression 'mass for itself', see Helio Jaguaribe, 
op.cit., pp. 272-311. 
53 Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, 0 Processo Eleitoral Brasileiro, 
~, 1962, Rio de Janeiro. 
54 Roberto Campos, cited in Estevan Martins, Brazil and the 
United States from the 1960s to the 1970s in Latin America 
and the United States: the Changing Political Realities, 
edited by Julio Cotler and Richard Fagen, Califo~~a, 
stanford University Press, 1974, p. 295. 
55 L. Martins, op.cit., ppo 132-133. 
56 For their organizational and historical premises, and the 
socio-economic formation in which they operated, parties 
tended to perpetuate the crisis of hegemony of the post-
Estado Novo era. 1,[henever a historical conjuncture put them 
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to the test, they were rendered helpless by events. Such 
was ~~e case in February 1954, when Lieutenant Colonel 
Golbery do Couto e Silva's Manifesto dos Coroneis was 
released with more than 80 signatures and Goulart was 
forced to resign his post as Minister of Labour. Other 
critical moments in which the parties sho~~d themselves 
as ineffective political machines were: the events that 
led to Vargas' suicide in 1954 and the political impasse 
of the caretaker government; Colonel Jurandir B. Mamedets 
anti-populist and anti-politician manifesto read publicly 
in November 1955 and the subsequent attempt by the ESG/ 
technoentreneurial alignment to block the assumption of 
President elect J. Kubitschek and vice-president Goulart; 
the Jacareacanga Air Force revolt in 1956; the Navy-led 
conspiracy of Admiral Pena Boto, Brigadier Guedes Muniz 
and Colonel Jayroe Portela in 1958; the attempts at a 
Navy revolt in Pernambuco, led by Admiral Silvio Heck, 
at the end of 1958; the AragarQas Air Force revolt in 
1959; Janio's resignation in August 1961 and the 
immediate attempt to block vice-president Goulart from 
assuming his office. See M. Benevides, on.cit., pp. 163-
164 and Glauco Carneiro, Historia das RevoluQoes, Vol. II, 
Rio de Janeiro, Edi9~es 0 Cruzeiro, 1964. 
57 P.A. Ribeiro, op.cit., p. 14. 
58 P.A. Ribeiro, on.cit., p. 16. 
59 By 1962, the total electorate of 18,500.000 represented 
25% of the total population. Their distribution i-laS as 
follows: Table 11 
'South East North- Centre- North / 
east west 
% of regional 
population 38.5 35.5 18.5 4 3 
% of Brazilian 
electorate 26 26 21 24 20.5 
Source: Paulo Assis Ribeiro, on.cit., p. 5. 
The state of Guanabara and the state of S~o Paulo showed 
striking contrasts: with less than 3% of the total 
territory, they had more than 23% of the population of 
the country and close to 35% of the potential Brazilian 
electorate, pointing to the rapid trend tmrards urbani-
zation, '''hile the southern region was responsible for 
6c% of industrial revenues, against so/o of the north, 
northeast and centre-east. P.A. Ribeiro, on.cit., p. 11. 
60 For further details of the imbalance between political 
power and socio-economic situations, see P.A. Ribeiro, 
op.cit., pp. 13-14. 
61 As early as 1956, ESG General Juracy Magal~es was 
already calling attention to the constituting elements 
of an intra-class conflict that could lead to a crisis 
of the historical bloc, by outlining political problems 
accruing from the assymetry between the leading economic 
power bloc and the political dominant one. At an ESG 
lecture, General Maga~es enumerated these critical 
elements: 1) ''Discrepancy betvleen the distribution of 
power in the State and the distribution of power in the 
rest of society, in such a way that, the class which 
holds the biggest economic and social pmier considers 
i tself receiving less political pOVler than is due to 
it; 2) the old elite closes the doors to the new elite, 
not allowing the vertical dislocations with the 
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individual access of new leaders, who frustrated, acquire 
a 'class consciousness'; 3) refusal by the old elite to 
give in to any of the reforms aimed at by the new elite; 
4) polarization of society between VdO antagonistic 
parties, without a third force able to contain the 
excesses, placing itself against the aggressor; 5) adhesion 
of intellectuals to the new elite, popularizing the 
revolutionary ideas, with the evidence that they deserve 
to be defended by the people; 6) the old elite loses 
fai th in itself, accepting the ne'i ideas, and stopping 
to use power for the defence of the established ordertl • 
General Juracy ~~ga~es, ESG Document C-25-56, pp. 37-39, 
basing himself on Ossip K. Fletchtheim, Fundamentals of 
Political Science, pp. 152-165. 
62 The study also observed the growing influence of 
alliances in Brazilian politics. From 1950 on~mrds, the 
votes given to tlegendas' of alignments rose from 20% to 
44% in 1962, while the sum total of the legendas of the 
three biggest parties (PSD,UDN and PTB) decreased from 
60% in 1950 to 41% in 1962. Such alliances undermined 
par~J influence precisely in federal elections. 
P.A. Ribeiro, op.cit., p. 17. A discussion of the 32 
electoral alliances for the elections of 1962 can be 
found in Brazil: Election Factbook, No.2, September, 
1965, Institute for the Comparative Study of Political 
Systems, Washington, pp. 63-68. 
63 Cadernos Brasileiros, No.1, Ano III, 1961. p. 76. 
With the persistent growth of an ideological sector 
~dthin the PTB, the dominant classes felt increasingly 
threatened by the popular vote. vlliat ~~d been a 
'regime input' and a device for the generalization 
of domL~ant class proposals through the electoral 
reinforcement of the post-1946 institutional frame~rork, 
had turned into a demand mechanism for change through 
the political system. 
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64 It was no wonder that politicians in general, but 
especially candidates to the presidency, felt themselves to 
hawe "the right and the duty to appeal directly to the 
electorate, outside party directions", with damaging 
consequences for the politicization of the people. 
Cademos Brasileiros, No.3, Ano II, 1960, p. 87. 
65 What became evident was that the multinational and 
associated bourgeoisie was unable to unite the people 
around itself, the cause of its defeats in 1954 and 
compromise of 1961, as well as the impulse for April, 
1964. The bourgeoisie had failed in creating a feasible 
and viable party system for itself as ivell as a party 
of its oYm. By using them all, it was left by the 
early 1960s, with none but the Armed Forces. The 
PSD, as an oligarchical machine had no significant 
capacity to aggregate the new pressures from mobilized 
rural and urban working classes. Nor was it able to 
carry out the broader interest articulation required 
by multinational capital, tied as it was to traditional 
rural and industrial interests. The UDN, vlhilst 
projecting a touch of modernity, as 'a party that had 
a dimension of opposition to the regime ••• had also 
, been ViiJttually a parti-b-i.paht in the regime t, and worse, 
as a party i tivas practically impervious to the masses. 
See Otavio Dulci, Ve.ia, 7th September, 1977. On 
Colonel Golberyts opposition to the UDN, see Carlos 
Lacerda, Depoimento, Rio de Janeiro, Editora Nova 
Fronteira, 1977, p. 155. 
66 P.A. Ribeiro, op.cit., p. 17. The PSD divided between 
'caciques' (chieftains) and 'ala mOQa' (young vring). The 
UDN had its 'Banda de Musica t (Nusic Band), a group of 
coup-supporting politicians formed by Aliomar Balleiro, 
Colonel Menezes Cortes, Carlos Lacerda, Bilac Pinto, 
Joff.o Agripino and others; and the Bossa Nova group, with 
more liceral .tend.enc:ies:~ SeeH. Benevides, op.ci t., pp. 137-
138. . 
67 Ironically, thePTB was criticized by 
i;lilson Figueiredo, editor of Jomal do Brasil 
and an influential poiiti.cal propagandist of the anti-
Goulart campaign for not being able "to become important 
in the most industrialized state of Brazil. It continues 
to be a saco de gatos (mixed bag) in Sff.o Paulo, incapable 
of conquering the political leadership in a state of 
big working masses. They lose the dispute ivi th other 
popular forces". Moreover, Figueiredo pointed out, 
sharply, that "if the UDN did not identify itself with 
the national aspirations of the paulista entrepreneurial 
classes, nor did the PTB stir the i'lOrkers of the biggest 
industrial complex in Latin America, this might explain 
in part ,·rhy Sgo Paulo, which commands the economic life of 
Brazil, does not have political domina tion". I·Tilson 
Figueiredo, A IndefiniQff.o dos Grandes Partidos, 
Cademos Brasileiros, No.3, Ano II, 1960, pp. 3-7. 
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68 The FNP, presided over by Bento Gon~alves and led by 
Sergio ~hgalhaes, reunited federal deputies of the 
Brazilian Socialist Party - PSB (77.8%); of the PTE (63%); 
PSD (41.7%) and even UDN (28.$%) on a strongly national-
istic platform that condemned multinational abuse and 
sought structural reforms along the lines of the Goulart 
government. 
69 P.A. Ribeiro, op.cit., pp. 18-19. This analysis ,~s 
consistent with one produced by the Sgo Paulo magazine 
Visgo. The analysis of Visao showed that in 1945, the 
PSD and UDN together held 96.4% of the electorate. 
In 1958, however, it had gone dovT.O to 52.~. By 1962, 
it was 45.9%. And it added "Parece haver evidente 
correla~go entre a declinio dos par tid os do centro e 
do exodo rural. Os eleitores rurais que sgo urbanizados 
rapidamente, primeiramente votam no PTE e depois tendem 
para 0 PCB". In Vieiro t 30th September, 1960, as quoted 
in Osny D. Pereira, Quem Faz as Leis no Brasil, Rio de 
Janeiro, Edit6ra Civiliza9go 3rasileira, 1963, p. 50. 
70 The .ADP, founded in March, 1961, ,.;as led by Joao Mendes 
de Costa Fo, UDN deputy for Bahia, a big landowner and 
lawyer. ADP gathered together reactionary and con-
servative gr?UPS, many of them pr<?-.£Q..~ activists. .ADI: 
concretized in a.n ad hoc way" an al~gnment across party l~nes 
basically built around a PSD-UDN-PSP compact and the 
adhesion of an important sector of the Christian 
Democratic Party - FDC, members of the Republican Party -
PR, of the Liberator Party - PL, of the Popular Represen-
tation Party - PRP, of the Labour Renovation Movement -
MTR and some other minor groupings, receiving even the 
support of the right wing of the PTE. ADP rallied the 
centre-right of the political spectrum, close to 160 
Congress members and approximately another 40 wavering 
supporters into a coherent opposition against the Goulart 
executive, the national reformist bloc and working class 
mobilization. Initially, ADP ,.;as associated ,d th the 
conservative militant position of CONCLAP, helping to 
stir up public opinion against the executive. It soon 
became the coordinated parliamentary outlet and political 
fac;ade for more sophisticated right lang social forces 
and action groups. ADP reached its peak of activity in 
1962, with a countrywide neti-lork of Popular Democratic 
Action - ADEP groups. In Brazil: Election Factbook, op.cit., 
p. 37. See also M.V. Benevides, op,cit., pp. 138-139 and 
~, 20th June, 1963. 
71 For a succint description of each of these organizations, 
see Brazil: Election Factbook, op.cit., pp. 37-50. 
72 
73 
74 
The deep social disaggregation in the Northeast and 
centre-south, in the form of peasant mobilization 
through leagues and rural trade unionization seemed to 
indicate that the peasantry was at last finding a 
coordinated and sufficiently mobile expression for 
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their aspirations and rights, overcomihg the shortcomings 
of party-bureaucratic organization, to reach the isolated 
individual in the socially complex and regionally 
differentiated Brazilian countr'lJside. The decrease in 
PSD control and the increase in peasant mobilization 
affected the very foundation of the populist pact of 
domination. Peasant mobilization reached critical levels 
with the expectations created by Goulart's projeot of 
agrarian reform and his attempts to incorporate the 
peasantry into his power base and tended to push the 
rural oligarchy and the agrarian bourgeoisie into the 
multinational-associated political bloc. For a 
description of the Northeastern political scenario and 
an appraisal of the significance of the peasant leagues, 
rural trade unions and right ",ing rural organizations, 
see Joseph A. Page, The Revolution t:b..at Never 1ilas: 
Northeast Brazil 1955-1964, New York, Grossman Publishers, 
1972. See also Paulo Cavalcanti, Da Coluna Prestes a 
Queda de Arraes, S~o Paulo, Edit8ra Alfa-Omega, 1978, 
Chapters XI-XIII; Gregorio Bezerra., 0 Frio e Sanguinario 
Gregorio Bezerra in 0 Pasquim, Rio de Janeiro, 26th 
Januar'lJ, 1979, pp. 19-21; Clodomir Moraes, Peasant Leagues 
in Brazil, in Agrarian Problems and Peasant :t-Iovements in 
Latin .~erica, edited by Rodolfo Stavenhagen, New York, 
Anchor Books, 1970, pp. 497-498; H. Cehelsky, The Policy 
Process in Brazil: Land Reform 1961-1969, Ph. D. 
dissertation, Columbia University, 1974, pp. 235-250; 
Antonio Callado, Tempo de Arraes: Padres e Comunistas na 
Revolu9~0 Sem Violencia, Rio de Janeiro, Jose Alvaro 
Editor, 1964; Moniz Bandeira, 0 Governo ••• , op.cit., pp. 
54-63. 
L. Martins, oP.Ci t., p. 131. In a country i .... here only a 
minori ty voted betvreen 1945 and 1963, more than half of 
the population over 18 years of age was excluded from 
political voting due to the restrictions imposed on 
illiterates), Goulart's policy of granting the civil 
right to vote to every Brazilian citizen was understood 
as clearly upsetting the fragile electoral balance in 
favour of social and economic popular reforms. Moreover, 
Goulart granted full political rights to lO"Ter military 
ranks who had been excluded from parliamentary eligibility. 
They became a new source of power, supplying the i .... orking 
classes with a potential popular dispositivo. 
P. A. Ribeiro, op.cit., pp. 18-19. 
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75 In its initial conception, the authoritarian corporative 
system had been a one way system, with the funotion of 
inoorporating the working olasses into the state. I'/ith 
the increasing levels of urbanization and modernization, 
and the rising political ideological consciousness of the 
workers, the disfunctionality of populism was made clear, 
as it became a dual carriage system, undermining the 
oapacity for sooial oontrol and political containment. 
By then, a popular-labour bloc had reached the scaffolds 
of the executive, under Goulart's aegis,and 'penetrated' 
the state apparatus. I-!hat unfolded in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s was a period of ideological mobility 
and the dawn of popular participation. The spearhead 
of the organized working class movement positioned itself 
on Goulart's political side, though not under his command. 
See 1;lerneck Viana, Liberalismo e Sindicalismo no Brasil, 
Rio de Janeiro, P2.z e Terra, . 1976, p:p.1l1-140. Also L. 
\'lerneck Viana, Inter'riew in 'I'S .. TA,12th October, 1977, p.6. 
76 See Ivilliam R. Kitner, The Politicalization of Strategy, 
in National Seourity: Political, Hilitary and Economio 
Strategies in the Decade A..."'ead, edi ted by D·~ AbsmreaJt.dRoV 0 Allen, 
USA, Hoover Institution Publication, 1963 pp. 385-412. 
Also 1'1. R. KitnerandH. Stokes, Discussion on Latin 
America, in D·o A.bshire, ide m , pp. 444-450. 
77 Lincoln Gordon, ESG Document C-4l-62, p. 32. 
78 Civil Society is used here in the Gramscian sense, as the 
mechanism for hegemony of a social group over the entire soc-
iety, exercised ·through the so-oalled private organizations, 
such as the Church, the schools, trade unions, etc. 
A. Gramsci, on.cit., p. 56. 
79 This is especially the case if Brazilian ','lorking class 
poli tioal mobilization is corrrpared 'vi th the level of 
popular participation and political organization of 
Chile, 1970-73 and Uruguay, 1970-73. 
80 7th Convention, September, 1962, in IPES Noticiario No.4. 
81 Oliveiros S. Ferreira, Uma CaracterizaQao do Sistema, 
OESP, 17th November, 1965, (dravang heavily on Gramsci). 
82 It is important to bear in mind that, although there were 
no revolutionary organizations able to threaten the 
Brazilian capitalist state, what made the early 1960s 
a critical period was the multiplicity of conflictive 
demands from the subordinate classes and the various 
fractions of the dominant class, "lhich, as a \vhole, 
constituted a critical pressure against the stability 
of the polity. See F. Weffort, El Pouulismo , •• , oD.cit., 
P. 84. ' 
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83 Joao Quartim, Dictatorship and Armed Struggle in Brazil, 
London, NLB, 1971, pp. 39-57. 
84 Fernando H. Cardoso, Autoritaritarismo e Democratiza9~o, 
Rio de Janeiro, Paz e Terra, 1975, pp. 171-178, 181-185, 
187-213. The relative autonomy of the State was not a 
social project for the dominant classes. Military and 
bureaucratic political 'dispositivos', a common feature of 
the Brazilian polity,were circumscribed to the dominant 
classes. 
85 Populist practices, ,vhich had allowed the dominant 
classes to preserve the basis of their effective 
domination,were being subverted by political-ideological 
platforms for reformist demands, undermining the 'control 
function of the corporative system', Kenneth P. Erickson, 
Corporatism and Labour in Development, in Contemoorary 
Brazil: Issues in Economic and Political Develonment, 
edi ted by Jon H. Rosenbaum and '\{illiam G. Tyler, 
New York, Praeger, 1973, p. 151. 
86 For the concept of ' necessity' and' necessary' as used 
throughout this thesis, see A. Gramsci, op.cit., pp. 412-
413. 
87 F. de Oliveira, Cr!tica ... , op.ci t., p. 50. 
88 F. de Oliveira, Cr!tica ••• , op.cit., pp. 40-41, 44-45. 
Real product rose from an average grmvth of 8.1% in the 
1953-1957 period, to an average growth of 11.2% throughout 
the Kubitschek administration. 
89 F. de Oliveira, Cr!tica ••• , op.cit., p. 48. Taking 1953 
as a (100) base, the cost of living index for Rio and 
S~O Paulo varied as follows: 
Table 12 
Rio S.!tO'·Paulo Rio December Slo Paulo December 
~. 
Annual Average Annual Average of eaoh 'lear ot each 'lear 
Year Index Yearly Index l Yearly Index Yearly Index 
Variation Va..."'iation Variation 
1953 100.0 100.0 108.0 100 
1954 122.4 22.4 118.3 18.3 136.3 26.2 101 
1955 150.7 23.1 141 19.5 162.4 19.1 142 
1956 182.2 20.9 173 22.2 197.6 21.7 189 
1957 211.9 16.3 206 19.2 224.0 13.4 216 
1958 242.9 14.6 237 15.2 262.7 17.3 264 
1959 338.0 39.1 325 37.2 399.4 52.0 378 
1960 437.4 29.4 439 34.9 494.3 23.8 499 
1961 582.9 33.3 607 38.1 707.7 43.2 I 716 
1962 884.0 51.7 905 92.4 1099.0 I 55.3 I 1159 
i , ! 
. 
S ouree: Funda<;i!:o Getulio Vargas and Pref ei tuxa de Mo Paulo 
(Quoted in Dccumento de T=abalho No.5, Ministerio de Planejacento. 
]'or Ce.binet Heeting, 4th June, 1964). 
Yearly 
Variation 
23.5 
17.1 
33.3 
14.1 
22.5 
42.7 
32.3 
43.4 
61.9 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
Taking as a base the index of 100 in 1944, real minimum 
salaries (wages) went do,vn from 161.6 in 1961 to 128.6 in 
1963 (Rio) and from 146.2 in 1961 to 114.5 in 1963 (Sao 
Paulo), while from 1958 to 1959, the real income of a 
family dropped by 10%. It is interesting to note that 
the most industrialized state (Sao Paulo) had Im"er 
indexes than those of Rio, while productivity maintained 
an average of 10.3 increase per annum from 1957 to 1962, 
and considering the year 1949 as the 100 base index, it 
reached the year 1963 with an index of 312.4. In the 
latter year, productivity slumped to a mere 0.2 increase, 
due to all the strikes, stops and slOl" downs, pointing to 
the political, not economical, stoppage of productivity. 
In 1964, vdth entrepreneurial order reinstalled, it 
swiftly picked up to 5.2. F. de Oliveira, Cr!tica ••• , 
op.cit., pp. 45-46, 48. 
F. de Oliveira, op.cit., p. 42. 
The belief grew among military officers that the 
government encouraged strikes and that the granting of 
large pay increases contributed to inflation, violence 
and the erosion of their own status and salaries. 
Such a narrow-minded and not at all national-oriented 
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belief would be whipped up conveniently. The political 
significance of their reaction to inflation was particularly 
great because milita~J officers gradually came to identify 
the labour unions and the politics o~mass mobilization 
as the most culpable factors. Alfred Stepan, op.cit., 
Pp. 71, 79. 
The most famous of these professional agitators was the 
CIA backed corporal Anselmo, who 'led' the sailors' 
revolt that sparked off the mi1ita~J backlash against 
Goulart. See Moniz Bandeira, 0 Governo ••• , on.cit., 
p. 169; see also Isto E, No. 132, 4th July, 1979, p. 17. 
Populism ",Tas condemned by the multinational and 
associa ted pm{er bloc as inept in its function of social 
containment; for its mobilizational content and for being 
bas e d u p 0 nan 'i n e- f f i c i e n t admini.s tra ti on 
which did not respond to the clmnging industrial con-
ditions of the late 1950s and early 1960s. The multi-
national and associated bloc also considered that it 
had reached the limits of its extractive capability 
within the political boundaries and socio-economic 
margins of the populist regime. See Rizzo de Oliveira, 
oD.cit., pp. 27-56. See also Helio Jaguaribe, Brasil: 
Crise e Alternativ8.a, Rio de Janeiro, Zahar, 1974, 
1'1'. 30-32. 
F. \-leffort, Pol!tica de 112.ssas, op.cit., pp. 195-196. 
On conditions for violent behavior of entrepreneurs 
against government, see F.G. Castles, on.cit., pp. 162-
163. 
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96 On the concept and aims of intervention, see 
J.N. Rosenau, The Concept of Intervention, in Journal 
of International Affairs No. 21, 1967, p. 167 and 
R. Little, op.cit., p. 33. 
97 See A. Stepan, op.cit., pp. 9-20, 57-12, for the form in 
which milita~J intervention has been rationalized and 
legitimated as moderating intervention. 
98 Intransigent polarization and outright rejection of the 
'System' was, never, the response of more than an active 
minority of the 'productive classes', nor for that 
matter, of the military. See Philippe C. Schmitter, 
Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil, 
Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1971, p. 197, and 
99 
A. Stepan, op.cit., p. 97. Only a political encounter 
for class survival, i.e., a zero-sum scenario, highly 
manipulative and intensely socially engineered, could 
establish the rallying point for a broad entrepreneurial-
military action front that could mobilize ample sectors 
of public opinion and bring about the task-oriented 
intervention of the Armed Forces. 
F. de Oliveira, A Econamia 
See Chapters V-VIII. 
... , op.cit., pp. 115-116. 
100 See Chapter VI of this thesis •. 
101 As one key military participant in the events of 1964 
remarked: "In Brazil, eve~Jone (todo mundo) conspirava; 
we knew how to do i til, Rio de Janeiro, 1976. Name ,<'1 thheld 
on request. Interview to R.A. Dreifuss). This view is 
reinforced by the analysis of Ronald Schneider, who 
quotes Leoncio Basbaum as saying: "Du...""ing the year 1963 in 
Brazil, eve~Jone conspired ••• There was not a conspiracy. 
It was a plateful of little conspiracies". Leoncio 
Basbaum, Histo'ria Sincera da Republica, Vol. IV, Rio de 
Janeiro, 1968 f ,p. 41, as quoted in Ronald H. Schneider, 
The pcliti<0a1.6., op.cit., p •. 7S. 
102 Glycon de Paiva, in IPES CD, Rio, April 4) 1962. 
103 The broad coalition mustered by the multinational and 
associated fractions, gave to the movement Of 1964 
its character. For many of the participants of this 
',ride bouxgeois front, the structural-political over-
determina tion of their action ,.;as concealed. The un-
folding of an authoritarian-associated state 'dould soon 
shatter their illusions. See F.R. Caxdoso, Autoritarisoo 
op.ci t., p. 187. ••• 
104 See A. Gramsci, op.cit., pp. 210-216, on theoretical 
insights into the question of Constitutional Bonapartism. 
105 F. de Oliveira, A Economia .. . , op.ci t., p. 110 • 
106 "If the process is looked at as a whole, vTe could say 
that the internal contradictions of the dominant class 
are subordinate to the contradiction that exists between 
the lattezo and the "Thole of the system, and to the 
contradiction that exists between the dominant class 
and the small·and middle sectors of capital". (My 
translation, BAD). El NUevo Caracter de la Dependencia, 
in La Crisis del Desarrollismo y la Nueva Dependencia, 
Jos~ Matos 11ar, editor, Insti tuto de Estudos Peruanos, 
Argentina, Amorrortu Editores, 1969, p.10. 
101 For the meaning of organic crisis, see A. Gramsci, 
opoci t., p. 210. 
108 It was clear that the ~ campaign viaS an elaborate 
affair. Thus, Julio de Mesquita Filho, ovmer of the 
o Estado de Sao Paulo nevTspaper and the S§:o Paulo radio 
station El Dorado, as well as Industrias de Papel 
Guararema S.A. (Parsons and Hhittmore Inc./Parshit Ltd. 
S,d tzerland), a prominent member of the right wing 
organic intellectuals, saw it fit to vranl, in a letter 
to the clandestine General Staff 'vThich proceeded to 
the first military articulation for tlle downfall of 
Goulart's government', that it was~necessarJ to act 
with absolute security, defining,before the military 
uni ts enter into action, ,.,hat is intended and ,.,hat is 
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to be done". (My translation, BAD). Roteiro da 
Revolu~§:o, ~, 12th April, 1964. See also Chapter VIII. 
109 On bifurcated social actors and the transition from 
tryadic to dyadic conflict, and the definition of 
intervention stimulus, see R. Little, op.cit., Chapter III. 
110 N. Bailey, Organization and Operation of Neoliberalism 
in Latin America, in Latin ~~erica: Politics. Economics 
and Hemispheric Security, N. Bailey,(ed.), New York, Praege~ 1965. 
111 The state '.vas definitely the political ground of the very 
rich. Consensus among the bourgeoisie and the consent of 
the working classes were ruled out. The authority of 
force was called in. By this verJ same token, authority 
,.,as stripped from its previous legi tima ting devices. 
It is ironic that the architect of the victorious forces 
of 1964, the then IPE~ Colonel GolberJ do Couto e Silva 
,.,ould not be able to follow his ovm recoIIL'J.endations: 
"T"he formulation, the expression of National Objectives 
is and must be regarded as a work of art, because ••• 
works of art promote the sense of identification. And 
is it not indispensable that all should feel easily 
identified with the stated Objectives? Only such 
identification will provide the plan with the authentic 
seal of an unquestioned authority". Colonel Golbery do 
Couto e Silva, Do Planejamento para a Seguran9a Nacional, 
in Cadernos Brasileiros, No.4, Rio de Janeiro, October/ 
December 1960, pp. 37-38. (My translation, BAD). 
112 Antonio Carlos do Amaral Osorio, '0 Estado Revolucionario 
e 0 Desenvolvimento EconOmico', in 0 Processo 
Revolucionario Brasileiro, Rio de Janeiro, AERP, 1969, 
Pp. 115-116. 
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Chapter V: THE ORGANIC ELITE 
Recrui tment, Decision-making Structure and 
Organization for Action 
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Introduction 
This chapter is concerned with how the organic intellectuals 
of the multinational and associated economic interests formed 
a political-military organization, the IPES/IBAD, whose purpose 
was to counteract the national reformist government of Joao 
Goulart and the alignment of social forces that supported his 
administration. This chapter sets out to describe the inter-
national organization of these organic intellectuals, their 
policy-making, decision-making channels, and their strategies 
for public and discreet, direct and indirect, action. 
The IPES/IBAD represented the political phase of the 
entrepreneurial interests. Following Gramsci's point, if not 
all the techno-entrepreneurs, entrepreneurs and military, "at 
least an elite amongst them had the oapacity to be the organizers, 
of their interests and of society". 1 This elite of the organic 
intellectuals (referred to hereafter as the organic elite 2 of 
the multinational and associated economic blOC) became a social 
force, aware that its "own corporate interests in their present 
and future development transcend the corporate limits of the 
purely economic class, and can and must become the interests 
of other subordinate groups too". This is the most purely 
political phase, and marks the decisive passage from the 
structure to the sphere of the complex superstructure; it 
is the phase in which previously germinated ideologies become 
'party'. 3 
In order to understand how the multinational and 
associated interests established their supremacy over the 
industrial-oligarchic populist bloc in power and how they 
were able to contain the emergent working classes, it is 
necessary to understand the process whereby the organic 
intellectuals of the predominant economic fractions were able 
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to involve themselves successfully in the political struggle 
of the 1960s. It is also necessary to understand the 'degree 
of homogeneity, self-awareness and organization' achieved by 
the organic intellectuals of the multinational and associated 
economic interests. This moment of homogeneity, self-awareness 
and organization in the process was expressed in the formation 
of an organic elite centred in the IPES/IBAD action front. 4 
The story of IPES/IBAD is one of how the organic elite 
of the multinational and associated bourgeoisie developed from 
a limited pressure group into a class organization capable of 
sophisticated political action, and of how it moved from the 
desire for a reform project to a desire for a cou~ d'etat. The 
multinational and associated complex of interests would seek 
to lead the professional and functional groups as well as 
aiming to neutralize the traditional power bloc, in the under-
standing that the organic elite could be victorious and 
affirm capitalist modernization only if it exacted the support 
and acquiescence of the majority of the participant population. 
The organic elite centred in IPES would then portray itself as 
the 'maturation of the will to act within a programme capable-
of mobilizing the men of enterprise', and as a whole, to offer 
solutions for the problems of the country. 5 In this process, 
the organic elite was to shape the bourgeois social forces into 
a class, a process which culminated with the transposition of 
the private power of the multinational and associated interests 
into the public government of Brazil. In order to do so, the 
dominant economic bloc had to become the authoritarian state 
it turned out to be. 6 
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The Formation of IPES 
National and International Dimensions 
The seeds of the Institute for Research and Social Studies -
IPES, as well as those of IE.AD and CONCLAP, were sown towards 
the end of Kubitschek's administration, 7 for whose inflationary 
excesses and populist overtones IPES/IEAD members showed dis-
taste; 8 and under the presidency of Quadros, on whose moralistic 
zeal they had placed high hopes. Although individual, group 
or even sectoral multinational and associated interests were 
duly articulated throughout the parallel administration, there 
was no authoritative, organized political leadership by the 
end of 1960, except for the more particularistic class associa-
tions. It was then, according to Paulo Ayres Filho, entre-
preneur and former director of the Banco do Brasil under 
Quadros, that "some franc-tireurs of Sao Paulo and Rio de 
Janeiro met for the first time. All of them (perhaps ten or 
twelve at the most) were relatively young executives of the 
generation born during World War I or just after it". 9 
According to the official story Paulo Ayres Filho was con-
tacted by Rio-based American born entrepreneur Gilbert Huber Jr., 
to whom was assigned the responsibility of recruiting Sao Paulo 
businessmen. 10 Paulo Ayres Filho recruited Joao Baptista 
Leopoldo Figueiredo, an important multinational entrepreneur 
and former president of the Banco do Brasil under Quadros. 
Leopoldo Figueiredo became the head of IPES, Sao Paulo. With 
the sudden resignation of Quadros in August 1961, it was 
decided to activate the grouP. 11 
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However, Paulo Ayres Filho, a 'dedicated anti-Communist' 12 
had already, it appears, performed some basic work in this 
sphere before being contacted by Gilbert Huber Jr. In the 
early 1950s, Paulo Ayres Filho had become increasingly con-
cerned about the political mobilization that was taking place 
throughout the country and across class barriers. Having become 
aware of the work of the Foundation of Economic Education, an 
organization based in New York, "proselytizing in the cause of 
limited government and free enterprise ll , as an antidote for 
what it called the 'something for nothing' philosophy, he 
began to translate their pamphlets and circulate them among 
friends. 13 
Meanwhile, on the Rio side, Gilbert Huber, multinational 
entrepreneur Antonio Gallotti, techno-entrepreneurs Glycon de 
Paiva and Jose Garrido Torres and entrepre~eur Augusto Trajano 
Azevedo Antunes,among others,were engaged in their own success-
ful recruitment campaign, as well as being involved in hiring 
the services of several reserve military officers such as 
General Golbery do Couto e Silva who was recommended to IPES 
by General Heitor Herrera. A series of informal meetings led 
by entrepreneurs in the homes of prominent Sao Paulo and Rio 
based businessmen openly inaugurated a stage in the process 
where different class organizations and state agencies began 
to proselytize for fundamental changes in the economy and 
polity. From these planned encounters and preliminary dis-
cussions with an ever-increasing number of prominent individuals, 
emerged the idea of stimulating a country-wiae entrepreneurial 
reaction to what was perceived as the leftward trend of 
politics. This entrepreneurial reaction would need to 
encompass sectoral representation and would have to share 
a wider 'popular' feeling, of a kind already being stimulated 
in Recife, Belo Horizonte, Sao Paulo and Rio by the first 
organized entrepreneurial action group, IBAD, and being pushed 
through by the militant class association, CONCLAP. 
!PES came into being. The founders of both IPES, Rio 
and IPES, Sao Paulo, the core of what was to become a national 
network of militant action groups, came from different 
ideological backgrounds. They were unified, however, in their 
multinational and associated economic relations, their anti-
communism and their ambition to redress and overhaul the form 
of state. These entrepreneurs aimed to attain a political 
leadership to match their economic supremacy and techno-
bureaucratic ascendancy, for, as has been observed, -the 
direction of the country could not be left any longer to the 
politicians alone". 14 IPES came into existence, officially, 
on 29th November, 1961. Its launching was received favourably 
by such diverse organs of the press as 'Jomal do Brasi~', 
'0 Globo', 'Correio da Manha' , and '~ltima Hora'. 15 Support 
also came from Rio's conservative Archbishop Dom Jayme de 
Barros Camara, while other political, ecclesiastical and 
intellectual figures also praised its emergence. IPES soon 
expanded in 'Porto Alegre, Santos, Belo liorizonte, Curitiba, 
Ma.n.aus and other minor centres. 16 
IPES led a political double life from its very inception. 
In the eyes of sympathizers and supporters, the overt side of 
IPES was an organization of 'respected businessmen' and 
intellectuals, with a number of 'blue-ribbon technicians', who 
advocated 'participation in social and political affairs and 
who supported the moderate reform of existing political and 
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economic institutions', 17 Their ostensible purpose was to 
study 'from a liberal engineer-businessman's point of view, 
the basic reforms proposed by Goulart and the left'. 18 
According to one version of their basic document: 'The 
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Democratic Responsibility of the Entrepreneur' (A Responsabilidade 
Democratica do Empresario), which was circulated among potential 
recruits, IPES was introduced as a "non partisan union 
(agremiagao apartidaria) with essentially educational and 
civic goals ll • Furthermore, according to the document, IPES 
was oriented by "leaders (dirigentes) of enterprises and 
liberal professionals who participate through democratic con-
viction, as patriots and not as representatives of any class or 
private interests. They get together to analyze the situation 
and contribute to the solution of the social problems constantly 
emerging in Brazilian life. Therefore, the direction of IPES 
counts upon the collaboration of university professors, 
technicians and experts, who, in agreement with its postulates, 
are ready to vlOrk in the study and equation of the national 
problems ll • Their professed purposes ,..,ere to "promote the 
cultural, moral and civic education of the individuals"; to 
IIdevelop and coordinate studies and activities of a social 
character"; and to "obtain, through objective research and. free 
discussion, conclusions and recommendations that will contribute 
to the economic progress, social well-beinG and streng~hening 
of the democratic regime of Brazil". 19 To shore up even more 
its faqade, IPES was portrayed (by its leadership) amongst the 
wider public, as an educational org~~ization, giving money to 
reduce illiteracy among poor children - and as a centre for 
academio disoussion. 
The covert side coordinated a sophisticated and multi-
faceted political, ideological and military campaign. The 
founders of lPES, avidly dedicated to lIopinion manipulation 
and psychological warfare, organized and recruited a nucleus 
of 50 members, each pledged to bring in five more, and they, 
in turn, five more. They agreed to conduct both covert and 
overt operationsll. 20 Some people in the initial group con-
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sidered that IPES should be a wholly clandestine organization, 
but it was argued that because of the nature of the tasks 
ahead, it would be wise to operate also before the public 
eye. 21 The secret and discreet operations of this insur-
rectional bourgeoisie were carried out by specialized task 
forces, action units, subsidiaries and code-named groups. 22 
I~AD operated as a tactical unit, with IPES as the 
strategic centre and 'Ylith llAD and other subsidiaries and 
parallel organizations t&~ing much of the blame (or praise) 
for covert activities and exposing themselves much more than 
IPES. The balance between long range a.'1d short range 
activities remained a delicate one, though the pattern that 
seemed to have emerged was one of parallel groups operating 
in the two fields, propping up contingent and ad hoc bodies 
and organizations when deemed necessary. 23 Disingenuously, 
Raul Pilla, leader of the Liberator Party remarked that IItwo 
very useful institutions were organized, one for doctrinarian 
studies to disseminate ideas and enlighten the citizens; the 
other for political action, to help them fulfill their 
patriotic duties". 24 
The organic elite directed its efforts t'owards the fusion 
of the scattered militant anti-government groups. They set 
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up front organizations for covert operations (penetration and 
containment) within the student and labour movements and 
discouraged peasant mobilization. The organic elite estab-
lished a well-organized political presence in Congress and 
coordinated the efforts of all the centre-right factions in 
opposition to the government and the labour-left. The organic 
elite also established what amounted to effective control of the 
audio-visual media and the press throughout the country. In the 
course of their opposition to the populist structures, the 
national-reformist executive and the popular social forces, 
IPES/IBAD became the real party of the bourgeoisie and its 
general staff for ideological, political and military action. 
According to Paulo Ayres Filho, results achieved by 
IPES were in no way spectacular in the initial stages of its 
existence as an organization; but gradually thanks to the 
collaboration with IPES by its subsidiaries and other existing 
organizations and action groups, the or~~ic elite succeeded 
in carrying into the dominant classes, as well as the middle 
social layers and military, first the idea of resistance 
against the government, then the consensus and urge for its 
overthrow. For this last operation, IFES/IEAD had to succeed 
in inspiring and mobilizing a large number of military officers. 
And this they achieved. 25 Thus, a number of well-known 
civilians and milit~J travelled throughout the length and 
breadth of Brazil, identifying local anti-government and 
anti-labour left movements, groups and individuals who were 
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willing to resort to military measures, if needed. 26 Moreover, 
IPES/IJ3,AD were faced \vi th the problems of indoctrinating and. 
organizing a bourgeois pmver bloc, forcing it into political 
action ,vi th a minimum of popular legitimation. The first task 
of the organic elite ,vas to convince the majority of the entre-
preneurs themselves of their immediate and reel needs beyond 
petty commercial gains; of the necessity to engage in ne,-[ 
levels and different forms of action. It also had to break 
the allegiance of some and the passive alignment of others to 
and ,vith the national reformist executive. In this task, the 
IPES/IBAD organic elite displayed enormous and resourceful 
skills. 
In Janua-ry 1962, IJ3AD's general coordi..'1ator, Ivan Hasslocher, 
published his p2.1-:1phlet As Classes Produtoras diante do Comunisno 
(The Producing Classes vis-a.-vis Ccrnunism), an attempt to 
explain the dominant classes to themselves. It proclaL~ed to 
the I-[ider entrepreneurial public, as lB.AD :lili tants had been 
disseminating privately among 8hosen individuals, the need for 
a ney[ role of the doninant classes. As Hasslccher explained, 
"There are at present in Brazil numerous entities and bodies 
of the producing classes dedicated to the combat of CO:r:'nunism. 
All of them v[ere i':)unded by consci.ous democ::cats •••• the elite, 
from all points of vie\v, of the producing classes. But none of 
them until today accomplished anything useful". 27 T'nis vas due, 
according to Hasslocher, to the emphasis being laid on the 
quantity of :::::enbers assembled in such entities and bodies rather 
than on the quality of their membership, for the founders of 
those organizations thought that they should be truly represen-
tative. And in fact they ',-Jere. In Hasslocher's vie .... r, tr.2.t 'tras 
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precisely the secret of their inoperativeness. Hasslocher 
pointed out that no "practical businessman VTould dream of having 
his company directed by a council, whose component Dembers had 
equal pOvTer and entirely divergent points of vie',.,". And that, 
Hasslocher stressed, \-laS precisely the form in ':Thich the 
organizations of the 'producing classes' had been constituted. 
The _ necessi ty for the creation of an elitist ,and secretive) 
organiza tion of the organic elite vTaS being' pushed forward. 
Hml did the organic elite stru.ctured in IE.AD perceive 
the entrepreneurial classes? Hasslocher divided them in 
categories, as follovTs: a) the Con,mmists, i'Thich ';Jere 1% of the 
total; b) the criminals, 3%; c)the useful innocents (inocentes 
uteis), 10% d) the reactionaries, l~~; e) the unmJare, 7Of6; and 
f) the conscious elements, 4%. The 'conmunists' were those 
entrepreneurs who vTere seduced by doctrine and political 21l1oi tion 
to support and organize activities against their Ovm class. They 
were considered to be destructive and disaggregating elements 
among the entrepreneurial classes. The 'criminals' ',·,ere those 
",ho assisted or ,;·,ere passive vis-a.-vis the action of opposing 
classes. They Here the sector \'Thich tended to :::aximize its 
reT.·rards at all costs, and for the sake of its 0' .. m commercial 
greed, to disregard the '..rider interests of the whole of the 
entrepreneurial classes. The 'useful innocents t "Jere those 
liberal-minded entrepreneurs \·,ho supported socio-Bconomic 
projects labelled as progressive, out of naive and \·:ell-
intentioned thinking. The 'reactionaries' · .. ;ere those sectors 
of the dominant classes '..rho identified as 'co::'lTlunistic tall 
modernizing causes. They attempted to fossilize society, refusing 
to accept change in order to preserve their petty interests. The 
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'una'>rare' ,.,rere those members of the dominant classes vrho did 
not become militant class ~embers. They belonged to the 
dominant classes not by political action or ideological position, 
but by their very objective economic situation. Finally, 
Hasslooher identified the 'consoious elements'. In this small 
group, were those who had the capaoity and disposition to lead 
the entrepreneurial olasses in the struggle ':Thich they should 
establish against the 'communist threat'. ';lith what could only 
be a touoh of irony, Hasslocher observed that in 1896, the 
author H.G. Hells had vITi tten a book in "Thich he presented 
his ovm vision of a future ;.;orld ;.;here the masses vTould be 
enslaved by a group of well-organized povTerful capitalists 
vri thout scruples. Twenty-three years later, I'lells "ITote a ne,., 
preface to his book, in ;.;hich he concluded that 'the human 
speoies '.-Tould never reach such an immense and depressing con-
dition of slaverJ', for 'the thesis of a gradual, and syste~~tio 
enslavement of the working ~asses presupposes an intelligence, 
a pm.,rer of combination and machiavellism on the side of the 
olass of the finanoiers and industrialists, ,·,hich this class 
oertainly does not and probably will never possess,.28 
Hm.rever, Hasslooher stressed, the 'conscious r elenents '.'lere 
"much more enlightened tr:.an H. G. Hells had ever thought 
possible, although not so numerous. They are men ,,,hose vision 
sUX?asses the terrain of their immediate busL~ess and they have 
a fair cO:r::Iprehension of politics". Emp!:8;sizing his elitist 
vie .... ', Hasslooher added that "the great ::::'eforDs in the histoX"'J 
of this ,·,orld have been introduced by minorities to the 
majorities. The most perfected democracy net only tolerates, 
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but stimulates the action of leaders. T'nere is no doctrinal nor 
practical motive for the producing cl~sses in Erazil to act only 
en masse". And he added that IIA minority group can do much if it 
finds cohesiveness around constructive and solidly based ideals. 
As the results of their ,.;ork are verified, ne\.; elements will be 
attracted to collaborate and the group may become more represen-
tative. Admission of those nei'; elements, nevertheless, must be 
conditioned to their formal adhesion, not only to the ideological 
line, but to a line of action defined by the founding group. 
Organized as an acting minority, without the dead Height of the 
una"rare and \-Ti thout the Irell or ill-intentioned opposition of the 
other categories, the conscious democrats ,,,ill then outline and 
execute a plan of action for the defence of the fatherland, 
liberty and themselves. In our view, the principal sphere of 
action of this group must be internal, i.e. ; t "Tould have the 
objective of )utting in order the verJ own house of the producing 
classes". 29 The degree of class m-lareness 'I'li thin lEAD i-res 
indeed high. 
Under the cover of lEAD, the orGanic elite campaigned 
publicly and ferociously throughout the media, ~s well as by 
economic and intellectual measures against the 'deviant or 
irresponsible political behaviour' of in~~vidual entrepreneurs 
i-lho did not comply '.'Ii th the required opposition to Goulart's 
government. In this particular activity, lEAD's De~ocratic 
Popular Action - ADEP played a significant part. ADEP carried 
out under the rather inocuous heading of 'Social Action' tHO 
basic campaigns. One consisted of economic pressure upon 
private enterprises and social entities "Thich did not identify 
,,,i th its poli tical ide~ls or vThich did give support to govern-
mental policies. The other I-ras the political guidance of 
entrepreneurial and public opinion against the national 
government and against selected public figures. 30 The media 
campaign 'Ivas instrumental in the attempts by the organic elite 
to consolidate a conservative front of public opinion vii th 
modernizing aims, in consonance ',-lith entrepreneurial goals and 
opposed to Goulart's national reformist attempts. 
A clear example of character assassination vras the 
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severe criticisms YThich Jose Ermirio de Horais, of the industrial 
group Votorantim, received for his ostensive support of the 
reformist candidate to the gubernatorial seat of Pernambuco, 
, 
the key state in the Northeast. Jose Ermirio de ~furais had 
been Minister of Industry and Commerce under the Prime IvIinisterial 
cabinet of Francisco Erochado da Rocha in 1962. ~ne pressure 
on Ermirio de Norais yTaS orchestrated in L'='ES Rio at an early 
stage, although it tras lEAD ,vho ostensibly carried out the 
campaign. I'ilien Ermirio de I10rais I case }laa. been raised at a 
meeting of the Comissao Diretora of IPES, it 'ITaS decided by 
Rui Gomes de Almeida and J.Eo Leopolda Figueiredo to 'chat vQth 
him'. P...nd if :he did not concede, he Hould be attacked, as he 
\·/8.S deemed unable to resist. 31 IBAIl also lashed out at economic 
groups suoh as DUCAL, belonging to Jose Luiz Horeira de Souza, 
brother-in-laYT of ESG General Affonso A. de Albuq,uerque Li::::a, 
for keeping its commercial advertising in ul tiro Hora , a populis t 
ne'lvspaper of national ciroulation. DA.:D, moreover, criticized 
the soft line attributed to Jamal do Erasil, the Rio based 
national nevrspaper, in the fight against 'leftism'. 32 Such 
campaigning against Moreira de Souza and Ermirio de I10rais 
served as a smoke soreen for the org2nio elite. Jose ~~irio 
de Morais Filho, son of the Minister, and co-ovmer of the 
gigantic Votorantim group, vms a prominent nember of the 
directing colJll:littee of IPES, StIo Paulo. Jose Luiz Horeira de 
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Souza was a key figure in the directing committee of lPES, Rio, 
and his brother and partner in the Ducal Group, Jose Candido 
Moreira de Souza, an ex-Clube da Lanterna menber (Carlos 
Lacerda's conspiratorial group of anti-getulistas, so active 
in the 1950s) was himself linked to IBAD. Being ostensibly 
attacked by 'the right', they were able to keep their com-
munications open ',vi th the centre and the left of the political 
spectrum, and it was on the presumed support of such sectors of 
the 'national bourgeoisie' that the ill-fated strategy of 
national reformism ,·ras based. I1oreover, Jorne"l do Brasil , 
behind its informative fa~ade, functioned as one of the key 
outlets for the organic elite's ideological cQillPaign. 33 
As pointed out above, for the organic elite, the DBin 
ini tial political problem in terms of organization ''las that of 
stripping the entrepreneurial classes of any particularistic 
demands or populist prejudices. 34 Throughout the initial 
period of lPES' existence, the organic elite disseninated ar:1ong 
the different fractions of the dominant classes the need to 
move tmmrds the fcmation of the bourgeois class spirit, 
although ar,·rare toot IPES ,'las still only 'prepared for studies, 
not for action', as stressed by IPSS leader and entrepreneur, 
llntonio Gallotti. 35 
One interesting publication aiming at instilling a sense 
of class a\·rareness of the tasks lying ahead f:;r the en tre-
preneurial classes, ''las a paper produced by J?ES leader, 
Jose Garrido Torres, on the 'Democratic Responsibility of the 
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Entrepreneur', "Thich vras widely disseminated in revised versions 
through lPES/IBAD ohannels. 36 Garrido Torres called the 
attention of the dominant classes to the gradual discrediting 
of private enterprise in the eyes of the public. Such a process 
was due not only to state interventionism, as Dany entrepreneurs 
argued, nor 'vas it merely due to the propaganda of ideologioal 
adversaries, "Thioh Garrido Torres' group of action in lPES 
'ioTaS attempting to counteract. Garrido Torres stressed instead 
that the negative image of the entrepreneurial classes accrued 
from SODe negative aspects of private enterprise IS aim 
behaviour. 37 Garrido Torres remarked that as i,rell as the knovm 
arguments about the lack of initiative imputed to private 
enterprise, nevT arguments ",hich made criticism of the 'intrinsic 
virtues t or private enterprise were being heaxd. ,'rhat "laS 
extremely alarming in Garrido Torres' vie,v vias that pri va te 
enterprise ','ras being openly attacked because it '.'laS perceived 
as the root of the economic bacbraxdness of Brazil. Garrido 
Torres observed that the number ,.,ras grOiving of those vTho 
preached that Brazil being in the stage of evolution it Tdas, 
the ideals of economic development and social justice could 
only be achieved in an accelerated rhythm if the "Thole of the 
economy ,.,ras socialized. Furthermore, 8..J.'1d truly vTorr~ling, such 
convictions "rere shared by a.mple seg:.ients of the bureaucracy, 
students, journalists, politicians and even military officers, 
for T..Thom the main factor responsible for the Brazilian under-
development Has economic imperialism and the cupidity of the 
'producing' classes. The argument thxoughout these segments '.ms, 
according to Garrido Torres, that a social revolution i-ras needed, 
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as the inescapable alternative to the anti-social action of 
the 'economic groups' and the incapacity of the 'leading classes'. 
Garrido Torres then cautioned the dominant classes about the 
nationalist and labour-left campaign, ,,,hich, although seemingly 
directed principally at the foreign enterprises (for tactical 
reasons in his opinion), 'Ilould, in concrete terms, also hit 
the national ones. Garrido Torres also attacked the pseudo-
nationalist entrepreneurs, who played the nationalistic part 
in order to advance their own narroi,T interests, disregarding 
the \-lider interests of the entrepreneurial COIIlITluni ty as a ",hole. 
Garrido Torres then urged the entrepreneurial classes to evolve 
not only t01-rards the practice of 'economic democracy', but also 
to assume public and social responsi bili ties ,.,hich corresponded 
to such a stance. Such an evolution had to "ge favoured by ,\·l1'.2. t 
Garrido Torres considered as the authentic leaders of the entre-
preneurial classes '\'/ho ",ere geared to the necessity of renovation 
of private enterprise as I-Tell as to the active search for the 
solutions to the political and social problems 0f the count~J. 
But to achieve economic development and social progress, .~ lv 
was necessary, accorciing to Garrido Torres, to think and act 
poli tically, I·Ti th a clear sense of urgency. It ,'12.8 necessary 
to tone up the regime, producing institutional reforms \-Thich 
",ould structure the framework for modernization. For Garrido 
Torres, the survival of democracy, equated 1di th pri va te enter-
prise, depended on the political behaviour of the entrepreneurs 
and a demonstration of their social function to the ,.rider 
Dublic 38 ~ . 
Faced vIi th similar problems, IPES and UDN leader and 
entrepreneur, Rafael Noschese, president of the Federation of 
Industries of Sao Paulo, remarked that "The time has gone 
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,·rhen entrepreneurs Ivere worried onlyby the economic and financial 
problems of their enterprises. Today they can not alienate 
themselves from the social responsibility i'Thich is contained in 
the enterprise they direct". 39 Nevertheless, it vras not 
sufficient to overcome the corporative-professional phase 
of ,vhich Gra..'1lsci speaks once the avrareness of their common class 
interests had been acquired. It lias necessary to act as a class, 
and to be able to lead politically a bourgeois reaction against 
the executive, re~~ing it to their control. In this respect, 
for IPES president, J.E. Leopoldo Figueiredo, in addressing the 
:Brazilian Association of Public Relations, it W::.s necessary to 
"a"Taken anong us the generalized a"rareness of the comnon good, 
in opposition to the priv3.tist search for pe.rticular advantages 
of individuals, groups, or classes; an illegitinate form used 
by some to transpose others' frontier of liberty, violating the 
right of all. It is more than urgent to stinulate the sense of 
responsibility of each one". And he added: "IreS emerges Hith 
the aim of elucidating primordially the entreprenelITial class, 
"rho, it must be se.id in pe.ssing, needs more than any other cle.ss 
to really lmOiv 'ihat the ideal limits of the regime of free 
initiative are in the economic field". 40 
The canpaign of class conscientization led by IPEs/rJ3AD 
began to bear results. Gradually, the leading entrepreneurs 
of approximately 500 Rio and Sao Paulo based multinational and 
associa ted corporations ans,.,rered the call of their organic 
elite and beGan to sUyply I?ES, by then the recognized structured 
class vanguard, \Ii th the necessary Deans to carry out its "lork. 41 
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Before we enter the discussion about the 
means at the disposal of the organic elite and their L~ternal 
structure, there is a point "rhich has to be made. The Brazilian 
process Ylas not unique. In the late 1950s, throughout all of 
La tin America, there ,vas a substantial development of organi-
zations dedicated to the maintenance of 'political and economic 
liberty' (sic). 42 These organizations \'lere backed by the 
relatively neiv entrepreneurial and professional sectors of 
their respective societies. These various organizations 
springing up especially after 1955 resembled each other in their 
ultimate goal and in the composition of their supporters and 
recrui ts, 43 although the methods of operation vri th i'Thich they 
operated i'lere extremely varied and in some cases, perhaps contra-
dicto~J. 44 In spite of this, or precisely because of the richness 
of varied eX?eriences, the exchange of info~Btion, e:Qertise 
and militants "\oTaS common practice, as ·\vell as the overlapping 
of membership in different national organizations. A list of 
selected Latin fu~erican organizations shaping such an hemispheric 
entrepreneurial organic elite allmvs us a glimpse of their 
poli tical i::l})ortance in this period and cf the po';!erful interests 
and vast reS")1.ITces pushing for modernizing-conservative change in 
the continent. lUnong the sister organizations of I?ES, in the 
sense that t:ley s:::'ared expertise and funds, cooperated in joint 
efforts and had, in cases, overlapping individ'J.al a..~d corporate 
membership, 1'1ere: Insti tuto de InvestL",:wiones Sociales e 
Economicas, Centro de Estudios Honetarios Lo.tinoa::1eY'icanos -
CENU., to ,,-,hich TI'~S/IEAJ) affiliate :I),enio Nogueira I-ras linked 
and the Centro iTacional de Estudios Sociales, all in !1exico; 
the Centro de Estudios Economico-Sociales (Guatemala); 
Insti tuto de Estudios SocioeconoIilicos (El Salvador); Insti tuto 
Venezuelano de Analisis Economico Social and the Instituto 
Venezuelano de Accion Comunitaria (Venezuela); the Instituto 
de Estudios Sociales y Economicos and the Centro de Estudios 
y Accion Social - CEAS, which vTaS controlled by the USA Central 
Intelligence Agency station in Bogota (Colombia); the Centro 
de Estudios y Reformas Economico Sociales - CERES, controlled 
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by the USA CIA Quito station,45(Ecuador); the Instituto de Accion 
Social and the Centro de Orientacion Economico-Social (Peru); 
the Instituto Privado de Investigaciones Economico Sociales (Chile); 
the Centro de Estudios sabre la Libertad, the Foro de la Libre 
Empresa and the Accion Coordinadora de las Instituciones 
Empresarias Libres (Argentina); the Sociedade de Estudos Inter-
americanos - SEI, the Instituto de Pesquisas e Estudos Sociais -
IP.r:;S and the Funda9ao Alian9a para 0 Progresso - FAP (:Brazil). Another 
hint of the importance of this netl-rork can be given by introducing 
the US and transatlantic equivalents, related organizations and counter-
parts of the Brazilian IPES, FAP and SEI. Some of these organi-
zations vrere: the United States Interamerican Council, f01.1.'Y)ded 
by Nelson Rockefeller's Latin Anerican Office, the Latin American 
Information Co~~ittee - LAIC, founded in 1961 and the Committee 
for Economic Development - OED, ("rho, after !J.erGing Hi th the 
business group for Latin ~~erica under tLe leadership of 
David Rockefeller, becar.:e the Council for Latin 1L~erica - CLA, 
as seen else,.rhere) (USA); the Latin llDerican Development COrm:1i ttee; 
the Business Council for International Understanding (Uruguay); 
the Consejo Interamericanc de Comercio y Produccion - CICYP, 
under the directorship of George S. Hoore, of the First National 
Ci ty Ban}: and Engineer Rowulo A. Ferrero, of the Economic Policy 
Committee (Peru); the Committee for Economic Development of 
Australia - CEnA (Australia); the Europaishe Vereinigung fur 
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die '!Tirtschaftliche und Soziale En-v .. rick1u.rw; - GEPES, (Germany); 
the Comite Euroneen nour le Progres ~conomiaue et Social - CEPES, 
(France), TN-hose directors have been Bernard de Harjerie (Bangue de 
Paris et des Pa;(s Bas), Jacques Nerlin (Credit Commerciel de 
France) and Jean Deplasseux (Credit Lyonnais); the Comitato 
Europeo per il Progresso Economico e Sociale - CEPES, (Italy), 
which has had as its directors C. Gastaldi, (I~CCI financial 
complex) and Paolo Succi; Keizai De:mkai - KD, (Japan), '-lhose 
directors have been Y. Ivrasa, of Fuji Bank and S. Nakayama 
(Industrial Bank of Japan); Political and Economic Planning -
PEP (Great Britain); Seminarios de Investigaciones Economicas -
sm (Spain); StUdieffubundet J:Taringsliv och Samh1:!lle, (S'-leden), 
led by Rune Hoglund (~Nenska Handelsbanken),'L. ~rik Thunholm 
(Skandinaviska Bank) and Erik Dah~en (Enski1da Bank). There 
was also an International CEPES, located in Italy. International 
CEPES i-las presided over by Vittorio Valetta of FIAT and 
Charles Buzzi. 46 
LAIC and CE~ in particular, provided LDternational 
coordination and logistic support for lPES and sister 
organizations. It is not by chance that at the very beginning 
of 1962, Alfred C. Neal, (,-rho eventually became COTILT!l.i ttee 
ChairElan of the Council for Foreign Relations) ,-[ould send a 
letter to IPES leader, Gilbert Huber, offering hL~ a 'CED 
support operation', and supplying,to this effect, a list of 
26 people. 47 
It is interest:i,...'1g to note that !;}ost of these selected 
entrepreneurs and organic intellec~~als beca~e central 2enbers 
of IPES, assuming leading posts in the Sao Paulo branch. Some 
of them, ,'li thout becoming formal affiliates or participants in 
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the !PES structure of political action, synchronized their o'.m po-
litical efforts \'lith the organic elite through the entrepreneurial 
class associations. Last but not least, their nanes are to be 
found among the entrepreneurs and companies \-Thich provided the 
economic and administrative infrastructure for the overt and 
covert activities of !PES. 
!PES in Rio de Janeiro was also closely related to the 
ADerican Economic Foundation - AEF, for '<Thich IPES became the 
Brazilian outlet. !PES leaders Jose Garrido Torres, J. R. 
\-Jhi ttaker Penteado, Glycon de Paiva and Harold Cecil Polland 
among others, I'Jere the contacts ,'lith OED and AEF. AEF's 
president authorized IPES through Garrido Torres, to use, 
l'lithout charge, any propaganda or research naterial produced 
by the forner institution. 48 The Latin p~erican Inforoation 
Committee, with headquarters in Ne'T York and sponsored and 
financed by US corporations, distributed fQ~ds from these 
corporations to those groups they chose to aid and provided 
some degree of international coordination. LAIC sponsored at 
least "bITO general meetings of these groups, held in Nassau 
(the Bah~~as) in 1962 and 1963. 49 Gilbert Huber, Garrido Torres 
and Harold Polland, all founding members of I?ZS, Rio, Here ar:long 
those \-Tho travelled to Nassau from Brazil, representing the 
organization. 
In those meetings varied issues affecting multinational 
and associated interests ,-,ere discussed, such as governmental 
and private planning, the Latin A.'Jerican COr:'J8on Harket, the 
political and social role of private enterprise, ~~d the 
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combatting of 'communism'. Moreover, in Nassau l'i'ere discussed 
the common problems of IPES and the various sister institutions 
represented at the gathering, in view of the period of political 
turmoil throughout the Americas, which lay ahead. 50 
From the 1962 Nassau meeting, the !PES group proceeded 
to the United States and contacted the president of the 
American Senate, giving him an image of how the United States 
was perceived by the majority of the Erazilians, through the 
behaviour of American closed, private enterprises in Erazil. 51 
The !PES line of argument vlaS that closed American enterprises 
should open their boards of directors and shares to Erazilians, 
and, when possible, engage in association. 52 The !PES leaders 
also had a meeting a t the Department of Commerce, "-There Huber 
spoke in front of a group of 8 technical experts about Erazil 
and iL":lerican companies. 53 The group also h2.d a meeting Hi th 
Ambassador Moscoso and a team of advisors at the Department 
of State, , .. There the :Brazilian and Chilean political and economic 
si tuations ,,-/ere discussed. 54 
A couple of months later, reporting on one of his 
regular trips to the United States, Gilbert Hu'cer I'laS to 
welcome the call by Nelson Rockefeller to the presid.ents of the 
big North ADerican companies 55 who 'tlere expected to bring 
their support to the campaign. Contacts I'i'ere not lini ted to the 
Latin _~sericans going to the United States or to the Eahamas. 
Among others, Esteban Ferrer, Enno Hobbing and fellow menbers 
of the LAIC, 56 Frank :Brandenburg, Ernest V. Gross, Herbert Stein 
and A.C. Neal of the CED; as \-Tell as a host of political 
scientists, sociologists, anthropologists, functionaries in 
state agencies and private crganizations and executives of the 
transnational corporations travelled extensively, keeping 
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routine contact and giving special support for their Latin American 
counterparts and allies. 57 Such international transaction exem-
plifies another form by , . .,hich one c an speak of :Brazil as an 
infornally penetrated polity, ,.,here me::1bers of one polity come 
into contact with people of other countries, in an effort to 
achieve their objectives. 58 
The organic elite received stimulus from other quarters 
as \Olell. 'di th the coming to pO'tler of Lyndon Johnson, the 
:Brazilian organic elite, as well as otner Latin l~erican organic 
elites, received increased support. 59 :But John Kennedy had 
already cleared the ,·ray. I,Then Colonel Vernon A. Halters, an 
efficient intelligence man, later to become CL~ sub-director,60 
returned from Italy on his Hay to :Brazil, ostensibly to become 
mili tary attache, he ",vas informed that Presiden t Kennedy "would 
not be against the removal of Goulart's governnent if he "laS to 
be substituted by a stable anti-communist government that "Hould 
stand by the side of the 'free' occidental ,·rorld". 61 i'Then the 
ci vilian-nili tary move agains t Gculart 'tras 'Jell under "ray, the 
American Embassy 'assured the plotters tr.a t the US ,.,as behind 
them' 62 
• 
The Decision-r'faking Structure 
The fo~al pre-1964 national organization and institutional 
background ,·rhich 'tras centralized in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, 
formed the joint National Co::unittee coordinating other states 
\-There IPES had established similar centres, such as I?3SUL 
(Rio Grande do SuI), I?ES Pernambuco, IPES :Belo Horizonte, 
IPES Parana, IPES l'Ia..'1aus, IPES Santos and otiler minor cen tres. 
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The institution yTaS led by a Conselho Orientador - CO 
(Orientation Council), a Comite Director - CD (Directing Committee) 
and a Comite Executivo - CE (Executive Committee),63 each of them 
structured in the different regional centres. ~~e Lain political 
unit was located in the ~/O major sections of Rio and Sao Paulo, 
y/i th the small sized CE (four to eight members at the most) 
meeting at least once a day, and frequently adding special 
sessions, \vhenever political or organizational requirements 
dictated. Formally, the CE had as its principal role 'supreme 
administrative direction' and the 'execution of the decisions 
reached by the CO and CD'. The CE also had the function of 
studying, elaborating and submitting to the CD thE3 programmes 
of activities v/hicn IPES intended to carr'lJ out and drawing up 
the respective budgets. Moreover, the CE had to 'ca~ry out all 
the activities of ad.ninistration ";Thich i;Tere not specific to the 
CD and the CO'. The CE accomplished the decision-making and 
programming of the general lines of action of IP.h;S goals, as "trell 
as the discussion and approval of projects and budgets. The C3 
also perfor::led as a policy-controller being ~oart of the poli tico-
military central cOIIlr.1ittee, acting through its ideological, 
political and military operational units, the Grunos de Estudo 
e Acao - GEA and Gru-oos de Trabalho e Agao - GT.c. (Study and 
Action Groups and 1::ork ami Action Groups). T'.:le importa..."1ce of 
the CE can be ~"1derstood by looking through the list of naces 
i'Thich made up this organizational level, both in Rio de Janeiro 
and Sao Paulo, as '.'Tell as tne National Executive Com:r:ri.ttee - CElT. 
(Their economic and political linkages and connections can be 
seen in Appendix B). 
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The main institutional policy-making body "..,as located in 
the regional Directing COIllu"'1i ttee, which met ,veekly at least 
once, and more often when required. The CD .... ras structured 
on the basis of a plan laid out by Harold C. Polland. It "Tas 
composed of tT;Tenty fixed members, ten fron Rio and ten from 
S~o Paulo, with another ten members chosen from those active 
in the supervision of action and study groups. The local CDs 
met on a regular ,veekly basis as ivell. Individuals from the 
local executives travelled constantly beti·reen the different 
!PES centres, providing a valuable Iwrking lin.1{. Formally, the 
CDs ,vere responsible for the choice of the me:wbers of the CEl 
and prograrmning of the activities of the GEAs and GTAs (referred 
hereafter as Study and Action Groups). The CD in ench city 
encompassed the heads of the Study and Action groups. 
The Orienting C:)uncil met several times a year as the 
for:wal body to 'draw' the guiding lines, ratify ongoing 
policy, elect the CD and establish the institutional frame .... rork'. 
It was conposed of forty members and acted as a basic fund-
raising nehrork, and as a backbone of the:>rganiza tion. The 
Orienting Council ilaS also the fOrL'Lr:l of sectcral, assc:ciational, 
professional and ideological representation. Several of its 
I:.1e:wbers made up the National Orienting Council - CON. 
The CO chose t"relve of its Olm menbers to be part of the ti'renty 
activists .... Thich :-.1ade part of the regim'Jal CD. From these ti"elve, 
ca'=1e the National President of IPES and the ti'TO vice-presidents 
of Rio and S~o Paulo. 64 
There Has also a Conselho Fiscal (Fiscal Ccuncil), for 
proced~al matters and control of accounts. The official 
accountants for 1PES Here Jose da Costa J3oucin!-ias and Eduardo 
Sampaio Campos, both of them corporate me=bers of the lUne~ican 
Chambers of Commerce and public accountants for some of the 
biggest corporations in Brazil. 
IPES grew from 'the original 80 members to 500 affiliates 
by 1963. 65 The three top decision-making bodies included 27 
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of the 36 leaders of the Sao Paulo based Federation of Industries, 
mentioned elsewhere (75%); 21 out of the 24 leaders of the 
Sao Paulo based Centre of Industries (87.5%); moreover, IPES 
included a large number of members of the American Chaobers of 
Commerce listed as I active I, as ,,;ell as the core of COnCLAP and 
leading technoentrepreneurial agencies, nentioned before. 
The fOrm2l structure of authority 
The official places in the Orienting Council, the 
Directing Comrni ttee a.'1d the Executive Commit-tee 'Here mostly 
occupied by oymers, shareholders, presidents and directors of 
mUltinational and associated concerns operating in Brazil. 
Not, all the members of the formal structure of authority ,,,ere 
entrep~eneurs, as it included militarJ officers of prestige, sone 
of 1trhom ,·;ere enployed by private enterprises, and ,,;ell-knmm 
professionals, journalists, academics and technoentrepreneurs. 
Several of the key agents of the operational units, many of them 
entrepreneurs themselves, ,·rere not part of the formal structure 
of authority. Influential affiliates, and coll~borators, such 
as Luiz Viana Filho, Roberto Campos, Octavio Gouveia de Bulh~es, 
and Luiz Gonzaga Nascimento Silva, as Hell as several entre-
preneurial activists I-1ho offered their cooperation, such as 
}fario Alves Lima, 1"'al ter Lorch, 1daldenir Paulo Santos Freitas 
and Hodesto Scagliusi, Tdere also not ~oart of tile fomal str'J.ctlITe 
of authority. 
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For our purposes, it is interesting to note tbat the 
structure of the representation of the different socio-political 
agents of the dominant classes within the fo~l organization 
of IPES/IBAD, reunited the various social agents discussed in 
Cr...a.pter TIl. 
Techno- Directors of ESG tormed SJlI!Pathetic 3ntrepnneuriall1Jmr~- [ :::3;.1) I 
entnllreneu:ria.l CO:r;lorations! officers ;;tate Class I Leeder: ADE1? 
agencies Technoantrepreneurs officials Associations ! .!JlP \ 
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Posts ':rere "'iidely scattered. among the various affilis. te r::ili tants 
and activists, follm-Jing patterns of ideological and political 
representa tion, as ,·rell as standards of efficiency and effective-
ness. J)issemi..'1ation of responsibilities also served as a d.evice 
to avoid 1.IDdue concentration of pm'/er, allOi-ling for a systen of 
check and calances to be exercised by the d.if':erent organizations, 
groups and individuals '.·;ithin the struct'J.J::'e :yf L-:JES. nevertheless, 
sOr:J.e activists occupied. nore leading pests than others, a 
certain recognition of the hegemony of the oig entre:Jreneurs ,ri t:'lin 
T"'=SS. The individ.uals listed celo"'I, ccr..posing the fOrr:!al st::::,ucture 
of authority of i :J-=';S, sad.e the fOIT.al lead.ers~:.i:? Qf the r:rul ti-
na tional md associated p01,.;er b10c the ::lost p01:!e:::iul economic 
and political asse:::bly of the domin2.!1t classes in the :ge:60d 
of the Goula::-t administration, as can ce cbse:::vec. £::-OD their 
c0nnections detailed in Appendix B. 
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In spite of the ascendancy of multinational and associated 
interests, IPES was not an ideological and political ~onolith, 
and there "rere several reasons for this. For one, being an 
'umbrella' organization for the dominant classes, as well as 
the 'coordinating' unit of a n~~ber of political entities, it 
could not help but have in its midst an inbuilt Variety of 
outlooks which were held together largely in view of the 
critical period they all faced. Moreover, being A political 
class organization, aiming at rallying large segments of the 
population behind its proposals and involving subordinate groups 
and classes in its political-ideological action, IPES had to 
aggregate sectors and factions from middle class quarters and 
even from the "forking classes. These reasons diluted, in 
appearance more than in substance, sone of the !PES positions, 
or at least forced the organic elite to pay lip service in 
their programme for action and make token space in their praxis 
for regional, fractional and middle class denands, for the sake 
of building sone sort of consensus for action, and thus appear 
as truly 'representative'. The proposals for the 'democratization 
of capital' and the agrarian reforD highli~1ted this problem. 
The existence of differences also nurtured the establishment of 
different levels of decision-making as ,,,ell as channels and 
agencies of action whose existence or relation to lP'::';S was 
~~ovm to many of its lesser participants, not involved in 
the hierarchy. 66 
One ideological cleavar;1'9 ".ms also expressed in the 
difference in national political perspectives bet"J8en 
Sao Paulo and Rio based entre9reneurs. According to IPES 
General Hei tor Herrera, it T,.ras clear that' the nen of Rio de 
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Janeiro had more vision than those of Sao Paulo', l-rho ,·rere charged 
by him Hi th reasoning ali-rays in regional te:r:'f:ls. 67 11oreover, 
accordL~g to IPES militant Colonel Ivao Perdigao, the assistant 
to General Golbery do Couta e Silva, disagreements developed 
as a consequence of "the differing roles performed by the tvro 
groups. The ideas and programmes were nearly completely a 
product of Rio's initiative; their execution and implementation 
,-ras more a responsibility of Sao Paulo", 68 and this was 
reflected in their organizational infrastr~cture. The political 
leadership and the study groups ,-rere based in Rio. The action 
groups in charge of most of the discreet operations in the 
various fields of action of lPES ,yere based in Sao Paulo. 
Anotter difference vTaS that Sao Paulo Has deeply involved in 
covert areas of operation. Rio vms more a participaI1t in the 
public decate, although selected Rio based ~embers, such as 
entrepreneurs Candido Guinle de Paula Hachado, Jorge Oscar de 
Mello Flores, Harold Cecil Polland, Jose Rubem Fonseca, 
Gilbert Huber; General Golbery, General Liberato da Cunha 
Friedrich, General Heitor Almeida Herrera, Captain Heitor de 
Aquino Ferreira and their contacts in the ~ilita~J officer 
corps, mainly General Cordeiro de Farias, General Ernesto 
Geisel, General Jurandir B. Hamede, General Nelson de Nello, 
General Jose Pinheiro de Ulhoa Cintra, Admiral Heck, Narshal 
Denys, General Ademar de Queiroz and General Rio~andino Kruel 
i-rere involved in either covert activities or in infh1.encing the 
military to act against the govern~ent. 
Personal conflicts Here also introduced 'tri th incoming 
members bringing their fo~er feuds into the org~ization. 
Thus, clashes betTtTeen IT'ES Rio president,Rui Gomes de AI:r:teida 
and IT'ES Sao Paulo president, J. B. Leopolda Figueiredo, i'lere 
'2;'76 
not only the expression of the above-mentioned regional 
differences, or of ideological confrontation. IPES leader, 
Nei Peixoto do Valle, a Rio based American Chanbers of C08~erce 
activist, observed that the problem. could be defined in tenns of 
a dispute for leadership. 69 Nevertheless, as !PES Rio leader, 
Oswaldo Tavares concluded, 'an institution may do ,dthout a 
leader, but not ("Iri thout) ... a full leadership (direQao 'Dlena) 
in effective functioning order', and this IPES undoubtedly had, 
despite the personal rifts. 70 Factionalism also came to a head 
nO'll and again, ·on account 0 f ethnic differences, or 
generation rivalries 0 r social a tat us 0 The most 
extreme of t~1e differences vrere reflected in the composition of 
the Paulista social clubs and prestige institutions (\'Thich were so 
important in the political-military articulation of the anti-
government movement) established acco+,ding to social, cultural or 
ethnic cleavages. 71 The above-mentioned factors of differentiation 
';fere also perceived as ceing part of a ,·rider political problem 
by the organic elite, especially critical at a time vrhen the 
need viaS for unification and the pulling together of the 
available resources. 
!PES brcught together the most diverse class associations, 
commercial and industrial sindicatos (sectoral associations of 
entrepreneurs),72 pressure groups, tecnnoentrepreneurial agencies 
and technobureaucratic ~ings, 73 military activists and political 
factions of t~e centre-ri&~t. Even the need to attract private 
organizations as 1;lidely apart as the Rotary or Lyons Club and 
the sectarian Catholic layman's Centro Dom Vital, 'Jas considered74 
in order to generalize the multinational and associated message 
at the core of IPES and in order to provide the i·ridest 
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ideological rallying point for dominant class mobilization. 75 
For the IPES leadership, the structure of authority had to 
represent 'the seve~al c~~ents, not one single current 
remaining outside'. 76 In spite of the seemingly all-encompassing 
structure of IP2S, it did stop short of becoming too hetero-
geneous so as to undermine effective class action. !PES 
integrated a comprehensive movement under its aegis, once the 
core had been settled, thus avoiding those dansers against i"hich 
IPEs/rnAD leader Ivan Hasslocher had warned, as seen elsewhere. 
There ,.,rere several reasons uhy IPES had to ::1obilize, in 
spi te of ideological and personal differences, the vlidest possible 
array of economic fractions and sectors, tecr~oentrepreneurial 
agencies, cultural centres, military factions a~d political 
groups, not the least being the attempt to disaggregate the 
,) 
basis of support on 1tlhich Goulart's executive ,.;as anchored. 77 
The articulation of the diverse associational, political and 
intellectual expressions of dominant class pm-Ter allo'lled LUES, 
by 1963, to represent the significant I-Ihole of the Brazilian 
bourgeoisie, able to act politically and militarily '\Ji th 
effe~tiv.e authOr.ityo 78 
A convenient outcome "lvas that the '.ride articulation which 
lPSS achieved provided also a large field for recruitment and a 
generous pool of technical expertise and r:aterial resources for 
the infrastructure of its action units. P..nother reason for the 
urge to coordinate such a ,-lide spectrum ' ... 'as clearly financial. 
A political endeavour of the scale of lFES needed vast monetary 
resources. 79 
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Al though !PES ,.;as successful in the coordination of the 
industrial and financial sectors, as \'lell as i:.f) the intellectual, 
milita~J and professional areas, in one sector it encountered 
great difficulties. This vTaS the rural sector. The problem 
was that the rural associations included both the traditional 
oligarchy, still pO''lerful, and the more modern rural bourgeoisie, 
as well as the grmdng multinational and associated agri-business. 
Such a tripartite political influence in the rural associations 
posed a dilemma for IPES/IBAD. On one h~~d, IPES/IBAD had been 
drawn to ,.;age an ideological war against the agrarian reform 
proposals of the government and the labour left sectors. On 
the other, it had to recognize that the agrarian reform issue 
had captured the imagination of large segr.ents of the population, 
to such an extent that it ',TaS impossible not to take a political 
-
stand in favour of it. IPSS had to establish its differences 
'Hi th the government and the labour left on the type of agrarian 
refors it '.-ranted, and not on its Qutright rejection. The entre-
preneurial organic elite had to adopt a reformist :position ..... ,hich 
alienated the rural oligarchy, "Thile fav,:uring the entrepreneurial 
transfoE',a tion of the count~Jside, benefiting the modern rural 
bourgeoisie and the multinational and associated agri-business. 
HOvTever, ll'::;S, a t the sarne time, needed. to Gain the su:pport of 
the oligarchy, for t:neir political influence in Congress, ",here 
IF~S e;~ected to block the executivets pro:posals on the Dost 
varied matters. Moreover, the organic elite tad. to pre-empt the 
rural base of su:pport 'dhicn the executive and. the populist 
politicalforces had among landovmers and rural middle classes. 
The large lando'tmers, a significant source of financial support, 
,-rere also necessar"lJ in the containment of the peasant po:pulation 
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and in the support vThich they gave to the regional authorities, 
namely the governors of thestates vTho, in turn, opposed the 
central government. Another reason for the difficult~eg_in 
coordinating the rural sector vTaS the byzantine infighting 
occurring be"b..,een, and vTi thin, the rtll'al dominant classes' 
associations. Considering the delicate equilibrium I.PES had 
to find, itvTas clear that the organic elite \'las not 'interested 
in falling out with any of them'. 80 IPES had to compromise, at 
least in a public form. Many of the sharper political stances 
of the or~anic elite in favour of capitalist modernization and 
rationalization of the rural areas were ad.opted. wi thout attribution 
to lPES. Eventually, a number of rural associations and important 
rural class leaders, mostly of the modern coffee and cattle 
sector and the agro-industrial sector vTere operating ,,·Ti thin the 
IPES fold, such as Ostoja B. Roguski, a Parana leader, of the 
Brazilian Rural Confederation - CRB; 1iTanderbil t Duarte de 
Barros (CRB); Salvio de Almeida Prado, of the Brazilian Rl.JIal 
Society - SRB; Jose Ulpiano de Almeida Prad~ of the Federation 
of Rural Associations of Sao Paulo - FARESP, Herbert Levy, 
~dgard Teixeira Leite, Eudes de Souza Leao (CRB) and J. Irineu 
Cabral of the Brazilian Association for Rural Credit and 
Assistantship - ABCL~. 
By November 1962, at a General Heeting of the Sao Paulo 
and Rio representatives, the leading cad::,es of lP;:;S were finally 
established.o At last the various b01..1xgeois associational 
expressions had been subsumed under one effective political 
leadership. 81 The dominant classes shielded the~elves 
behind the firm leadership of their orgc,nic elite. lPES 
vTaS to function finally as the political umbrella of class 
organization. As I:PES leader, Abelardo Coimbra Bueno stressed, 
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!PES had 'to plan articulation, rather than direct execution'. 
IPES had to be 'the General Staff'. 82 Sone of the representative 
DeDbers of interest organizations, class associations and pressure 
groups i'ihich belonged to IPES are listed belm1. This list does 
not include the regional associations, such as the Associaoao 
Comercial de Londrina, the FederaQao das Associa95es Rvxais do 
Estado de rfinas Gerais or the Associagao Comercial de Pernanbuco, 
but it comprises some of the regional and national organizations 
based in Rio and Sao Paulo. !1'any of the I.:'SS affiliates ',Tere 
also re]resentatives of the associations operating in the heavy 
industry sector, mainly of the Brazilian industries of textiles, 
machinery and accessories, the industries of machinery and 
implements for agriculture, the industries of tool machinery and 
other diverse industries. Hare inforeation about the associational 
relation of the !PES affiliates can be obtained in Chapter III 
and in Appendix B. 
Prominent Officers of Class Associations in 
IrES Rio and Sao Paulo 
A.C. Pacheco e Silva - Centro de L~dustxias do Estado de sto P~ulo - CrESP 
Rafael Noschese - ?ederarriIo das Indti'smas do Estado de Sao Paulo - ?ESP 
Paulo Almeida Barbosa. - AssooiarriIo Comereial do 2stado de Silo P~ulo - ACZSP 
Gilbert Huber Jr. - Conselho das Classes Produtcras - CONCL\.? 
Jose Ignacio Caldeira Versiani - li'ederac;iIo das IndUsmas do Estado da Guanabara - J'IEGA 
Os_ldo Tavares Ferreira - Clube de Lojistas do Rio de Janeiro - CJ:RJ 
Rui Gomes de .~eida - AssociarriIo Comero~al do ?~o de Janeiro - AC~J 
Zulfo 'de Freitas Hallman - Centro de IndUs trias da Guanaba.ra 
Paul Norton .Ubright - Federstion of Awerican Chambers of Comneree 
Bento Ribeiro Dantas - Centro de Industrias do Rio de Janeiro - C:2.J 
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Salvio Pacheco de Almeida P::-sdo - Federac;i!:o das Assoc. itu..""2.is do Estado de SiIo Paulo - JARESP 
Eudes de SO'lZa. Leao - Confedernrr1!o ilural 3rasileira - CBR 
Jose Luiz !1oreira d.e Souza. - .l.ssoc. de C~di to, Investi::ento e Financia:-:ento - .illECIF 
B:umberto Reis Costa - Servi90 Sooial da Industria - SESI . 
Jose Irineu Cabral - Assoc. Brasileira de Credito e Assistenoia ?ural - A3CA.~ 
Paulo Hario Cerne - Sindioato lTaoional da IndUstria de Caoento 
Gus.avo Borghoff - Assoc. Naoionald.e ~Jaquinas, Veioulos e Perras - .UTV • .\P 
Luiz Emanuel Bi~ohi - Assooiarrao Paulista de Avicultores 
Hario Henrique Simonsen - Confederac;1!o lTaoional das Indti'stxies - CnI 
Basilio Haohado lTeto - ConfederarriIo lTaoional do Comereio - CllC 
?livaldo Ul.'loa. Cintra - Camara de Comereio Sueco-Brasileira. 
Orlandy 3ubem Correia - Sindicato dos Bancarios da Guanabara 
Claudio Aloeida Rossi - Sindicato de Companhias de Seguros 
Mig,,:.el Rea.le - Federa9ao de Comereio do :::stado de Si!:o Paulo - FCESP 
GuiL"ter::le da Silveira §11ho - Sindicato de IndUstxia de Fiarrao e 'recelagen do Rio 
Jayme Torres - Sindicato da IndUstria de Produtos Far.maceuticos 
Trajano Puppo lIeto - Sindicato dos Bancos do Estado da Guanabara 
Lelio Toledo Pizza. - Assoc. Nac. de ?abrica.'1tes de Ve10ulos ';'utomotores 
Nelson Parente Ribeiro - AssociaqiIo dos Banoos do Estado da Guanabara 
Nelson Parente Ribeiro - AssociarriIo de Dirigentes Crist1!os de- E.::presa - .loDGE 
· .. /al tel.' Poya...."'es - Assoc:!.acriIo 3rasilei=a de PropagandE. 
~dua:rdo Garcia 209Si - Sindicato cie Ind. de .. ~tefatos de Fe:::oro e :·retais eD G-eZ'"J.l 
O. de Ca~alilo - Federacr1!o das Ind~si;xias do Rio de Janeiro - F:r3J 
Lui~ Rodovil Rossi - SL~dioato de L~d~s~a de lutope9as 
Jose 'Tasooncelos de Car'lal..~o - Sindioato dos Lojistas do Rio de Janeiro 
Lucas lTogueira Garceoz - FederacriIo ,i,)8 3a..~oos do 3stado de SlIo Paulo 
Luiz Dumont Villaree - Associao;1Io Brasileira. ':lara 0 Desenv')l'li.:::ento de L'1dlist:::ias ;asioas-ABDI3 
Fernando Ed'.a:ci Lee - Ca::ara de Com,hcio ~euto-Brasilei:ra 
l1onteiro LL~denberg - .\ssooia911:0 3msi1eira de Fabrioantes de Lata 
)1ioolai Filizzola - Sindicato das L'1dus'::rias de Balancras, Pesos e ;·redidE.s 
Jorge Frank Geyer - Sindicato de Joias e 1e1651os 
Mario Leao Ludol! - Servio;o ITaoionalio Comeroio - SElTAC 
Jose Ulpiano de .Uneida Prado - 301sa de /{ercedoxies de S1Io Paulo 
JolIo 3aylongue - Sindioa to Ind:.!strias :':Scanioas e :·!ateZ"ia1 :,:letxico 
3:stanislau ?ischlo'tli tz - Servi90 Nacione.l da IndUstria - s:sJ:TAI 
?a.ulo ~f2.rio Cer.1e - Si.."dicato Indus"tr:..as Hid..roter.!1o 31etric2.s do ::tic 
.~ Frederioo Torres - Insti~~to de Pes~uisas Tecnologioas - I?T 
Jaao 3a~ista !sn~~ de Gouveia - ~s~~dos Tecnicos e Adoin~9t=a.ao - ~~\ 
Frederico lu~~sto Sc~idt - 3s~udos Tecnicos 3uroua-3r2sil L~da. 
Jo1Io 3aylongue - J1B ,\.d.:n:L~istm91Io e Orgnniza9iIo . 
Alexandre ZAfka - ~C~rs~TSC 
?3:~O de Assis ::tibeiro - ConseTho 3:t'2.sileiro d.a ?:odutivide.c.e - CSP 
Jose .:.rthu:::' -:tics - 30ciec.D.de d.e ?esquisa e ?lane,ja..'":lento - S?~T 
?a.ulo 4':..]:=es ?ill::) - 31.L.-eau de Or~iza~ao 2.acional ;"pl:"cada - 3C5...;. 
Juan 1'ussi=lian - Tecn:'c2. de Organizat;lro e Consul to:=ia - ::CC 
David 3eetty III - Tecnica de AvaEacroes e Pes~'J.isas - 'lAL"I.~ 
Cctavio Ps:!:ei:ra. L0ges - ::nsti tu"to de Cr.j2.niza<;tIo Ra.cioI:al to ·r~=a2l'...o - ~'23.T 
J o:rg'9 3ehring d.e ~·h tt·')s - . .;.lJ22G 
Luis Si1:ces :'opes - Compa.n..~a de '=:studos ~ecnicos, .~d--u..'1ist.:'r!Cfc!O e ?:.=t:'cipa<;~es - CZT.;""~ 
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The regional leadership of lPES in Rio Grande do Sul, ,.,here 
it \-laS knoi'm as IPESUL, included entreprene"lrr's Candido Jose 
Bezerra Godoy, Joao P~tonio O. ~~rtins, Don Charles Bird, 
Carlos Gastand Gon~alves, Favio Araujo Santos, Jose de Abreu ,Fraga, 
Alvaro Coelho Borges, Ary Burger, Emilio O. Kaminski, Carlos Lo:pes 
Osorio, Amadeu da Rocha Freitas, Itacyr Pinto Schilling, Oudinot 
Villardino, Jose Zampregna and Paulo Barbosa Lessa. The leadership 
of IPESUL also included Colonel Yeddo J. Blauth and Paulo do 
Couto e Silva. 
In Parana, the state adjoining Sao Paulo, the IPES and 
IBAn/ ADEP structure i'Tas based on the membershi:p of the CO:r.J...lJercial 
Association of Parana - ACOPA. Some of its activists i'rere the 
entre:preneurs ApdrUbal Bellegard, Carlos Alberto de Oliveira, 
Oscar Schrappe Socrinho and the juridical consultant of ACOPA, 
Aguinaldo Bezerra. Other significant mili tanjis 'Here Ostoja ROg'..lski, 
of the National Council for Agrarian Reform of Parana and of the 
Brazilian Rural Confederation and r1anuel Lin.1mres de Lacerda. 
In lunas Gerais, lPES counted on entre:preneurs Jonas Barcelos 
Correia, of the Centro de Industrias de lUnas Gerais; Ruy de Castro 
l1agalhaes, of the Sindicato dos Bancos; Jos8fa Hacedo, of the 
Federation of the Rural Associations of "the state of Hinas Gerais -
F.'\.BE]>l; Oscar Nicolai, Laercio Garcia Nogueira and Aluisio Aragfio 
Vi12.r. 
In Pernambuco, it ims General Golbery hinself vrho had gone 
to Recife, studied the political situation 1-11 loco B.nd founded 
the IPES centre for the Northeast in A::;ril, 1962. 83 The leading 
figure of IPES in Pernambuco 'Iras Antonio Galvao, the yresiclent 
of the Commercial Association of Pernambuco. HOi·rever, it ,ms 
IBAD "Thich actually appeared as the !Jain :political catalyst in the 
specific case of the Northeast, which kept a very low profile, 
since ~uc~ of their activities was highly subversive. 
IP3S Has also established in :Belem do Para, in tb.e North, 
where Freq.erico N2.ragliano of IPES Rio nade contaot "ri th 
Dr. Vidigal, director of the Commercial Association of Para and 
president of the National Coordination CoTImission of the 
Producing Classes. 84 
:By mid 1962, as IPES braced itself for its first critical 
test of political action, nanely the legislative and state 
government elections of 1962, it had becone a regional and 
national class organization for politioal action. 
Organization for action 
To prepare its strategy and tactios for action, the ~rganic 
eli te in IP.8S \·ms structured through a nenTork of operational 
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units. These operational units had a dual y~~ose. They provided 
the orgE'J1ization both 'tTi th its think-tanks, the Study and Action 
Groups (GR.~), and the 'dork and Action Groups (GTA) , to carr! out 
policy. The study and action groups also indoctrinated their O'tm 
rank and file, 1rhile influencing new elements, involvinb and 
engaging them in the activities of IPES, thus mu~ually reinforcing 
an interplay of roles and ftmctions. 85 
:By the beginning of 1962, an organizational infrastructure 
of Study and Action Groups \'laS set up, in acco~a.'1ce ,-lith the 
1962 Plan of Action. Formally, the &roups aioed at: 
1. Publioation and Publicizing (DivulgaQao). This vms an 
attempt to characterize IPES as an institution ,·rhich 
gathered the m~lern entrepreneurial el~te of Brazil and 
expressed their nel'l Bentali ty. 1i'.8S disseminated through 
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the media articles, speeches and intervie"rs defending 
private enterprise, free initiative and 'democracy as 
the best form of government and demonstrating the grave 
risks of extreI2e solutions, \'lhether from rig..'I-).t or left'. 
2. Education. IPES stimulated the development of democratic 
and Christian convictions and the dissemination of basic 
economic and social notions indispensable to the 
furthering of democratic principles, equated 'IIi th the 
tenets of private enterprise. 
3. Trade Union \·Tork. !PES envisaged t~~e promotion of 'a 
tFUe syndicalism, democratic and dynamic, stimUlating 
a COl~esponding syndical structure'. 
4. Social 1ilork. In this field, IPSS sought the promotion 
of 'social '-lork for the solution of tensions and conflicts 
in key areas'. 
5. Economic Activities. !PES sought the promotion of 
'liberal neo-capi talism, vri thin each enterprise and 
\vi thin the vrhole of the system'. 
6. Conj'U."1ctural Survey. IPES sought to folloyr up and 
analyze the evolution of political !:l8,tters, both 
nationally and internationally, in all the sectors that 
"rere of relev3...T1ce to the multiple acti vi ties of IPES. 
It also aimed at carrying out syster::atic reseo,rch and 
elaborate evaluations related 'di th the economic, 
political and social sectors. 
7. studies. !PES strove to consider the institutional and 
structural reforms necessary for the economic developr::ent 
and social progress of Brazil, 'di thin a democratic regiI!1e. 
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80 Editorial. IPES attempted to promote and publish bOQks~ 
as well as stimulating the realization of plays and films. 
90 The establishment of links with government bodies and 
contacts with political entit ies through the IPES 
Brasilia office o 
10. Integration. !PES sought to increase its membership 
and obtain resources for the above-mentioned activities 
of the instituteo86 
To achieve their ends, these study and action groups 'I'[ere 
involving themaelves wi trr parliamentary interfere-nce, button-
holing legisla tors, manipulating public opinion and integrating 
the different economic fractions and political factions of the 
bourgeoisie into a wide: anti-government front. They alsa 
attempted to politically disrupt and penetrate ideologically 
the working class: ex ganiza ti ons and the stud:n t movement: and 
influence the Church and the Armed Far ces . Furthermore, they 
prepared a body of doctrine and policy recommendations intended 
to become a programme for government. These groups operated 
in ten major areas of political and ideoloaical action: in the 
Armed Farces, in Congress, the Executive, the entrepreneurial 
class, the trade unions, the peasantry, the Church, the ?olitical 
parties, the media and the middle layerso 
IPES was certainly not, as often pDrtrayed, an amateurish 
movement of romantically inclined empresarios, or a mere dis-
seminator of narrow anti-communist propaganda; it was, instead, 
a so~histicated, well-equipped and prepared87 down-to-eartt, 
task-oriented and strategically informed action group, the core 
of a very able and far-sighted entrepreneurial organic elite, and 
the vanguard of the dominant classes. 88 The frequency E:.nd 
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intensi ty of their meetings was astonishing, b~T any standards af 
committed party militancy. It was not uncommon for members to 
work solidly overnight at their meeting places, \'lhen so requiredo 
The possibility of a member discharging himself from a speeifi~ 
activi ty or a commission had to meet ~'I'i th the a'"pproval or counter-
pr.essures of peers and hierarchical superiors in what was a 
strictly ver.tical chain of commando89 A service of monitoring 
individuals (as well as activities) and a 'whip' were organizedo 90 
General Hei tor Herrera and Nei Peixoto dO ValJe in Rio, and 
General Hoziul Horeira Lima and Luiz Cassio dos Santos ;verneck 
in Sao Paulo, '\'Tere in charge of formalizing gatherings. They 
also stimulated membars to attend all kind.s of events, \'Thether 
of an internal or public nature 0 .A. coordination team vras also 
formed vd th its Oi'm independent plan of action, a necessity 
in an organization I'd th so allch overlapping of personnel and 
1'1ith such a varied number of activities. 91 This constant 
activi ty in I'Thich so many entrepreneurs, tecimoentrepreneurS, 
journalists, professionaJs and military 't'lere engaged, ,'las so 
absorbing that it required for some of them salary payments 
on a monthly basis to compensate far the losses incurred in 
their regular' earning occupationso 92 Professional members of 
the different study and action groups were paid fer the specific: 
tasks in which they I'Tere involved as well as receiving .jetons 
de presenca (participation chips), thus reinforcing their 
dedicationo 93 Internal communication 'tras ensured by effiCient, 
quasi-milita~J methods, such as the Permanent System for 
Telephonic Communications: 
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The Action and study Groups of the Institute of Research and 
Social Studies 
1. Gruno de Levantamento 
Groun - GW' 
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This group vlaS also referred to as the Rese!ll'Ch Group, so as 
to project a more neutral external image. The GID' s immediate 
task was to follow political events in every area and sector, 
evaluating, ascertaining and estimating their political impact, 
and outlining tactical moves to meet the evolution of any 
situation and influence its process. The GLC indicated areas of 
concern for the Study Groups and Dootrine Groups, produced 
information in the politioal and sooial fields and handed out 
guidelines for the manoeuvres of the Aotion Groups operating 
in Congress and with the political parties, with the trade unions, 
the students, the Church, the peasantr], th~ Armed Forces and the 
media. The GLC in these areas coordinated the covert action 
developed by the organic elite through their politico-military 
struc~~e. 94 In short, the GLC was responsible for Information 
and Strategic Survey, and for the preparation of the organic elite 
for action. Specifically, it was in charge of the Army and Intel-
ligence Sector, operating mainly in the areas of the 1st and IIIrd 
Armies, headquartered respectively in Rio and Porto Alegre, and 
covering the states of Rio de Janeiro, Guanabara, ~linas Gerais, Goias, 
Rio Grande do Sul, Parana, Santa Catarina and Espiri to Santo. 
According to General Golber] do Couta e Silva, the national 
head of this aotion group, the GLC established the short and 
long range goals of IPES. 95 Consequently, by June 1962, 
General Golbery was preparing a strategic paper on assalto ao 
uoder (the take-over of power). 96 In November of that year, a 
plan of action defining fields of action (C&mpos de aiao), 
priori ties and chronograms vTaS introduced by Gilbert Huber, 
General Golbery and General Liberato da Cunha Friedrich. 97 
General Golberyts team produced the strategic and tactical 
papers and provided the Diretrizes t Doutrina e Projetos 
(Guidelines, Doctrine and Projects), what "TaS knovm as the 
t ordem de serviio com calendario t (programme of 'lork vIi th 
timetable).98 General Golberyt s working :9apers vTere of special 
and limited circulation, twelve at the most, de:gending on the 
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seriousness of the matter. These papers and theses were 
generally not registered in the minutes of the IPES meetings. 99 
The Rio based GLe group vras headed, until June 1964, by 
General Golbery, ,.,rho :9rovided expertise in counterintelligence, 
strategic drive and· links with an intimate ne:tio(ork of 
able milita~J officers: Captain Heitor de AQuino Ferreira, 
Lieutenant Colonel Rubens Resteel, Lieutenant Colonel Gustavo 
110raes Rego, Lieutenant Colonel Joao Baptista Figueiredo, 
Colonel Ivao Perdigao. Other Rio based mili taI"'J members '/Tere 
General Liberato da Cunha Friedrich, General Jo~o Batista Tubino, 
General Octavio Gomes de Abreu, General JaUl Pires de Castro, 
General Heitor Almeida Herrera, Colonel Hontagna Heirelles, 
Colonel Octavio Vellio, Colonel V:Lctor d '.!i.rinos Silva and many 
others Vlho provided the planning and organizational backbone of 
the organic elite t s political enterprise, as i.,rell as its 
intelligence ne~rork. 100 General Herrera, a business associate 
of Gilbert Huber and Director of multinational corporations, 
was among those to recruit the first staff members, and 'since 
the emphasis i-laS on recruiting competent degree-holding people 
of confianca, graduates of the Escola Superior de Guerra "Tere 
preferred'. 101 This relationship vTaS en..">mnced by the fact 
that many of the key civilian founding members of IPES had 
attended the ESG, mostly as lecturers and also as alumni. 102 
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This common reservoir of personnel helped to develop a necessary 
civilian-mili tary interpenetration for the coup campaign. In 
particular, General Herrera and General Golbery also provided 
the connection "Ti th an intimate cluster of high ranking officers, 
s orne of '\>Thorn became ac tual covert colla bora tors of IPES, and 
'I'rho ,.,ere to be found in command of the coup of 19640 Among 
them it is 'Ioforth mentioning General Jurandir B. Namede, General 
Ernesto Geisel, General Ademar de Queiroz, General Idalio 
Sardenberg, General Cordeiro de Farias and General Ulhoa Cintra, 
a group of officers "rho had been together for over thirty years •103 
~ne GLC produced weey~y reports of its actions and 
those of other IPES action groups, and produced "ree~-::ly assess-
ments of the political situation. To dxa,,,r ':;Jractical sense' 
from these rep':)rts 'ioTaS the responsibility of the Directing 
C ommi ttee, 'IoThich de facto became the policy-=alciJ1g body. 
Nevertheless, the possibility of informal decision-making 
by an 'inner layer', comprising other members than those 
of the C~ and directly connected to the GLC, should not be 
dismissed, in vieYT of the secretive nature of General Golbery1s 
action group. Among the Rio based civilians \'i~o operated 'In th 
the GLC i'rere Gilbert Huber, Harold C. Polland, Candido Guinle de 
Paula H2.chado and Helio GODide. 104 
i,;ith the help of its TIilitary officers, IPES established 
from 1962 to 1964 an intelligence systeTI to monitor 'co~istl 
influence on the government and to distribute thei.r findings on 
a regular basis to key military officers and others throughout 
Brazil. By their OiofD estimate, IPES s:pent betl·;een 200.000 
and 300.000 dollars a year in this intelligence gathering 
operation and distribution netl~ork. 105 
The GLC circulated, ~nthout identification of source, a 
mimeo bi,~eekly ne\~sletter among the rnili tary, describing 
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and analyzing 'communist' activity throughout the country, 106 
and stirring up military opinion against the executive and 
against popular mobilization. vIi th the same laboriousness as 
it prepared the weekly re:ports from printed material, it 
compiled documenta~J files on 'communist' groups and individuals, 
distributing a chart identifying structure and key persons of the 
alleged subversive organizations. 107 To be able to have an 
accura te and efficient knOldedge of the political si tua tion, 
IPES relied on a ividely scattered ne-brork of information "nthin 
the Armed Forces, the state administration, ~he entrepreneurial 
classes, the political elite, student organizations, peasant 
movements, the c1erg'J, the media and cultural E,TOUpS. The 
GLC also tapped about 3.000 telephones in Rio alone. 108 The 
GLC in Rio occupied four out of the thirteen rooms IPES had 
I. O,:~,\/,J .,./;:,',/- .S~·'I_' 'ri ~ 
rented on the 27th floor of a. prominent 
building, the Ediflcio Avenida Central, ,·,here CONCIui:? also had 
its offices. In those four offices, t~'1e GIC l(ept files on 
109 400.000 people. 
To receive a yrecise political picture of the national 
situation and grasp the public mood for its propaganda 
activities, the Rio team scanned daily through the national 
press, (a total of 14,000 units .a.year), )allo'l'ring 
for a syster::a tic follm-l-up of the political and economic 
conjuncture. 110 The Gle also "rent tl:l~ough a nUDber of 
na tional magazines and produQ13d an average of 500 monthly 
articles of practical use to be disseminated in the national 
press, or released as speeches, )amphlets, and other • grey , 
material. 111 The GlC team also surveyed a very broad range of 
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books and other local and foreign publicationsjfr6m'many of. which 
IPESreceivedmater:j.al and for ,,,hom the !PES political and media 
structure provided a most important outlet. To accomplish what 
were central tasks of IPES, the GLC made use of the specialized 
skills of a number of highly competent specialists in the 
various fields of action and organizations. The publicity 
agencies affiliated to IPES and the technoentreyreneurial 
agencies and certain uni'lersi ties '/Tere crucial reservoirs and 
sources of technical and political expertise. 112 
In Sao Paulo, the Gruno Esnecial de Con,jt1.D tura (Special 
Conjuncture Group - GEe) 'I"as formed, based on the blue print of 
the group organized in Rio. The GEC "ras geared for direct action 
and ,,,as in charge of the Army-Intelligence Sector of Sao Paulo. 
The GEC "TaS headed by General Agostinho Cortes. It furnished 
the leadership and the study and action groups of I?ES Sao Paulo, 
as ,·rell as parallel organizations such as SEI, 'I-!hose action v!as 
coordina ted by lPES ,vi th the continual st',~dies of affairs in 
f ' l't' 1 h . 1 . d ~ , 113 our maln areas: po l lca , psyc OSOCla , econODlC an Iorelgn. 
T'ne GBC aimed not only at coordinatinG direct action a::J.ong the 
military, but also penetrating the trade lllions, the stt~.dent 
organizations, the peasant movements, the church ancl. the media. 
The G3C 'I'laS in contact i-li th the most varied ideolOGical cuxrents 
because of its intelligence activities, thus most of its me~bers 
',rere never publi81y related to IPBS. The GL:;C ' .. ;as fllldamental 
for the general c)ordination of the covert e.ctivities of I?BS 
and the coordincdion of the various factional ~ili tary conspiracies 
in the area of the lInd Army, headquartered in Sao Paule, 'Thich 
covered t~e st2,tes of Sao Paulo and I-12.tto Grosso. 
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The GECreceived its orientation from the Doctrine 
and Study Group of Sao Paulo and synchronized daily vTi th 
General Golbery's GLC in Rio for the operational and intelligence 
side of its activities. The GEC met hrice a vTeek formally, and 
unofficially on a daily basis, functioning at LUES official 
addresses in Sao Paulo, as \'1ell as at General Agostinho Cortes' 
114 
ovm home and other places. 
_.unong the mili tar; officers ,·rho collaborated "li th 
General Agostinho Cortes in Army and Intelligence action were: 
General Souza Carvalho, General Moacyr Gaya, Colonel Jorge 
SaI'aiva, Colonel Caio Kiehl, Colonel F:ra..'1cisco Ramalho, 
Lieutenant Colonel Rubens Resteel (-I.rho opeI'ated as liason officer 
vri th the Rio activists), and Najor Geraldo FI'anco. 115 Civilians 
opera ting in this area \·reI'e the entI'epreneu:rs: Hennan de Horais 
EaI'ros, Octavio l~rcondez Ferraz, Eduardo Levy, Flavio Galvao, 
Antonio Carlos Pacheco e Silva, Roberto Levy, QUE.rtim Earbosa, 
Fra..'1s l~chado, Vitorino Ferraz, J. Soares &~aI'al Netto, 
Adalberto Bueno Neto and many others 'dho comprised the leadership 
of I?ES Sao Paulo. General Agostinho Cortes' group also 
included the Sao Paulo based L1stitute of Engineering, a key 
conspiratorial centre, through the mediation of AndI'e Telles de 
116 l-fattos. 
Besides receiving the suppoI't of the Doctrine and Studies 
group and of I?:SS Rio, the GEe dre" on the naterial stocked and 
olassified by the Centro de DocumentaQao (Documentation Centre) 
of the Pontificia Uni versid2.de Ca t61ioa of Sao Paulo, "hich Has 
connected to IPES through its directors Dr. Sant&Dche and 
Alvaro Halheiros. 117 
Attached to the GEC '~ras the Planning unit. The Planning uni t 
came abpu,twith theneed fora group to study 'orientation, and work 
out a plan for action '. This had been de:nanded. by J o'Bo Leopoldo 
Figueiredo. The planning group vTaS designed to function as a 
'staff unit' of the IPES :9resident. The planning unit ,'TaS 
headed by General Agostinho Cortes, who Has also active in the 
Society for Inter-american Studies - SEI, one of the IPES 
counterparts mentioned earlier. The planning ~~it was devised 
to provide a basic guideline for the different study and action 
groups, ,-lith the latter having initially entire autonomy of 
action. In this form, the executive of IPSS S~o Paulo had 
direct control of the political action of IPES over the heads 
of f onnal leaders. In a further stage, i.,then IP,b;S Sao Paulo 
,-ras already in full conspiratorial siving, the planning unit 
would then control the execution of the plans by the different 
groups. It counted upon the expertise of other Dilitary 
officers, such as SEto Paulo based General !-1oziul Horeira Lima 
and General 110acyr Gaya. 
Host significant of all perhaps, the GLC/GEC complex, 
together 1,·ri th the Doctrine and Study g.coup of SEta Paulo, vrere 
in charge of the coordination of activities and direct involve-
ment of IP~S in the peasant movement, the trade union movement, 
the student movement, the Arued Forces and in the nobilization 
of the middle classes. These activities sh2,11 be seen in more 
detail in Chapters VII and VIII. 
2. Gruno de Assessoria Parlanentar (Pa"Y'lia:::e::Jte.r:'; 
Groun - GAP' 
:By the end of 1962, the IPES leadership reconmended that 
"All mention of the Parliamentary Advisory Grou) must be 
suppressed. Perhaps one might speak of t The :J3re.sllia Office' 
'di thout more explanation". 118 There vTaS €;ood cause for concern. 
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The 'Brasilia Office' as it was to be dubbed, 'Has I?~S' Doney 
channel for their parliamentary network of beneficiaries and 
aid recipients. GAP also provided the political coordination 
of the anti-Goulart campaign in Brasilia, establishing links 
vTi th government bodies and contacts ,,,i th political groupings • 
. ADP, the Parliamentary Democratic Action, led by Jo8:o l1endes, 
the lB.A1) supported TJDlT deputy, i'.raS .IPES' most important outlet 
in Congresso l19 IBAD/ADEP took the pOlitical blame (or praise) 
for such activities \vi th lPES keeping a tactical silence and 
low profile. 
The general idea behind the GAP had been clearly expounded 
by !PES leader l<Iiguel Lins, i",hen he urged the organization to 
'advise Congress, to be ,d.thin ±-t". to'. have an !PES 
man inside'. Lins sugg~sted that IPES should offer 'technical 
advice' to PSD leader Am2.ral Peixoto, in order to '1'lOrk '.,Ti thin 
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the Chamber'. Antonio Gallotti supported this propos2.1, 2.rguing, 
moreove~ for the need to have a 'milit2.nt deputy (deuutado 
atuante) wi thin each house of Congress'. 120 On the other hand, 
for !PES leader Israel Klabin, the idea ,·ras to establish five 
'shock areas' i-Tith parallel::;roups for IPES. For Klabin, the 
ide2.1 would h2.ve been 'to have elements i'lithin the Chanber, out 
of it, in the pre s s, etc. IPSS i'rould be behind them, providing 
support 2.nd suggesting solutions'. From these early and fairly 
modest steps, the presence of lPES in Congress gre',r to unprece-
dented proportions. By the end of 1962, it pr2.ctically controlled 
tb9 Chamber of Deputies and the House of Sen2.tors, mainly tnrough 
ADP. lPES 'tiaS thus able to coordinate the les'-,-slative efforts 
to block G,)ulart's parlia...'J.entary and executive action. lP:SS 
(under the cover of IBAD/ADEP/Promotion S.A.) and through ADP, 
forced a parliamentary dead-end, 2.S ,,,ell as an executive 
dead-lock, vThich '.Jas only to be solved by the 'modeJ;'ating' 
power of the actively canvassed Armed Forces. 
The head of the GAP and pay-master general for the lillP 
netvTork, .... 13.s IPES leader Jorge Oscar de Nello Flores, aided by 
Paulo lJatzel and Francisco Nobre de Lacerda in :Bras{lia, and 
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IPES leader, Jose Rubem Fonseca in Rio. The GAP had the function 
of lining up support for LP~S sponsored bills. The GAP also 
operated as a task force, engaging itself perDBnently in action 
against the executive and its parliamentary support and allm'ling 
for the preparation of ,·dder manoeuvr.e-s, buying' off 
time for other forces to gather and for gr:mps of L"DES to 
develop their aim activities. GAP was also L'Jportant in anti-
cipating the opposi ti on's political tactics and pre-er.Ipting its 
moves. 121 J .0. Hello Flores decided 'on t11e spot i on tl<..e order 
of priori ties of GAP's activities, indicating lines of action to 
other sections and groups according to his perception and analysis 
of the situation. 122 
Each section (Rio and Sao Paulo) had its ovm 'congressional 
machineries', as IPES leader Jorge Behring de ]:':fattoscalled 
them, pre}ared f,')r ?ressure activities, lobbyiClg, petitioning and 
coopting individuals, gToups and governt1.e~t fi;.rures. Hello Flores 
coordinated them both. 123 Some entrepreneurs .such as Augusto 
Trajano de Azevedo Antunes had their 'own independent lobbying 
facili ties in Congress., which vTere' put at the disposal of 
IPES. 
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GAP kept a political office with formal counsellors, 
jointly occupied with the Federation of Industries of Sao Paulo -
FIESP, who provided a degree of cover and material assistance. 124 
IPES Rio provided human resources and material support (specialized 
writers, office equipment and furniture) for the Brasiia head-
quarters and initially about 4,000,000* cruzeiros monthly for 
personnel and administrative expenses, put forward by IPES 
leaders, Paulo Ao Barbosa, of ESSO Brasileira de Petr61eo, and 
Rafael Noschese, of FIESP. IPES Sao Paulo provided most of the 
money needed for poli ticral action. In this they 1vere joined by 
IPESUL, another important source of financial support for 
1 d t · t·· t· 125 c an es ~ne ac ~v~ ~es. 
GAP was allowed tactical freedom by the national leadership 
of IPES. Important issues "Tere am lyzed by the Conjunctural 
Survey group, vThich was aided by the study and Doctrine group, 
and synchronized with the activities of other groups and unitso 
This allowed IPES to develop comprehensive political action. 126 
This synchronization was put into practice on government bills 
of law, which required political amendments (reuaros) to be 
implemented by the parliamentary contacts of IPES. IPES' own 
proposed bills of law at a state or federal level also employed 
the collaboration of the different groups of study and action. 127 
3. Grupo de Ouiniao Publica (Public Opinion Group - GOP) 
Formally, the group's aims Here the 'dissemination of IPES 
air:J.s and acti vi ties in the I'lri tten ald spoken media', bringing 
* In 1962, one US dollar 200 to 475 cruzeiros; in 1963, one 
us dollar 475 to 600 cruzeiros. 
'to the publie opinion theresul ts of i ts research and studies'. 128 
ItS' man;ii"est function 'das the manipulation of public opinion 
by all means available. In order to conceal its real purpose, 
the use of the tem 'public opinion' "ras avoided. Instead, the 
IPES/IBAD activists spoke of 'disclosure' (divulgaQao) and 
'promotion' ,.;hich 'das the nane of one of I3A.D' s 'subsidiaries', 
Promoti on S.A., inv 01 ved vTi th propaganda. The Public Opini on 
Group ''I'as so important that it vlaS considered by General Herrera 
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to be the 'base of all the machinery' (a base de toda a engrenagem). 
For IPt:S leader, Jose Luiz Noreira de Souza, to "dn over public 
opinion' i-raS the essence of political action. 129 
Some of the outstanding figures of this group in Rio \'Tere 
Nei Peixoto do Valle, Jose Luiz Moreira de Scuza (o,mer of 
Denisson Propaganda), Glauco Carneiro (writer, journalist), 
Jose Rubem Fonseca (who dealt specifically ',d th ne'tTSpaper 
editorials and films), Helio Gonide and General Golberj_ The Rio 
counteryarts in Sao Paulo ,,,ere Paulo Ayres Filho, vrho ,,-ras i'Tarking 
in education, 'social schools' (political indoctrination) and 
general propaganda, and IPES/I3AD affiliate Geraldo Alonso, 
owner of Norton Propaganda. 130 ~ley received the help of 
Flavio Galvao, of 0 Estado de Sao Paulo and Luiz Cassio dos 
Santos ''''emeck. Among other IPES affiliates and linked personnel 
i'l'ho joined in this propaganda machinery I'Tere, Silveira Lobo 
(Denisson Propaga.."r1da), 131 Evaldo Pereira Simas (lin~:ed to AW:;usto 
Trajano de Azevedo .~tunes), Jorge Sampaio and Alves de Castro, 
of 'ReDorter ESSO Dara todo 0 Brasil' (the nost inportant and 
extensive daily TV nei'iS programme of interno,tional, national 
and current affairs sponsored by :SSSO do Brasil). This group 
of people i'lorked in radio and TV, together T,ri th Arides Visconti 
and lwtonio Peixoto do Valle, '.'rho, ',d th ~:iilson Figueiredo 
299 
(editor ~ Jornal do Brasil) had formed a team some time oefore 
the formal launching of IPES. This team 'I'fas incorporated within 
the IPES propaganda and indoctrination units and covered the 
" 1" t' t"" t " 132 orga~c e ~ e s ac ~v~ ~es. 
In carrying out its activities, the GOP undertook four 
major lines of action. These were: ~) to ensure the security 
of IPES; b) to disseminate statements elaborated by the study 
and Doctrine Group of Rio and the Doctrine and Study Group of 
Sao Paulo; c) to 'project doctrine', which involved the reali-
zation of IPES tenets and basic aims, among the different sectors 
of the population considered to be appropriate targets for its 
activities; and finally, d) to feed back information to the 
Conjunctural Survey Group. The projection of doctrine had to 
be accomplished in three different forms: appearing ",ith the 
name of IPES, as 'democratic doctrine' and as doctrine without 
the name of IPES. This outline was prepared by General Golbery, 
"Tho was the covert overlord of the Public Opinion Group (Chefe 
Geral de Ouiniao Publica) 0 133 The projection of doctrine 
also entailed ideological and psychological "Tarfare .. Thich the 
GOP carried out as a support activity for the action units 
responsible fer trade union and peasant action, or military 
and middle class mobilizationo 134 
The 'target' sectors of the population or 'publ:ic' for 
the propaganda action of the GOP were the various I~ES affiliates, 
supporters and linked personnel themselves, for 'i'Thom the GOP 
"Trote up ne'dS releases, edited a monthly bulletin, released 
material in the media, ani prepared a political bulletin for 
internal limited consumption. Horeover, the GOP prepared 
suitable material f~ potential recruits. The GOP also dis-
seminated a variety of material whose form and content suited 
the different social, political and cultural se~ents of public 
opinion, namely the middle classes, industrial ,,;orkers, students, 
military, housewives and professiona~ 0 
The GOP mailed thousands of letters, sent telegrams and 
made phone calls, stirring up public opinion and reinfcr cing 
the message of IPES/IBAD. Throughout the early stages of 
Goulart's governr:J.ent, it accomplished what were considered to 
b& 'training operations', of limited scope, in preparation far 
the build-up leading to the state crisis of 1964 and the intense 
press campaign and middle class mobilization enacted by IPES 
shortly before the coup.135 Ideological penetration, neutrali-
zation of opposition, staving off the political organization of 
the industrial working classes and averting the consolidation 
of national-reformist opinion .fithin the Arm.ed Forces, as "Tell 
as the formation of favourab~ political cleavages and active 
support within the wide middle class public were all :part of 
the campaign of the GOP. It aimed at 'realizing the basic and 
strategic goals of IPES, preparing the ground for covert and 
overt political action and giving to it continuity 'and wide-
spread repercussion', the much needed caixa de resonancia (poli-
tical reverberation).136 General Golbery maintained that a 
lack of ideological preparation of the people prevented the 
13 n 
success of the coup of 1961, and noted the lesson. ' By 
August 1962, a unit was formed with the s~ecific job of prepar-
ing the public ideologically for a take-over. This unit had 
its first test in the preparation of the political climate for 
the crucial legislative elections of October 19620 
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By November 1962, the list of the organizations that worked in 
Public O~inion and in Mobilization (Radio and TV) were nearing 
three thousand, according to IPES Helio Gomide, one of the IPES 
members res~onsible for establishing the 'relay stations' for the 
modernizing-conservative message .138 Helio Gomide was also in charge 
of establishing links wi th individuals and grou~s who were developing 
their own action, congruent with IPES and against the 'executive (see 
Appendix G). 
The GOP was also employed by IPES to establish its hegemony 
among the bourgeoisie. That class hegemony among the entrepreneurs 
was a project for IPES was made evident from a document discussed 
by its leadership in mid-1963. IPES leader, Helio Gomide, in his 
document 'Basic Guidelines for a Long Range Programme of Action', 
recommended initially the expansion of the bases of IPES in the 
domestic front, together with a plan of public opinion formation 
which the organic elite would follow. Then IPES should~tempt to 
reach other goals. Among these goals were the expansioncr IPES 
cadres, in order to~ace at least one member in each and every 
class association of entrepreneurs, be it syndical, recreational, 
cultural, or political. IPES should also maintain permanent links 
between its members by means of a continuous and constant indoc-
trination, which was deemed necessary to provide a safe and sound 
ideological guideline for members to act always in unison, what-
ever the circumstances. Moreover, once IPES had created in the classe 
natronal (em~loyers' clas3), the idea that the entrepreneur is 
anyone working in an 'enterprise', and thus ending the status 
distinctions between boss and employee in the enterprise, IPES 
must attempt to link themselves up vri th the firms financially. 
Later bosses and employees should be persuaded torupport political 
parties of the centre. Furthermore, the paper continued, after 
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a period of two to four years, there would probably be a substan-
tial number of IPES members in the parties of the centre which 
would form a sufficient masse de manoeuvre to constitute the 
skeleton of a new Party and thus give enough strength to IPES 
to influence the thought and political action a the new Party.139 
4. Gru~o de PublicaQoesjEditorial (Publications Group/ Editorial 
Unit - GPE' , 
Operationally related to the public Opinion Group was the 
Publications Group and Editorial Unit. This group was formalized 
in August 1962, although as a working unit it had existed along-
side other groups for almost one year. The GPE organized a net-
work of outlets for their material; what was called the cadeia 
de vefculos de divulga9ao (network of disclosure vehicles). It 
also attempted to stimulate and, when possible, synchronize the 
propagandistic efforts of individuals and groups whose goals 
coincided with those of IPES, or whose activity was instrumental 
to the aims of the organic elite. The GPE disseminated printed 
and visual material with the 'right' ideological message across 
the length and breadth of the country. The GPE, jointly with 
the Conjunctural S~,ey Group and the Public Opinion Group, in 
effect conducted a campaign of psychological warfare organized 
by IPES. 
In the supervision of the activities of the GPE vIas novelist 
and IPES leader, Jose Rubem Fonseca, who took care of the 
Editorial Unit. General Liberato da Cunha Friedrich was in charge 
of publications and was aided by a publishing and book 
selection commission, composed of Jose Garrido Torres, 
General Heitor A. Herrera and General Golbery 140 who Has 
JOJ 
seconded by Captain Hei tor de Aquino Ferreira. The personnel 
for this group vTaS made up of professionals from the media 
net<tTork, literary "Torld and pUblicity agencies. Among them 
was Jose Francisco Coelho (ex- Jomal do Comercio) who was 
brought in by Glycon de Paiva to help the group, Hilson 
Figueiredo, and the poets and novelists, Augusto Frederico 
Schmidt, Odylo Costa Filho, and Raquel de ~~eiroz. 
The GPE vlrote, translated and distributed anti-co.r'JIlunist, 
anti-labour a.YJd anti-populist printed ::;aterial, as 'dell as 
publishing, translating and reprinting chosen books, articles 
and pamphlets. Through the Editorial Unit, it inserted 
commentaries, debates and opinions in the :press and prepared 
edi torials for ne'.'Tspapers, planted ne"i"S and ready-wade articles 
prepared by specialized agencies. 141 The'dissenination of 
democratic literature' (sic) ' .. TaS one of the crucial functions 
of the GP3, in a joint effort "lith the Public Opinion Group, 
and supported by the Study and Doctrine Group. As Garrido 
Torres '.'Trote in his report to the Directing Comr:ri. ttee, at the 
beginning of 1962: "The abundance of l1arxist literature in 
our bookshops is obvious to a.'1y a ttenti ve observer. Hardly 
noticeable is the effort to counter-oalance its effects "Ti th 
the corresponding divulgation of books, ?a.Bphlets and articles 
that 'promote' the democratic regime and alert t~e readers of 
all social layers agains t the evils and the mytl:.s of the 
socializing dootrine". 142 Garrido Torres then ?resented a 
progra.nrme of action drafted by the A?praisal sector 
(Setor de Levantanentos). In short, the pro g r a mm e 
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attem~ted three ty~es of ~ublication. In the first place (the 
easiest and least ex~ensi ve ), was n'~lanting' articles in the news-
~a~ers and magazines of the country, which deal 'I'd th current affairs, 
in a language accessible to the large ~ublic".143 The second 
ty~e of ~ro~ganda action consisted in the ~ublication of ~am~hlets, 
"for disclosure among students, military, industrial workers and 
office em~loyees in general" .144 The third ty~e of a cti on con-
sisted in the ~ublication of books "within what IPES considered 
to be a modern democratic line". This line conceived 'democracy' 
as being equated with private enter~rise which would generate 
social benefits; this was to be the ideological Brazilian frame-
work of 'neo-ca~italism'. Hany foreign books were considered. 
The idea was to choose a certain number of titles, for whose 
~ublication IPES would interest some publishers. If the case arose 
of the ~ublishers having doubts about commercial success of the 
publications, IPES would take upon itself the res~onsibility to 
acquire a certain amount of issues, thus hel~ing the ~ublisher to 
decide in a ~ositive way. In charge offue ~rogramme of translations 
was IPES activist, Colonel Octavio Alves Velho, a director of r1esbla 
S.A. 145 
The standard circulation ~attern of the GP8 aimed at blanket-
ing the country. IY£S relied on~filiates and linked personnel 
in various key cities like Belem, Curitiba, Sao Paulo, Brasilia, 
Salvador, Porto Alegre, Belo Horizonte, F'ortaleza, J oinville and 
Cam~o Grande. These people were responsible for getting the litera-
ture into the hands of the local and regional decision-makers and 
.. h 146 op1.n1.on-s apers. 
Some of the IPES affiliates were oHners, directors or 
closely linked to several publishing houses and printing 
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companies. Consequently, they put their technical and co~~ercial 
infrastructure, equipment, personnel and e:~ertise, at the dis-
posal of IPES. Among them it is worth nentioning in Rio the 
Editora Agir, of Candido Guinle de Paula }~chado; 0 Cruzeiro, of 
Assis Chateaubriand; Grafica Gomes de Souza, of Gilbert Hucer. 
IPES colonel, Victor D'Axinos Silva, secured technical help 
for the printing shop operated by IPES, receiving the help 
of Renato Americano, from the Instituto Brasileiro de 
Geografla e Estatfstica (Brazilian Institute for Geography 
and Statistics - IBGE), a government research centre. 147 
!PES also sought the American Embassy book progra~~e support. 
Supplementary aid came through indirect ,-rays, mainly as gratis 
or subsidized services. In Sao Paulo, the sector of publications 
received a considerable boost through the proposal of the 
important Edi tom Saraiva, brought to Paulo "Edmur de Souza Q:ueiroz, 
of the IP~S S~o Paulo Publications Group, by Edib Casseb. The 
proposal consisted of a plan of publications, l'li.lereby Edi tom 
Sarai va i'TOuld g:i ve to the Doctrine Group of Sao Paulo the 
possibili ty to examine the i{Orks it \'lould publish, eventually 
being able to publish IPES pamphlets and translations. The 
Editc5ra Saraiva, through its contacts, \'las also able to offer 
free television space for LnsS. 148 Another publishing house, 
Cia. Edi tom lTacional, of Octales l'Jarconcles Ferreira, also 
offered to publish IPES books. 149 G.R.D. Editora, of Sao Paulo 
1'!aS also a significant publisher of IPES subsidized books. 
IPES ,'laS thus getting a foothold in the 3up2~ision of ",hat 
was being published throughout the o ountry , as I'rell as on i'That 
vras being read and discussed. It proved to bean effective 
assault on the minds and hearts of the population, the more so 
if one oonsiders the vast ne'b-rork of support T?ES/I:B.w had 
established vii th the nain national nevTspapers and Lll:1gazines, 
television companies and radio stations. 150 
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The GEE also set up at a later stage a Centro de Bibliotecnia 
,nth the function of stimulating Brazilian pUblication of 
ohildren's books, helped in this endeavour by the Franklin Book 
Company, a clearing-house f or American pUblishers I-Tho thus had 
their books distributed in Brazil. 151 l1Bnbers of the Centro 
i-lere Candido Guinle de Paula Hachado, Decio GuL.'1araes, 
Jose Alberto Gueiros, Fernando Bastos de Souza, Pedro Jacques 
Kapeller, Propicio Hachado Alves, Oscar de Olive:ix a and 
Tito Leite, the Director of 'Reader's Digest Publications' for 
Brazil. 
5. Grupo de Estudo e Doutrina (Study and Doctrine Gl"OUU - SED) 
T'ne GED Has Bade up of a cluster of policy-r~search units, 
providing material to feed the Conjunctural Su-l"Vey Group and 
the Publications Group. The papers produced by the Rio based 
Study and Doctrine group, for example, were a basis for the 
'formation of Public Opinion'. 152 The GED prepared studies 
which became the basis for theses and long range policy ,as \'Tell 
as for bills of lavT and a..-rnendments to projects introduced in 
Congress by friendly parliamentarians. GED also provided 
oritical analysis of projects amd background research for the 
political front organized by IPES in Congress, state legislatures 
and state governnents through the P8.rliamentary Action Group and 
its sponsored outlet, the Parliamentary Democratic Action. 
The GED a 1 sop rod u c e d ad hoc a n a 1 y s e s , 
'.-ri th tactical ains and short range outputs. 153 The political 
priori ties for the studies of the GED i-Tere set out by the 
Conjunctural Survey Group, in conjunction vTi th the 
Parliamentary Action Group and the executive and directing 
committees of IPES. 
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The Study and Doctrine Group l,vas the ideological hothouse 
of IPES. The political ideology of IPES Ims quite simple and 
can be discerned from three of its pUblications: Que ~ 0 !PES? 
(\!lhat is IPES?), Declara;CSes de Principios (Declaration of 
Principles) and Reformas de Base (Basic Reforms). Most of the 
more general §,1.1idelines to be found in these documents i'Jere 
presented in the ideological language of the 'Alliance for Progress'. 
Moreover f IP~S leader Rumberto Reis Costa, himself f became the presi-
dent of a preparatory commission of the Brazilian Alliance for 
Progress; created by Sao Paulo Governor, Adhemar de Barros' 
executive decree of 22nd February, 1963. 154 Having in mind 
the large Catholic electorate, the ideological message of IPES 
was also couched in the ideological language of '}~ter et 
Hagistra'. Both served the pu....ryose of 8,gp;' 0:::'118,::,ento of the 
bourgeois pm'rer bloc Jl.d ',-rere instrunental for its legi tine. tion 
vis-a-vis subordinate classes. 155 Finally, I?~S also tempered 
its arguments ',lith the anti-cornnunist ::ceformisB of the Punta 
del Este Charter. ll".8S endorsed and disseminated "the tenet 
that regines not recognizing private :!,)ro:!,)erty and tl:e :!,)rivate 
production of goods and services are guilty of oppressing and 
suffocating personal liberty, and also the belief timt social 
imbalance increases social tension vrhicn, in turn, creates a 
fertile field for deI:'.e.goguery. ll"~S stressed the need for 
TIcnetary stability, the promotion of personal savings, and the 
punish;"J.ent of tax evaders. IPES a bs orbed tne AlianQa 'I s r:landa tes 
urging agre.:C'ian, housing, health and sani te.rie.n reforms. It 
endorsed the right to collective bargaining, adequate working 
conditions, and literacy, and expressed the conviction that a 
man "rho o'.ms his mm land becomes the best guarantor of his 
ovm liberty". 156 
IPES urged the entrepreneurs to involve themselves 
politically, fulfilling their public responsibilities and 
proclaimed that "man's basic needs, such as food, shelter, 
and health, can be best satisfied in a system of private enter-
J08 
prise. Hhen the government enters the economic realm, it should 
use indirect methods such as credit and fiscal controls. If the 
governnent establishes an enterprise, it should be of the pioneer 
variety or be undertaken only i-Then private capital is insufficient. 
If the latter, it should eventually be tr2nsfe~red into private 
hands". 157 This last proviso '-Tas, accordinG to I?ES leader, 
Jose Rubem Fonseca, not generally accepted by the Rio people, 
but 'Has produced to appease the S~o Paulo , .. ring. For I?ES, the 
"state should intervene in the economy only to preserve the free 
market from monopoly, to promote economic developnent and to 
con~ribute to social peace". 158 IPES also urged the reform of 
Erazilian business thr~ugh the establishcent of open commonstock 
companies, the 'blue-chip' enterprises. 159 As lPES leader, 
Rui GO:::les de Almeida observed, IPES ",auld 'aCL"TIit liberalism in 
the economic field, but could not accept it in tile political 
field r. 160 In the political field, ll'~S s::W.red the national 
seQ1.1ri ty viei'! developed at the Superior '.lar College and '.'JaS a 
fim disseminator of the ESG's doctrine. Furthernore, lPES 
urged stabilizing moneta~J policies and championed educational, 
tax, credit, s8-'r1itation, banking, market, trans:portation 
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and agrarian reforms of a modernizing-conservative nature and 
recommended regional development particularly of those regions 
close to the great centres. It also proposed the colonization 
of uninhabited areas. 161 It ,,,as in the study and Doctrine Group 
that most of the technoentrepreneurs and technobureaucrats, listed 
in Chapter III, ,,,ere included. The Rio based Study and Doctrine 
group had Jose Garrido Torres as full-time and overall coordinator 
of tlle different study units, ,'rho I·rere under the direction of 
different !PES affiliates. The assignment of one or other 
activist to head the various study units depended on the 
specialization and personal and professional capacities of the 
individuals involved. The general coordination of the GSD 
activi ties 'ITaS carried out by the Conjunctu:::-al Survey Group. 
Besides the technoentrepreneurs and technioal eAyerts already 
mentioned elseI·rhere, the following i'lere oooperating in the IPES 
campaign through their partioipation in study units and as 
advisors of IPES: Vmrio Henrique Simonsen, Antonio Dias Leite, 
Jorge I<2.furi, J. Knaack ('dho '.'ras brought by Gilbert Huber), 
Hiroea Buescu, Alexandre Kafka, Jesse Hontello, Estanisla\{ 
FiscLIO','litz, Jose Carlos Barbosa Horeira (of Je-rnal do Br~sil), 
A. La~ Filllo, Afrlli~io de Carvalho, Frederico Cesar Cardoso 
H[c:'2<:;liano, Og Ler.1e and Helio Sohli ttler Silva. 162 Robe::::'to Campos 
and Octavio G8uveia de Bulh5es also cooperated 'dith r:;:::S in 
developing its ideas. Campos had been both a lec~rrer in D)~S 
courses and a participant in its ciebates; G)uveia de :Oulhoes 
had been a participant in its debates. 163 The Study 
and Doctrine Group of Rio counted initially on t\olenty 
professional econonists, but, folloi·{ing hotenio Gallotti's 
suggestion, !PES recruited other professionals of prestige. 164 
In addition to the cooperation of professionals closely linked 
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or affiliated to IPES, studies ,-rere also made by 'tecnicos' called 
in on the basis of their professional expertise, as Has the case 
of Anibal Villela and his technoentrepreneuria1 agency, BRASTEC. 165 
The GED also sought and received the cooperation of intellectuals 
related to the clergy and lay ecclesiastical struc~~re. Certain 
!PES affiliates Hell connected "lith the Church ,·mre responsible 
for establishing the netHark link, such as F..aro1d Polland, Paulo 
de Assis Ribeiro, Jose Garrido Torres and Jose Arthur Rios. 
'External' help "TaS also sought for certain aspects of the TI->.8S 
projects and for their implementation. IJ:his '.ms the case '.,fith 
the presence of an 'experienced' Italian priest, \-Tho Has brought 
over to aid the Study and Doctrine unit headed by Candido Guinle 
de Paula r'Iachado, ,-rho dealt Hi th peasant, student and i-Torkers t 
natters. 1:66 
In Sao Paulo the GED "HaS called the Group of Doctrine and 
Studies, emphasizing '.d th the change of name ,·[here tile ileight 
of t~leir acticn 'tie.S. 167 The Sgo Paulo ~oup fixed doctrinal 
points ,";hich defined IFES thought and prepared the naterial 
f t - . ... 1 .... . t ' . " S"'"D ul 168 or .J.e VaTl,)lcS sec ~ora ac "lon unl S opera\jlnG lrom ao.;. a o. 
The joint acceptance of position papers end anal:rses by the tHO 
groups made them final IPES policy. 169 The Doctrine and Study 
GTOUp also received the ideological and political subsidies of 
regional I?ES oentres on the key issues. I?ES Sao Paulo sought 
through this policy to establish entrepreneLITial consensus over 
the most varied iss~es. 170 
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The Doctrine and Study Group , . ,as coordinated by 
J.L. Nogueira Porto and included among others: Paulo Edmur de 
Souza Queiroz, l1iguel Reale, A.C. Pacheco e Silva, Adib Casseb, 
Flavio Galvao, L.A. Gama e Silva, J .L. An.1-J.aia Nello and 
Antonio Delfim Neto. 171 As ",as the case ivi th the Study and 
Doctrine Group of Rio, the Sao Paulo counterpart i'laS aided by 
the technical agencies of the various industrial and commercial 
olass associations. The Dootrine and Study Group also received 
support for particular issues, both financial and technical, 
from such influential entrepreneurs as H. lJeissflogg. 172 
The Doctrine and Study Group took care of tlce canpaign 
to carry IPES' ideological message to the various sectors of 
the public and translate policy papers into political action 
by overseeing and by coordinating the political-ideological 
action on the various target populations: industrial \'lorkers, 
private and public employees, peasants, stuclents, middle class 
vTomen and the Church. 
Coopera ting in the 'projection of doctrine , .. ri thin the 
Church' 'I'lere J. Ely Coutinho, Paulo Galvao Filho and Paulo Ferraz. 
Luiz Cassio dos Santos \verneck, Paulo Galvao Filho and Paulo 
Ferraz also .':1elped Osvraldo Ereyne da Silveira in the lPES action 
'I-Ti thin the trade union and student L10vements. The Doctrine and 
Study Group also supported a unit in charge of selective 
education, in charge of the administration of courses for 
entrepreneurs, managers and professionals, as '-Tell as the 
prepRration of trade union and student activists. This unit ' .. ras 
under the responsibility of OsvTaldo Breyne da Silveira. 173 The 
Doctrine and study Group also coordinated the ac~ivities of 
IP~S members in conferences, seminars, professional and trade 
congresses and in organized discussion tables, "'There such 
varied issues as tax e~'~sion and national security 174 'tTere 
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tackled. The group also supervised !PES action in the mass Nedia, 
by preparing the arguments for exposition and discussion, 
providing the ideological guidelines and in effect, coordinating 
the propaganda material to be used in television appearances, 
and regular radio broadcasts of iNportant political figures, 
trade unionists, entrepreneurs and literary or artistio persona-
lities. The realization of IPES/IBAD doctrinal projection 175 
was also achieved through the publication by the study groups 
of an amazing nUNber of policy papers, articles, pe~phlets 
and other functional studies and ivorks. SOLle of these papers 
'vere circulated at the time either under the .name of IPES/IBAD, 
or, as ivas frequently the case, as the 'proposals' of some 
friendly parliamentarians. They also appeared as basic 
material for articles in the national press, as texts for 
lectures, monographs and even books, released by individuals or 
groups oovertly related to the IPES/IBAD neti'lork. The pUblication 
of booklets, pamphlets and books, as ,vell as the acquisition of 
relevant printed material ',TaS u.'1der the responsibility of a 
special unit headed by Jose Garrido Torres and General Heitor 
176 Herrera. 
As seen already, there Has a high degree of overlapping 
and interchange of personnel bet,veen IPES/IBAD and AIl:SSG, ESG 
and technoe:1trepreneurial agencies and tec:nnical eodies of the 
industrial and conmercial associations. 177 Therefore, special 
care I-TaS taken not to duplicate efforts. Inlenever possible, 
studies ,·rere produced jointly ,·lith other institutions, groups, 
organizations and individuals of capacity and prestige. It T/TaS 
chea!) , saved time and also involved 'didening circles of support 
J1J 
for the cause defended by !PES. 178 The organic elite studied 
the material prepared by others, then passed it through its 
own ideological and poli tical filter, shaping the papers so 
that they v[ould 'attend the national interests' vii th the under-
standing that 'other projects reflected sectoral interests'. 179 
Financing the Organic Elite 
The Grupo de IntegraQao (Integration Group) - Sector of 
Entrepreneurial Action 
The Integration Group had 8.S its objective to 'integrute 
persons and c.)rporations \·ri thin the democratic spirit of IPES; 
at the SaDe tine raising financial contributions for the 
activi ties of the Institute'. 180 The Integration Group m:.s 
actually a ne-b.·rork of units for entreprenelJ.rial economic mobili-
za tion in support of IP3S. The entreprex:eul?s 'de:::::'e canvassed to 
participate in the action led by I?ES ,-lith v8,rious deg.;::ees of 
economic and political commitment. The Integration Group 
recruited affiliates and financial sup?orters fron the 
different entrepreneurial fractions, and, accordingly, several 
integration teams Here fielded,able to operate at ease in the 
various levels and anong the various sectors of the donina~t 
class. Recruitment activities ';jere conducted bearing in Dind 
the economic potential, and the political possibilities of the 
potential rec:!:'Uits. 181 The Integration Group also served the 
overall purpose of IPES to establish its ideological and 
poli tical heGemony ui thin the bourgeois p01>rer bloc. 
Rio cased te&~s of integration consisted 8f, at various 
monents, the follOi-ring rr.ss militants: Omraldo Tavares Ferreira, 
Eduardo Galliez, Jose Duvivier G:mlart, Julio Is::ard, Tony 3ahia, 
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Rubem da Fraga Rogerio, Juan 1rlissirlian, Decio de Abreu, Ernesto 
Pereira Carneiro, Carlos Henrique Schneider, Joaquim Carneiro, 
Abr§:o Yazigi Neto, Fernando da Silva Sa, Hauricio Villela, 
Miguel Guerra, Colonel Jorge Augusto Vidal, AlITelio de Carvalho, 
Esio Alves Ferreira, Jorge Duprat de Eri to Pereira, Nauro Ribeiro 
Viegas, idaldemar Hartinsen, Jose Haria de Araujo Costa, 
Claudemiro Gomes de Azevedo and General Liberato da Cunha Friedrich. 
These !PES activists operated mainly in the Rio-Guanabara region. 
In S§:o Paulo, Nivaldo Ulhoa Cintra, Lelio Toledo Pizza, and Salim 
Chamma headed various fund-raising and recruit:-:lent units. 
Furthermore, in S§:o Paulo, a treasDxy departwent functioned, 
as a sub-division of the integration/fine..nce netl-rork u..nder 
the responsibility of Frans Nachado and Victor Eou<~as. In 
Rio de Janeiro, there ,.;as a caixinha (till), kept for adminis-
-
trative rr.atters, under the responsibility of Joviano Rodrigues 
Iv!oraes Jardim. 182 
Recruitment activities Here conducted on a personal 
level and in a syste:::la tic form using various teclmiques. 
The Integration Group functioned through a series of meetings, 
mesas de inte,Q,TaQao (integration tables), '-'There potential recruits 
and financial supporters participated in debates, lectures and 
also throug..1J. a nu..'C!ber of sr:Jall group reu..1Jions and inf:r!::al 
t - - 183 In th t' ga :18rJ..ngs. ose meeJ..ngs, the current situation,· the 
:reasons for the existence of IPES and the tasks ahead for those 
who opposed the present state of affairs ·were analyzed. Some 
Iffi8 members stimulated debates with potential recruits and 
economic sponsors, and in doing so developed an involved 
relationship with them~l84 
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Up to September 1962, IPES organized 36 'tables of 
integration', inviting 136 enterprises and registe~ing an 
average of 3.8 enterprises per 'table'. To their meetings, the 
Integration Group invited 476 enterprises, including the 136 
participants of the 'table of integration'. After establishing 
1000 personal contacts and more than 3000 telephone contacts, the 
Integra tion Group obtained the support 0 f more than 3O;~ of the 
enterprises that ,'Tere part of IPES by September 1962. 185 
OSivaldo Tavares, the head of the Integration Group of Rio, 
organized three to four \'Teekly 'inforDative' lw."1ches r,.;i th 
entrepreneurs in order to raise funds. 186 For lunches '\.fi th 
bankers and directors of larger enterprises, Tavares as~:ed for 
the cooperation of vTell-known entrepremurs such as Augusto 
Trajano de Azevedo .An tunes and _Antonio Gallotti, ',rho carried 
econonic i'Teight and prestige Hi thLY} industrial and banl:LYJg 
circles. Glycan de Paiva i'laS also actively involved in t::ese 
endeavours. 187 OSivaldo Tavares and Juan Hissirlian Here in 
c}:1..arge of providing a course i-Those ail:J.s He::::oe: Ilto eX:9and 
the penetration of !PES in the environment of big connerce 
and big industry through their directors and leaders and to 
. t -, t' Il 188 1ncrease con r10U 10ns. 
The Integration Group also incorporated a series of 
individuals on an ad hoc basis, for particluar nis sions and 
assignments Hhicll depended on pe~sonal lin~=s, authority or 
means of persuasion of the militant menbers in question. 
Certain :Jili tarj also helped in fund-raising' and recrui tnent, 
t~..J:'o\-ring their prestige be~:ind the entrepreneurial effort; 
Brigadier General :t}eynaldo Nelson de Carvalho, for example, the 
Air Force minister of Goulart, took care-of fund-raising 
in the C81!WOS region of Rio de Janeiro state, anong the sugar 
plantation m-mers. 189 The Integration Group also structured 
t flying squads t, whose aims ,,,ere to take to en trepreneurs 
outside the central areas of Rio and Sao Paulo and the other 
major cities vThere IPES had headquarters, the request for 
collaboration with the !PES political project. At one point 
the, possibility of coordination of 'rtrral cO~Bandslby the 
Integration Group i-ras considered necessc.ry. 190 Another form 
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of brinb~ng more reluctant people to the IPES fold for affiliation 
and financial con-:ributions i-raS by task-oriented integrG. ti~n. 
This was a process whereby potentialrecrui ts 'I'1ere assigned to a 
limi ted and specific acti vi ty, and were gradually involved through their 
careful and increasing participation in operations of various 
sorts. As a result of the intensive caW9aign developed by 
the Integration Group, IPES had the sup::/0rt of 500 corporate 
menbers by mid-1963, an(1. eViOn :;;ore by 1964. 191 
Financial support i.;aS als a gathered fran \-r'c.a t appeared 
to be minor sources of income, such as the voluntarJ ,{ork 
carried out by Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro socialites. Ey 
lUJ.."'1ping together vaTious contributions, individuals ;rho did not 
,-rant their nanes to be knmm, or even corpor2.tions, \-lere able to 
1:elp ,-ri thout stirring up undue suspicion. The fund-raising 
activi ty of upper micldle class '1-TOmen also helped to engage them 
in the political effort of IP:SS. Active in tr:ese operations 
\"as Roberto Levy, the son of 1IDN deputy 2.Dd can~cer, HeTbert Levy;92 
Individual contributions 'Here also im~Jo:ct£'d1t, much more fOT 
their political significance, as a SUP]o:ct in;mt, tilan fo::::, the 
actual SUIll :ceceived.. Individ.ual contributions 'Jere also a 
conveYlient cover for corporate cooperation, 195 as ','ms the 'facily' 
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contributions, es~ecially when the latter were the owners of 
industrial and financial complexes. Small firms were canvassed 
as well. In most cases these small firms were not significant 
financial contributors, but their commitment was relevant in 
two ways: first, they were mobilized under the leadership of lEES, 
which was thus able to wrest these interests fromru~porting a pro-
Goulart industrial-commercial bloc. Secondly, by mobilizing the 
smaller industrialists and retailers IPES avoided the undesired 
projection~ multinational and associated corporations as being 
the core of the anti-Goulart movement. 
Large scale contributions vrere also made for specific and 
limited targets (arrecadacoes especiais), which were not mentioned 
in the ordinary budgets. This was clearly the case of the extra-
ordinary fund-raising campaign to support the IPES/IBAD activities 
related to~e legislative elections of October 1962.194 The work 
with Brazilian firms had been intensified throughout the second 
quarter of 1962, thanks to which IPES Sao Paulo alone was obtaining 
15 to 20 million cruzeiros per month for specific activities, and 
a further 15 million which would go to deposit as reserves for 
special occasions. There was the possibility of obtaining an add i-
tiona1 5 to 10 million cruzeiros for propaganda which lPES would 
want to do.195 
By mid-1962, IPSS Sao Paulo was collecting 40 Million monthly, 
a far cry from the official budget expenses and publicly acknow-
ledged income. 196 But even this kind of money was not enough 
for the needs of a fast expanding political network. Big con-
tributors who had supported lP£S from its very beginning had 
to double their already very high corporation contributions, 
in order to set the examp1e.197 In September 1962, Oswaldo 
lavares urged the lEES leadership to take advantage of the big 
firms "Thich "Jere collaborating i·Ti th IPES for the electoral 
canpaign and organize them as contributors fo~ the period 
after the elections. 198 In Sao Paulo, once the legislative 
eleotions ,,<,ere over, Joao Baptista Leopoldo Figueiredo called 
the attention of the IPES leadership to the fact that the 
financial obligations of the majority of the contributors 
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,,[ould end in December of that year. He stressed the need to 
take preventive neasures "Thich could ensure a 'permanent budget 
which 1.wuld all01.'1" LUES to take up permanent conrr.i tments'. 199 
Leopoldo Figueiredo proposed to hold hTo discreet 'deekly 
gatherings 1:Ti th groups of 20 to 30 people, defined as potential 
big contributors. These men "Tould be invited to the homes of 
selected !PES affiliates in 'smaller groups, for more intimate 
and deeper meetings'. For these fund-raising sessions, important 
entrepreneurs offered their hones, such as Leopoldo FigL~iredo 
hi>"':lself, Salim Char.1Ina, Adalberto Bueno Neto, OS"ic',ldo Breyne da 
Silveira, Nivaldo Ulhoa Cintra, Fuad Lutfalla, Nicolau Filizola, 
Geraldo Quartim Barbosa, Paulo Ayres Filho and several others. 200 
In tLese meetings, the IPES leadership sought to obtain 
ideological comnitment from these entre?reneurs coupled ':lith 
pledges of fin2.ncial support. Flavia Galvao ",ras responsible 
for tl:e orgc:.niz.ation of a i'fork schene tr..2. t 1;Tould serve for all 
the meetings, in ,'Thich the various heads of the D?ES action groups 
1"rould present a SUll'1Dary of their political 2ctivi ties to the 
potential sponsors. 201 The first meeting of 20 2,ffilia tes and 
15 potential contricutors took place 11 t Leopoldo Figueiredo I s 
home, on 12th Decenber, 1962. Rio Integration spealcers at 
special private lovl-key meetings iolere amonG' others: 
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Glycon de Paiva, Harold C. Polland, Denio Nogueira, Jose Garrido 
Torres, Augusto Trajano Azevedo Antunes, Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, 
Jorge Oscar de Hello Flores, Gilbert Huber, Oscar de Oliveira, 
Luiz Carlos ~~cini, Jose Luiz Moreira de Souza, Helio Gomide, 
Guilherme Borghoff and Nei Peixoto do Vale. 202 Even General 
Golbery '<Tas personally involved in the fund-raising campaign, 
through his numerous contacts and in joint efforts with import~t 
entrepreneurial leaders such as !PES leader, Jorge Behring de 
Ma ttos. 203 In Rio, one of those special meetings was ,>Ii th 
Fernando Machado Portela (director of Banco Boavista), Olavo 
Canavarro Pereira (director of Banco Portugues), Claudio de 
Almeida Rossi (president of the Sindicato de Comuanhias de 
SelZUros), Hanoel Ferreira Guinaraes (Director of Banco de 
Minas Gerais), Homero Souza e Silva (director of Brasil \'Tarrant), 
and Versiani Caldeira (director of the Centro Industrial do 
Fesforo). The IPES activists -present-at this: gatl:eringwere 
G. Borghoff, H.C. Polland, Glycon de Paiva, J.R. Fonseca, 
General Golbery, General Herrera, General Liberato and 
Augusto Trajano de Azevedo Antunes. 
By January 1963, the denand for financial resources "laS 
so high that the corporations vlere yressed for a SUbstantial 
increment in their contributions. At a joint meeting of the 
Executive Committee of Rio and S~o Paulo, Leopoldo Figueiredo 
proposed to 'coTi1promise on the fornula of n-% of the capital 
per annum' 'i'Thich had been the norm for big contributors. 
Leopoldo Figueiredo argu.ed for increased efforts to secu:::oe the 
expansion of IPbS nembership. He vranted to be able to 'tell the 
big contributors to reduce their contributions a little, once the 
me:lbership had been increased'. 204 In tivo :years, 4.000.000 dollars 
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had been collected, 205 and by 1964 many tines this sum had been 
spent by the organic elite. 
Clearing financial contributions 
The Integration Group had two main problens. One ",as 
hOif to keep and augment the corporate and individual contributions 
and their participation for the ever-increasing activities of 
IPES/IBAD, maintaining the momentum of vThat Jorge Behring de Hattos 
called 'the sacred fire'. 206 Or as Jorge Geyer put it, the 
problem Has I to find a formula to keep the contributors intebTa ted I 
for he understood that the sponsors and supporters could not 
possibly be as enthusiastic about the activities of IPES as the 
Directing Comr:U ttee itself. 207 The other problem vms hml to 
'clean' and disguise financial contributions of firms and 
individuals and other sources for the activities of I?ES. Both 
donors and IPES had to be protected from public knovlledge. 
As H2.rold C. Polland su-"ll!led it up, 'the big firms need special 
treatr:1ent'. In C8:ndido Guinle de Paula H'achado's opinion, it Has 
'delicate for the Institute and for the fixms'. 208 DisG~~sed 
contributions also allowed for the attendance of certain eX.Jenses 
i-:hich could obviously not be credited in the cal2.nce sheets of 
IPES, especi2.l1y those referred to the secret action in Congress, 
the ID~litarJ, trade unions, media and student movement. 
}!any of the contributions i-rere organized through class 
associa tions, ,{here the identity of a single company 'das not 
revealed. By contributing throU&~ the different class associations, 
large allocations of sums could be justified in terns of insti-
tutional activities - expenses 'dhich did not appe2.r in IPES 
balance sheets or in those of the enter~)rises. For example 1 the 
associates of the Federation of Industries took upon theli1selves 
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to give a large r::1onthly contribution through their class 
association. Other contributions vTere made to the organic 
elite through the Associaol1o dos ]angueiros, the Centro de 
Inch(str:i as, the Sindicato das COnIPanhias de Seguros. The bankers 
contributed through the Sindicato dos ]ancos, in order to 'disguise 
their contribution to IPES'. 209 
One of the forms of disguised contribution '\'Tas the creation 
of 'Iuesinhos' (literally little IPES). The idea consisted in 
setting up 'seminars' for the contributing firms and for 
individual members. Ten to DtTenty firms per month I'Tere invited 
to participate in those 'seI'linars', for '\Thich they paid 
attendance fees. The firms v[ould be 'paying' for 'technical 
services' rendered through their participation in the seninars. 
This ingenious device W1S first tried in Friburgo. The Friburgo 
'station' then becane an ongoing seminar/f~d reception unit. 210 
Another "Iray to clean contributions '.ms an idea fOI",mrded 
by Oscar de Oliveira. IPES vTaS to establish or act through 
established tec:nnoentrepreneurial agencies. ':::hese agencies 
i{ould be sou&ht by private corporations in 'need' of feasibility 
studies and other projects. The agency '\lOulcl then receive 
''Payment' for these projects and studies, "Thich \las passed 
on to T?ES or '\·ras used to directly subsidize 17;:;S ""-' • .t..' ao vl Vll.tles. 211 
A very effective form to cover for f'll_nels and beir donors/ 
reciuients w .. '.s to issue receipts through 'democratic associations 
subsidized by T?ES Rio vThich I·rere B"ole to c,-:l ve receipts that "[ould 
~ S... P ul' 212 IPli'S d . . n' ')c' • run J.. or ao a o. _l!J an prl va 1;e r lI':"'.S vTere t"len ::1anng 
'philanthropic' done.tions for i·,hich they obtained :receipts ·..rhich 
actually freed the noney for other purposes thBn these officially 
acknoi·,rledged. Contributions I·rere also :1ede through 'y"-i.tlic 
subscription', ,'Ti thout invoice, as iIaS the case of Lir;.'lt S • ..:1.. , 
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and through the Pontificia Universidade Catolica. 213 Another 
form of disguising contribution 'Has through the ,-rives of 
inrportant directors or enterprise O1mers, ,{ho contributed on a 
personal level, or channelled funds to philant~opic organizations 
and social centres, which then redirected the money to !PES. 
As funds increased, as ,{ell as the nUL1ber of sou.rces, neyr 
,-rays of 'easing' contributions had to be fODnd. One very 
inrportant ,\'laY of disguising contributions 'tras through the public 
relations and propaganda agencies vIho handled the so-called 
'invisible budgets' of the big corporations, ';rhich represented 
huge sums of money. 214'.1hat the corporations could do \'Tas to 
channel their contributions t:cU'ough funds ea,:r::larked as budgets 
for advertisement and public relations by Deans of agencies 
sUIYporting :L:'.tiS. The other form '\<TaS for the 'big co:rporations to 
'Pay in advance their 'brelve months contracts 'iii th the pub2.ic 
relations agencies, '.rho then channelled funds, as ,Tell as 
contributing financially from their mffl S81J.rces. 215 T'nis ',.,ras not 
a ve~J conplicated operation, since many of the L~S affiliates 
,-rere oymers or directors of publicity agencies themselves, 
handling the accounts of the multinational and associated 
oorporations ,·,hose directors and Oimers ;·rere ESS affiliates 
as Hell. 216 In a meeting attended by Augusto Tra.jano de 
Azevedo .~tunes, General Golbe~J, Helio Gomide, Glycon de Paiva 
and Harold Polland, in which these questiorcs ~·rere discussed, 
Jose l1:tiz Horeira de S')uza, mmer of Denisson ?rop2.6,"8.Dda, 
offered himself to operate as a conduit for 'clea=2nc money'. 
lie \'lOuld not feel the 'least constre.int in receiving STh~S through 
his Propaganda Agency and then lw.ndirig. them over to IP~S. 217 
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Among the oompanies initially involved in the financial and 
propagandistic effort of IP~S were (besides Denisson Propaganda)f 
Gallas Propaganda, Norton Propaganda and Hulti Propaganda. 218 
Direct financial support ''laS not the only form of con-
trlbution to the efficiency of the organic elite. Servioes and 
I 
equipment of different sorts ,{ere also an important part of the 
efforts to provide the organic elite ,d th the necessary requirenents. 
Thus, Bento Ribeiro Dantas, president of the ServiQos Ae~eos 
Cruzeiro do Sul S.A' f one of the main airlines in Brazil f declared 
that any request for transport ,;,ould be readily attended to, be 
it by his company or by any other. As for the payment, 'll';;;S 
should not ,ororry,.219 Rubem Berta, president of YA . :l.IG S.A., also 
offered the services of his company. IPES established a ~ 
faciendi '.-ri th both, as 'vell as Hi th Valentim Bow,as, director of 
"D " "B "1 220 
.I. anal.r (LO rasl. • The airline services 'lTould be invaluable 
in .the coordination of the military moveDent to topple Goulart. 
For a conspiratorial elite to have the biggest national airlines 
at tneir disposal to travel the length and breadth of Brazilf 
inconspicuously, ' .. TaS very important indeed. 
It ,-ras also important to have the su~:}port of private telegraph 
and telephone compe.nies, 'tihich provided a vi tal service as \{ell as 
the required privacy and discre tion f or the conn:ru.nica tions of the 
organic elite, as \{ell as the possi bili ty of tapping and controlling 
the cOPiliillnication of other political groups. 221 Other forms of 
transportation, media services, communications, office De.terial 
and equipnent, printing services) etc., Here provided at nominal 
prices or gratis. 222 Another form of contribution '..ras to provide 
the pay:::1ent of technical personnel iforking for ! )~S, or for the 
big corpors tions to 'lend' their Oim experts to the political 
" ~ .1-" "1' t 223 C9npal.gn 01 vne or6dnl.C e l. e. 
The issue of transnational contribution 
In spite of public denials made by IPES leaders about the 
existenoe of 'foreign' funding, the then US Consul, Niles :Bond, 
said that he was sure that US funds were going into the IPES 
operations, although he maintained that they i'rere not being 
channelled through his office. In speaking of 'US funds', :Bond 
did not distinguish between ~ublic and private funding. He 
suggested, for example, that Albert :Byngton, a lbrvard. graduate 
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and direotor of several US concerns in :Brazil vTaS 'probably' 
reoeiving US funds and passing them on to !PES. 224 Albert :Byngton, 
the nresident of COlWLAP, i-TaS also a Sao Paulo based IPES leader. 
Substantial private assistanoe did reach IPES/I:BAD from the 
Uhited states and from elsewhere. 225 US Ambassador Lincoln Gordon 
was es~ecially important in engaging multinational support for 
IPSS/IEAD actions. In a report to the Executive Committee in 
early 1962, Gilbert Huber expressed that, on the issue of 
contributions by American fi:rms, "the P.nerican Char;ber asked 
its ambassador vrho opted for contribution". Huber ad.ded that 
there "Tas "more politics in the &TJ.erican C?'J.ar:lber tr_an in the 
Federal Chamber". Eu tit seemed to him ~~12, t they vere reaching 
a solution, not only about quantities of money Qnd other support, 
but also about the Hays of contributLYlg in inconspicuous fOrD. 
Huber I'Ie.S also inf8rmed. in Sao Paulo "that the ~\merican 
Ambassador had asked the Department of St2.te fli.ld the Denarment 
of COID.rae!.'ce to agree". Huber observed th2,t although 'only the 
ma tri::ces decide, it is important to convince Gordon'. 226 
Not only private corporstion funds re8,c~lecL the orc;,mic elite. 
us CIA funds ,·rere also cne.nnelled into IBA]). Students of the 
Goule.:rt period:mzzled over the extent of "bbe.ssf).dor Gordon's 
knmdedge ab::::ut the US CIA's varied activities. "Certainly, 
Gordon :":new all about !BAD. lie ·Has a\'i'are that not only ',TaS 
IBAD the CIA's means of channelling money into local political 
campaigns but that such clandestine contributions '-Tere an 
absolute violation of Brazilian lai'i'". 227 
In March 1962, in Sao Paulo, the Social Action Fund (FAS) 
was established, in the belief that 'Brazil ·Has one of the 
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choicest battlefields of the cold war and that business could not 
stand idle and see itself destroyed by demagoguery and ignorance'. 
FAS was established with the aim to obtain a 'closer cooperation 
of. the foreign business community with its Brazilian counterpart,~28 
FAS "i-TaS set up by some fifty private corporations '!Thich later made 
up the Council for Latin !nerica, as 'an organization to promote 
civic projects outside the normal sphere of Chanber of Commerce 
operations'. Its activities included 'studies on basic problems 
in Brazil, "i'fOrk "rith democratic labour grou:ps, co:mnunications 
efforts i'i'i th key national groups'. 229 FAS "Has one of the main 
contributors of !PES. It was also claimed that among the foreign 
spons ors, DELTEC, of ,\Thich IPES leader David Beatty III "ras the 
Brazilian director, had nade contributions from its 7.000.000 
dollar kitty in the Bam:oas, \vhich I-ras the meeting place for tb.e 
Nassau conventions of the organic elite's sister organizations. 230 
T<dO hundred and ninety seven A;'::lerican corporations provic.ed 
financial support for IPES. .Another 101 corporations from other 
origins gave further financial support. 231 (A partial breakdmm 
of uSS cO:r);)orate contributors is provided in Appendix H. A list 
of individual contributors is found in Appendix I). J3y B2.y, 1962, 
J .B. Leopoldo Figueiredo infoTI::ed the Directing COIIlf'2 ttee about 
Sao Paulo's regular income (recei te,s srdim:Cric.s), '.!hic:!'. '.rere H t 
the tine ar~und 9.5 millions. Leopoluo Figueiredo also reported 
::m the ',.[ork being done 'Iii th A.TIlerican and Bri tish fiITls. Tlle 
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A..ll1erican firms ,·rere to contribute i'l'i th more or less 7 millions 
yearly, hoping to reach 15 nillions. The :British fims \-Tould 
contribute 3.5 millions. The monthly pers)ective '.ms to be 
more or less 20 ~illions and it could even reach much nore. 232 
Tmlards the end of 1962, at a joint mee tint; of the CE and OJ) of 
S~o Paulo, IPES leader Nivaldo Ulhoa Cintra suggested that 'the 
thxee or four men Hho control all the SHedish fims existing in 
:Brazil' should be contacted in order to obtain 'the support of 
those fims'. Paulo Reis 112.za,lhaes vlaS charged yri t:'l the responsi-
bility to organize a plan of action for a ca~paign to raise 
funds among t~e foreign firms. 233 Still another source of trans-
national financial cooperation Ylas the Konrad Adenauer Stiftill1g, 
a body of the Gersan Christian Democratic Pa:::-ty, i·rho contributed 
throug.1]. rifannessmann (the giant steel complex) and through 
tfurcedes Benz. 234 :Because of the ielicacy of the satter, fund-
raising ,lith multinational corporations operating in :Brazil'.·ras 
left to the disc:?:.'etion of a fe .. ·r nembe:::-s of the L'1tegration Group, 
as i'l'as the case ,·ri th :Hannessnann and other si.!'Jilar concel."TIs. 235 
General Herrera '"ras appointed to contact Antonio Gallotti about 
" the contributions of Cia. Siclert1.re;ica Belzo l'.fineira - ASB-r.:n. 
Harold C. Polland '.'Tould take co.re of Anderson Clayton and 
ReDington Rand do Brasil. 236 Even General GolCery took part and 
"Tould accorclingly present a plan for the presiclent of the 
Nercedes :Benz Co. 237 
Most of the contriccl.tion of t.'le foreign firms vms channe::'led 
to the Sao Paulo section, de3lriving Rio of the c2.'p8.ci t;;r to act 
Tin tn po\·rerful financial backing. 238 To re~edy ,J... ~ • •• ,. vDlS sl~ua~lon, a 
big neeting of i\;"Jericans in Sao Paulo 'Has ~:elcl in Januar:r 1963, 
'/.'i th the presence of the Ju:1ericans of Rio to decide on funds for 
DES Rio. The meeting took place 8.t tl;,e no:=.e of John Clinton 
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Lerena, an IPES leader 8..'1d entrepreneur. L1 tlle neeting 'irere 65 
con tributors of the Social Action Fund of SB:o Paulo, "rho 
received a 'report on the use '.,<,hich had been r.ade of the money 
contributed by FAS I. Hany of the A.TD.ericans '"rere of the 
pharmaceutical industry, 'worried Hi th the ne,'r la'tT that created 
SlliTAB', the National Superintendence for Supply, one of Goulart's 
measures destined to ensure the regular supply 6 f basic 
cOlnmodities and nedicines at a fair price for the conSl..1.!c:er. 
Harold Polland provided a political analys~s of the situation. 239 
IBAD itself "TaS a financial channel for sul tina tional 
funding to l?ES. Among the corporations that deposited in the 
I31>..D/ADEP/l?romotion accounts ,'re:!:'e: Texaco, Sllell, Esso Brasileira, 
Standard Oil of lTevT Jersey, Texas Oil Co., Gulf Oil, Bayer, Enila, 
Schering, Ciba, Gross, General 31ectric, I3H, ReDington Rand, 
illiG, Coty, Coca Cola, Standard Brands, Cia. de Cigarros Souza 
Cruz, Belgo Nineira, US Steel, Hanna H:i..ni:.1g Corp., 3ethlehem Steel, 
General Hotors, T:,fillys Overland and IEEC. 240 
Because of the na'bc.re of its income sources and financie.l 
channels and the variety of activities S2)orlSc.red oy I?~S, the 
budgets of the ')rganization did not reflect its true finances. 
All sorts of inconsistencies cnn be found I-Then exar.:ining the 
consolidated budgets and the various su'J.s receiveci a..'1d spent. 241 
'Parallel ace :-l..m ting', various levels of 'acccuntabili ty I, 'oroinar'J 
and special expenses' I-lere the norm. It Has clear tl12.t all the 
illegal and illegi tina te ope:!:'D. tions did not ~,-ave their eX'penses 
recorded in the 'official' budgets and bD.l~1ce sheets. 
One of the nos t i..'"1portant activities of IP:::S ,'laS granting 
'sD_bsidies I, a ratber neutral ,'lay of refe~rinc to the slush 
funds pU.l·Jped into political -parties, the ::leciia, the mili ta::y, 
the trade l..mions and rural or0'c.illiza tioDs, tl:e st"'J.dent ::lovee.cent 
and clerical projects and organizations e.s Hell as selected 
individuals. !1any of these contributions ,'rere Dade by IPES 
through subsidiary institutions or by individuals (members of 
!PES) as 'personal' contributions. 242 Jose da Costa Eoucinhas 
and Eduardo Sampaio Campos, corporate members of the lunerican 
Cha::lbers of Commerce and vrell-lalO'lm publio 2.coountants of some 
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of the biggest corporations in Brazil pre?ared a 'urestaQao de 
oontas uad~o' (a standard declaration of e:Qenses) for the funded 
sums. 243 
Foreign financial entanglement and that of private enterprise 
in political affairs 'YTaS of such importance in the context of the 
period, that it prompted the establishment of a Parliamentary 
Inqui~J Commission - CPI, to investignte the matter. The CPI 
probed into the proceedings of IBAD and its alleged intromission 
in political affairs through illegal means, especially in the 
Congressional elections of October 1962. IP,SS ~ITaS also inves-
tigated. IBAD ;'ras found guilty of political corruption and 
closed dOi,m. DES i-ras acquitted on the g:cotmds that no unusual 
activities contravening their publicly declared goals as stated 
in their Charter, ,'rere realized by the Institute. The CPI also 
could not find any connections bet"vreen I?.::JS a;;:)d Dlw. '.Then the 
CPI pressed I?ES/:r3AD, several neas',;.res ,':8::::-e decid.ed upon in a 
special meeting of IPES in the presence of Leopold.o Figueiredo, 
Harold Cecil Polland, Candido Guinle de Pe.ula Hl1cnaao, Luiz Cassio 
dos Sa.ntos i.1ernecl:, Gene::::-al Golber'J, Adib Ce.sseb, Flc.wio Galvao, 
Jose Rubem Fonseca, Glycon de Paiva, Jorge Oscar de Hello Flores, 
Gilbert Huber and Jor:;'e Horais Gueiros. The covert d.ec:'siollS 
taken by the IPES leadership 1Jere: to meet the cont::::-ibuto:!?s of 
IPES aml e}..":plain to tne::l the situation, as itell 2,S assuring inem 
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that their names 'Yrere to be in thheld froI!1 t:le CPI; to clean the 
archives and shelves of IPES of incriminating' clocUDents; a series 
of precautions and protective ~easures in ~elation to the con-
ponents of 'hidden organs' and 'discreet orG~~s' (mostly individuals 
operating in the student media, labour, peasent, party, rnili tary 
and intelligence sectors); measures to protect those functionaries 
and employees of IPES 'Yrhich were overtly employed by 1PES.244 , 
The overt decision of IPES Has somei'Jhat different. After 
discussing the oficios Nos. 28/63 and 29/63 of the referred CPI, 
the Executive Corm ttee reached the follcHi..."1S decisions by 
unanimity of votes: t~~t on the request by the CP1 to Imnd in the 
list of fims I,Ti th foreign capital or :Jart of foreign capital 
that collaborated 'Hi th ll'BS, the Institute should reply that 
'no foreign enteryrise forms part of its body of associates'. 
Ftl.rthermore, I?ES could not comply '.d th t~e second )art 8f the 
CPI's request, namely to hand over the list of firrls ',dth part 
of foreign capital that colla bora ted 'l'Ii th the Ins ti tu te beca~se 
"it ignored the structure of capital of the enterprise ••• " 245 
IPES, it is very clear, led a clouble life, both politically and 
financially. 
Conclusion 
l;Jith the fornation of I?.8S as a polit:'co-nilito.ry 
organization, the organic elite of the cultinational and 
associe.ted interests reached 'what Grassci has temed the 'nost 
pl..U'ely political p!.12.se t, ,.,hen 'previously Germinated ideologies 
beco::re p2.rty'. 246 T'1:e organic elite, as the 'party' of the nel'r 
interests, organized overt and covert activities in civilien and 
mili tary areas until the ESG/AXT.led Forces - as ~,re~Jared class 
po'/rer in t::e state appara.tus - overshad::::i·red -:he I?~S/bol..U'geois 
JJO 
complex and concealed the immediate class characteristics of the move-
ment, being recognized only in its mil i tary and para- military fashion as 
amili tary component • At such a moment, General Gol bery do Couto e Silva 
affirmed himself as the head of staff of the multinational and associated 
power bloc. By then, the problem of the state had been posed at its highest 
level for the multinational and associated power bloc, in the sense of not 
only winning politico-military dominance over the subordinate classes as 
a whole, but of also subduing the populist historical bloc and gain-
ing effective political command of the state apparatus. 
For the organic elite, the control of the state Has clearly the out-
come of a process whose essential characteristic was the deliberate and 
purposeful class action of the multinational and associated power bloc, in 
which strategic preparation aimed at reducing to zero all the imponderabi-
li ties. The organic elite in IPES/IBAD constituted itself into a power-
ful class apparatus. As such, they were able t6~ert strategically 
planned action and tactical manoeuvres through a careful and elaborate 
cam-paign which successfully counterposed their organized classpovTer 
with the state pOl>fer of the populist historical bloc and cgainst the 
incipient militant formation of the working classes. Through its 
specialized action groul's, and using every means available, TIES/IBAD 
were able'to astablishthe political, ideological and military presence 
of the multinational and~sociated power bloc in eve~J relevant soci& 
area of conflict and dispute. 
r':ost of the poli tical-mili taI'J activities of the organic elite have 
been highly controversial, they have been kept secret to a large extent 
for obvious reasons, and information on them has been scarce. 247 In 
the next chapters, we intend to describe some of the organized class acti-
vity of the multinatior..al and associated pO'Herbloc s Hhichled to the 
destabilization of the Brazilian polity. 
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It also used premises on the same floor belonging to its 
associate, the Conferencia de Fretes Brasil-Estados 
Unidos-Canada. It is interesting to note that telephone 
bills were invoiced to Henrique Geisel, a reserve .~y 
General, a brother of General Ernesto Geisel, and an 
important entrepreneur. In Sao Paulo, one of its head-
quarters \'las at Rua Bahia, 131. In Belo Horizonte, 
IPES operated at Avenida Afonso Pena 867/11° 8 In 
Porto Alegre, IPES functioned in the Edificio Palacio 
do Comercio, 4 0 Andar. In Curi tiba, IPES/IBAJ)/HAC/OPAC 
had meetings in Edificio Asa, at the Rua Voluntarios 
da Patriae Moreover, IF8S/IBAD held meetings in the 
SENAC-SESC headquarters, in the I Circulo de Estudos 
Bandeirantes', in the SESI headqtlarters, the COI71Jllercial 
Association of Parant offices and in the headquarters 
of the PEP, the former integralista party, in 
Pol{tica e Negocios, 19th August, 1963, p. 30. 
~Finally, the address of another base of IPES in Sao 
Paulo was Avenida Brigadeiro Luiz Antonio 19+, 16th Floor. 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
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N. Blume, op.cit., p. 213. The aims of IPES, as stated 
in Chapter I of their institutional charter Here: to 
promote and stimulate cultural, moral and civic 
education of the individuals and to develop and coordinate 
studies and activities of a social character and to 
obtain, by means of research, recommendations "lhich con-
tribute to the economic progress, social well-being and 
the strengthening of the democratic regime of Brazil. 
Article 2 stated that 'IFES will not participate in 
any political party activities'. Article 4 stated that 
'all the activities of the Institute ,vill be developed 
~dthin the Constitution and the laws of the country, the 
democratic principles, the social order, the norms of 
Christian civilization and the obedience due to the 
legally constituted authorities'. IPES Estatutos, 1961, 
pp. 1-2 (My translation - RAD). 
J. RO~le, The 'Revolution' and the 'System' - Notes on 
Brazilian Politics, American Universities Field Staff, 
USA, 1966, p. 12. See also M. Cehelsky, The Polic;y; 
Process in Brazil: Land Reform 1961-1969, Ph.D. Thesis, 
Columbia University, 1974, p. 129. 
A Res~onsabi1idade Democratica do Empresario, p. 4.- IPES 
Jos~ Garrido Torres would popularize an homonymous 
version for Cademos Brasileiros, July/Se9tember 1962, 
Ano IV, No.3, pp. 3-5. He also prepared a popular 
summa~J for IaAD's newspaper A9~0 Democratica. 
(Ny translation, RAn). 
J. Rowe, ou.cit., p. 17. 
P. Sie~an, op.cit., p. 149. 
In true military style IPES coordinated operations 
'V{ere codenamed, such as 'Operation Brado de Alerta' 
(Alert Call Operation);'Projeto Gammon' (GammcnProject) , 
etc. 
N. Bailey, Organization and Operation of Neoliberalism 
in Latin America, in Latin America: Politics, Economy 
and Hemisuheric Secuxit;y;, USA, Praeger, 1965, p. 234. 
Raul Pilla, 'A Influencia do Dinheiro', '0 Globo', 
24th August, 1963, (my translation, R~). 
Paulo Ayres Filho, op.cit., p. 249. 
Idem, p. 251. 
Ivan Hasslocher, 'As Classes Produtoras Diante do 
Comunismo', Special issue, Asao Democratica, February, 
1962, pp. 14-15. (Hy translation, RAJ). 
I. Hasslocher, o~.cit., p. 5. 
Idem, pp. 14-16. 
30 As Sombras do !BAD in VEJA, 16th March, 1977, p. 4. 
31 tEle nao resiste, e meio born. Estao dispostos? 
Vamos a ele', Rui Gomes de Almeida and J.E. Leopoldo 
Figueiredo, IPES CD Rio, 22nd Hay, 1962. 
32 lEAD denounced on a monthly basis, a list of companies 
'who make contributions to the cor:rmunists to maintain 
in Rio the ill tima Hora I, a populist nevlSpaper. A98:0 
Democratica, July, 1962, p. 7. It is interesting to 
notice that most of the companies mentioned in the 
lists vTere to be found as funders of lPES. Their 
directors could be found in the list of IPES leaders. 
33 See statements of IPES leaders, Ermirio de Morais Filho 
and J.L. Moreira de Souza, in Jornal do Brasil, 29th 
April, 1962, under the heading Como Industriais Javems 
veem a SituaQ8:o Nacional (How young industrialists view 
the national situation). Cited in O. Ianni, Crisis in 
Brazil, New York, Columbia University Press, 1970, p. 
186. 
34 An important landmark in the 1961 Document of ~PES 
'A Emnresa Privada como Comunidade de Trabalho' 
(The Private Enterprise as a l,{ork Community), \'Thich 
introduced the vievTs of the modernizing-conservative 
entrepreneurial bloc. 
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35 IPES CE Rio, 5th February, 1962. It was vTith an insight 
into the political conjunoture and an understanding of his 
o.wnlevel of internal organization, preparedness and 
capability for action that IPES leader, Antonio Gallotti 
recommended to the political exeoutive of the organ~c 
elite to 'stabilize first, so as to pass to the second 
phase after..,rards'. Gallotti urged the entrepreneurs 
to 'move om-rards for the formulation of the great 
theses subjacent in all of us'. 
36 The original was part of a presentation booklet for 
potential recruits, as mentioned above. It also 
served for the preparation of papers for limited 
entrepreneurial circulation. And, finally, it served as 
a basic guideline for a number of papers and articles 
which appeared in the national press or in partisan 
publications and pamphlets, in n~ny cases, signed by 
vTell-lcnown intellectuals and politicians. 
37 A98:0 Demooratica, l1arch 1963, Rio. 
38 In its document '0 Brasil quer tranguilidade' (Brazil 
wants tranquility), of July 1962, IPES conoluded: "The 
prooess of economic and social development has an 
intimate relationship ,-lith political improvement 
(anerfeiQoamente nol{tico). A country \uthout leaciing 
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elites (elites dirigentes) is a sub-nation, incapable of 
conducting itself and imposing exte~a1 respect (respeito 
externo). It is necessary, therefore, for the leaders 
to direct (que os dirigentes dirijam) .~.II 
39 FIESP lectuxe, in IPES Bulletin, September 1962, Rio. 
40 Noticiario IPES, No.4, September 1962, p. 3, Rio. 
These \'l'ords are exactly the same as those to be found 
in a document of a Course on National Problems: Planning, 
p. 1, which vms delivered in Sao Paulo class associations 
and social clubs. The appeal to move omvards from 
corporate identity to class solidarity and then to 
political action was put insistently. 
41 P. Ayres Filho, op.cit., pp. 248-249. 
42 N~ Blume, op.cit., p. 211. The victory of Fidel Castro 
over Batista's regime was portrayed as the principal 
catalyst in the development of these organizations. 
Given the inevitable power redistribution be~Teen the 
various fractions of capital occurring in Latin ~~erica, 
the emergence of the modernizing-conservative action 
units was unlikely to have been long delayed. This was 
the clear case of Brazil, where the structural differen-
tiation in its socio-economic formation prompted the 
political organization of multinational and associated 
oligopolistic interests. See N. Bailey, op.cit., p. 193. 
43 See N. Blume, ou.cit., p. 213. 
44 See N. Bailey, op.cit., p. 194. 
45 Phillip Agee, Inside the Company: CIA Di.ar;z, England, 
Penguin Books, 1975, p. 604. The Chilean IPIES 
had Dr. Carlos Urenda linked to it. 
46 Letter from A.C. Neal to General Gomes de Abreu, 
IPES, Rio, 22nd August, 1966. 
47 Letter to Gilbert Huber, 28th FebruarJ, 1962, IPES 
Archive, Rio. In this official OED letter, A.C. Neal 
vTrote to Gilbert Huber: "Dear Luke; The attached list 
of people from Sf'io Paulo vTaS put together by a trusted 
associate of Hr. Robert Kleberg, one of our trustees. 
The list is of people who might be interested in a 
CED type o:peration". 
The lis t of names, vTi th address and phone numbers, 
included: 
Paulo Reis rvJagalh~es (Cia. Itaquere Industrial e 
Agr:lcola) 
Luiz Dumont Villares (Ind. Villares S.A.) 
Jose Ermirio de Morais (Votorantim S.A.) 
Joao de Moraes Barros (Cia. Cafeeira do Rio Feio) 
Francisco ltIattarazzo Sobrinho (HetalUrgica Nattarazzo 
S.A. ) 
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Caio de Paranagua Moniz (Frigorffico Cruzeiro S.A.) 
Severo Fagundes Gomes (Tecelagem Paraiba S.A.) 
Paulo Ayres Filho (Instituto Pinheiros) 
Jo~o Batista Leopoldo Figueiredo (L. Figueiredo S.A.) 
Justo Pinheiro da Fonseca (Banco do Comercio e IndUStria 
de Sao Paulo S.A.) 
Fonseca was also a director of Fabrica de Caldeiras a 
Vapor Cyclope (Pigantari Group); Cia. Brasileira de 
Constru~~es Fichet e Schwartz-Hautmont; A~os Sandvik 
S.A. Ind. e Com. (Sandvikens Jernverks A.B. Sweden) 
Gast~o Eduardo de Bueno Vidigal (Banco Nercantil de 
Sao Paulo S.A.) 
Julio de Mesquita Filho (to Estado de Sao Paulo') 
Jorge de Souza Rezende (Maquinas Piratininga S.A.) 
Helio Muniz de Souza (Cassio Muniz S.A. Imp. e Exp.) 
Jorge Alves de Lima (Sociedade Comercial e Construtora) 
Prof. Noe Azevedo (Faculdade de Direito do Largo de 
S. Francisco) 
Francisco Pignatari (Pignatari Administra~ao Ind. e 
Com. S.A.) _ 
Antonio Devisate (Cia. Ca19ados Devisate) 
Rogerio Giorgi (Cotonificio Guilherme Giorgi) 
Adhe8ar de Almeida Prado (Banco de Sao Paulo S.A.) 
Antonio Caetano Alvares (Cia. SiderUrgica Paulista 
COSIPA) 
Olavo do Amaral Ferraz (Fazendas Nelogir S.A.) 
Joao de Scantimburgo ('Correio Paulistano') 
Theodoro Quartim Barbosa (Banco do Comercio e IndUStria 
de Sao Paulo S.A.) 
Benedito N. Lobo Rosa (Hartinelly Comercial S.A.) 
Camilo Ansarah (Cia. Nacional de Tecidos). 
Nost of these entrepreneurs ,·rere linked to other 
corporations, and the connections of those that became 
leaders of LDES are presented in detail in Appendix B. 
Others are mentioned throughout the thesis and in 
Appendix: E. 
48 IP~S CE Rio, 20th February 1964; IPES GE and Study 
Group, 27th July, 1964; LUES GE, lOth Narch, 1964. 
The AEF 'Iras functioninG at 295 L·12.dison Avenue, Ne .... l York. 
49 N. Bailey, op.ci t. t p. 201. This coordination vTas 
expected to be improved by the formation of a Joint 
Executive Committee by the Latin American Information 
Conmittee, the United states Inter-American Co~cil -
USIAC and the Business Council f or International 
Understanding. (The USIAC ,.;as the AJnerican section of 
CICYP t headquartered in 110ntevide 0 as Hell). 
A t the tenth Annual !1eeting of the CICYF, held in 
Santiago de Chile, 15th-18th March, 1964, a group of 
delegates from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Peru and Venezuela, met to f arm a committee to 
coordinate activities in the various countries 'to 
promote the ideological spread of a sound and 
democratic system of free enterprise', N. Bailey, 
op.ci t., p. 231. 
50 !PES Hinutes Rio, 12th February, 1962. 
51 According to the report of the IPES leaders, the 
president of the Senate vTas verJ impressed vn th 
their exposition and asked their opi.n.ion about 
Jogo Goulart, whom the IPES leaders described 'as a 
man of the centre, and a political opportunist, vTho 
turns according to his interests and the direction of 
favourable winds'. 
52 The fact that the American enterprises vlere I closed 
enterprises' was perceived as a political hindrance 
and an economic problem for a local bourgeoisie wanting 
to associate its interests and have access to technology 
and capital, ,,,hile it \Vas also negative for the 
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'Blue Chip I companies seeking to vnden the stock and 
financial markets and their own participation in them. 
MOreover, the 'closed enterprises' created a negative 
atmosphere in terms of public opinion and entrepreneurial 
rela tions. See H.B. Simonsen and i'l. Baer, American 
Capital and Brazilian Nationalism, Yale Review, 
Vol. tIll, USA, 1dinter 1964. 
53 In this meeting a Hr. Morgan "Tas present, who asked 
for a memorandum. IPES IvIinutes, Rio, 12th February, 
1962. 
54 "In the Department of State, the IPES leaders had a 
meeting vn th A,,'nbassador 110scoso. He paid immense 
attention, listening to everything. Be found the 
Brazilians very developed. Be called t\'TO assistants 
and asked detailed explanations so that they could 
listen too. 'de repeated everything for them. 
Anbassador Hoscoso declared that Brazil is a de facto 
ally of the United States". The Brazilian political 
conjuncture . had priori ty and at the same tine it c·ras 
decided to investigate the cases of South _~erican 
cmL"r1tries. IFES leaders gave the case 
of Chile, as an exa.'nple. "The Americans promised to 
send people. Also to Rio, one of them having lunched 
today with Polland. Afte2"o[ards we left for Puerto 
Rico; while Gilbert Huber went to viashingtonll. 
IPES Ninutes, Rio, 12th February, 1962. See also 
N. Bailey, o;p.cit., p.230, on the problems of 
international coordination of the organic elites of 
the different countries. 
55 IPES CE Rio, 3rd July, 1962 - In this meeting Gilbert 
Ruber was able to report a major bre~~through in relation 
with transnationa1s. At the same meeting, the CE 
considered Harold C. Polland's proposal that 'IPES should 
launch a programme of government'. 
56 Bnno Robbing would become staff director of the Council 
of America in 1970. The steering Committee of the 
Council in 1971 included Enno Robbing, Jack :D .ileal of 
ITT and Richard S. Aldrich, who had been the IEEO director 
in the early 1960s in Brazil. 
57 See Letters by General Octavio Gomes de Abreu to CE:D of 
24th :Narch, 1965, 5th April, 1965, 19th 'April, 1965, 
20th April, 1965, 20th Hay, 1965, 3rd June, 1965, 22nd 
June, 1965, 12th July, 1965. 
58 See Andrew N. Scott - The Revolution in statecraft: 
Informal Penetration, New York, Random House, 1965. For 
a discussion on the 'Politics of Penetration' applied to 
the Brazilian context see Jan Knippers -'.Black, United 
States Intervention in Brazil, Hanchest, }'[anchester Univ-
ersity Press, 1977. - Preface XIII to XX. 
59 N. Bailey, ou.cit., p. 232. See Lyndon Johnson, as 
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quoted in E. Lieuwen - Generals vs Presidents, New York, 
Praeger, 1964. pp. 142-143. Thomas C. Hann, Secretary of 
State for Latin America made a foreign policy statement 
behind closed doors in mid-Barch 1964. It signalled the 
approval of the U.S. administration for military govern-
ments in Latin America. See also Ted Szulc tlU.S. may 
abandon effort to deter Latin :Dictators", in The New York 
Times, l1arch 16th, 1964 and Joseph A. Page, The EBVolution 
That Never ~vas: 1'1.E. Brazil 1955-196.1, New York, GrossIIl2..!1 
Publishers, 1972. P. 189. 
60 On Vernon I-falters long-standing relationship '-lith the 
Brazilian military since his days as liaison officer 
betvleen the Brazilian Expeditionary Force in Italy, and 
the U.S. Fifth A:rrrry, during idorld Har II, see John Foster 
Dulles, Castello Branco: The I·laking of A :Brazilian 
President, Texas, Texas University Press, 1978. On 
Colonel Vernon \1al ter' s role in the early 1960s in Brazil, 
see lvIoniz Bandeira, 0 Governo J08.0 Goulart, Rio de Janeiro, 
Civiliza<1ao Brasileira, 1977. Also Yernon 1:Ialters, 
Silent Hissions, Heio[ York, Doubleday, 1978. 
61 Phyllis Parker, 0'0 • cit., p. 89. \-{hen \I/al ters was intro-
duced to Ambassador Gordon he \-laS told by the ambassador: 
"From you I want three things: First, I vlant to knm·l 
what is going on in the Armed Forces; second, I vlant to 
be able in some measure to ir~luenoe it through you; 
and third, most of all, I never want to be suxprised", 
V. Walters, op.cit., p.374. Walters would later say: 
'He never had suxprises', P. Parker, ou.cit., p.48. 
In fact, the system worked so well that duxing the dawn 
of the day in vlhich Auro 1>louxa de Andrade declared 
the presidency vacant, as Joao Goulart left Brasilia, 
some Congressmen went to the Palacio Presidential of 
Planalto, which was in complete darkness after a power-
cut. They followed acting president Rainieri Nazzili 
and after some matches were lit, Deputy Luiz Vianna 
Filho recognized at his side Robert Eentley, a young 
secretary of the American Embassy. Luiz Via:r..a Filho, 
o Govemo Castello Branco, Rio, Jose Olympio Editora, 
1975, p.46 
62 J. Page, op.cit., p.190. 
63 IPES Relatorio - wid. pp. 6-7. 
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64 The National Executive was staffed by Joao Baptista 
Leopoldo Figueiredo, Glycon de Paiva, Adalberto Eueno 
Neto, Jose Rubem Fonseca, Luiz Cassio dos Santos "lemeck, 
(the t'o10 latter ones as secretaries), General Heitor 
Herrera, Antonio Carlos do Amaral Osorio, Oswaldo Tavares 
Ferreira and Paulo Ayres Filho (the four as coordinators), 
and Paulo Reis Hagalhaes, as treasuxer. 
65 N. Elume, op.cit., p.2l4. 
66 A careful reading of their minutes, reports and classified 
documents suggests the existence of severa] levels of 
trust, secrecy, and responsibility within the organization, 
which cut across the formal structure of decision-making. 
These arrangements seem to indicate that throughout the 
formal structuxes a netvlOrk of overlapping and selected 
members composed a truly covert political buxeau. The 
reasons for such a secretive structure were both organiz-
ational expedience and the natuxe of the organic elite's 
political action. It 'vas also an efficient form of over-
running particular interests within the organization which 
could eventually collide with the policy of the organic 
elite. These key decision-making bodies were staffed by 
a small number of members, most of them big entrepreneuxs 
who constituted as Jorge Behring de Nattos recommended 
'a central group functioning 24 houxs a day', both in Rio 
and Sao Paulo. IPES cn 12th February, 1962. In Sao 
Paulo, the core was with the CE members and some of the CD • 
.Among them were: Luiz Cassio dos Santos Hemeck, Jose 
Ely Coutinho, Eduardo Garcia Rossi, Adalberto Bueno Heto, 
Gustavo· Eorghoff, Nivaldo Ulhoa Cintra, Oswaldo· Breyne da 
Silveira, General Agostinho Cortes, Octavio Uchoa da 
Veiga, Salim Chamma, Thomas Pompe'll B. Magalhaes, Paulo 
Ferraz, Paulo Edmur de Souza I~ueiroz, Jose Luiz Anhaia 
Mello, Rafael Noschese, Luis Mascarenhas Neto, A.C. Pacheco 
Silva, Julio Arantes, Frans Hachado, Paulo Galvao Filho, 
Geraldo Alonso, Andre Arantes, J.L. Nogueira Porto. IPES 
Rio was led by Harold G. Polland, Glycon de Paiva, General 
Heitor Herrera, General Liberato da Cunha Friedrich, 
Gilbert Ruber, Augusto Trajano de Azevedo Antunes, Candido 
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Guinle de Paula Machado, Oswaldo Tavares Ferreira, 
Jose Duvivier Goulart, Antonio Gal1otti, General Go1bery 
do Couto e Si1vaand Rui Gomes de AlmeicU1. 
67 IPES !I!inutes 27th March, 1962. 
68 N. Blume, op.cit., p. 211. 
69 IPE3 Minutes Rio 12th February, 1962. Rui Gomes de 
Almeida did not accept the leadership of Joao Baptista 
Leopo1do Figueiredo, while Antonio Ga110tti was wary of 
Sao Paulo entrepreneurs, given his experience with 
the electricity companies. 
70 IPES Minutes Rio 12th February, 1962. J .L. Horeira de 
Souza and O. Tavares. (:t>1y translation, RAJ)) 
71 IPES Heeting 12th February, 1962. Antonio Carlos do 
Amaral Osorio aclmovlledged that Sao Paulo was riddled 
wi th 1/, cysts', groups, Q,uartim Barbosa, Vidigal, all 
disunited Ii, with separate groups "of immigrants (Lebanese, 
Italians, Portuguese, etc.), at a moment vlhen the need 
was for unification. It was precisely at that time that 
the 'quatrocentoes 'I(Pau1istas whose fami1es could be 
traced back to the early settlers, thus their name of 
'four hundred years') were setting up a separate club for 
just 300 people. This separatist attitude,re1ated to 
style and status, was, in the eyes of -A.C.A. Osorio, also 
a waste of badly needed money for the political campaign 
of IPES. t10re so, since the Sao Paulo social clubs were 
crucial for the c 1 ass act ion of the organic elite, 
as loci for the mobilization of thd middle and upper 
classes. See also Chapter VIII on the political function 
of the social clubs 
72 IPES C3 Rio 5th February, 1962. At this early stage, 
1. Klabin remarked that 'In 1PE3 \'lere missing the true 
representative organs of industry and commerce'. (Ey 
translation, RAn). By ~id-1962, they were 'IIi thin IPES. 
73 IPES cn 27th November, 1962. IPES minutes Sao Paulo 
28th August, 1962. 
74 IPES CD Rio 1st Nay, 1962. 
75 IPES Ch.GR. Sao Paulo 28th August, 1962. According to 
Paulo Ayres Filho, the final composition of the leading 
cadres (quadros dirigentes) of IPES depended, at this 
stage, on 'the last conversations (entendimentos) vlith 
the :?'ederation of Industries'. 
76 IPE3 Minutes Rio 27th Narch, 1962. R. Gomes de Almeida 
and A. Gal1otti. Also IPES CIl 27th I>larch, 1962. (l·ry 
translation, RAIl). 
77 IPES Rio, 5th February, 1962. To achieve such aims, 
according to Jose Luiz Moreira de Souza, ~~o or three 
'shock theses' (Teses de Choque) \'/ould have sufficed, 
'tThich would hit at the crucial point, namely 'For vThat 
reasons are the class associations tied (pressas) to the 
Government?' (My translation, RAD). 
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78 See Prominent Officers of Class Associations in liES Rio 
and Sao Paulo, on page 281.. . 
On 10th December, 1962, the Executive Committee received 
Dr. Calafate, president of CONCLAP, who "Tanted to tighten 
the ties vri th IPES. (He also informed the Executive 
Committee on the parallel activities of the Centro de 
Estudos Sociais Brasileiros) which operated from Office 
1103 of the same building in \{hich IPES had its head-
quarters. See also IPES Minutes of 27th Februa~J, 1962, 
on the instrumentalization of the Commercial Association 
of Rio de Janeiro by lPES. 
79 IPES needed vast financial resources. After all, argued 
J.L. Moreira de Souza, if SESI, the Social Service of 
Indust~J, had nearly 6 billion cruzeiros at its disposal, 
and other class leaders, such as R. de Almeida, Hugo de 
Farias and Cicero Veloso also mobilized enormous resources 
through the national associations of entrepreneurs, they 
could certainly pull their efforts together. This ,{ould 
certainly ease the financing of the IPES operations. 
Gilbert Huber \-TaS in charge of working out the agreements 
vdth R. de Almeida. IPES Rio, 5th February, 1962. 
Fernando Cicero Veloso was a director of Parke Davis Ltd., 
Otis Zlevators S.A. and of Helena Rubinstein, jointly 
wi th \'lilliam 110nteiro de Barros. 
80 IPES General Meeting, Sao Paulo, 25th September, 1962. 
Initially IPES did not have 'in its midst any representatives 
of the rural classes', as they did not intend to neddle 
or be caught in the petty feuding of the rural class 
associations. 
81 IPES General Meeting, 9th October, 1962. 
82 IPES CD, 27th November, 1962. 
83 IPES CD, 10th April, 1962. IPES Sao Paulo ,·.ras in charge 
of the installation and orientation of the activities. 
By mid-1962, IPES counted with the leaders of the class 
associa tions of .Amazonas, as 'Iolell as with the various 
heads of the enterprises operating in the area. lPES 
General Meeting, 16th October, 1962. 
84 IPES GE, Sao Paulo, 21st March, 1963. 
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85 IPES Ch. Gr. Sgo Paulo, 28th August, 1962. The staff of 
the various study and action groups vTaS not fixed in quantity, 
Task-oriented units and 'flying squads' ".Tere aggregated 
to each group, whenever the situation so required. IPES 
was a rapidly expanding organization and nevr affiliates, 
or supporters, were constantly involved in a vddening 
range of activities. 
86 See IPES document, A Responsabilidade Democratica do 
Empresario, op.cit. 
87 IPES benefited from broad logistical and material support, 
including the availability of free transport offered by 
different national airlines, bus companies and other means 
of freight. A vast fleet of vehicles of all types, ''lell-
equipped offices, (vlith telex, data banks, private bank 
exchange, PTB telephone system, addressographs), first 
class technical advice and expertise for their various 
activities, large financial support ~~d the contribution 
by different enterprises of badly needed and expensive 
or specialized services, gave the or@i~ic elite in I?ES/ 
IBP~ an impressive material and technical infrastructure, 
\'lhich made other poli tical groups seem amateurish. 
88 The political project to \'lhich such a select and powerful 
group of entrepreneurs, techno-bureaucrats and hired 
military personnel committed themselves involved an 
extremely intense rhythm of work, '-lith daily meetings 
and participation in the operationaliiation of their 
plans, an activity i'lhich required enormous personal 
dedication, in 1tlidely apart fields of action. The 
heads of the study and action groups, f or e~{ample, had 
a joint ,-reekly meeting ,\'lith a coordination unit of the 
CE, both in Rio and Sao Paulo, which actually made the 
CD. They added special sessions "Then required. Then the 
heads of the groups had their regular meetings ''lith 
their o'.m unit of action and also had ,veel'".l.y sessions on 
their own with the CE. Horeover, there .. ras the actual 
involvement in the operation and realization of tasks. 
As laid out in Reunio~s de Infraestrut-ura, LUES Hi.nutes 
25th May, 1962 Ch. Gr.; IPES Ch. Gr. and CC; and IPES 
Ch. Gr. and CD of 25th Hay, 1962. 
89 Permission had to be granted for militant sembers to leave 
their operational bases, !PES GE, 27th August, 1962. The 
possibility to discharb8 oneself from a specific activity 
or a commission had to meet ,'lith the ap)roval of peers 
and hierarchical superiors, in what, by the' end of 1962, 
Has a vertical cha~n of command. 
90 IPES i'Iinutes, 18th September, 1962, Gilbert Huber. 
91 I?';:;S Hinutes, Sao Paulo, 12th April, 1962. 
92 Tre ~ayment of some of the more active members 
'vas an ar:::-angement which did produce a certain amount of 
ill-feeling and friction with some of the most dedicated 
militants. Rifts emerged on this issue on several 
occasions. Once it prompted Gilbert Huber to remark that 
~ose Garrido Torres should be invited to the meetings 
vii thout receiving any payment. Gilbert Huber "ranted 
him to 'put his soul and not his purse in the business. 
I am with my soul t, !PES CE, 6th June, 1962. Garrido 
Torres 'lias receiving, at the time, 0$300.000 per month 
and attendance chips, !PES CE, 15th Hay, 1962 and !PES CE 
Relatorio Geral, 17th Nay, 1962. Garrido Torres ,-ras 
finally urged to give daily service at IPES and not 
limited dedication. -r do not understand the (payment) 
of C$300.000 to Garrido Torres, of '.-Thom I am a friend. 
I do not preside over an organism in the mould of 
Repa:::-tic;ao PUblica (Public Service), of 'sinecures nt. Rui 
Gomes de Almeida, !PES CD, 10th April, 1962. See also 
IPES General Meeting, 30th November, 1962, !PES GE, 
21st March, 1963. J .C. Moreira Earbosa received C~~lOO.OOO 
monthly. J.L. Anhaia Nello received C$.120.000 for his 
study on the referendum. J. Arthur Rios also received 
payment. 
93 In November 1963, certain 'extraordina~J services' of 
Paulo de Assis Ribeiro in relation to his 'Roteiro da 
Refonna A ria' were met vTi th C~~400. 000. Internal 
Memo 63 0487 to Treasu~J Department, 5ih November, 1963. 
The De~bers of the Grupo de Estudos,for example, had a 
basic of C~~lOO. 000 per month, and their salaries vrere 
.supplemented.to co.ver for taxes and other· government demands. 
Communication 63/0488, 5th November, 1963. This 
represented large expenses, as the Study Group of Rio 
had several dozens of effective members. Participants 
of the Study Units received attendance chips of CY10.000 
per meeting and those responsible for presenting papers 
at the meeting received C~~15.000o 
94 To create the need for co-ordination of the di'::ferent 
bodies, some external pressure Has needed. According 
to Jose Luiz Moreira de Souza, IPES needed a 'Political 
plan able to mobilize the existing instruments and to 
make them function in the short run. for the benefit of the 
whole, i.eo of the task (da obra). To strengthen the 
IP~S must be the target. Thus, it is necessary to 
constitute a Group \{hich has the authority to criticize 
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the structural faults, in their aspect of Political Action'. 
IPES Minutes Rio, 5th FebruarJ, 1962. General Herrera 
,[ould take care of t.bis aspect of the organization. 
95 IPES CD, 27th 119.rch, 1962. 
96 IP~S CD, 12th June, 1962, Glycon de Paiva. 
97 
98 
99 
100 
!PES CD, 16th October, 1962; IPES CD, 17th October 1962; 
!PES CE, 22nd October, 1962. 
IPES CE Rio, 4th June, 1962. 
lPES CE Rio, 4th April, 1963. 
lPES CE and CD Sgo Paulo, 20th November, 1962. 
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103 Elmar Bones, 'Golbery, Poder e Silencio', Coo,iomal, September, 
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104 lPES CE Rio, 28th February, 1963. Adalberto Bueno Neto 
operated as coordinator of the planning unit. IPES CE and 
Ch. Gr. Sao Paulo, 18th December, 1962. 
105 A. Stepan, op.cit., p. 154. 
106 N. Blume, ou.cit., p. 215. 
107 See Chart in Appendix E. 
108 E. Bones, on.cit., p. 20. 
109 lifarlise Simons, \'/hose Coup? Brazilian Information Bulletin, 
No. 12, 't1inter 197~, p. 8, California, USA. 
110 See Rela torio 1964, Reseaxoh Gxoup. The GLC \'lent through 
the follOi'Ting ne\olspapers: 'Jomal do Brasil~ 'Jomal do 
Comexoio~ '0 Jomal', 'Diario de Notioias', IDiario Carioca~ 
'Correio da }:Ianh§:~ '0 Globo~ '0 Dia', 'Tribuna da Impxensa~ 
'Gazeta de Notioias', 'm tima Hora' (all of Rio de Janeiro); 
Jomal do Comeroio (Pernambuco); 'Jomal da Bahia' (::Bahia); 
'0 Estado de Sao Paulo, /Folha de Sao Pe.ulo' (Sao Paulo). 
The GLC '>'lent through, almost daily: 'Jorne.l de Hoje' (A.lagoas), 
'Jomal dos Spoxts~ A Noticia','Luta Demooratioa' (Rio); 
'Diario de Sao Paulo, 'Diaxio do Comeroio~ 'Diario da Noi te', 
'A Gazeta Espoxtiva, 'A Gazeta', '0 Dia', 'Noticias Populares~ 
'm tima Hora, 'Diario Popular' (Sao Paulo); 'A Tribuna' (Santos); 
'Jomal do Dia, 'Diario de Notloias', 'Correio do Povo~ 'Folha 
da Taxde' (Poxto Alegre); '0 Povo', 'Tribuna do Ceara~ 'Uni tario', 
'Correio do Ceara' (Ceara); 'lhario do Parana,' '0 Estado de 
Parana' (Paxana); 'Diario de Ninas','Diaxio da Tarde~ '0 
Diario, 'Estado de Minas' (l<unas Gerais);'Diario da Uoite 
(Pernambuco);'Diario de Notioias~'Estado da ::Bahia, 
'A Tarde' (Bahia). The international magazines ,,!Thioh the 
researoh group \{ent through included: 'Este e Oeste', 
ILes Informations Poli tiques et Sociales', J'Bulletin of the 
Institute fox the Study of the USSR~'r1onthly Bulletin of 
the United Nations' and several other similar publioations. 
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111 The magazines 'vere '0 Cruzeiro', '¥..anchette', 'Fatos e Fotos, 
'Guias :Banas', 'Visao; 'Conjuntura Economica!, ':Boletim Cambial~ 
'Desenvolvimento e Conjuntura', mc', 'Guanabara Industrial', 
'Petrobras', 1-1ensario Estatistico' and some other minor ones. 
112 By May, 1962, the Rio based GLC 'YTaS spending approximately 
12 million cruzeiros on basic material and personnel. 
!PES CE Rio, 17th May, 1962. 
113 !PES CE S~o Paulo, 11th December, 1962. 
114 !PES CE and Ch. Gr. Sao Paulo, 31st March, 1963, 
115 Eldino :Brancante, Relatorio do Estado Haior Civil de 
Sao Paulo, in General Olympio Mourao Filho, I1emorias: 
A Verdade de um Revolucionario, Introduction and 
Research by Helio Silva, Rio, 1 & B1, 1978, pp. 220-222. 
Also Helio Silva, 1964 Golne ou Contragolpe?, Rio, 
Civi1iza~~o :Brasileira, 1975, p. 378. 
116 E. Brancante, op.cit., p. 217. 
117 The GEC had an administrative budget of almost 25 million 
cruzeiros per annum, to be spent on personnel and basic 
materials. !PES CE and Ch. Gr. Sao Paulo, 18th December, 
1962. See also IPES Budget 1963. 
118 IPES letter to Oswa1do Tavares, 4th December, 1962, 
considering the presentation of a booklet about IPES 
being produced by them. 
119 !PES ~linutes, 17th May, 1962. ~ne ~\P office in :Brasilia 
was established with the explicit aim to 'link mainly with 
the ADP section'. 
120 IPES CE Rio, 5th February, 1962. 
121 These activities involved an intelligence gathering 
operation, in order to anticipate the executive's moves 
and its allied or sympathetic forces in Congress. For 
this goal, General Golbery's group '.vas fundamental. 
122 Letter from J.O. Mello Flores to Glycon de Paiva, 
7th December, 1963, !PES Archives. 
123 !PES CD Rio, 11th December, 1962. 
124 !PES Rio, 20th February, 1962. 
The need for close coordination beti'leen the study groups 
and action in Congress, 'vas, according to Jorge Behring de 
Mattos, a necessity felt by the industries. It I'ras also 
'cheaper to join efforts'. IPES Hinutes Rio, 5th February, 
1962. Safe cornmunica ti on vlaS ensured by the 'didespread 
use of telegrams through friendly and discreet telegraph 
agencies, 'malas empresarias' (courier bags) of big 
enterprises vThose directors were involved in IPES/IBAD 
activities, especially in the Rio-Sgo Paulo triangle 
(such as Capuava Refineries, Banco Lar Brasileiro and 
the National Confederation of Industries). !PES CE 
19th June, 1962. 
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125 IPES CE Rio, 15th October, 1962. Augusto Trajano Azevedo 
Antunes. This sum did not include the much larger amounts 
spent on specific political actions, nor the massive resour-
ces spent on the congressional elections of 1962. 
126 Campaign level had to be coordinated v~th other activities, 
such as the manipulation of sectoral opinion (militarj, 
middle classes, intellectuals, trade unions and students). 
\fi th the help of the Study groups, and after being 
'processed' by the Public Opinion Group, the analysis 
made by the GLC of the issues involved were then offered 
to the Parliamentary Action Group and other political 
sections of !PES as policy-papers, position papers, 
recommendations and guidelines for overt and covert 
action, and transformed into articles for the media 
network and the Publications Group. IPES CE Rio, 
15th May, 1962. 
127 Some issues deserved multiple studies ,d th slight 
differences, vThich vlere then tcounterposed t in Congress 
by different ADP parliamentarians, SUCll as the tvTin 
studies on Basic Principles of Agrarian Reform and 
Guidelines for the Implementation of Agrarian Reform. 
11any of these study units and their studies became, 
in fact, the infrastructure for the IPES proposed 
Reformas de Base (Basic Reforms). LP~S GE Rio, 
8th January, 1963, Glycon de Paiva, Jose Rubem Fonseca 
and General Golberj. 
128 IPES Hinutes, Rio, 17th Hay, 1962. 
129 IPES GE, 12th February, 1962. For Glycon de Paiva, 
'public opinion vIas money'. 
130 IPbS CE and Ch. Gr. Sao Paulo, 25th 11ay, 1962. 
131 IPSS CE, 30th Hay, 1962. 
132 IPES Ninutes, 27th 11arch, 1962, Nei Peixoto do Valle. 
A. Visconti worked for the American Chambers of Co~~erce 
together '.d th l1arcello Porto and Nei Peixoto do Valle. 
133 IP~S CE Rio, 3rd July, 1962, Glycon de Paiva land 
LUES CE Rio, 25th Hay, 1962, General Golberj. 
134 I?ES CD, 27th November, 1962. 
135 I?ES Report L.C. 1962, p. 5. 
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136 General Herrera recommended that IPES should ~eep using the 
press , following the rallying point produced by the 
IPmS launched document'O Brasil auer tranguilidade' 
(Brazil wants tranquility) which received extremely 
wide coverage in the media. LUES CE, 8th June, 1962. 
137 A. Stepan, op.ci t., pp. 97-98, 189. For the organic 
eli te it was clear that, ,n thout visible popular support, 
its covert action 'vi thin the Armed Forces and other 
sectors of society 'vould be hampered. Furthermore, the 
military would not be brought to favour a coup position 
without visible public support. 
138 !PES CD, 27th November, 1962. 
139 !PES Dooument, Roteiro Basico para um Prob~ 
Longo Prazo, by Helio Gomide, 6th June, 1963. 
translation, R~D). 
~o a 
140 IPES GE, 8th June, 1962. 
141 Also articles from American magazines "Here published and 
distributed. Nei Peixoto do Valle suggested to 
Garrido Torres, 'Irho "Tas I a reader of American t'l8.gazines', 
to 'sell the interesting articles'. Garrido Torres replied 
too t he was already doing so and ad.ded "Se a embaixada ja 
tern franquia para reproduzir, nelhor", DES CE, 26th July, 
1962 and IPES GE, Rio, 14th June, 1962. 
142 Report to !PES CD Rio, May, 1962. 
143 Several of those articles would be translations from 
articles of well-lmown authors, appearing in foreign maga-
zines such as, Harpers, Atlanti:: ]\~onthly, Foreign Affairs 
and Ne'.'r York Times Magazine. J. Garrido Torres also 
stressed that -Recently the Spanish edition of Life lifagazine 
published three excellent collaborations of Professor 
Jessup, '.'Thich ,'Tould become an efficient anti-connunist 
propaganda pamphlet. There is need to avoid delays in 
obtaining the right to divulge those ',wrks, preferably 
In thout expenses for the ne'vspapers and ;;}agazines. This 
could be achieved by using the good services of the 
embassies, "rho could ensure the good 'viII of the publishing 
houses previously selected and "Thich ii'ould be those in 
'.'Thich generally appear those collaborations '.Thich interest 
us ". J. Garrido Torres Report to CD Rio, f1fay, 1962. 
144 For the preparation of general and specific indoctrinating 
material, the organic elite served itself of a series of 
foreign inputs, such as G'BD, ALFRO, AEF, AFL-CIO. For 
instance, from the Organization of .~erican States, IPES 
received the '.,rcrk of the Special Consultative Commission 
of Security against the Subversive Action of International 
Communism - General Initial Report, 1962. ~ne contact 
'Iii th this input centre 'I-ras Nyosotis de Albuquerque Costa. 
He also provided, after Glycon de Paiva's request, 
"tT orld Communis t Movement', Selec ti ve Chronology, 
18th August, 1957, prepared by the Legislative 
Reference Service of the Libra~J of Congress and 
printed by the Committee on Anti-American Activities 
(AAA). IPES CE, 8th October, 1962. According to 
Paulo Ayres Filho, 'most of the matters on Russia, etc. 
came from the USA, sent by Northamerican nevTS agencies', 
IPES Reuni~o Plenaria, CE, 8th April, 1963. 
145 For personal and basic administrative needs, the group 
had a budget of 6.000.000 cruzeiros yearly. IPES CE, 
31st August, 1962. Another 6 million were to be spent 
349 
on basic printing material. IPES GE, 17th May, 1962. 
Funds for specific projects were also available, advanced 
by different enterprises and other sources. J. Garrido 
Torres Report to CD Rio, May, 1962. 
146 N. Blume, op.ci t., p. 215. In 1963, 182.144 books "rere 
distributed. 
147 IPES CE Rio, 7th ~furch, 1963, Glycon de Paiva. 
148 IPES CE S~o Paulo, 11th December, 1963, PaLuo Edmur de 
Souza Queiroz. 
149 IPES CE S~O Paulo, 16th April, 1963. 
150 See Chapter VI for a description of the IP~S/IBAD ne~vork 
in the media and its action. 
151 N. Blume, op.cit., p. 216. 
152 IPES Minutes Rio, 5th February, 1962, Gilbert Huber. 
153 IPES CD Rio, 5th :t-1arch, 1963, Glycon de Paiva. The 
GED prepared the various bills of l8'I'T on 'Remittance of 
Royalties', 'Agrarian Reform', 'Tributary Reform', and 
'Popular Housing', which were introduced by ADP 
Parliamentarians. IPES Hinutes Rio, 17th Nay, 1962. 
154 The tvlenty menbers of the commission i'lould be selected as 
follo'l'ls: 
1) The State secretaries of justice, finance, agriculture, 
education and health; 
2) Ten members chosen respectively by the folloidng 
organizations: 
il 
~~ 
State Bankers Association of S~o Paulo 
Institute of Engineering of S~o Paulo 
Federation of Industries of Sgo Paulo 
Centre of Industries of S~o Paulo 
Commercial Association of Sao Paulo 
Federation of Rural Associations of Sao Paulo 
~l Brazilian Rural Society Federation of vlorkers of S~O Paulo Funda~~o Getulio Vargas. 
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3) Five persons chosen by the Governor from among persons 
in science, economics, administration and the press. 
In George W. Bemis, From Crisis to Revolution: Monthly 
Case Studies, International Public Administration Series 
No.1, Los Angeles, University of Southern California, 
1964, pp~ 70-71. 
155 See J.L. Moreira de Souza, for histPhilosophy of the 
Revolutionland~even basic tenets in the economic, 
social and political fields~ In Glauco Carneiro, 
Historia das RevoluQoes Brasileiras, Vol. II, Rio de 
Janeiro, 0 Cruzeiro, 1965, pp. 595-596. 
156 N. Blume, op.cit., p. 213. 
157 N. Blume, op.cit., p. 221. 
158 N. Blume, op.cit., p. 214. 
159 It is interesting to note that out of the 78 'blue-chip' 
corporations listed by Banas in 1964, at least 61 were 
financial contributors to the organic elite and its 
directors were members of the key decision-making 
bodies of IPSS. Guia Banas, Bancos, Investimentos e 
Bolsas 1964. Sao Paulo, Editora Banas, 1964, pp. 112-
142. See also AliowBr Baleeiro, Democratiza~~o do 
Capital, in AQao Democratica, October 1962, Rio. 
160 IPES CD Rio, lOth April, 1963, R. Gomes de Almeida. 
See also !PES S~O Paulo, Esquema do Planejamento, 
Sao Paulo, 1965. In the political field, IPi:!!S shared 
the vieyrs that the relative democracy of populism 
would have to give way to the relative authoritarianism 
of a technocratic polity. 
161 N. Blume, op.cit., p. 214. Also G. Bemis, op.cit., pp. 
59-60. 
162 IPES CD, 5th March, 1963; IPES CD, 24th August, 1964; 
IPES CD, 3rd October, 1964; IPES CD, 26th October, 1964; 
IPES eE, 4th November, 1964. 
163 N. Blume, op.cit., pp. 217-219. 
164 IPES eE, 28th August, 1962. 
165 IPES CE, 7th Narch, 1963 and CE, 21st November, 1963. 
See also IPES 22nd ) .. pril, 1963. IPES entrusted to 
Aniba1 Villela's team of ERASTEC, for a fee of 
2.496.000 cruzeiros, a study in depth of the role of 
the state enterprises in the economy at national, state 
and municipal levels. The research strove to understand 
and evaluate the participation of the state enterprises 
in the formation of the national product, the economic 
behaviour of the government and its sectoral parti-
cipation, an economic revievT of t he past 15 years and 
an evaluation of the tendency of the role of the state 
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and the economy, an estimate of the expenses of investment 
of the government enterprises, personnel employed, levels 
of salary and productivity, a comparison vn th sicilar 
enterprises in the private sector, a comparison of the 
Vargas, Dutra and Kubitschek periods, a comparison of 
Brazil with Indie, Pakistan, Indonesia and Argentina. 
See letter IPES, 11th June, 1963 from Joao Eaptista 
Leopoldo Figueiredo to Jose Rubem Fonseca; see Proposal 
for Research of 15th April, 1963; letter to General 
Liberato from Anibal Villela, on 3rd January, 1964; Memo 
on 'etatisme' from Glycon de Paiva to Dr. Torres. 
Glycon de Paiva provided Villela ,d th the help of the 
national IPES netvrork in the data-gathering, engaging its 
ovm specialists in the survey of measures, lavTs, 'etatiste l 
and leftist projects and the action of the state in each 
region of the country deemed to curtail private industry. 
The Commerical Association of Parana .. ACOPA, IPES Eelo 
Horizonte, IPESUL and IPES Pernambuco provided !PES Rio 
with data on the degree of estatiza9ao (state take-over) 
in their respective states. See letters froTI Antonio 
Galvao (Associa~ao Comercial de Pern&tibuco); Jose Alves 
of the Economic Department of the Associa~ao Comercial 
do Parana and Fabio Araujo Santos of IP~SUL on 15th February, 
1963, 22nd February, 1963 and 27th February, 1963, addressed 
to G1ycon de Paiva. vfuen the data arrived, besides being 
used for the main research, it Has to be 'blended, chosen 
and published' according to criteria laid out by General 
Liberato. lPES GE, 12th February, 1963. 
166 IPES CD, 11th 11ay, 1962. 
167 IP~S GE, 29th 11ay, 1962. 
168 EveXVIJ document prepared by the Study and DO,ctrine g-.coup 
had to contain: 1) doctrinal eA?osition (diagnosis), 
2) practical measures for reform (therapy) and 
3) position. IPES Rio, 16th August, 1962, General Go1berj. 
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169 Differences between the groups of Rio and Sgo Paulo in 
the areas of Study and Doctrine were noted before. 
These differences remained throughout the period. In 
the beginning of 1964, Garrido Torres complained that 
'The group of Doctrine has transforoed itself into an 
advisorybody for Penteado' (one of the leaders of'IFES Sao 
PaUlo). Delfim Netto was (presumably) wrfting up a paper in dis-
agreement with the ideas ofa book snonsared by the study and 
Doctrine group of IPES Rio. "IPES eE, loth ~arch, 1964. 
170 Letter from Antonio Galv~o to Glycon de Paiva on 
Banking Reforms, IPES(Pernambuco) , lOth April, 1963. 
171 See Movimento No. 189, 12-18/2/79. Antonio Delfim Netto 
had Horked 'Iri th Carvalho Pinto, the Governor of Sao Paulo. 
De1fim Nettohas been linked to Construtore. Camargo Correia. 
172 !PES CE, 2nd April, 1963. H. \·Teissf10g vlaS a director of 
Cia. de He1horamentos de Sao Paulo IndUstria de Panel 
(Incopar ParticipaQ5es Comerciais e Industriais S.A.). 
His associates in the enterprise Here H. Villaboim, 
IPES leader H. Toledo de Horaes and ,\1al ter \·leissf1ogg. 
173 The group also provided the intellectual infrastructure 
for the realization by the Public Opinion group of crash 
courses on basic themes of economy for the journalists 
making up its unit. !PES Hinutes Rio, 29tb :Hay, 1962. 
174 IPES Ch. Gr. Sao Paulo, 5th June, 1962 and IFSS Ch. Gr. 
Sao Paulo, 21st August, 1962. 
175 IPES General !fueting, 16th October, 1962. 
176 The unit worked vlith a basic budget of 25.000.000 cruzeiros 
a year and received additional help from private sources 
for specific projects. Although budgets did not reflect 
actual financial flOI'I nor the real resources of IPES in 
this sector of activities, and in all the other sectors, 
it is interesting to consider some of the declared e:~enses. 
The Study and Doctrine Group's basic administrative monthly 
expenses ivere 6.8000.000 cruzeiros. 2.000. oeo '.vere at its 
disposal monthly for administrative and secretarial help. 
In addition, there was a separate monthly budget of 
8.000.000 cruzeiros, as vlell as a se:[:18.rate monthly budget 
of 2.000.000 cruzeiros per study ~~it. IPES C~, 5th 
February, 1962; IPES CD Rio, 22nd Hay, 1962; I?ES CE 
6th June, 1962, Glycon de Paiva. 
177 See Chapter III. 
178 !PES CD, 11th Hay, 1962. Some tiDes it viaS a Da tter of 
technical expediency and approp:d2.teness. L'1 April 1962 
li'ES contncted the Associ2. tion of Denocra tic Lm·ryers to 
ask them for a study on juridical aspects of the issue 
of Parlia"Jentarianism and Presidentie.lisn, having in vie';! 
the referendum on the 2a tter '.{hich eventually returned 
full presidential pm'Ter to Goulart. It is interestinc 
to note that one of the sain campaigners for the return 
to the presidential system was IPES leader Jose de 
~illgalhaes Lins. See also J. Camilo de Oliveira Torres, 
o Presidencialismo no Brasil, Rio, Edi~~es 0 Cruzeiro, 
1962; J. Camilo de Oliveira Torres, Cartilha do 
Parliamentarismo, Belo Horizonte, Itatiaia, 1962. 
J5J 
179 The classical example is that of the issue of Agrarian 
Hefom. !PES took into consideration preliminary studies by 
the Centro Dom Vital, CONC~Y, ESG, the National Economic 
Council. IPES z.-linutes Rio, 5th February, 1962. Then the 
projects, amendnents, bills of layT and printed propaganda 
material vTere prepared after a careful elaboration by an 
IPES/rBAD study team. See further in Chapter VI. These 
institutions were also contributors of preliminary projects 
in other areas and on other issues. 
180 !PES Boletim l1ensal, No. 23, 1964. 
181 A t a meeting on 12th December, 1961, one of the earliest 
recorded, the Sao Paulo section convened an encounter with 
Paulo Ayres Filho, Othon Barcellos, Jose Ulpiano de 
Almeida Prado, Paulo Reis r1agalhaes and Professor Franca, 
of the Escola de Sociolog{a e Pol{tioa. 
'Listed' as having invitation envelopes oontaining IPES 
material for the meeting and disoussion ·...,ere: Fernando 
Alenoar Pinto, Eudoro Villela, a representative for 
Luis Reid, Harold Levy, Rogerio Giorgi, Paulo C. Suplioy, 
Salim Chamma, Julio Cruz Lima, Luiz Eduardo Campello 
and Fernando E. Lee. Most of them '-Tould become leading 
members of the organization. 
182 !PES - Boletim 11ensal, September 1962, LTo. 41, informed 
that 20 entrepreneurs made up the Grupo de Integra9aO. 
See also !PES CE Rio, 17th May, 1962. IPES had accounts 
in the Banco do Estado da Guanabara, Banco Bamerindus, 
Banco Prado Vasconoellos, among others. ADEP, IBAD and 
Promotion money 'Has dra\m from the Brazilian branches 
of the First National City Bank of NevT York, the Royal 
Bank of Canada and the Bank of Boston. 
183 LDES CE and CD, Sao Paulo-Rio, 8th April, 1963. 
184 In this operation the outputs of the Study and Doctrine 
group, the Dootrine and Study group 8.;.'1d the Public 
Opinion group were strongly felt. Corporate nesbers 
also participated in a series of debates and lectures in 
'(Thich one key government administrator led the discussion. 
Many future and incumbent government ministers, such as 
Roberto Campos, Luiz Gonzaga Nasoimento Silva, Nauro Thibau, 
Delfin Netto,r1ario H. Simonsen, Helio Beltrao, Octa.vio 
Gouveia de Bulhoes lectured before the affiliates of 
IP3S as part of this programme. H. Blume, op.oit., p. 216. 
The Integration group used, for putting across their 
messaget sophisticated audiovisual means (charts, films, 
reports) 'VThich'VTere distributed before the meetings for 
limited consumption. By the end of 1962, !PES maintained 
a tvTice daily session of films for contributors. !PES 
Ch. Gr. 25th September, 1962. 
185 !PES Boletim Mensa1, No.4, September 1965, Rio. 
186 IPES Hinutes Rio, 5th February, 1962. 
3.54 
187 Glycon de Paiva had no trouble raising each month the 
equivalent of 20.000 dollars, A. J. Langguth, op.cit., p.86. 
188 !PES Hand,~tten Observations, ~fuy 1962. It cost 100.000 
monthly, besides Juan Missirlian's sal~J, IPES CE Rio, 
21st !1ay, 1962. 
189 General Reynaldo Nelson de Carvalho reported his activities 
to Joviano Jardim, the treasurer, handing over "9 
inscription notes vThich were to be paid against bank 
receipts" (9 notas de inscriQ~o para cobran9a mediante 
recibos por bancos). The contributors were: Dr. Rubem 
1-1011 - Usina Novo Horizonte; Ageu I1acabu e Cia.; Jones 
'{alter Alvim; Vazadas Cobogo S.A.; Juliao Nogueira e Cia. -
Usina do Queimado; Dr. Luis SenSe - Usina Victor Sense S.A.; 
Distribuidora r'Iercantil S.A.; Dr. Nelson Ve1oso Borges -
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Introduction 
Cha:?ter V desori bed the decision-rlo.king structure and 
orynization for action of the organic elite. It sh01;,'8(4 in 
effect, the existence of a class apparatus i'Thich ' .. r2.S able to 
carry out operations of a public nature as uell o.s 2..ctivities 
hidden to the public eye. 
Chapters VI, VII and VIII are concerned l'Tith the specific 
overt and covert activities, both tactic2..1 e.nd strategic, '\'Thich 
ylere utilized by the organic elite. The 2..in of these activities 
',18.S to conte.in the popul2..r forces, to dis2..tS's..cege..te tl1e populist 
historical bloc and to carry the multinc.tione.l o.nd associated 
interests into political government through a civilie.n-Bili te,2"1J 
C OUD d' eta t. 
The conquest of politic2.1 pO':fer by the Crf8-nic elite '.las not 
merely a result)f the economic-politic2.1 crisis cf the period 
and the ir.:mediate breakdo,m of regime le2.ciing to 8- subseque::lt fall 
of tbe government. 1 ',1i thin such critical conditions 2..S outlined 
in Cha]ter Dr, the organic elite a tter:l:?ted a cor.rpaign to dominate 
the polity, in both political and ideological terns. 2 The break-
d~\m of the ruling class converge:'1ce and tte rll:?t1.ITe of the 
populist for.::l of dOr.lination VlaS accomplished by the Dultinational 
and associated po'"rer bloc throug...l1 the exercise of its influence 
at all political levels. 3 
The period of organized class action "lTe are ac::mt to study, 
sp~~ned from 1962 to 1964. Politically, it sicnified a con-
junctural mobilization for the coup, ,,'rhen stn:.tegy cecaDe politics 
and party-poli tice.l acti vi ties finally tU::C:"1ed into mili t3.ry 8,ction. 
'This Has the stage of 'positive enterprise', Hhen various techno-
entrepreneurial agencie~ and bureaucratic-entrepreneurial rings, 
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class associations and action groups famed a strategic political 
centre, the IPES/TBA.D bloc. Once the v:arious oppositions i'rere 
unified ~1der one connon synchronized leaaership, formulating a 
master plan, the orGanic elite launched the politico-nilitary 
campaign "Ihich mobilized the 'whole of the bourgeoisie, convinced 
the releva~t segments of the Armed Forces of the justice of their 
cause, neutralized dissension, and gained the support of the tradi-
tional entrepreneurial sectors as i{e11 as the adllesion or 
passivity of subaltern middle social layers. But before O})ening 
the hostilities at the politico-military level, the entrepreneurial 
orcanic elite developed a nul tipront;ed id.eo1oc'~c2.1 oarrpaign asainst 
t~e populist historical bloc. This multi-faceted action involved 
the dis a[;gre ga tion of the populis t cadres as uell as t~lose of 
the iDl;lature reformist groups, delaying tr"e actions of the 
executive and attemptin; to contain the developnent of the 
national organization of the "rorking classes. Their failure to 
rep:ress the political a'.rareness of the Horkin:; class and the 
s1L-rprising capaci ty of the executive not only to survive, but 
actually to cons:::lidate and gain ne' .. [ positions 4 reinforced their 
deter::lin[?,tion to take by assault the establisl:ed poli tical society. 
The ent:repreneurial organic elite ;22.<1e itself the c1efende:r 
and s:)okes:;.:an of 'r:lic:cUe Jf tr_e rc·ad.' vieus, ·\{ic.i.eni:'1g the con-
sumptionist and elitist pers?ectives:::f t~1.e ;;1ic.dle classes ancL 
enccurac.;ing the fear of the r:1£',sses. 'rhis eli te ~einforced. the 
middle classes solipsistic ?erce~tiol1 sf B~aziliaD social 
reali ty and clre'J ti.len a'..r.o .. y fron the :9 opulis t :polity. 
J6J 
~De orgunic elite prepared itself to operate in everJ area 
of social life in order to compete ilith the )revailing :poli tical 
interests and the labour left for the control of the st['~te. Once 
in action, the organic elite ~ade use of every available legal 
and illegal resource. 5 According to IP~S leader, Glycon de Paiva, 
these activities, Hhich bordered on illegality, could be summed 
up as the :preparation by civilians to ensure an appropriate 
political climate for the military to intervene. For Glycan de 
Paiva, political action had to be discreet. 6 Glycon de Paiva's 
reco~~endations involved the 'creation of political and economic 
chaos, fomenting discontent and deep fear of coomunism among 
employers 2nd employees, blocYing legislative efforts of the 
left, organizing Dass demonstrations and rallies, even acts of 
terrorisn if necessary'. 7 The target areas for specifio indoctri-
na tion and direot political pressure ,{ere the trade unions, 
student movement· and nobilized peasantry, tlle I.-uddle social 
layers and the Church hierarchy, the legislative and the Gilitary. 
The aotion of the entrepreneurialorgs.nic elite Dust be 
considered as the praxis of a bourgeois po',rer bloc, prep-edi ta ted 
and carefully evolved over a number of ~rears. :By brine:;ir.g into 
con8::'deration the organic dimension and dynamics involved (cl2.88 
• .1-.. .J-' 1 . .J-' • 1 +.). .J-l l' t . l SllA18 ~lon, c 2.SS :POSll..lOn and. c ass ac ~lon , J.. e. vi'.e 11:1.8 o::::':1.ca~ 
class constraints, one is able to :perceive G~d portray the 
historical evidenoe of the energent multinational-2,ssociated 
pOI·[er bloc forging its Gvm form of state. 1,'ili2,t occ"U::'rec. in 
April 1964 vias not a conspiratorial rnili tccry ccup 8 but 1,:as the 
outcone of a political, ideological and Dili i:2.ry c['.c:po.i;n \wCed 
by the organic elite centred in I?.ES/:::3A.D. It ',ms sucre a 
ca:::rpaign '.'Thich 1JaS cr:::'lmed in April 1964 by mili t2.ry action, 
necess2.ry to topple the executive and contain tl:ereafte!.' '.12.SS 
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t · ...... 9 par lClpa \.olon. 
lPE8, by its very nature and policies, being a strategic 
ca talyst rather than a visible prime move:!:', did not take direct 
credi t for most~ of tl1e political achievements cf the organic 
elite, "Thich i<Jere attributed to other organizations and agents, 
presumed to be independent from lPES. Even though many 
organizations 'ITere aotually synchxonized by lPES/IBi\]), one should 
not dismiss the activities of parallel bodies i·rhose aims, broadly 
speaking, and means ooinoided \d th those of 1P:28/1131;]). l,ihenever 
it \1aS :possible, IPES attempted to play dO'im its acti vi ties and 
keep out of tlle political linelight. For insta.TJce, "Then the 
I?ES leaders returned froD one of the Nassau meeti::1gs in 1962, 
they did so ,nth the olear intention of minimizing the significance 
of tile Institution. T:-.e proposal of Glyoon de Paiva, in April 1962, 
-
to ]ublish a paper by General Golbe~J do Couto e Silva providing 
guidelines for aotion against the national-::cefomist bloo, ,faS 
objeoted to by IPSS leader, Jose Luiz lforeira de Souza. His 
opposition ':JaS based on the g-~ounds that it vTould reveal \'That 
hi therto l:ad been avoided, nanely, an crg:.nized PGli tical movement; 
,·,hile General Hei tor Her£era pointed out the danger of exposu::ce 
of illegal action. 10 This neoessity to r£intain the inoons:piouous 
profile of the organic elite ',faS stressed cy Harold C. Polland 
in the beginning 8f 1962. Moreover, 1.'le pointed out to tl:.e IPES 
leadership be t ot:ner ccuntries had insti tu-tions siTIilar to lESS 
and that poli tioal experience had proven that a single ore=;anization 
vras not en:mgh. He save the exatrple of Colonbia, \·,rhere tl:e local 
.L'?'::';S '.-las a oentral org2.nism \·ri th ::lany organs disseninateci th::!:'Jugh-
out the i::':terio::!:' of the cf"untry. These institutions 'Jere many 
ti2es 't..:..'1de::!:' 9.ttac~c, but all-rays shielcii:1'j t.he real centrs of 
action. Polland reaffir.ned ti1e need for I?ES never to appe2.r 
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directly and c~enly. IP~S ~ad to adopt a ?osition of complete 
unassailability 11 t~xoughout its political c&~paign and act 
behind the scenes. After all, he argued, inside L::SS ',rere 
entre~reneurs. 12 The other organs '''hich ',iould a:p~ear :;mblicly 
or take responsi'bili ty for the execution of the ozoganic elite fS 
can:Paign 'Here, of course, ADEP, J3.ill, ~illP, Promotion S.A., and 
SEI among the most outstanding civilian and civi1ian-nilita~J 
agencies; 13 as ,,,ell as ';'lell-knmm political bodies ',Thich 
operated side by side 14th I?3S, such as the Association of 
Christian !:.fanagers of Enterprises - ADCE. 14 i1ozoeover, the 8,ction 
of L?.!c.lS ',ras not confined to class organizations and political 
action groups, but reached i...'l')stead almost eve7:'.l org2l1ized segDent 
of society. Their tsctics Hould serve as e, blue-lJri...Ylt for the 
events of almost ten years later in Chile. 
T':To ty?es of Action 
The tactics of the oI'ganic elite ro.nged from 2ctivities, 
intenc.ed to 112.ve a long ranse effect on t~1e entire direction 
of social, economic 2nd ~oli tico-nlili t8.r'J :gers:pecti ves, to 
defensive tactics designed to ~rovide sufficient ti~e for 
stretegic "Doli tiC21 2nd :dE t2I'Y o.ction to ~:ave :. ts effect. 15 
T'I'ro ty-pes of action are to 'ce considered: 1) soci21 [',nel 
ideologic2.l action 8.nd 2) :poli tical-nili tarJ action, which shall 
be described in the fol10'l-ring chapters. 
1. S0cial 2,nd Ieleolodc21 ,,~ction 
The conbined social and ideological activities of the 
organic elite consisted of a) genero.l i:xloct::,:'n2.tion, [mel 
b) , ~. .. t' . . ',J..\., f ,. , rd' .J.. d . th s:peC2...I.lC lnccOC r2..na-;:lon, co Wi 0_ ".:l1l0~'l ':reI'S coo lt~c. ... e· ';Tl 
,.fideI' :poE tical-ideoloc':'cal . activities in Congress, 
tl:e tro,cce 1..llions, t~:e stude:'1t :10VeL'lent a::;~~ tl:e clert5:? 
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General indoctrination ained at presenting the orgsnic 
eli te IS vie,,,s to the political decision-nakers Md t::1e public 
at large, as vTell as having an ideologicsl i:r:Ipo,ct on selected 
audiences and ioti thin the state apparatus. General bdoctrination 
through the nedia I'Tas attempted by overt and cove:rt action, of a 
defensive and defensive-offensive kind. General indoctrination 
\'Tas basically a neutr2.lizing measure. It aiDed at instilling or 
rei..nforcing traditional right ,.;ring attitudes 2nd Vi6ITS, Emd 
stimulating negative perceptions of the national ~efo~~ist 
16 popul2.r bloc. 
T!le organic eli te 8,ttacKed cor:nnunisn, socialism, the 
rural oligarchy and the vices of populism. On the positive side, 
they 2_rgned that the prosperity of the ccuntr"J nnd the increase 
in the standards of living of tile people ",Jere due to private 
initiative, certainly not due to socialist nethods or to sto.te 
inte:!:Vention in the economy. 17 On the other ::.and, the neg2.tive 
approach ,of the or:::sanic elite ,{as sho-Im in its use of a . .... nlXlJure 
of sophisticated techniQues and orude anti-con"rrUIlist propags,nda, 
in ','That amo'Lmted to ideological ~)ress:c:::::e 'oThich e:cploi ted 
10rg2.nized panic I (enc1..1xralaneClto :)e10 "Janico or,23.nizado). 18 
Th:roug.1J. specific indoctrina tion, the orge.nic elite 'das 
concerned ;ri th stC1ping t~'le 2.':'raren6SS 2.nd ::'rga.nis2.tion ,')f the 
doni~'lant sectors, ane. r:f bringing them i:1to action as 8, '018,ss 
for i kelf', '\Thile consolic1e.tin; the poli ticD.l lec.c.ership of the 
multi::::ation2.1 2nd 2.ssociated f::c'actions '\;ithin the dom.inant cl2.ss. 
They G.id. so by attemptL:6' to unite the eT.1ergent pmie::c' cloc s.ro'.1l1d 
a specific :?r0s:r2nme::f ecoDom.ic modernization 2Ild socio-poll tic2.1 
co~-::serv?tism. .s....'1 ext::c'e~;,e e:m::::lple of such c"ctions '.I~~S the Con,;ress 
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for :Basio Ref o~"I'1S, "'Thich took place in J anU2..ry 1963, and the 
sustained campaign through the media, ,·rhich e.lso attenpted to 
disartioule.te the traditional industrial-oligarchio historical 
bloc. 19 Specific indoctrination (together ~d th genere.l indoctri-
nation) also dealt ~dth the ideological and political formation 
and co-optation df trade union activists, yeasa~t leaders and 
rural 12,bour nili tants, students and rJ.ilito.ry leaders, and vri th 
their nobilization. Moreover, the overall aim of specific 
indoctrination 'Has to she.pe the various fractions of the dominant 
classes and different social bTOUps of the Diddle classes into 
a movement of opinion 1,.;i th widely shared short rang'8 objectives, 
naDely, the renoval of Goulart from the presidenoy and the 
conte.innent of popular mobilization. 
Gene~e.l Indoctrination 
The channels of persuasion and the tecr~i~ues most conmonly 
employed Here the circulation of publications, lectu:::::'es, 
sJTIposiuos, press conferences of public personalities, public 
debates, ;£il::1s, theatre plays, comic strips, television inte::::-vieHs 
and propag2nda, and radio. ~ne IPES/I3AD org2nic elite also 
published directly, or in agTeeDent '\'li th V8,riOUS publishing 
houses, an extensive series of ',{orks, incl".J..ding cooks, pa:::r9hlets, 
periodioals, ne'tiS)apers, nagazines and leaflets. 20 :Radio and 
television "..Jere flooded •. .,ri th their ideolo[,"ic[',l anct political 
Desss.;es. Ne"Tspapers carried their articles and inforsation. 
To accomplish this ra~ge of varied activities, I~~S enlisted a 
large nlX~ber of professional ",Trite:!.'s, journalists, theatre and 
cinena people, public relations, propaumda and nedia e:oerts. 
I -::l-::"C h'-:'J, .\)\ ',"l S al"'o able to Clrtl' c"11'" -'-e "nCl' ch"nne' tll", ~~/ -~ ~~ ~, ~ , ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~.- Sl.1-:JDO:ct of 
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some ~f the biggest international advertising companies, ~~us 
creating a formidable team for the ~anipulation of ?ublic opinion. 
Professional journalists i,ere integrated into the general effort 
as 'devillers' and pro?ag'2ndis ts, "rorkinG' r::ainly through the 
opera tional units of the groups of Public Opinion, Dootrine and 
Study, and Publications. Certain industrial and financial enter-
prises linked to I3S/:rnAD took care of t~le monetary arranger:1ents 
by including them in their pay-roll, thus providing another form 
of the indirect financing of organic elite action. Uriters, 
essayists, literarJ personalities and other ~lte~lectUEls lent 
tb.eir ?restige by themselves I'rri ting and by undersi@1ing articles 
produced in the ideological and political hothouses of the r?3S/ 
I:BAD study o.nd ac ti on group s. 21 
IPES "/8.S able to es tablish a synchronized o.ssaul t on public 
opinion, through their special rela tionsJ:>..i:p 'iTi th the ::aj or national 
nei'rspapers, r2.dio and television, such as: the Din'rios Associados 
chain of Assis Cl:.2.teaubriand end its ?ovrerful r2.dio and TIT ne"t;'rork, 
tlo..rough EdEl.U1do Nonteiro, its general director e.nd I?SS leader; 
t~e Folha de Sffo Paulo, of IP~S affiliate Octavio Frias' group; 
o ~st2.do de stro Paulo and Jomal do. Tard.e, of the I?ES connected 
Nes<luita group, \'rho also o,med the prestiGious . Eldorad6-, Jeadio 
ste.tion Clf Sao Paulo. Several influentio.l jO"c1.J:'Dalists and editors 
of 0 ::Jsto.do de S~o Paulo, Here directly involved in the ?ublic 
Oyi:ni on g::'oup of ISS. Others inv 01 vee. in the c2...':Ipaign "ere 
J. !)ant2.s:::f the !)~ irio de Hoticic:s, the TV ?.ecord 2.nd TV Paulista, 
linked throuzb IPSS leader Paulo 32.rOos2. 1e3s2.; Jo::nal do :BI'2sil, 
of Hio de Jc:neiro, thr::mgh .l...:-i:...S activists ' .. ~ilson :FiGueiredo ond 
Jose Carlos :Barb0sa Horeira; Correia do ?ovo, ()f 11io Grande do Sul 
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and 0 Globo, of the 1 P'sS connected Harin..1-:to group, \·,ho also mmed 
Radio Globo, the influential national radio station. lT8'.-TS l.ygS 
also planted in 0 Globo, ,Ii thout attribution of source nor 
indication of paynent and was reproduceias factual information. One 
such 'ne"'Ts 'item "'Thich made a serious irrrpact on public opinion 
,,'laS that the Soviet Union ivanted to inpose a Communist Cabinet in 
Brazil, exerting all sorts of internal and external pressures to 
that end. 22 
Other national ne":<spapers "Tere )ut p." t the service of IPES. 
Rafael de Almeida r~Galhaes, son of IPCS leader Dario de Alneida 
HagalMes, placed Carlos Lacerda IS co-mmed T~ibuna de Imorensa, 
a militant anti-Goulart and anti-populist Rio based ne,wp2.per, 
at the disposal of IP~S, for any article to appear unsigned or 
in the form of an editorial. 23 And in Sao Pc.ulo, £e(leral de::':lUty 
Herbert Levy, 1ID1:T leader and entrepreneu:r ,·rho 1ms connected i·n th 
ll,SS, and "Those s ons ~Tere IPbS ac ti vis ts in c overt opera ti ons, 
launched a Llili tant ne','rspaper, Notici2.s Populares, to cODpete 
·,Ii th the popular press for the i1enrts and. mincls of the industrial 
"lorking classes and 101,:er niddle classes of S8:o ?:2ulo. Furthermore, 
I?ES/=Lt'cD also had hold of some ninor neuspa::)ers throucl1out the 
COlL'1tr'iJ. 1:I11e prestiG~ous political C01U111.'1 8e<;2:0 Livre (Free 
Section) si[,'1'led 'by Pedro Ilantas (the pseudony:n l.:.sed by 
PI".ldente de Horais Ne to) provided an 2.nalysis of the political 
conjuncture and attenpted to sha;?e public opinion. Tl1is colur-,,-'1 
' .. !2,S :9ublisl;.eci in the advertising sec".:ion of 0 ~stc'cI.o de S[r:) ?8ulo, 
and it o;?eratc'c. ~.:i thin t21e ideol')GicC'.l st:::,e2'::l~'f ISS. }!';''1otl:er 
felloH tr8.veller 'Jas Joao de Scariti.!:1burGo, of Cor-reio :'?aulisb:o.no 
('.Tho ll&.d 'been singled out 'by Alfred Neo.l, of the Council £'Clr 
Econonic Ilevelo;?nent in ~lis letter to Gilbert ~Iu'::er e.s one of 
24 
the ·oossible peo;?:2.e £'or a CB.D su;?port operC',tion). In the 
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Hortheast, Paulo Hal ta' s column Perisco.'Jio, in the influential 
Diario de Fernambucot promoted a series of 'anti-CoDrru~~ist 
exposures' and pro-Cor:nnunist charges against Ar::::aes, 8.S a 
contribution to the general effort of the organic elite. 25 
Arlindo Pasqualini, a director of Empresas Ca1das Junior! an 
important media co:o.plex in the south of the count~J, '<'las s:-mght 
by Jose Luiz Horeira de Souza, in order to produce a series of 
articles attacking Leonel Brizzola and his g-..cO'Hing popular 
influence and comma-Dd id thin the PTB s truchrre. Arlindo 
hisself (brother of Alberto Pasqualini, the deceased PTB major 
ideologist) as 'dell as the Rio Grande do Sul politicians t 
Paulo Brossard and Kos Cher.nont de Britto, ",rere considered by 
IPES as desirable counter-candidates to be promoted 8.gainst 
B · 1 26 nzzo a. In Parana, ~BS/IBAD were active in this area 
through Roberto Novaes, of Diarios Associ2.d.os and Disrio do 
Parana; U'oaldo Siqueira, of Im-::>rensa Nova C':.nd. Bacilla Ueto, 
the Pc.raml co::::-res)ondent of 0 :Sstado de S~o Paulo. 27 Career 
diplonat Jose Set~e Camara lent his na2e to political colTh~s 
in the n2. tionally influential Rio based dc:dl:r 0 Globo; 28 and 
J::P3S leader Augusto Frederico Scr ... r:rl.dt, entre)reneur, poet and 
ambassador, ·\'78.8 active in the Public ~pinicn group of IP~S. 29 
Papers produced for political and entre)rene"Lxial consLL""::]tion 
',Tere tr2.nslated into 'houseuife lan~l..l.2.ge' (lin;:1.w,cen de dona de 
~) by people 2S varied as 1,1ilson Fi6~leiredo, secret2.YJ of 
Jor:1al do :Bl"8.si 1 and novelist Raquel de l1ueiroz. 30 1,lri tel' 
ITelida Pifion, ,rho served as lPES Rio sec:::'eto.:::::-y, 2,180 hel)ed in 
the ) rO)8.§;"2...~d8. ende 8.v~ur. 
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All these nevlspapers also kept their olm steady editorial 
d.r\..l21lbeat, on behalf of the organic elite. 31 Tllis '.·n?s aided by the 
control IPESjI:BAD had of ne'VTS agencies o.nd outlets throughout 
the count!.""J and their special relationship '>ri th advertising 
conpanies and advertisers. !PES nade sure t~~t the editors of 
the major national nei·rspapers ran their Oim n8\·lSp8.pers in fact 
as vlell as in name according to the line of the organic elite. 32 
Through Promotion S.A., the organic elite rented the editorial 
pages of A Noite, one of Rio de Janeiro's evening ne',rspapers, a 
move initially proposed by its ovm director Nelson }jobre. 33 I:BAD 
'i-ras also behind Renorter Sindical, a Dag2.zine dedicated to the 
dissemination of ideological information as 1iTell as engaged in 
data gathering. As IPES leader Jose Rubem Fonseca, himself a 
novelist engaged in public opinion activities, put it succintly, 
"The Institute publishes in ne'l·lspe.perB articles, editorials and 
opinions l1 • 34 The aiD 'das to occupy "the ce::Jtre of poli tioal 
and ideological~iscussion". 35 IBAD also ~Jublis::1ed its molD 
monthly A9,t1o Denocratica, ,.nth a circulation of 250.000 issues, 
'\'Thieh tad the collaboration of Gabriel Chaves e.e Hello, Eugenio 
Gudin, Jose Garrido Torres, Denio Nogueira, tIDlT deputy leader 
Alionar :Baleeiro and other influential entre)rene'~rs and 
politicians. It ,:!e.s districuted gratis and c2.::::'J:'ied no 2.clvertising. 
The Public Opinicn Group of the org::.nic elite, through the 
person of I?t:S leader Nei Peixoto do Valle, also helped to 
prepe.re the 'Survey on COLmnmist Infiltr2.tion in the Press' 36 
";Thich '\'T2.S l'Tidely circulated among en treyreneurs, mili tarJ snd 
other opinion !:la:zers, as :Dart of a cam;>aign 8xyosL"1g varied 
intelleotu2.1s and jcurnalists as ceing guilty of havinG leftist 
vie'·ls. Th'Jse .journalists '"ere 2"cct~sed of :::8.~i)ul8.ting public 
opinion; precisely the 2ctivi ties in ""ihich IPES/IE}J) '.'fere 
really involved. 
In orcler to shovr to the entrepreneu:::'s, professionals and 
to nembers cf the armed Forces the immedia te threat to "Thich 
they '\'Tere being subjected, the organic elite made extensive 
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use of a chart denouncing 'cor:u:rnmist infiltr2tion' Hhich ''laS 
circulated \·ridely and appeared to have a serious impact. Prepared 
by Colonel A. da Fontoura, 'Hhile head of the general staff of the 
6th division in Rio Grande do Sul, the chart pUI'.Ported to give 
a penoramic viel'f of the threat to the doninant classes. (See 
Appendix K). In 1962, the team of General Golber"J drafted a list 
of 200 military f rom the three services, \-Thile Glycon de Paiva 
provided a list of 200 politicians (cong:."'9ss:1en and ste.te governors), 
200 students, 150 pr0fessionals, 50 journalists, 50 entrepreneurs, 
50 uni versi ty lecturers and 100 IPES affiliates of Se:o I'8,ulo~ aJ.l 
selected opinion-~akers, to receive and be instruQental in the 
dissemine. tion of ideological material rele2.sed by the organic elite. 
A decision i'fas taken that the naBe Gf I?ES should not appear in 
nany of the pUblications that ':lere to be distributed. 37 
A different form of 8.ction 'i'Tas the support and s:yonsorship 
of 'm.e.nifestces' \·rhich flooded the press betHeen 1962 and. 1964 
and i'Thich He:::oe pr'Jcluced by professionE',l c1ncl femctional associations 
and groupi.'1gs. .tunong them, one should ::lention He.nifesto d.e.s 
Clo.sses Pr'JduttJre.s, I'Or its emoti ohal :i.nrpa6t, "Thich ste. ted the 
political position of the Brazilian entre~reneurs and the 
publication in Rio 20nd S~O Pe.ulo, at the beGinning of 1963, of 
a J.L~:mifesto to the Ne,tion. This f.Ianifesto ':.J8,S published in 
Jomal do Err,sil 8,nd Correio dB. r'12nh'8: of Hio de Janeiro and in 
o -::"sto.G.o cle Sao I'o.ulo cy the S[!o ?aulo c~'secl De:~;)cratic Centre 
J7J 
of Engineers, "Thich Ivas coordinated Hi th IPES, signed by more 
than 500 professionals of natioDl,ride prestige. 
Also "forth mentioning ,'ras the r1anifesto of the Nurses to 
the Armed Forces, of mid-1963, in \-Thich they called upon the 
military to intervene directly in the political process against 
Goulart's government. 38 Other manifestoes "Tere the 'IvIanifesto and 
Letter of Democratic Principles of Parana', in April 1963, and the 
}funifesto by the Law Students of the l1ackenzie University, in 
May 1963 39 as well as the manifesto, 'For Erazil, for its 
Progress and for the Happiness of its People, against disorder, 
irresponsibility and denagogy', a one full page appeal in 
Q Estado de S?:o Paulo, "Thich \vas introduced by the entrepreneurial 
associations, federations, employers, 'sindicatos' and Lyons club. 40 
'E'1ese articles, announcements, and transcriptions Here then 
reproduced in other ne\-Tspapers throUG-'lOut the countr'J, by means 
of the relay netTtTork at the disposal of ll'J:;S/:LB.ill. 41 Another 
form of shaping public opinion vfas the reproduction of speeches, 
expositions and public pronouncements by relevant individuals, 
such as that of IBAD General Funaro Bley, a fDrmer intee;.ralista, 
in Belo Horizonte, for ",hose speech Glycan de Paiva sought 
Nei Peixoto do Valle's cooperation to republish in otber cities 
and thr~ugh varied media. 42 The cbannels for the dissemination 
of political anQ ideological material produced or reproduced by 
IPES \·,rere neHS agencies such as Planal to, run by rP.::S itself, 
'\'Thich fed the small local ne,·rspapers throughol).t the length 2.nc. 
breadth of Brazil, through around 800 media outlets. The sa:Je 
function i'lnS fulfilled by Asa-Press, o,med cy Fernando Nar-..::-ey, 
,.,rhose director, Arlindo Olympio dos Santos, '.-12S lin}:ed "Ji th 
I?ES. 43 
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IPES' covert ideological and political side blanketed 
the country i'li th the organic elite's anti-communist propaganda 
in the form of books, folders and pamphlets. As observed 
earlier, in terms of doctrine, IPES saw itself as expressing 
Alliance for Progress objectives and ideals. 44 Over a million 
copies of IPES' Cartilha para 0 Progresso (Charter for Progress), 
introducing the purported benefits to be brought by the 
Alliance for Progress, i-fere inserted in Brazil's Sunday nevlspapers~5 
AI.;PRO's leaflet vms also inserted as a supplement in Fatos e Fotos, 
the leading maGazine of the Rio based Bloch group and '/ridely 
consumed by the middle classes. 46 Nossos Hales e Seus Remedios 
(Our ills and their remedies), a crafty booy~et produced by 
'Andre Gama' (pseudonym of an A.TJlerican living in Petropolis), 
also had a print-out of 1.000.000 copies. 47 Another pUblication 
"Thich reached the 1.000.000 distribution ITl2.rk '_-Tas 0 que e 0 T?ES 
(\'lhat is IPES), an inlay jointly districuted ·,'lith the AL..'PRO 
promotion. liLa terial on the 112. ter et l-I2cistra '..ras als 0 pre~)ared 
by IPES in a form accessible to the gre2.t ]ublic. 48 The publica-
ti ons, promoting the Alliance for Progre s sand lob. ter e t Hap s tra 
(leaning heavily on tne iI!l.age projection of John F. Kennedy and 
of Pope John XXIII) s-erved tl-TO purposes: to provide public 
opinion ',ri th an ideological message sufficiently broad to allmr 
for 'modernization' and restricted enough so as to disaffect the 
public from socialism,conmunism or national reformism. It also 
enabled lP~S/IBAD to engage a series of Catholic intellectuals 
(le.y and Churchmen) in the discussion and s'..lostract tileD. from 
the popular-refoJ::'8ist camp. 
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!PES "published and financed, edited, translated and 
distributed books, booklets, magazines, and leaflets, of its 
own production as '\'lell as of those of I'ela ted SCUI'ces. !PES 
also reached the basses by issuing pamphlets that had the 'I,ell-
knOlm earnarks of cheap paper and poor -bJPography in ordeI' to 
disguise the source. 49 IPES 'bought' quantities of ceI'tain 
publications, thus making them feasible comnercially. 110reover, 
through its pOHerful net-l·rork of publishinC;Jdistrlbution and 
retailers, IPES subsidized other publications either monetarily 
or through printing facilities and other se~'ices, and acted 
as an outlet for centres for the formation of public opinion. 50 
Radical, PTE, socialist, cOD~unist or nationalistic argwnents 
"Tere c01.mterposed ,d th propaganda material of vaJ:"lJins degrees of 
sophistication, ranging from material in gutter press style to 
'serious' academic prose. 
Some of the pUblications produced by I?SS/TI3].J) "rere 'grey' 
propaganda, basically factual and carefully selected information 
to I-Thich 'spin t vTaS added. Other ',Torks \-181.'e straight lies and 
fiction. .~ong the subsidized and distributed =agazines cateI'ing 
for a I'elatively ,intellectual public, as part of the 
campaign of 'dha t L?::JS called ideological t cr8ss-fertiliza tion' 
and the c1.'ea tion of intellectual bar:r-ieI's to I·furxism, ue:re 
Cadernos ErasileiI'os,51 Convivium and Sl!)tese, the last -bolO 
gea:r-ed tr::'.'Ta:r-ds the ChUTCh hieI'aI'chy and the CathoJ.ic lay intelli-
gentsia. 52 IPSS also produced and distributed a series of 
booklets I·Thich taC}:led. cUI'rent affairs in [), fo:rn 2. ccessible to 
the great public, although wi th a style and outlook '.1hich enhanced 
their pseudo-academicism. Among these bco~dets HeI'e'Te!:':8.s da 
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Hora Presente' and 'Oademos Nacionalistas'. 
A clasic example of the Im-Ter type of psychological 'tTarfare 
vTaS the regular publication '0 Gorila' (The Gorilla) i-Thich I'TaS 
distributed ,vithin the Arued Forces. In one of the issues, 
after introducing vThat were considered to be the basic tenets of 
Nar . .cism, the authors COffi..'"1ented that the programme sounded vTell. 
ROvrever, this was a bait, for "Eehind the apparent beauty are the 
mass shootings, trE abolition of dignity, forced labour camps, the 
rejection of every notion of liberty and fraternityll. The 
'conmrunists t 'Here then portrayed: "He is ap:parently inoffensive ••• 
never betrays himself, "rill ahTaYs betray others. He speaks 
about peace and fraternal love". "He 'dill be your dearest friend, 
most sincere, most loyal ••• until.the day in "Thich he ivill kill 
you, through the back, coldly... They kill friars, rape nuns, 
tear dovm churches". 53 General l10acyr Gaya vTaS in cl'.,.arge of 
the plans for the distribution of pamphlets and other similar 
material produced or distributed by IPES. 54 Ey 1963, the 
Public Opinion/Publications groups had published more than 
280.000 books lli1d printed 36.000 monthly bulletins. In all, 
by that time, JJ?:SS had distributed alnost 2.500.000 printed 
units, 55 and several million copies of the above-mentioned 
pamphlets. 'Hi th the exception of i-rha t Here considered to be 
legitiEmte publications such as befitted an 'I.;}stitute for 
Research', none of the IPES reprints 1,.,rere identified 8.S being 
sponsored by I?SS. 56 
Individual 1trri ters of "Tha t IPES/ TI3.~J) considered to be 
the 'correct' political and ideol()gico.l :persuasion and stance, 
Here supported, stimulated and projected. Their books, i-Then con-
sidered to be of the ISTeatest importance f'Jr t~'1e forf.'l2.tion of 
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insti tutional, class or public opinion Here 'bougnt' by IP.J:;S 
to assure the ~ublisher of an initial sale, as in the case of 
the !PES leader, jurist and entreyreneur, !~bUel Reale. His 
book, Plur~lismo e Liberdade, published by Edit6ra S~raiva in 
1963, vT~S sponsored by IPES. 57 Other !PES le~ders, such as 
Rafael Noschese, of the Federation of Industries of Sao Paulo, 
and P~u10 Almeida Barbosa, of the Commercial Association of 
Sao Paulo and of the American Chamber of Commerce, provided 
support through thei::- respective insti tuUons by buying up p~rt 
of the circulation of books, 58 and subsidizing the activities of 
IPES in an indirect form. 
IPES principles Viere applied to specific cases in the form 
of subsidies for the Parliamentary Action Group 8,nd the Public 
Opinion Group, as \ve11 as through the preparation of 23 proposals 
known as the Reformas de Ease (Easic Reformi).59 These detailed 
reform projects ,·rent ',Tell beyond those suggested at the Superior 
\'iar College, \'Thich has been portrayed tmdi tional1y as the 
intellectual source of national change 60 for the Dodernizing-
conservative bloc. IPES/IBAIl had been fir:ruy drmm into the 
ideological battle being fought in the early 1960s. l\.S T:1entioned 
elsevlhere, the Study and Doctrine groups pre:;Jared the systeDatic 
cri ticism of the governmen t 's ref om prop osals, ,·rhile the 
Par1iamentar'J Action Group arranged the blocking of the executive, 
supplying the ADEP/IBlw/A.DP neb'Tork l-rith politic~l and nateria1 
logistical support. The study units in Rio e::&'Clined matters in 
Congress on the request of Il?~S leader Hello Flores. 1'1ello Flores 
established the priorities and rer.:ained in Bradlia during the 
discussion of t~e projects and coordinated the operations. Thus, 
the study GT~1.t9S prepared amendnents to gOV8EJ::lerlt projects and 
bills in economic, social and political areas ranging froD t~£ 
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law proposal to curb strikes, to one of the most important 
"Tarries of IT.8S, the bill on Profit Remittance; from the bill 
on the Electoral Code to Legislation on Teleoonmnmications. 61 
110reover, the study groups Here responsible for sifting thrC1Ugh 
the different projects, absorbing the work of different indivi-
duals and institutions into one sole !PES project 62 and taking 
care of the procedural and legislative perts in Congress. 
For example, tbe policy proposal on the envisaged Code 
on Telecommunications, one of the high priority studies for 
!PES ''las t..he responsibility of General Luiz A. l:Iedeiros, of 
the 0 Globo net',Tork. He had to prepare the policy proposal 
(ante-nrojeto de lei) on the matter and i-I2.S also asked to 
prepare a prelimina~J statement and an outline of required 
faction bebind doors t (Ac;fl:o dos 3a,stidores). 63 The project "TaS 
then ',rorkedon by the IPES study groups and the supportive action 
synchronized by the Conjunctural Survey Group and the 
Parliarnenta~J Action Group. 64 
Some of the most importnnt study groups i-rere those on 
Profi t Re!:li tt2.I1ce, Tributa~J Refo:r:m, Po::;:mlar Housing, Electoral 
Reform, Inflation, Constitutional Refo~, Agrarian Reform and 
Planning, all of them b11-""r'l1ing political issues at the time. 
The group on Profit Remi tknce ',JaS integro.ted oy Jose Garrido 
Torres, filario Henrique Sim0nsen (convener and spokes::Jan), 
Denio Nogueira, General Heitor Herrera, JorGe Oscar de Hello Plores, 
Jose Luiz Noreira de S:cuza, Gilbert Huber, Herold C. Polland, 
Glyoon de Ps.iva and the ad hoc and anonymous participation of state 
bureaucrats. 65 The project and justification of the a2endsents 
relative to t~le Profit Remittance Imr in discussion at the .1-' v~me 
in Congress, ':laS prepared for P3S by t2:e BeonoBic Council of the 
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National Confederation of Industries, vThere Simonsen ~'laS an 
executive member. It did not cost a cent to TI'ES. Only 
attendance fees (,jetons de uresenoa) i-Tere paid out to li.H. 
Simonsen, Helio Schli tIer da Silva and Denio Nogueira. The latter 
prepared the substitutive to the project on the lav1 of 
Profit Remittance, introduced by senator Daniel Krieger. 66 
On Tributary Reform and Fiscal Policy, TPES produced an 
in-depth study contracted to Mario Henrique Simonsen. Ire ,-,ras to 
elaborate the follOl'ling bills, 1,'Ti th their respective justification: 
a) income tax; b) consumption tax; c) sta~ t~~; d) single tax 
on petrol and oils; e) single tax on electric energy; f) improve-
ment grants. It 1,.,raS prepared by a study lUli t integrated, among 
others, by Denio Nogueira, and a state bureaucrat, accountant 
Balduino, \'Those presence vTaS kept secret. 67 
On Popular Housing, the study unit also prepared an ~ 
projeto and its corresponding parliamentm ... 'Jr justification. 
It 'Has financed and prep2red by an IBA.D team, in i,rhich Ivan 
Hasslocher "Tas involved. 68 As soon as it vas ready, it vTaS 
examined by I?ES in the form of the procedure in other similar 
cases, such as the study group on Agrarian Reforn. 69 
Sandra Cavalcanti, of Hosken Constr.ltora, the big engineering 
8.C'ld construction firm based in Rio and a political ass'Jcia te of 
governor Lacerda, i.,raS consul tal'Jt to this lmi t. She 'das also a 
leoturer at I?SS. Other studies '>Tere produoed on this issue, 
suoh as Jose Arthur Rios' paper on Housin£, PoHcy (Pol{tioa 
Habi taoional). These papers I'Tere ::::.'eleased through the :?ublic 
Opinion Group, contributing to the general debate. 70 
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On Electoral Reform, Themistocles Cavalcanti and DQrio de 
Almeida lIagal:bl1es ' .. lere involved, as well as Paulo de Assis Ribeiro. 
Other chosen people, such as Afranio de Carvalho, Alfredo Lamy 
Pilho and Homero Pinho, 71 'Here convened, in order to provide 
their authoritative advioe on various matters. On the Eleotoral 
Code, Os,valdo Trigueiro was o on suI ted. 72 
!PES also researched into the issue of/Democratization of 
Capital. The position papers on this question were aocomplished 
jointly ,-lith the Integration Group. Besides the eoonomio reasons 
for the 'demooratization of oapital', namely plaoing shares of 
looal conpanies in the stook JIl.arket and capitalization through 
minor investors, suoh policy had a clear propagandistic effect. 
It highlighted the positive 'social effects' of the economic 
system whioh allov~d for small shareholders to have a stake in 
business and for the 'co-ovmership' by vlorkers and employees. 73 
The team, which was formed ~o supervise research to be conducted 
on private enterprises and whose findings- were to serve 
as guidelines for the preparation of nor::s for the 'democratization 
of capital' in private enterprises, comprised Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, 
Alberto Venancio Filho and Juan Hissirlian. 
On Inflation End its causes, Denio Nogueira "lorxed in 
coopera tion I·Ti th, among others, ADEP congressBan Rai.nnmdo Padilha. 
On planning, IPES vTaS especially acute, as it Has an issue 
of najor concern to the organic elite, just as the bill on profit 
remi ttance had been. \Then Celso Furtado's Plano Trienal ;ms 
lalmched, a ttec:b~ical group' of I?ES prepared a nunber of oritical 
studies, both for information and political action. Sone of the 
analyses, such as those of Denio Nogueira, \Tere turned into 
posi tion papers to be released through the 20nthly bulletin of 
I?~S; otners, li~-(e the studies by Julian Chacel, I'xorio Henrique 
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Simonsen and Paulo de Assis Ribeim Here used as guiding lines 
for IP~SI political and ideological action, especially in 
Congress. 
Denio Nogu.eira, together "ri th i.'!illiam Embry, ,·;as also in charge 
of the production of a study on Anti-Trust LavT. Before it ',-ras 
introduced, its basic information ';Tas used by 1·18110 Flores for 
his action in the Senate in 1963. It 1;TaS prepared as a Bill of 
Law, ,,·Ii th corresponding parliamentary justification. 74 
On the participation of Employees in the Profits of 
Enterprises, a bill of law ,·ras envisaged and the basic iv8rk 
entrtlsted to Paulo Novais, of Pontifieia Unive~sidade Catolica, of 
Rio. 75 
On Judieia~y Reform, Celestino Basilio, Carlos de Assis 
Ribeiro, Romero Pinho and l'liguel Seabra FagLmdes, among others, 
' .. [ere involved. Paulo de Assis Ribeiro prepar.'ed the !:leper. 76 
A study on the reform of the Legislative a..Yld the Public AcLr:lini-
stration I'Tas also prepared, for "lhose production IPES r.'eceived 
vTide collaboration. 77 
On Constitutional Refom, IP~S, thrOU@l Pau~o de Assis 
Ribeiro and his study group, had the follo\-rinS to say, e.t the 
beginning of 1962: 'IPSS judges its (luty to contribute to the 
study and debate \·rhich must pr.'ecede the introduction of ::1odi-
fications in the H::.p;na Carta' (sic) (constitution). Among the 
various aspects, which, according to IPES, should draw the atten-
tion of.legis1ator~ was that of 'national security', a concept 
which in., IPES' view co14d not be confined to the spheres of 
mili tary defence of the countT'J. According to IPES, 't h e 
generalized phenomenon 0 f the totalization of war 
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and the acknovlledgement of the indispensability of an integrated 
strategy both for \·mr and peace required a true policy of national 
security'. Tpis policy'ent~ed 'the conception ahd realization of 
suitably coordinated actions in the political, economic, 
psycho-social and vTi thout doubt, also in the mlHary fields. 
Thus, the concept of 'national security' is not 
entirely the necessarily s-pecialized responsibility of the 
military. All the bodies of public administration are, ti1erefore, 
called upon to collaborate in the res-pective planning' (of 
'national security). 78 Jos~ Carlos de Assis Ribeiro prepared 
a study on Constitutional Reform, providing for the reformul~tion 
of 'outdated' and 'disadj~illtedt points. The pa-per on constitutional 
reform \<Tould stress needed chanGes in sensitive areas, SUC::1 as 
plannins', the right of ,·[orkers to strike, political mobilization 
and increased faculties for tl1e executive and tl1e federal govern-
mente It is interesting to note that the notion of national 
sec~~ty, expounded by the ESG is here incorporated by li-BS 
as its :p:roposal f or the reform of the Constitution. The notion 
of national security 'I'laS b:r~:mght to bear by I?'3S, not only on 
Dili tary :::1atters, but on civilian ones, in both peace and. ',-rare 
On Eany,ing Reform, IrES encountered SOGe di~ficul ties 'IIi thin 
its mom :ranles. Until mid-1962, the studies pre:pa:red by ::I2t:S 
vTere, 8,Qcorcling to Guinle 118.chado, 'independent of :)ersonal or 
group interests'. But on the :Banking Refo:t'ln, Gilbert Hu':::er 
had to re:port to the Executive Cornnittee in Rio that it '.,ras being 
pre:pared, not by IPES S~o Paulo, but by the ve:::y b8,n~.;:ers, \·rho, 
according to Glycan de Paiva, considered the question as being 
of such an importance for them 'tbat tl:ey \·r2.Dted to be :9resent, 
defendi:.1g their interests t. In s1)i te of the b~n~:ers' st:rength, 
J8J 
Glyc on considered that IPES should not s top doing '·Tha tit 
thought ought icbe done and Huber considered that vrhen a divergence 
of opinions arose, IPES' stance should be one of 'not being afraid 
of the bankers'. 79 Most of the big bankers ·Here in IPES anyhOi-T. 
I·mat the political leadership of IPES '-Tanted to avoid Has paI'tisan 
and narrOVT interests prevailing over the Institute's policy, as 
seemed tc be the intention of Sgo Paulo based bankers. The 
Insti tute 's viei-T prevailed. By l'Ta.rch 1963, IPES had submitted 
24 bills, tllrough its Parliamentary Action Group and the ADP 
deputies it sponsored and controlled. 80 
An important objective, vri.thin the limits of the ideological 
struggle of the early 1960s vTas to pre-er:zpt the 'reformist 
value' of the labour left proposals for governnent and dissociate 
the modernizing-conservative entrepreneurs from the oligarchic 
poli ty. Such a strategy i'Tas clearly discernible in the drive 
of the organic elite to undercut the pOi-Ter base of the tradi-
tional right,centred on the oligarchic agrarian interests, 81 
and find a Hay to deal 1,·ri th the mobilized peasa.Y1tr'lJ, i'Thich had 
begun to insurij"8 against the populist structure, and most impor-
tant :Derhaps, i-Those plight began to have e. serious eflotional 
appeal for the mid.dle classes. In this ende8,vour, 13AIl '·T['.8 the 
first line of combat of the entreyrenel..1xial organic elite. It 
launched itself into the heart of t:1e confrontation, e.ppropriating 
symbols, the:1es and language i-Thich vTere, at the tiDe, the 
rallying banners for the popular-refornist forces. It strove to 
place itself at the 'ideological centre i , representing a grand 
middle class social project. 
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Through its nei{S-paper AvEro ])emocra tiCH, IDA]) stressed t'c.a t 
its Agrarian Reform '-laS in no vTay intended to serve the aims of 
the conmunists nor to maintain the iniquitous and immoral state 
of affairs sustained by the large 'latifundistas,.82 For IPES/ 
IBAD intellectual, Jose Arthur Rios, it 'I-ras the 'democrat's 
duty to combat the unique front formed by the reactionaries and 
the communists' against v;h..at he dubbed 'true Agrarian Reform'. 83 
IBAD organized the dominant classes around the issue, studied the 
rna tter and published printed material propounding a modernizing 
capitalist efficiency-oriented Agrarian Reform, vThere industry 
and agro-business I'Tere integrated and ,,[hich attempted to nullify 
the popUlist and socialist demands. In April, 1961, IRill organi-
zed its Symposium on Agrarian Reform, out of , .. Thich C8J:1e a ,-lidely 
distributed and vTell printed book: Recomenda<;oes sobre a Reforma 
Agraria. 
In all, 34 individuals participated in the Symposium: 
Alvaro Ribeiro, Bertha Koffman Becker, Celestino Sa Freire Basilio, 
Charles Hogenboom, D t Almeida Guerra Filho, Denio Nogueira, Dirc6u 
Lino de Hatos, Edgard Teixeira Leite, Edson Cesar de Carvalho, 
Estanislau Fischlo',ri tz, Everaldo Nacedo de Oliveira, Padre Fernando 
Bastos D'Avila, Frederico Augusto Rondon, Gladstone Chaves de Hello, 
Gustavo CorQao, Hilgard O'Reilly Sternberg, Ivan Hasslocher, 
Jairo de Noura, Jan Litjens, Jo8:o Camilo de Oliveira To::'res, 
Jose Art!lur Rios, Jose AU£;Llsto Bezerra de :Hedeiro~, J'x:::e Bonifacio 
Coutinho nogueira, Jose Carlos Barbosa Horeira, Jose Gomes da Silva, 
Jose Irineu Cabral, Jose Vicente Freitas H2.rcondes, General JUD.rez 
Tavora, H:::rcelo Lavener Hachado, Hilciades Sa Freire, Hoyses 
Rosenthal, Odegar Franco Vieira, Thonas Lynn Smith and ':ianderbil t 
DU8,rte de Barros. The general c oordina tion of the de ba te s ,-Tas in 
the hands of Denio Nogueira, Ivan Hasslocher, Gustavo Cor9ao, 
Hilgard O'Reilly Sternberg and Gladstone Chaves de Mello. The 
symposium '\-las chaired by General Juarez Tavora. 84 The parti-
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cipants in the Symposium were mostly a collection of ibadianos, law-
yers and techn~entrepreneurs specializing on agrarian questions 
and labour relations and centre-right intellectLmls. The parti-
cipants favoured transformation of the rural economy, steering a 
middle course of modernization, i{hich included the break of the 
oligarchic hold of the land, increase in productivity, rationali-
zation of production, mechanization and the transformation of 
labour relations. 
As poli t;i.cal events developed in the countryside, I'There the 
peasantry organized in increasing numbers, and as the ideological 
struggle in the cities reached ne"T levels of sharpness, JJ?ES was 
forced to take up the issue of agrarian reform in a manner quite 
different from befo:re. The issue had to be raised from I'Tr.L8. t Has 
termed tr.e 'demagogic terrain' and IPES I·ms forced to pose it in 
"That they considered. to be 'rigorous scientific terns'. 85 The 
Agrarian Reform issue nearly provoked a major crisis benreen the 
Sao Paulo and Rio sections of IPJ:;S, as the project envisaged by the 
political leadership in Rio suited the agro-indu.strialists but 
seemed too drastic for the paulista landovming interests represented 
in IPES. The blue-print of the IPES project 'I'laS based on the con-
clusions of the I:B.ill organized syrrposilm, from ,'!hich a project 
and legislative justifications had been prepared by Jose Arthur 
Rios and Edgard Teixeira Leite. The ivork of the tecbXlOentrepre-
neurs ~~d entrepreneurs involved in the preparation of the project, 
was financed by 1:3A]). Due to agreed operational meaSLC:'es bet\·reen 
IP3S and IBAD, the project had to be discussed by I?ES study lmits, 
Ivhich \'rere made up f J.. hn ~, 86 o veO oentre~')renel,rs anc. entre)reneurs. 
I3_:'J) i'ra,S officially represented in the joint oO::L8i ttee in cliarge 
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of blending the proposals by Ivan Hasslocher, Jose _~thur Rios 
and Denio Nogueira and the participation of other nenbers as 
required by the circ't.1mstances. 
FollovTing the suggestion of \'landerbil t Due,rte de Barros, 
it vTas agreed that neither !PES nor lEAD should nanifest itself 
as publicly sponsoring or defending the project in parlianent or 
through t.he press. The project had to be deEvereq. discreetly. 87 
The naster plan of IPSS/IJ3AD vTaS to produce first a project '-Thich 
,ms to be the substantive part of the '-lork, containi~g principles 
and norms that could serve to define the position of IPES in 
relation to the Agrarian Reform. Secondly, it prepared a 
parallel docunent to 'soft sell' to public opinion the ideas con-
tai...'1ed in the project, 'Iii thout any reference to its origins in 
RES/TRill. This entailed for Julian Chacel, a dynamic vie'-l of 
the agrarian sector, the essential idea, beinG that the benefi-
ciaries of the access to rural :;Jroperty to be created by the 
Refonn should be individuals endm-red id th entrepreneurial capacity, 
and that there \'laS to be a necessary interde-')endence betvreen the 
rural sectors and the industrial sector, i-Thereby industries r:J.oved 
to invest ancioperate in the countryside. 88 
The original study group on Agrarian Reform conprised 
Harold Cecil Polland, Candido Guinle de Paula Hacl1ado, Ill1tonio 
Carlos do ~~aral Osorio, Julian Chacel, Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, 
Jose Garrido Torres, Jose Ruoem Fonseca, Luis Carlos :Ianeini, 
Ivan Hasslocner, Jose Arthur Rios, Denio Nogueira, 'Janderbil t 
Due,rte de Barros, Ferr:;ando !·foielli de C:::n'v8.ll10, J. Irineu Cabral 
and EdG'8.rd Teixeira Leite, a nixed team of entrepreneurs and teeM 0-
entrepreneurs. 89 Bronislau Ostoja Rogusld, as member of the 
Brazilian Rural Confederation and of the Agrarian Reform Council 
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of Parana, vlaS an ad hoc figure in the meetings. (See Apendix l~r). 
The project 'llaS laboriously developed at a cost of at least 
50.000 dollars. 90 The study unit had 32 neetings over a period 
of six months, from Hay 1962 to November 1962, 91 ",ith Julian Chace1, 
J. Irineu Cabral, Denio Nogueira, Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, Luis 
Carlos Mancini, J. Garrido Torres and \·Janderbi1 t Duarte de Barros, 
being the central ,.rorking group. Significantly, the last meeting 
i-las at I:B.AD's aim offices in Rio, vlith Jose A:;thur Rios, Ivan 
Rasslocher and Edgard Teixeira Leite. Paulo de Assis Ribeiro 
discussed va th them the re-exanination of the 1?,ntec")rojeto de lei 
(bill of laH) on Agrarian Reform, prepared by the Study Group of 
I?ES and the last details ',·rere armnged i-Ti th them in vie,v of its 
future presentation in Congress, Ylhich involved nusterinG the 
necessary support from the I?ES/IBAD sponsored Parli~senta~J 
Democratic Action. 92 
The second dOCL.ment prJduced by the study unit 'Jas handed 
over to the Public Opinion Group in order to be transformed into 
rna terial fit f-:.:r propag"anda and public action, ,·ri thout involving 
the n~e of I?ES, or IBlill. 93 
Publication of the recolTlhlendations of t"'-e various position 
papers o.s 'serious pe;pers' Has also necessary in)rc..er to 
legi tL,ate arguneDts froD a 'techno-scientif:"c' ~Joint sf 'lieu. 
This .,·;o.s done in cook f~rm aDd in pseudo-aceccle:"i1ic pa~Jers and 
booklets. Purthemore, froD the basic stCl.cly produced by the 
Study Group, various :9osition pa)ers anc1 articles ',ere produced 
and disseninated through the Bedia, acade:Jic chc.;'mels and by 
:9arlian6::1to.rians. 94 
388 
In spite of all the efforts of IPES and the cOf.'JTIit:1ent '':lith 
'tThich it thr9'\'1 itself into the heated debate on Agrarian Reform, 
it vTaS not able to stop Goulart from passing his Agrarian Reform 
Decree a Ii d toe s tab 1 ish the Superintendency for Agrarian 
Reform SUPRA, the agency charged ,d th the responsibility of 
carrying out the policy of the executive. \>Ji th such a m.ove, 
Goulart's governm.ent reaffi~ed the support it had from the 
peasant~J and of the national-reformist seotors of public opinion. 
r1oreover, the activities of SUPRA pushed the most recalcitrant. 
elements of the rural oligarchy to support the ever-widening 
front of anti-populist and increasingly anti-popular social forces. 
The most elaborate single event vrhez-eby entrepreneurial 
demands for conservative modernization Here publicly expressed and 
their opposition to labour-oriented refo~s asserted as a national 
project for Brazil ',faS the First Brazilian Congress for the defi-
nition of Basic Reforms. 95 The Congress for Basic Reforms took 
place in the Faculty of La"l of Sao Paulo, in Je,nuo.ry 1963, 
in an emotionally charged atmosphere, 
vrith an estir.J.ated 22.000 persons in attendaYice at sO:Je time during 
the seven days of session. Presided over oy AVEP general ECL~do 
Nacedo Soares, the ConGTess ',ms the fOrcL11l in '"hich a cOIT9rehensive 
collection of policy 2:'ecof.'nendations, in-depth studies and pcsition 
papers ',lere presented, publicly defininb' the posi ~ion ')f the 
organic elite in relation to institutional and st:ru,ctural reforms. 
The Congress provided t}--e rationale for direct and publio entre-
preneurial intervention in Brazilian politics o:uched as teclmo-
cratic policy-saking, a true progral7'u'ne of Governnent in t:te nal:ing. 
Al though ostensibly promoted cy ty'0 nD. tional neHSp8yerS, C orreio 
da Hanhc., of Rio de Janeiro and Folha de 88:0 ?auIo, of Sao Paulo, 
the 32.sic Reforms \'Tere a joi;Jt effort of the study and Doctrine 
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groups of I!?ES Rio and IPES Sao Paulo, synchronized "Ji th the 
effort of subsidiary organizations, aligned groups and indivi-
duals. Garrido Torres, Derlio Nogueira a..Yld Paulo de Assis 
Ribeiro '-Jere central figures in the preparation of the proposals-which 
involved 300 participants, "There over 50 separate topics ,.,ere 
discussed and vJhere 80 policy proposals "Jere introduced. 96 
The Study and Doctrine group prepared a basic guideline '\<Thich 
'-lOuld se::'Ve to orientate the Ipesianos (IPES follo,tlers and 
affiliates) who '\oJere present at the Congress. The general line 
"ras the one sub 6 u ill e din the already published documents. 97 
The policy recommendations "'fere regularly released through 
periodical publications, among others in the Jornal do :Brasil, 
in the fDrm of DeclaraQ~es S1ntese (SyntheSis Declarations). 98 
Responsible for this operation ',Tere Paulo de Assis Ribeiro and 
Denio Nogueira, '\oTho revised position papers and updated them. 99 
The influential senator, Hem de Sa, provided advice on the form 
of publication of the 23 DOC~Dentos S{ntese (Synthesis Docueents) 
i·rhich emerged as conclusions from the Congress for :Basic Reforms~OO 
The policy proposals of the Congress covered three wain 
areas of concern, namely: 1) Political order, './hich comprehended 
Electoral Reform, Legislative Reform, RefarD of the Political 
StrucRxe, Administrative Reform, Reform of the Judiciary and 
Foreign Policy Reform; 2) Social order, conprising Agrarian Refom, 
Reform of Labour Legislation, Reform in the Participation in the 
profits of the enterprises, Income Distribution Reform, Reform 
of 'delfare Policy and Social Security, Educ2.tion Reform, 
Housing Reform, Reform of Sanitary and Health Policy; 
3) Economic oY'der, ',.;hich included Noneta.:ry 2nd :Scmk Rei'a.:;::TIs, 
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TributarJ Reform, Budgetary Reform, Reform of Anti-Trust 
Legislation, Reform of Foreign Trade Policy, Reform of Public 
Utility Services, Reform of the Policy of the use of Natural 
Resources and Reform of Private Enterprise. 101 Anong the dis-
cussion teams, conveners and those responsible for the exposition 
of theses presented in the plenary sessions 'dere: icTanderbil t 
Duarte de Barros, Luiz Toledo Piza Sobrinho, lfunuel dos Reis 
Araujo and General Frederico Rondon (Regional and National 
Planning - Agrarian Measures); Themistocles Cavalcanti (Labour 
Legislation); Valentim Bou9as 102 (Quin~uennial Plan against 
Inflation); Fuad Bucnain, Olympio GuiL'1erme,Alirio de Salles, 
Luiz Cabral de Henezes, }:Tanoel Linhares de Lacerda,103 Decio 
Toledo Leite, A.FQ Cesarino Junior and llauricio de Carvalho 
(Professional Training); Jorge Oscar de £.lello Flores, 
-EstatizaQ~O (Nationalization of Insurance in Brazil); Rafael 
Noschese (Participation of Employees in the ]rofits of 
Enterprises); Joa~uim Ferreira l'angia (Per:'..anent Defence of 
the Prices of Exportable Products); J .H. Heixelles Teixeira 
(Constitutional Reform, Party Political Reform and Electoral 
Reform); PedX'o Brando (Herchant Navy and No.val ConstI.'Uction); 
Antonio Pexeira r-hgaldi (Trade Union and 1.1age Ref')rms); 
Rubens Gomes de Souza (Tributary Reform); Jose Costa Boucinhas 
(Regulation of Investment and Financial Societies); Rubens 
RodxigL~s dos Santos (Oxganization of Coastal Traffic and 
Offshore Herchan t Fleet); Haxcello Damy de S :uza Santos (P::cogra"':1t1e 
for the Production of Atomc Energy); J.V. Freitas !'Ja::ccondes 
(Agra::cian Reform); DorivalTeL~eira Vieira (Brazilian Inflation 
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and its Control); Padre Felipe Nery Moschini (Agrarian Refolm); 
Joaquim Peixoto Rocha (:Banking Reform); Ru;/ de Azevedo Sodre 
(Participation of Horkers in the Profits of the Enterprises); 
A.F. Cesarino Junior (The Participation in Profits Hithin a 
Prograrr~e of Basic Reforms); Otto Gil (Basic Refor1s in 
Tri butary Matters); Rena to Cos ta Lima and 1"'al ter J. Santos 
(Alimentary Auto-Sufficiency). From the comprehensiveness and 
quality of the theses presented, it Has clear that the entre-
preneurial organic elite 'Has developing not only a structured 
campaign to attain pm'ler, but a programme for government. It 
aimed at the reform of the state and it llad prepared a coherent 
set of alternative policies to those propounded by the national-
reformist executive. At the historical c:r:ossroads of 1963, the 
organic elite, centred in L""ES/IBAD, "as the only soci2.1 force 
among the dominant classes possessing a coherent and cohesive 
project and model for the country. By April 1964, it also had 
the milita~J, technical and political means to realize it. 
After 1964, the core of the pr0posals of t~le Congress for 
Bas=-c RefoTI1s :pre:,;ared in the IPES/IBAD study groups, Here 
adopted as the g'J.ideli..'les for a host of adminis-:rD.iive, con-
sti tutional and socio-economic refor1s implemented by the ne'" 
military gove:cnnent. 
Psychological warfare through 
Radio and Television 
The organic elite, through its Public Opinion group and 
the Doctrine and Study group of Sao Paulo was especially 
active in Radio and TV., where it gave maximum. coverage to 
its militants, supporting activities and ideas. Through the 
audio-visual media it organized a formidable ideological and 
political barrage against the executive. It also attempted 
to shape opinion within the Armed Forces, stimulating the 
sense of the impending doom of the 'hierarchy, institutions 
and nation,104 and stimulating a quasi-hysterical reaction by 
the middle classes, which in turn reinforced the military 
rationalization for intervention. Finally, it aimed at 
counterposing the organic elite's own social, economic and 
political message to the impact of nationa~reformist ideology 
within the working classes. In these activities, IPES sought 
to keep away from the limelight, leaving to IBAD and ADEP / 
Promotion S.A. a relatively overt role. 
The organic elite mounted, in effect, an efficient and 
powerful network of public relations and professional expertise 
in the fields of communication and propaganda. 105 IPES 
made ample use of TV in its campaign against the government 
and the labour-left, presenting weekly programmes in most 
national and regional channels. 
As'they dreH closer, the legislative ele9tions of October 
1962 became a central preoccupation for the organic elite of 
IPES/IBAD, who were drawing up plans to influence public 
opinion. IPES/IBAD concentrated their efforts through 
audio-visual media in a manner hitherto unknown in Erazil. 
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At IPES, fifteen ~r programmes costing 10.000.000 cruzeiros 
J9J 
were made, using three TV channels, and aimed at building up 
public opinion until the elections. Gilbert Huber took upon 
himself to raise the funds, although asserting that 'without 
political issues', he would be unable to motivate the would-be 
sponsors. General Golbery retorted that in the present 
circumstances there was no relevant issue that was not political. 
The 'urgency' of the political situation had to be brought to 
the prospective contributors through a well organized campaign 
of the Public Opinion and Integration groups. 
Jose Luiz Moreira de Souza proposed nationwide interviews 
to be held by chosen journalists in Recife, Parana, Rio, Sao 
Paulo and other key centres blanketing the country with the 
IPES inspired political messages. The interviewed persons 
would have to be well chosen 'national names'. The journalists 
would then submit a questionnaire provided by lPES on such 
issues as the 'Cost of Living', the I Alliance for Progres~, 'Educatiorl, 
and 'Ifua t do you' think about a centre-position? I Senator Nem 
de Sa and another fourteen public figures were chosen to 
participate. The journalists would also seek to engage the 
newspapers to which they were attached, in order to provide 
coverage of the events and the necessary reverberation. 106 
The pool of .speakera for this operation was made, up by: 
Carlos Lacerda;Carvalho Pinto (then governor of Sao Paulo); 
General Juracy Magalhaes (governor of the State of Bahia); 
Mem de Sa; Egydio Michaelsen (candidate to the governorship 
of the state of Rio Grande do Sul); Daniel Faraco (Deputy for 
Rio Grande do Sul); Loureiro da Silva (prefect of Porto 
Alegre, capital of the state of Rio Grande do Sul); Lopo 
Coelho (president of the Legislative Assembly of Guanabara); 
JS4 
Raul Pila (Federal Deputy for Rio Grande do Sul); l1il ton Campos 
(Senator for Minas Gerais); Gilberto Freyre (historian and 
director of the Instituto Joaguim Nabuco, of Pernambuco); Raquel 
de Queiroz (writer); Guilherme Borghoff (president of COPEG); 
Lelio Toledo Pizza (entrepreneur of Sao Paulo); Miguel Vita 
(Entrepreneur-Fratelli Vita, of Bahia); Octavio Marcondes Ferraz 
(entrepreneur of Sao Paulo); Clemente l1ariani (banker of Bahia 
and Hinister of Quadros); Deputy Joao Mendes (leader of the ADP); 
Ernesto Leme (Rector of the University of Sao Paulo); Dom Helder 
Camara (Bishop of Rio de Janeiro); Dom Vicente Scherer (Archbishop 
of Porto Alegre), Dom Fernando Gomes dos Santos (Archbishop of 
Goi~?); Dom Jose Tavora (Bishop of Aracaju); Padre D'Avila 
(vice-rector of Pontificia Universidade Catolica); Joao Camilo 
de Oliveira Torres (writer and historian); Fernando Sabino (writer); 
Helio Eeltrao (techno-entrepreneur of Rio de Janeiro); Alvaro 
Americano (entrepreneur of Rio de Janeiro); Octavio Gouveia de 
Bulhoes (techno-entrepreneur of Rio de Janeiro); Edgard Texeira 
Leite (vice-president of the Council for National Agrarian Reform); 
Julio de 1'1esqui ta Filho (owner of 0 Estado de Sao Paulo); Frederico 
Heller (of Consultec); Rubem Berta (president of VARIG); Raimundo 
Padilha (ADP Federal Deputy); Flexa Ribeiro (UDN); Sergio 
},Iarinho (senator); }liguel Reale; Aluisio Alves (governor of 
Rio Grande do Norte); Euclides Aranha (entrepreneur); Concei~ao 
Neves (State Deputy of Sao Paulo); Fernando Ferrari (leader of 
the j\iovimento Trabalhista Renovador, a right-wing wplinter of 
the PTE and Edgard Santos, Rector of the University of 
Bahia. A£ter a tactical appraisal of the pool of names, a 
short list was handed down to Glycon de Paiva, at a meeting 
of the Executive Committee in Rio. The list consisted of: 
Lacerda, Carvalho Pinto, Aluisio Alves, Juracy Magalhaes, 
Mem de Sa, Milton Campos, Daniel Faraco, Lopo Coelho, Raquel 
de Queiroz, Lelio Toledo Pizza, Euclides Aranha, Luis Carlos 
Mancini, Joao Mendes, Dom Vicente Scherer, Helio Beltrao, 
Alvaro Americano, Octavio Gouveia de Bulhoes, Rubem Berta, 
395 
Raimundo Padilha, Miguel Reale and J. Marinho. The programme s , 
according to General Golbery, had to follow a mixed line 'having 
one common denominator - democracY',107which was understood 
as a wide capitalist platform opposed to Goulart, the populist 
stance and that of the left. 
By July 1962, an outline was ready for what was named 
the Encounter of Democrats with the Nation (Encontro de 
Democratas com a NaQao). It stated its fundamental aims as 
being those of strengthening what IPES called the 'Democratic 
convictions of the people', especially in relation to the 
forthcoming legislative elections of October 1962, to affirm 
a 'middle of the road' voice in the midst of the extreme right-
left wing dialogue; orienting the electoral choice 'in the 
sense of containing the ongoing process of increasing radical-
ization of the Brazilian political life'. Some of the leit-
motivs to be outlined were that all the current problems of 
the country could be solved within the democratic framework, 
that the radicalization of the political process was of 
interest only for adventurers, irresponsible or anti-democratic 
elements,at the 'service of ideologies foreign to the Christian 
feeling of our people', as well as the maintenance of a regime 
of private initiative and free enterprise as the ~~ ~ 
for the solution of the problems affecting the country. 
396 
They decided upon 14 weekly sessions through the national 
television network, of 30 minutes each. The programmes would 
receive wide press and radio coverage. Interviews were to be 
held with elements of the most diverse segments of society, 
'all with previous acceptance of the fundamental aims of the 
programme and full agreement with the master-ideas mentioned 
above' • The journalists would be chosen from the various 
regions of the country. In each session a debate would take 
place,in a language within reach of the great public and without 
technical details which could blur the political message, on 
two or more of the principal issues already being discussed 
throughout the campaign oriented by the Group of Public Opinion. 
Among these themes were: Agrarian Reform, Development and 
Inflation, Tributary Reform, Participation of the Employees in 
the Enterprises, The Alliance for Progress, Foreign Capital, 
The Role of the University in National Life, State Planning versus 
Free Enterprise, Democracy and Communism, Parliamentarism versus 
Presidentialism, Electoral Reform,and Rural and Urban Trade-
U · . t· 108 n~on~za ~on. 
The organic elite maintained a series of political programmes 
in Sao Paulo, especially intensified in the critical election 
and post-election months of October and November 1962, to which 
prominent regional and national public figures were brought to 
express their views on current affairs. Among the participants 
were: Jamil Nunhoz J3ailao (on/Democratization of Capital' and 
on
/J3asic Reforms') j DDt! deputy Padre GodinhOj Carmen Prudente j 
several leaders of the Ordem dos Advogados (Lawyers'Order); 
trade-union pelego Jose Rotta; Jurist and mentor-of the, Estado Novo 
Francisco Campos (on ~ Panorama of the J3razilian situation') j 
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UDN deputy Pedro Aleixo (on the 'Elections of October'and on the 
'Crisis of Authority); Senator Mem de Sa (on Profit Remittance, 
on Infl&'tion and on the Cost of Livin@; Joao Mendes (on 
Resistance to Demagogic Pressures); Padre D'Avila (on Christian 
'solidarismo' - the doctrine of Christian social solidarity, of 
which he was an ideologist - and on Social Order); General 
Juracy Magalhaes (on Political Problems of the Northeast); 
Milton Campos (Parliamentarism); W. Menezes (on Workers' problems); 
Alberto Betanye (on solutions to the problems of the workers 
within the capitalist system); Raquel de Queiroz (on "False 
Nationalism") ; Sandra Cavalcanti (on the Electorate of Guana-
bara and demagoguery) and Leda Collor de Mello(Private Cooperation in 
Social Welfare). The line of argument was prepared by the 
study and doctrine groups of IPES. I09 Another series of 
programmes on TV Cultura - Channel 2 was of particular interest. 
In this programme, personalities from different walks of life, 
whose opinions were 'in agreement with IPES objectives', were 
interviewed on matters of popular and middle class interests 
and on current affairs. According to Flavio Galvao, the 
leadership of IPES Sao Paulo intended to bring periodically 
to those programmes public figures based in Rio, as well as 
those from Sao Paulo. The Doctrine and Study Group of Sao 
Paulo drew up a list of themes, working out the argument. 
Among the Rio people were: General Golbery do Couto e Silva 
(' Democratic_ Nationalism' ); Luiz Carlos Hancini (Economic 
Progress and Social Justice); General Jurandir Bizarria Mamede 
(on Armed Fomes and Democracy); Jose Garrido Torres (on Free 
Enterprise) ; and Raimundo Padilha (on the Parliamentary 
Investigation over the National Union of Students):lO General 
Lyra was also considered. III 
IPES also sponsored jointly with IBAD, various other 
series of TV programmes, such as Frente a Frente (Face to Face) 
and individual presentations of polemical issues, among them 
Que Pensa Voce sobre a Reforma Agraria? (What do you think 
about Agrarian Reform?) on TV Cul tura; Carvalho Pinto IS 
appraisal of the political situation through radio and ~lt 
Herbert Levyls Reforma da Constituiqao e Defesa da Democracia 
(Reform of the Constitution and Defence of Democracy), on TV 
Tupill~; Joao CaIman'S discussion of the Problemas Nacionais 
(National Problems), on TV Cultura; Admiral Silvio Heck's 
most important public appeal and address through TV 4 of Sao 
Paulo, launching the Civilian~ilitary Patriotic Frontl14 ; and 
Mem de Sals address after the realization of the Congress on 
Basic Reforms. 115 
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IBAD was very active in the south of the country, especially 
through TV Parana, where it had two key political programmes.116 
The organic elite also backed, sponsored and coordinated, 
mainly through 1PES, a massive TV campaign for the Alliance for 
Progress, coordinated with newspaper inserts and distribution 
of pamphlets. Moreover they also sponsored the TV Escola 
programme of Gilson Amadol17 and the series Capitaes do 
Progresso (Captains of Progress), thirty weeks of programmes 
in Belo Horizonte, Sao Paulo, Recife, Salvador and Bras{lia.118 
The lPES network of general propaganda and indoctrination 
took care to circulate and relay TY material which was 
produced in Rio and Sao Paulo throughout the country, making 
good use of friendly airlines, TV stations and other agencies. 119 
To coordinate activities analysing and providing public opinion 
inputs on current affairs, lPES mounted a I speakers bureau I • 
In Rio, this action was led by Harold Polland, Nei Peixoto 
do Valle, Oswaldo Tavares and Rui Gomes de Almeida, while in 
Sao Paulo it was Flavio Galvao who led the operations. 120 
In the period from 'July to September 1962, prior to the 
October Congressional elections, Promotion S.A. sponsored 
programmes in the name of .A1)EP, in 13 television and radio 
stations throughout the country. In th~se programmes current 
affairs were discussed by wellknown right-wing public figures. 
These thirty-minutes long, twice weekly programmes on a total 
of 312 stations, were charged by the stations at a price of 
450.000 cruzeiros per half-hour, (a total of 140.000.000 
cruzeiros). These programmes were called: Esta e a Noticia 
(This is the news); Assim e a democracia Crhis is Democracy) ; 
Democracia em Marcha (rremocracy on the march); Julgue voce 
mesmo (Judge for Yourself); Estado do Rio em Foco (Rio state 
in Focus) and Conhesa seu candidato (Know your candidate). 121 
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In Assim e a democracia, ADEP sponsored and~romoted the 
presentation of ADP politicians and entrepreneurs Padre Godinho, 
Antonio Feliciano, Alipio Correa Netto, Araripe Serpa, Paulo 
Lauro , Hamilton Prado, Aniz :Badra, Arnaldo Cerdeira, Agenor 
Lino de Mattos, Nenotti del Picchia, Jamil Gadia, Yukishique 
Tanura, Jose Henrique Turner, Scalamandre Sobrinbo, Abreu Soare, 
Mario Oovas, Cunha :Bueno, Jose Menck, Tufic Nassif, Herbert Levy, 
Homero Silva, Antonio Hagaldi, Valerio Giuli, Chaves do 
Amarante, Dante Perri and }1ario :Beni. 122 
The organic elite became connected with a host of wellknown 
producers, actors and directors of television programmes, such 
as Gilson Arruda and :Baptista do Amaral. It favoured the use 
of comic programmes when possible. As Rui Gomes de Almeida 
noted, a joke against a politician could provoke 'formidable 
harm' • The organic elite also severed support for actors 
who did not cooperate, or acted against, the programmes, the 
lines of reasoning and the people which IPES sponsored. 
This was the case with Chico Anisio, a popular figure on TV 
and acute observer of social reality. Another casualty of 
this kind of pressure was Arapua, the widely-read columnist 
of Ultima Hora, who kept a section in which humorous criticism 
of Uni ted states policy was frequent. 
the newspaper in 1962.123 
He had to leave 
Finally, the organic elite was able to block undesirable 
and uncooperative individuals and programmes. That they would 
not have many difficulties in doing so was understandable. 
In October 1959, the powerful Brazilian Association of 
Advertisement Sponsors - AB~was founded with the aim of 
gathering together the principal advertisers, establishing 
among them conditions for the mutal defence of their interests 
as well as the discussion of matters related to propaganda and 
sales promotion.124 ABA's thirteen founder members, as well 
as the companies which joined it later, were related to IPES 
as direct financial contributors and through the participation 
of their directors in the executive levels of IPES.125 It 
was precisely to coordinate their activities and produce a 
common guide-line, that a meeting of the big advertisers on 
TV was held at IPES in mid_1962.126 
Radio was a powerful means of general indoctrination and 
a valuable focus from which to mount offensive actions against 
the executive, especially in a country of masses of poor 
people who could not afford television sets. Horeover, with 
such a large proportion of the population being illiterate, 
and therefore not reached through the indoctrinating activities 
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of the press, the relatively cheap transistor radio,avai1ab1e 
in the most remote corners of the country, was an enormous aid 
for the organic elite. As with television, lPES did not 
openly sponsor radio programmes. Nevertheless, its 
401 
connections with radio was not only in the form of financial 
support for anti-communist weekly programmes, geared to a 
working class public, such as those of Radio Tupi in Sao Paulo;27 
but a 1 s 0 i n the s p 0 n s 0 r s hip 0 f a v a r i e t y 0 f 
programmes an d public figur es, co nferences 
and dis c u s s ion s • 
Most of the radio propaganda of the organic elite was 
made under the ostensible or covert sponsorship of ADEP and 
Promotion S.A. In 1961, IBAD had r ad i 0 pro g r a mm e s in 
34 principal cities. By July 1962, it had 51 programmes in 
top reception houxs duxing "reekdays and special programmes at 
weekends. At the height of its activities, IBAD had more than 
80 weekly radio programmes, transmitted allover the country 
at peak reception houxs. IBAD also financed 300 daily radio 
programmes duxing the height of its campaign, before the 
legislative elections of October 1962, and at this time 
practically controlled the country's air time. 128 Through 
82 radio stations, IBAD transmitted such programmes as Congresso 
em Revista (Congress in Review) and A Semana em Revista (The 
week in Review).129 These programmes, produced in popular 
language, drove home to the listeners the points of the organic 
elite~ The organic elite also formed their own 'Network of 
Democracy', of more than 100 radio stations allover Brazil. 
From October 1963 until the coup in April 1964, the radio 
stations of this network o~ganized by Jo~o Calmon of the 
Diarios Associados, among others, went on the air at exactly 
the same time as those of the labour leader Leonel Brizzola, 
thus effectively 'jamming' his broadcast and delivering a 
130 steady stream of attacks on the labour left. 
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lEES also sought the help of Raul Brunini of Radio Mundial 
of Rio de Janeiro, a popular radio station, and that of Alziro 
Zarur, a right-wing 'Christian' populist politician, who had 
a wide political impact in urban slum areas. He also appealed 
strongly to Umbanda sectors.13l Professional politicians 
served as sources of feedback and as advisers on the efficiency 
and relevance of the IPES propagandistic campaign, by reporting 
back to the Executive Committee their own impressions and those 
which they had gathered among the general public. In this 
respect Senator Mem de Sa stood out, because of his capacity, 
influence and popular prestige.132 He was one of the most 
important covert links lEES had in Congress. As part of the 
advice given by Senator Mem de Sa, the IPES leadership was urged 
to emphasize that 'development' could only be attained through 
more security and the liberty of free enterprise. 
Theatre people and television personalities gave a helping 
hand, such as Carlos Laje, who was connected with lEES leader 
Gilbert Huber.133 This allowed lEES a singular form of 
'cultural' intervention. lEES supported the SAJE theatre in 
Sao Paulo, taking care of the pay roll of the theatre's people. 134 
lEES leader Luis Cassio dos Santos Werneck was responsible for 
contacts in this area. The public opinion group also played 
a big part in the preparation and distribution of propaganda 
films. 
~sychological warfare through 
fhe Comic Strip and Films 
lEES attempted to reach a wide literate public by use 
of the comic strip. 'Dialogo Democraticus' was placed in 
four newspapers widely sold among the popular sectors and the 
petit bourgeoisie, (0 Dia, Luta Democratica, ~ltima Hora and 
o Globo), stressing such values as private initiative, 
productivity and political plurality, as well as the rejection 
of '~tatiste' or socialist policies.135 The importance of 
comic strips was immense in a country where a large segment of 
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the population had limited reading abilities. This fact, duly 
noted by the organic elite, prompted the widespread release of ' 
booklets, magazines, cartoon strips in the press and leaflets 
which popularized the same line of argument developed by 
lEES/IBAD in other media, though geared to 6ther sections of 
the pUblic.136 
To reach a wide public, IPES relied on a series of 
extremely effective films produced by itself, and on others to 
which it gained access. These were shown in all cinema circuits 
throughout the length and breadth of the country in regular, 
as well as in special, sessions. Films were shown in a 
'chain-system', by arrangement with distribution companies and 
owners of cinema houses connected to lEES. Subsidiary and 
related organizations, such as the Social Service for Industry -
SESI, circulated lEES-made films. These were also shown on 
television, as in Silveira Sampaio's popular programme of 
current affairs.137 
To reach the poor, who could not afford a cinema ticket, 
lPES mounted projectors on open trucks and buses with special 
chassis, displaying the films not only in the favelas and 
poorer urban neighbourhoods of the main cities of Brazil, 
but also throughout the interior of the states.138 This 
project followed up an idea put forward by Oswaldo Tavares, of 
a 'cinema ambulante' (m 0 b i 1 e cinema) for Rio's poorer 
sections. Some of the big companies provided IPES with the 
required technical infrastructure, such as Mesbla S.A., who 
contributed projection equipment, and other necessary 
requirements. Mercedes Benz and CAlO, one of the biggest bus 
and truck body builders in Brazil helped with transport.139 
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Films were also screened in factories located in the industrial 
centres of the big cities, for the consumption of the industrial 
workers, by arrangement with the managers and owners. 
The main feature was usually an American 1tlestern, with 
IPES shorts slotted in, ranging from a plea for social harmony 
among classes to a commentary on the exploitation of students 
for political purposes.140 
Some of the films were produced for lEES by Jean Manzon, 
the biggest commercial documentary producer in Brazil, who also 
helped in the circulation of films. 14l Among these films were: 
o lPES ~ 0 Seguinte (IEES is the following), .... ~ Que e 0 IEES? 
(N.hat is lEES ?); Historia de um Maquinista (story of an engineer 
worker), Nordeste Problema No.1 (Northeast Problem No.1), 
Criando homens livres (Rearing free men). Other films shown 
through this network of propaganda were: Que e a Democracia? 
(What is democracy?), Vida Har{ tima (Hari time Life), Portos 
Paral{ticos (Paralytic Ports), Asas da Democracia (i'lings of 
Democracy), Conceito de Empresa (The Concept of Enterprise), 
A Boa Empresa (The good enterprise), Deixem 0 Estudante Estudar 
(let the Student study), Uma Economia Estrangulada ( A Strangled 
Economy), Papel da Livre Empresa (Role of Free Enterprise!142 
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Responsible for these operations were Jose Rubem Fonseca 
and Luiz Cassio dos Santos Werneck. 143 
lEES Sao Paulo produced some films on its own, as well 
as a series on Brazilian problems, such as 'Electoral Reform', 
'Agrarian Reform', 'Etatisme' and 'Free Enterprise'. It 
sponsored Filhos da Demagogia (Sons of Demagogy) made by 
Senator Aur·:) de Moura Andrade, one of the major landowners of 
Sao paulo:44 CONCLAP also produced some films and the American 
based organization Moral Rearmament , with whom lEEs/mAD. had a 
very close rapport, provided lEES with various films. The 
copies of those films were in the custody of Luiz Severiano 
Ribeiro, the biggest owner of cinema houses and film distributor 
of Brazil.145 Luiz Severiano Ribeiro's support was very useful 
indeed. 146 
Publicity companies contributed financially to the making 
of films that were to carry specific lEES messages and entre-
preneurial ideology. This operation was discussed between 
J.B. Leopoldo Figueiredo and propaganda man David Monteiro, 
who for this task was to collaborate with· Emil Farhat, of 
McCann Erickson Publicidade and Visao magazine. 147 
Films were not only for the consumption of the working 
class, rural labourers or 'lumpen' proletariat. Sao Paulo 
produced films were shown in such exclusive places as the 
Monte L{bano and other Paulista social clubs, Lyons Club and 
the School of Police in Sao paulo:48 In charge of film 
exhibition for industry and commerce and some other entities 
was Ricardo Cavalcanti de Albuquerque. 149 Films were shown 
also at Universities, through the lPES penetrated Gremios 
(stUdent federations), as was the case of the Faculty of Medicine 
in Sao Paulo and the Faculty of Law of Mackenzie University. 
In charge of these operations was A.C. Pacheco e Silva.150 
Last but not least, lPES also produced a series of films 
with a double-pronged appeal to the Armed Forces and to the 
general public, portraying the nation-building role of the 
military. Films were produced about the Merchant Navy, the 
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Air Force, the War Navy and the Army. According to Luiz Cassio 
dos Santos Werneck, some of the films were to be made by 
Canal 100, owned by Carlos Niemeyer, a short-film producer and 
current affairs film maker.151 Canal 100 was the most popular 
and most widely distributed newsreel shown in almost all 
commercial circuits before the main feature film. Jose Rubem 
Fonseca was in charge of studying the scripts of the films with 
Carlos Niemeyer himself. 
IPES also received support from outside sources. Nei 
Peixoto do Valle was in contact with Harry Stone, the 
representative of Notion Pictures, singled out as a USA Centr8.1 
Intelligence agent, who provided basic material as well. 152 
Specific Indoctrination 
This section describes the activities whicb were intended 
to shape the entrepreneurial sector into a class 'lOr itself' and 
to push it into action, supporting and participating directly 
in the general effort led by the organic elite. As was put 
by Glycon de Paiva, the IPES motto might be to businessmen: 
'if you do not abandon your business today for an hour, 
tomorrow you will have no business to worry about. ,153 The 
specific indoctrination carried out by IPES also aimed at the 
mobilization of the ever widening numbers of intellectuals, 
journalists, university students and Armed Forces towards a 
'common will' defined by the emergent power bloc. The 
outcome of IPES activities was to conceal the demands of the 
multinational and associated bloc within the various pressures 
of a wider spectrum of class interests and action, while 
isolating Goulart's executive and neutralizing positions of 
a reformist-distributionist character. Most of these 
activities were carried out by the Rio lEES groups of 
Doctrine, Study, Integration, Public Opinion and the covert 
groups of lEES Sao Paulo. 
The Doctrine groups provided ideological briefings to be 
disseminated among lEES/IBAD affiliates. This indoctrination 
was deemed necessary so as to provide a common denominator 
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for lEES affiliates when attending private meetings, symposiums, 
conferences, interviews or any other public political and 
ideological manifestation. The shaping of this class awareness 
and common political stance was considered to be of the utmost 
importance, both for IPES action in the polity and for the 
development of the organization as a whole. 154 
Not only did lEES/IBAD develop an intense ideological 
campaign aiming at its own rank and file of entrepreneurs, 
military and functional categories, but it also indoctrinated 
the bourgeois bloc at large, in an operation which was known 
within IPES as the 'projection of doctrine'. The organic 
elite sponsored and organized conferences, discussions, and 
symposiums, in schools, colleges, private houses, social and 
sports clubs, student and professional associations and at 
the headquarters of lEES itself. Many participants were 
recruited by the political units of the Integration group. 
The details were handled by General Heitor Herrera. The 
message which the organic elite spread, of strong anti-communism 
and broad modernizing aims, with anti-labour overtones under a 
professional-technocratic veil, had a strong appeal for new 
recruits among the entrepreneurs, military and middle classes. 
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It served the purpose of upholding and building up the legitimacy 
of the Armed Forces' anti-government involvement in politics. 
A measure of the success of the propaganda machine of the organic 
elite was shown by mid-196J when populist and na~ional-reformist 
political~titudes were depicted by IPES and by the middle 
classes, the Armed Forces and entrepreneurs, as intertwined 
phenomena, thus reinforcing their rejection of both the regime 
and its labour-left critics. 
Various methods were used to hammer home the IPES/IBAD 
message. One of the most popular was the political-economic 
courses. These courses were administered both by civilians and 
military members of the organic elite, disseminating among the 
entrepreneurial organic intellectuals both the concepts and 
the worries about business-oriented security and development. 
Present at the meetings were industrialists, bankers, tecnicos 
and military.155 
In order to ensure lFES influence, a group of covert lPES 
directors was appointed to each~ace where seminars were held, 
in such a number as to allow them to set the tone and aims of 
the discussion that followed the lecture.156 These directors 
met before the seminars took ~ace, in order to fix the general 
norms of orientation of the referred seminars and conferences, 
which took place usually under the cover of an in t ere s t 
association, generally the Commercial and Industrial Associations 
as well as the Rural Societies. The themes treated in the 
IPES sponsored and organized seminars reflected the sophisticated 
level of the organic elite.157 Moreover, by taking 
advantage of the overlapping of some of its leaders and 
affiliates with ESG and ADESG, IPES organized and participated 
in courses for entrepreneurs and military alike. By the 
end of 1962, IPES leader Jose Ely Coutinho informed the IPES 
leadership about the organization of a Course of National 
Defence at the Sociedade Harmonia de Tenis, a Paulista social 
and sports club, modelled on a previous course de11ve~Q " 
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at the JoquciClube under the aegis of ADESG. 158 From IPES 
Pacheco e Silva and Luiz Cassio dos Santos Werneck participated:59 
IPES organized 'soft-ideological' courses and seminars 
as well. At the Clube de Engenharia of Sao Paulo, a centre 
for professional discussion and political articulation, a cycle 
of conferences was set up, on the 'Causes of Social Unrest in 
Brazil' (Causas da InquietaQao Social no Brasil):60 Another 
locus of ideological dissemination was the FundaQao Lowndes, 
formally instituted in December 1963, in Rio de Janeiro. Its 
patron was Vivian Lowndes, an IPES contributor and wife of 
IPES leader Donald Lowndes, who was the president. It provided 
ideological courses and reference points for entrepreneurs and 
their executives. 
161 the lecturers. 
IPES affiliates or linked personnel were 
IPES/IBAD did not rely . only on local organic intellectuals . 
to disseminate their views. European and Americans also 
participated. IPES brought over from France the militant right-
wing writer Suzanne Labin, whose books IPES distributed. Labin 
lectured on 'Tactics of Communist Infiltration' and 'Political 
"[ar' for the most varied audiences and at such a range of places 
in Rio and Sao Paulo as ADESG, ESG, the Centre of Industries 
of Rio de Janeiro, the Sindicato dos Armadores (Syndical centre 
of Shipbuilders), Colegio Santo lnacio, Teatro Municipal, 
lEES' own Institute of Education, the Automovel Clube, and 
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Colegio Mackenzie. Conferences and meetings were also organized 
in Porto Alegre, Belo Horizonte and Curitiba. 162 
The organic elite provided for lectures at the Federation 
of Industries of Sao Paulo, CONCLAP, the Forum Roberto Simmonsen, 
tl:e:Commercial Association of Rio de Janeiro and other class 
associations throughout the country. In this process it shaped 
not only civilians to a particular path of development. lEES 
invited military officers to these lectures and courses 
indoctrinating them in entrepreneurial interests, which were 
generalized as 'industrial national needs'. The military became 
'civilianized' in this process. Value congruence established 
already through the ESG rapport was reinforCedand the Armed 
Forces were portrayed as 'natural' entrepreneurial and political 
partners for this particular kind and form of development. 163 
The Church became another ideological battlefield in the 
Goulart government, and perhaps one of the most influential 
channels for indoctrination. By the late 1950s and early 
1960s, the drive for social change permeated the Catholic 
clergy and society's conflicts we r e ref rae ted· 
within the newly formed ideological cleavages. New perceptions 
and stance s by the lower I ranks of the clergy and by broad-
minded figures, such as Frei Tomas Cardonell, a French Dominican 
and Padre Henrique de Lima Vaz, a professor of Philosophy, were 
challenging the traditional attitude of the hierarchy and even 
the positions of. right of centre figures such as Dom Helder 
CaJ:na.ra and Dom Eugenio Salles, Bishop of Natal. 
The reformist positions crystallized in popular organiz-
ations, such as the Catholic Workers Youth, the Catholic 
Student Youth, the Catholic University Youth and Popular 
Action, a multi-sectoral political front. The Church was 
fundamental for the organic elite, for the clergy provided a 
much needed grass roots hold, being the only true national 
structure besides the Armed Forces. It was the ideal organ to 
reach the middle classes, of which, students, intellectuals, 
the organized womens' movements and military were an obvious 
part as well as the peasantry and sectors of the urban working 
classes. 
Pressure upon the Church was exerted by IPES/IBAD 
affiliates,who were linked to the ecclesiastical and lay 
structures of the Church, and through the agency of Opus Dei, 
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an organization that in Latin America, as in Spain, supported 
economic liberalism and technoc~tic polities in contrast to 
other segments of the Church at that time. 164 These activities 
of IPES/IBAD attempted to incorporate the widest possible 
spectrum of Catholic intellectuals and public figures who were 
not aligned with the government or who were opposing it. Thus, 
somewhat discordant positions were rallied behind a loosely 
connected Social-Christian-Solidarity message, which was blended 
in with the modernizing-conservative idea of the organic elite. 
In this way such disparate figures as Alceu Amoroso Lima and 
the extreme right-wing Gustavo Cor~ao were brought into the 
lPES political fold. Adib Casseb of the Doctrine and Study 
group of Sao Paulo, was engaged in a programme of conferences 
and debates that attempted to convi·nce.' the public of the 
'incompatibility of Socialism and the Social Doctrine of the 
Church' •165 Hany reform minded Catholic intellectuals were 
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thus subtracted from the Goulart popular camp. 
Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, with the assistance of Jose 
Garrido Torres, two IPES affiliates with significant links 
inside the Catholic hierarchy, prepared a seminar on the 
Reformas Democraticas para um Brasil em Crise (Democratic 
Reforms for a Brazil in Crisis) which was sponsored jointly 
with Pontificia Universidade Catolica and the Association 
of Christian Entrepreneurs - ADCE, for the beginning of 1963.166 
The seminars purported to provide the 'Christian answer to the 
Crisis' as opposed to the socialist solutions that wem being 
presented. Members of the debate panels were all familiar 
names, making up an assorted, and in cases disparate, collection 
of entrepreneurs, technoentrepreneurs, politicians and academics. 
Members of the debate panels were: Octavio I1arconde s Ferrez, 
Joao Carlos Vital, Guilherme Borghoff, Clemente Hariani, Padre 
Velloso, J.P.A. Magalhaes, Paulo Ayres Filho, Themistocles 
Cavalcant i, J.B. Leopoldo Figueiredo, Lucas Lopes, Oswaldo 
Tavares, Eugenio Gudin, Paulo Lacerda, Miguel Reale, Julio 
Barata, General Juarez Tavora, Gustavo Cor~ao, R. Cardim, 
E. Fischlowitz, Gilbert Huber, Augusto F. Schmidt, Gilberto 
Marinho, Konder Reis, Eudes de So~za Leao, General Betemio 
Guimaraes, Dermeval Trigueiro, J. Irineu Cabral, vlanderbil t D. 
I de Barros, John Cotrim, H. Penido, Alvaro Alvim, Raimundo 
Noniz .Aragao, General L.A. Medeiros, Glycon de Paiva, 'dalter 
R. Poyares, Suzanna Gon~alves, Tarcisio Padilha, Padre D'Avila, 
Candido Hendes de Almeida, Joao Camilo de Oliveira Torres, 
Edgard da Nata IYIachado, Raimundo Padilha, Joaquim Ferreira 
Mangia, Hem de Sa, 14.ario H. Simonsen and Mario da Silva 
Pinto. The coordinating commission comprised: Padre Laercio, 
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Padre Avila, Padre Beltrao, Celestino Basilio, Jose Carlos 
Barbosa Moreira, Daniel Faraco, Jose Garrido Torres and 
Paulo de Assis Ribeiro. Denisson Propaganda, owned by IPES 
leader Jose Luiz Horeira de Souza, and the newspapers 0 Globo, 
Jomal do Brasil, Jomal do Commercio and 0 Jomal, took care 
of the promotion of the event. 
lPES also sponsored a Centre for Research and Social and 
Political Documentation at the Pontificia Universidade Catolica, 
and sponsored the establishment of a course on social and 
political science at the Faculdade de Filosofia,Ciencias e 
Letras de Campinas. It distributed to 'decision makers,168 a 
collection of studies and papers on a variety of subjects, most 
of them encompassed in the proposals of the Reformas de Base 
of IPES and the Congress for Basic Reforms. IPES also organized 
through PUC and the Diretorios Academicos (Student Councils), 
a series of seminars, conferences and discussion papers aimed 
at the student body at large. 
IPES links with the Pontificia Universidade Catolica - PUC, 
were significant. The PUC provided lPES with intellectual 
support; a field of action because of its student and academic 
population, as a channel for middle class penetration. It 
also functioned as a clearing centre and channel for financial 
contributions to and from IPES. Some of the activities in 
which PUC was involved are considered elsewhere. 
IPES assisted several Church oriented or supported magazines, 
such as the Revista Ponte Pioneira and Padre Crippa's Associa9ao 
de Cultura Brasileira Convivio, which published a more intellect-
ual magazine, Convivium, dedicated to 'cultural and political 
affairs' and to the 'study and defence of the values of our 
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Christian occidental civilization,.169 IPES, as in other 
cases, 'bought' a considerable amount of magazines for 
distribution among contributors and supporters. 'Convivium' 
was written mainly by university lecturers and intellectuals 
related to the Church. This organization acted through an 
Instituto de Forma9ao de Lideres (Institute for the Formation 
of Leaders), a news agency and a Centre for Research. The 
Institute offered basic courses to students, trade unionists, 
and other sectors of the public, preparing them for ideological 
and political militancy in their particular areas of activity, 
providing political orientation as well as aiming at the 
widespread dissemination of the IPES' message. The 'best' 
students were picked out to participate in specialized courses 
for activists, mainly aimed at the student and trade union 
organization. The Institute also organized cycles of 
conferences destined to indoctrinate public opinion. 170 IPES 
also supported Padre Crippa's other projects, such as the 
Escola Superior de Lideran~a (Superior School of Leadership) 
and the setting up of a political seminar. Joao Baptista 
Leopoldo Figueiredo appointed Paulo Edmur de ~ueiroz as link-man 
. .. 171 The news agency 
and adv~sor of Padre Cr~ppa's proJects. 
through which this action centre operated was the IPES outlet 
Planalto, 
As for the Research Centre, it provided the framework for 
the activities of right wing intellectuals dedicated to the 
analysis of the political situation. This work was subsidi~r 
to that of the Doctrine and Study group and that of the 
Conjunctural Survey group of IPES Sao Paulo. It was this 
section which published the magazine Convivium. 172 
Seeking to legitimate its public stance, IPES also 
intervened in apparently less offensive quarters. The 
Association of Christian Youth - Aill1 (the equivalent of the 
internationally known YMCA) was one of them~73 In spite of 
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their appearance and their declared sporting and cultural 
activities, the A~1 was deeply involved in political matters-
Moreover, the sight of ACH youngsters and their mothers parading through 
the streets of Sao Paulo, voicing their fear over the 
'communization'of the country was an effective piece of 
propaganda. They were heavily involved in popular mobiliz-
ation against the government, especially in street marches and 
public rallies, jointly with middle class womens organizations 
and other groups and movements sponsored by IPES. As 
reported to the IPES leadership, 'the ACM found.it convenient 
to maintain ~he unity of~group that organized the Democratic 
Rally (Cornicio Democratico) at Roosevelt Square in Sao Pauld. 174 
For the continuation of their efforts, they sought the help 
of IPES. 
The ACN was also an important asset in the infrastructure 
of IPES, as it provided a widespread network of centres for 
meetings, discussions, conferences and seminars. The carefully 
organized files of the ACN provided the organic elite with 
an identifiable target population for the dissemination of 
ideas in scattered neighbourhoods. It provided a valuable 
cross section of the middle class, assembling people from 
different walks of life and age groups. Because of its public 
image I the ACN had the advantage of providing' ins:bi tu:pional 
legitimacy for activities which did not quite fit the motto 
of the youth association; at the same time it could also operate 
as a financial clearing house for special contributions. 
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Some of the issues and themes of seminars and conferences 
organized by lEES that took place in ACM centres were: 
'Company executives and the Preservation of Free Initiative', 
'The Responsibility of Private Enterprise vis-a-vis Society', 
'Economic Cooperation between Brazil and U.S.A.' and 'The 
Role of the Government'. As a by-product of its attempts 
to shape class solidarity and heighten the political 
consciousness among entrepreneurs, executives and managers, 
IPES also spread in these conferences its ideological message 
to the middle-class members of the Aa1. Among the organizers 
of such events was lEES affiliate and entrepreneur, Decio 
Fernandes Vaeconcellos.175 
The Brazilian Scouts (Uniao dos Escoteiros do Brasil), 
led by Frei Daniel also received assistance from lEES, through 
Frei Metodio de Haas, who had been appointed by Archbishop 
Dom Jaime de Barros Camara.176 Contact was established 
initially through Eugenio E. Pfister with Paulo Ayres Filho. 
Guilherme Martins, of the Phillips company was sought as a 
candidate for contribution, because of his 'scoutist ties,.177 
Contributions to the Scouts served to shore up lEES public 
image, provided lEES with legitimate invoices for 'expenses' 
and another middle-class milieu in which to operate. 
lPES also carried out its indoctrination activities through 
FACUR, the Christian Fraternal Urban and Rural Friendship 
Association, which used the headquarters of the Brazilian Rural 
Society for its seminars and courses. Involved in these 
activities were lPES affiliates Jose Ulpiano de Almeida Prado; 
Paulo Edmur de Souza ~ueiroz; Jose Pedro Galvao de Souza, from 
the Faculdade Paulista de Dire i.+'o ; Padre Raphael Llano, from 
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Opus Dei; Adib Casseb and Padre Domingos crippa.178 FACUR 
was also heavily involved in the middle-class mobilization 
against the executive and specifically in the political 
mobilization of women organized by IPES, which will be 
described in more detail in Chapter VII. 
Other systematic means used to carry the IPES ideology 
to recruits, and also to shape the entrepreneurial social 
force into a bourgeois power bloc, were accomplished through 
a special group, that of Selective Education (Grupo de EducaQao 
Seletiva - GES) and through the Institute for Social Formation. 
The GES administered two basic courses, the Course on Brazilian 
Current Affairs - CAE (Curso de Atualidades Brasile~ and 
the Superior Course on Brazilian Current Affairs - CSAE (Curso 
Superior de Atualidades Brasileiras), which continued to operate 
after 1964. Horeover, IPES also organized, under the 
responsibility of Oswaldo Breyne da Silveira in Sao Paulo, 
specialized seminars, conferences and courses. 179 IPES 
provided 'scholarships' for students, urban and rural trade 
union leaders and other activists of the Circulos Operarios 
(Workers' Circles), the Catholic University of Campinas, of 
Convivium, the Movimento Universitario de Desfavelamento and 
the Instituto Universitario do Livro, in order to enable them 
to participate in those courses. 
Courses were given to different audiences and at separate 
places, having in mind their cultural and intellectual 
differences as well as their functional roles. But exchanges 
were stimulated amOJ:lg the groups, thus 'dotting the class 
barrier lines'. 
The programme of 'selective education' was a singular way 
to co-opt members of the state apparatus and of other 
classes. It started with the primary intention of bringing 
together different segments of the entrepreneurial class and 
functional groups, so they might 'live together' intellectually. 
A second stage was then to introduce, IFES -to them and 
make them IPES affiliates.1SO 
!PES envisaged the composition of a selective education 
unit as being ideally formed by 10 entrepreneurs, 4 liberal 
professionals, 2 working-class trade unionists, 2 students, 
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2 journalists, 5 IPES, and,J 'special' guests.181 They reserved 
2 places for suitable people who might fit cont~xtually into 
any specific course. 
Initially the seminars "lere to be grafted onto existing 
organizations which had at their disposal appropriate facilities, 
such as the Commercial Association, the Federation of Industries, 
the Clube dos Lojistas, the Centre of Engineers, the Reitoria 
of the Universidade de Sao Paulo, PUC, inviting to the direction 
of each seminar a member of the respective organization where 
the course was taking place. Sao Paulo activists of Doctrine 
and Study groups and Rio members of the Integration Group and 
of the study and Doctrine Group were to provide the infra-
structural support, as well as being its beneficiaries. 
The objects of the courses were to 'inform' entrepreneurs, 
1) r 0 f e s s ion a 1 s, bot h civilian and military, and public 
opinion makers such as journalists, student leaders, trade 
union militants (the 'different classes of the national elite', 
according to IPES leader General Joao Baptista Tubino), about 
current Brazilian problems within the ideological perspectives 
of IPES lS2 
. IPES also cultivated this fertile soil as a 
source of new recruits. An alumni organization called the 
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Association of ex-Alumni of IPES - ADIPES (Associa9ao de 
Diplomados do IPES) was eventually formed to help maintain 
the former students tied with IPES, with important functions 
after 1964. ADIPES was structured on the model of the Alumni 
Association of the Superior War College - ADESG, and was, 
according to IPES affiliate Colonel J. Vidal, integrated with 
the Course on Brazilian Current Affairs, serving as a reservoir 
of activists183for political action and policy research. 
Courses lasted three months and were organized in three 
different cycles, destined, according to General Tubino, to 
review 'basic concepts in the fields of economy, sociology, 
and politics' and to study the 'principal aspects of the 
national conjuncture,lf4 to search and stipulate framework 
for the solution of the principal problems of the Brazilian 
current situation; to introduce papers produced by the work-
groups of varied participants;85 Lecturers in the CABs were, 
again, all familiar names, 186 and the structure of the courses 
had similarities with that of the ESG study groups and courses. 
The CABs served other purposes as well. They were idea-
development units as well as research units into matters of 
entrepreneurial or political interest.187 The courses vTere 
designed to be an anti-ISEB endeavour, an attempt to pose an 
alternative to the national-reformist Superior Institute of 
Brazilian Studies, the policy research centre which also drew upon 
academics, military, journalists and students.188 
Finally, the Instituto de FormaQao Social - IFS, established 
in 1963, was dedicated to the recruitment of followers at all 
levels of Brazilian society' and to the dissemination of the 
ideology of IPES. It was also a convenient cover for courses 
of indoctrination among the working classes and for the 
development of trade-union activism. The IFS provided 
courses for entrepreneurs, executives and managerial staff, 
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as well as for students and female activists. It also 
provided special courses f,or trade-union and peasant activism. 
Conclusion: 
It is obvious that the range of operations developed 
and carried out by IPES/IBAD in so many areas involved 
extraordinary professional and political expertise, as well as 
enormous financial resources, which went well beyond what IPES 
officially declared to be its expenses. 
The multinational and associated bloc through its organic 
elite was able to encompass support within wide circles of 
the dominant classes in its attempt to shape-a new historical 
bloc. The organic elite did not rely solely upon the material 
force which their economic dominance gave them, in order to 
exercise an effective leadership of the dominant classes. It 
was clear from the policies and action of the organic elite 
centred in IPES/IBAD that they understood the need for ideological 
activity leading to the establishment of their hegemony within 
the dominant class, as a means to their rise to power. The 
shaping of a militant bourgeois bloc and its politico-military 
leadership by the organic elite was a necessary condition in 
the struggle of the emerging power bloc to bring its predominance 
in the economic field into consonance with its political 
authority and its influence in the state apparatus. The 
formation of a militant bourgeois bloc, under the leadership 
of the organic elite, was also necessary to achieve the 
containment of the subordinate classes and the exclusion of the 
traditional interests. 
Although the modernizing-conservative bloc was unable 
to impose itself by consensus on the Brazilian society, it 
nevertheless was capable through its ideological campaign to 
pre-empt the homogeneous support for the existing executive 
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and rally the middle classes against the government. Moreover, 
the effects of the IPES/IBAD activities had consequences on 
the capacity of the executive and the labour left to muster 
a feasible political alignment to carry through its national 
distributionist reforms. However, ideological containment 
of the popular classes and the ideological mobilization of the 
middle-classes was on its own not enough to bring about a 
change of regime. Ideological containment was supplemented 
and coordinated with other activities in the political and 
military fields, which will be described in the following 
chapters. 
The political-military action of the multinationalcand 
associated bloc would be central to the realization of the 
crisis of the populist historical bloc and fundamental in 
bringing about the institution of a new power bloc in state. 
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assembled material under the general coordination of 
the specialist in psychological vlarfare, General 
Golbery do Couto e Silva. These 'devillers' i·mre 
responsible for the 'scare campaigns'. The 'Red 
Scare' campaign unleashed by IPES 'vas also instrt.lI!lental 
in the improvement of its financial situation, as it 
brought contributions from panic-stricken business and 
professional men who feared for their future. As far 
back as early 1962, Dario de Almeida }~galhaes had been 
entrusted with the task of recruiting 30 well-YJ10vlD 
people to form an initial team which would vITi te 
articles for ivide sectors of public opinion, on r:'.atters 
determined by IPES. The published articles "Tould, 
according to circumstances, be ascribed or not to 
!PES. Payment was to be on the basis of 5.000 cruzeiros 
per article. A series of articles ,·ras produced under 
the general coordination of Dario de Almeida Maga~es 
and Nei Peixoto do Valle. Payment "laS met by the giant 
brei-rery and soft beverage company Antartica. IPES 
leader Miguel Lins ivas assigned for making these 
arrangements. IPES CD Rio, 19th Februa~J, 1962. 
22 Letter of J.E. Leopoldo Figueiredo, exhibited at the 
Parliamentary Inquiry Commission - CPI, instituted to 
investigate the denounced irregular activities of 
IPES/rEAD. In this letter was mentioned the 9urchase 
of editorial space in 0 Globo, and the support '\'lhich vlaS 
to be given to a right-',ving newspaper soon to appear. 
In 'Polltica e Negocios', 2nd September, 1963, p. 11. 
(TV Globo is presently the most po,\·rerf.ul audiovisual 
nen'Tork in Erazil). See also Plinio de Abreu Ramos, 
Como Agem os Grupos de Press~o, Rio de Janeiro, 
Editora CivilizaQffo Brasileira, 1963, p. 63. 
23 IPES CE Rio, 27th July, 1962, Glycon de Paiva. 
IPES CD Rio and CD Sgo Paulo, 20th November, 1962. 
24 As mentioned in Chapter V. 
25 Telegram to Department of State from Delgado/Arias, in 
Recife, No. 427, 29th June, 1962. In National Security 
Files - NSF at the John F. Kennedy Library. 
26 IPES CD Rio, 4th September, 1962, J.L. Noreira de Souza. 
27 Polltica e Negocios, 19th August, 1963, p. 30. 
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28 'As Sombras do IBil.D', CPI Hinutes, in VEJA, 16th Harch, 1977, 
p.4, Flavia Galv~o to Glycan de Paiva, p. 374 of the CPI 
Report, C!:lamber of Deputies, Erasllia, 1963. See also 
Plinio de Abreu Ramos, op.cit., p. 78. 
29 Among others, A.F. Schmidt produced his influential 
tColuna POI' Um' series in 0 Globo. Schmidt ivas 
extremely useful because of his influence and prestige 
wi th the Catholic middle class public. His 
denounciations of the centre and centre-left positions 
ivi thin the Church hierarchy, carr'lfing the moral 
authori ty of the enraged poet and professional vTri ter 
were particularly damaging. Even Dom Helder Camara, the 
centre-right Rio based bishop,i'Tas a particular target 
for Schmidt's attacks. His scathing remarks about 
Dom Helder's populist overtones and worries about 
the situation of the slum dvTellers of Rio ('this sudden 
conversion to the poor is far from deserving the 
consideration of the most lucid Catholics'), or his 
vitriolic attacks on the centre-left leaders of the 
FDC tagents of communism disguised as Catholics') earned 
him a special place in the propaganda effort of IPES/ 
IBAn. See further A.F. Schmidt, Preludio a Uma 
RevoluQgo, Rio, Edi~3es do Val, 1964, a selection of 
his political vlri tings published in 0 Globo. 
30 IPES CE Rio, 29th November, 1962, Glycon de Paiva. 
31 Clarence S. Hall, T.he Country that Saved Itself, Special 
- - ,- ---. - - -- -_.. -.,-.-
Feature in Reader's Digest, USA, November, 1964, p. 143. 
32 A steady stream of daily denounciation was orchestrated 
by the Public Opinion Group. Joao Goulart, the Communist 
Party, Tito, !1ao, Khrusnew, Cuba, the student unions, the 
trade unions, agrarian reform, 'etatisme', the Erazilian 
Labour Par:ty, corruption, inefficiency, socialism ivere 
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all thrown into a hotch-potch of condemnation by 
association. See also Julio de lfusquita Filho, A 
Democracia e 0 Fenomeno Erasileiro, in CESP, 14th August, 
1963; James \'1. RDive, Revolution or Counterrevolution in 
Brazil, American University Field Staff Report, East Coast 
South American Series XI, No.4, USA, 1964, pp. 11-12. 
33 08SP, 11th July, 1963. See also Eloy Dutra, Il3AD: Siglo 
da CorruDQ~O, Rio, CivilizaQao Brasileira, 1963, pp. 17-18. 
IPES/IBAD paid 2.000.000 cruzeiros monthly to A Noite, 
Plinio de Abreu Ramos, op.ci t. ,po 65. 
34 IPES Special Report, 6th June, 1963. 
35 IP~S GE, 11th Se~tember, 1962. 
36 IPES l'Iinutes, 25th May, 1962, General Golber'J. 
37 IPJS GE, 21st August, 1962', IPES eE, 29th November, 1962 and 
IPES GE Rio, 5th March, 1963. The idea '1TaS to "set the ball 
rolling, but \;,i thout the 'made in IPES' label". 
38 IPES Rio, 17th Hay, 1962 and~, 20th June, 1963. 
39 Eldino Brancante, Relatorio do Estado Naior Civil de 
Sao Paulo in General Olynmio Noura'b Filho - Nemorias: 
A verdade de urn Revolucionario. Presentation and 
Research by Helio Silva, Rio, L & PH Editores, 1978, p. 212. 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
OESP, 21st January, 1962, 'Pe10 Brasil, pe10 seu 
Progresso e pe1a Felicidade do Seu Povo, contra a 
desordem, a irresponsabi1idade e a demagogia'. 
IPES practically controlled or had the direct support 
of the major press in the main urban centres of the 
country, as seen in Chapter V and throughout Chapter VI, 
as well as international support from friendly press. 
IPES CE, 11th June, 1962. See also the space bought by 
!PES in CorreIo da Hanha for the neYlSpaper to publish 
an intervievT yTi th Hario Brant as mentioned in !PES CE, 
11th September, 1962. In the fall of 1961, Joao Funaro 
B1ey, co~~ander of the 4th Division of the 1st Army, 
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based in Minas Gerais, gave a speech in Be10 Horizonte 
before a conference of the state's Commercial Association. 
The meeting had been unde~vritten by the Diarios Associados 
chain, 1'Those publisher "was being given funds by the CIA 
to promote anti-communism. Predictably Funaro Eley gave 
an anti-communist speech... Funaro Bley claimed that 
Communists had penetrated every level of Erazi1ian 
society and posed a serious threat to democracy", in 
A.J. Langguth, Hidden Terrors, Ne,,, York, Pantheon, 1978, 
p. 77. For the incidents "Thich ensued the speech and 
its projection, see A.J. Langguth, 1978, pp. 78-80. 
IFES General Meeting, Sao Paulo, 23rd October, 1962. 
The Committee for the Alliance for Progress, established 
in Rio on 13th November, 1962, vTas composed of Luiz 
Sim~es Lopes (of Cia. FiaQao Tecidos Sao Bento, Ban~ue 
de l'Indochine, Societe Cotoniere Francoceani~ue), 
Joao Calmon (Digrios Associados), Them!stocles Cava1canti, 
Dantom Jobim and trade union Pelego Ary Campista. Gilbert 
Huber and Paulo Ayres vTere fre~uent1y in contact ,vi th 
US-ALPHO officials, US entrepreneurs and executives vrho 
vTere tuned in with the general aims of the Alliance, as v,Tell 
as government figures. Thus, in Hay 1962, Huber vTas able 
to report back to the leadership of IPES on ALPRO matters, 
his contacts with Teodoro Mosooso, the Puerto Rican born 
ALPRO executive and a special meeting on mining matters 
he held in the USA. IPES CE Report, Hay, 1962. 
See also his report on trip to the USA in July, IPES CE 
Rio, 3rd July, 1962 and Paulo Ayres' declarations on his 
participation in the meeting of entrepreneurs \'Ti th 
President John F. Kennedy, OESP, 6th ~hrch, 1963. 
This close contact bet\.,reen Ii?ES and the entre:preneurial-
political elites of the USA, throuGh the ALP3.0 as vrell 
as through private channels, allol·red for arlPle opportunities 
for manoeuvrability and support in their campaign to 
encircle and isolate the Brazilian executive. In this 
they were aided by the A.'7lerican Chamber of Commerce for 
Brazil, through Pedro Freire Cury and by the Committee 
for American-Erazilian Relations. It ilas through these, 
for example, that !PES would organize the big nultinational 
and associated enterprises to support the Special Edition 
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of 0 Globo of 28th February, 1962 on the Programme of 
the Alliance for Progress. Among the contributing 
corporations vlere: :Braniff Int., Leon Israel Agri'cola e 
Exporta9ao, IBN, Vick Farmaceutica, Esso :Brasileira de 
Petroleo, :Burroughs do :Brasil, The Home Insurance Co., 
American Insurance Co., st. Paul Fire and I,brine Insurance 
Co., Remington Rnad, ITT, Atlantic, Liquid Carbonic, 
General Electric, Gilette Safety Razor. See also 
Plinio de Abreu Ramos, op.cit., pp. 67-68. 
45 lI'ES CD Ria, 19th February, 1962. This ,ms done at a 
cost of 8.000.000 cruzeiros. See also N. :Blume, 
Pressure Groups and Decision-Making in :Brazil, Studies 
in Comparative International Development, Volume III, 
No.1, Saint Louis, Social Science Institute, \-Tashington 
University, 1967-68, p. 217. It is interesting to 
quote excerpts from one of the meetings in which the 
Alliance for Progress was discussed, 2.S it t..'lJ.roHs further 
light on the general proceedings and attitudes. For 
Jose Luiz Moreira de Souza, "A ideia e a a9aO polftica. 
Falta colocar 0 problema em sua grande perspectiva. Aos 
poucos, tudo gira em torno do grande eixo Oriente/Ocidente. 
Podemos dizer ate que, hoje em dia, a Pasta das Rela~oes 
Exteriores e a principal. Janio Quadros sentiu essa 
perspectiva e concebeu uma formula de A9aO Pol:ttica" ••• 
"antes das elei~oes, seria necessario, por exemplo editar 
e difundir a Ata da Alian9a para 0 Progresso, transformando , ,., 
em documento acce8s~vel a todo ~do, BO alcance de 
qualquer brasileiro. Ainda antes das eleicoes: Uma visita 
devidamente preparada de Kennedy ao :Brasil (vide Venezuela 
e Colombia). 'RemeDber' vista de Roosevelt. Ora, os 
polfticos tem antenas, sentem onde esta 0 lade do interesse, 
das vantagens, da vitoria. Sentem 0 que e nODular, em 
suma". l10reira de Souza added that "assim conduzida 
a questao, nao seria negocio para os pol:tticos profissionais 
passarem a ser ou continuarem a ser anti-ocidentais. 
Tambem seria necessario penetrar na area dos estudantes, 
conquistalos. Tudo junto, somado, daria uma especie de 
Plano de Salva9ao do :Brasil e da lL~erica Latina. 
Confidencialmente: Ja estao dados os primeiros passos para 
a visita de J.K. ao :Brasil, cern' Jacquie e tudo". 
I. IG.abin: "tudo esta bem, mas riada impede de pensarmos 
em termos immediatos". G. Huber: "Os primeiros passos ja 
foram dados. ~ serio, alguem deve publicaI' a Ata da 
Alian~a para 0 Progresso, na exatal Porgue 0 It&~araty 
nElo narece muito disnosto a face-lo". A. Gallotti: 
"Em texto facil, sob- a forma de cartilha ou em quadrinhos". 
Somebody who was not individualized in the minutes, 
reported then that "0 Insti tuto :Smsil-EEUU vai publicalo 
junto com: Carta de Juscelino e Ata de :Bogota. Tudo sera 
:publicado com texto exacto ll • !PES CE Rio, 5th February, 1962. 
46 At a later meeting, presided by J .0. Mello Flores, i·lith 
Harold C. Polland, G. Huber, General Herrera, J. Rubem 
Fonseca, A.C. Amaral Osorio, O. Tavares and J .L. Horeira 
de Souza, it "TaS reported that the pamphlet had been 
prepared, jointly YTith a television campaign on the 
matter. The decision vTaS taken to place the pamphlets 
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as an insert in the newspapers. J.L. Moreira de Souza 
suggested that the inlay should appear "Domingo proximo, 
antes da ida do Pres. Jango Goulart aos States. Faci1ita-
1he a tarefa e preocupa-o. Diversos jornais que rem 0 
encarte. Saindo primeiro na Guanabara, depois nos 
demais Estados lt • A. Gal10tti informed that the inlay i'Tas 
'already on the table of the AIilerican Embassy'. II Os 
Diarios Associados pub1icar~no exterior. Fim: Fazer 
a propaganda da democracia. Vinda de J. Kennedyao 
Brasil, antes das elei~5es. Onda da democracia crescendo 
antes da elei~ao. Po1~tica faz-se por ondas. Projeto 
J. Dantas: Empresarios preparado8 para discutir com 
todos". IPES CE Rio, 27th March, 1962. 
47 Andre Gama's booklet was circulated by entrepreneurs 
and managers to their employees. It is significant that 
the execution of the immediate edition of this booklet 
,,,as left to General Golber'lJ's responsibility and the 
budget vTaS taken care of by \vilson Figueiredo. IPES CE, 
19th November, 1962. 
48 IPES CD Rio, 19th February, 1962. 
49 John Foster Dulles, Unrest in Brazil: Po1itica1-Hilitary 
Crises, 1955-1964, Austin, Texas, University of Texas 
Press, 1970, p. 188. 
50 Jose Rubem Fonseca, Report to Economic Supporters, 
IPES, 6th June, 1963. 
51 Eduardo Portela's Cadernos Brasileiros was involved 
in a political scandal by 1967, accused of being 
connected "lith the CIA-supported wRgazine 'Encounter', 
Folha de Sao Paulo, 20th Janua~J, 1979. Directors of 
Cadernos Brasileiros vlere Jose Garrido Torres, Vicente 
Barreto, Afranio Coutinho and Nuno Velloso. 
52 One thousand and 'bro hundred units per issue ~Tere bought. 
IPES GE, 31st January, 1963, J. Garrido Tor:?::'8s. 
53 '0 Gorila', July, 1963. Moreover, in Rio, 50.OCO posters 
were printed vIi th cartoons depicting Fidel Castro lBshing 
the Cuban people Bnd the caption 'Do you H8.1'1t to live 
under the ,.rhip of communism?'. C.S. Hall, op.cit., p. 142. 
54 IPES CE Sao Paulo, 14th Ma.y, 1963. 
55 See Appendix L for B list of some of these publicBtions. 
56 
57 
58 
59 
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After April 1964, !PES continued to yublish and sponsor 
books and pamphlets. In 1967, !PES published Historia do 
Desenvolvimento Economico by ~lircea Euescu and Vicente 
Tapajos. The Council for Latin America collaborated in 
financing the edition of 5.000 copies. !PES also published 
'0 Imnosto de Servicos - Dtlvidas e Esclarecimentos sobre 
Sua Incidencia', by Arthur E.V. Aymore. 
N. Elume, on.cit., p. 215. 
~, 17th l1arch, 1979. 
!PES CE Sao Paulo, 11th December, 1962. 
The forerunners of these proposals were a tentative list 
of themes for study drawn up by the IPES/IBAD leadership 
in Janua~J 1962, and classified according to 'short-range' 
and 'medium-range' requirements. To each theme an 
individual, group or institution '-TaS ascribed, responsible 
for its realization. The degree of priority for the 
realization of these studies was determined by the needs 
of the Parliamentary Action Group and the political action 
coordinated by the Conjunctural Survey Group. The list 
of study groups ,ms as follm.;s: 
1) Profit Remittance (or definition of a policy of invest-
ment, especially urgent in view of the curbing measures 
on foreign capital intended by Goulart. Its convener 
was Mario Henrique Simonsen; 
2) Agrarian Reform, Jose Arthur Rios; 
3) Fiscal and Eudgetary Reform, H.H. Simonsen; 
4) 110netary Reform (including banldng reform and the 
creation of a Central Bank), Casimiro Ribeiro; 
5) Repression to the abuse of economic pm-rer, 
Denio Nogueira; 
6) Reform of the Electo~al Code, Tnemistocles Cavalcanti. 
(It is interesting to note that initially, OSI·mldo 
Trigueiro vTaS as signed to it); 
7) Participation of employees in the yrofits of enter-
prises, Nelio Reis; 
8) Functionality of social-economic planning. Aims and 
methods applicable in Erazil, Genival Santos; 
9) Problems of popular housing by IBAD, Luiz Carlos Hancini; 
10) Rural tradeunionization; 
11) Telecommunications, General Luiz A. Hedeiros of 
o Globo. 
The 'medium range' themes were: 
1) Economic and Sooial function of the modern 
enterprise; 
2) Expansion of market of capitals (supplementing 
measures proposed in the tributary and banlcLng 
reforms, as well as those referring to the 
stock market and 'sociedades anonimas'; 
3) Discrimination of incomes for the strengthening of 
the federative system; 
4) Dynamics of the economic development. Role of the 
private initiative and of state initiative; 
5) Revision of the Federal Constitution and of the 
Parliamentarian system; 
6) Reform of Labour Legislation; 
7) Reform of Social Security Legislation; 
8) Educational Reform; 
9) Reform of the Mines Code; 
10) Foreign Trade Policy (ALALC, ECC, I-Iron Curtain?; 
11) Transport policy; 
12) Energy policy; 
13) Public Health policy; 
14) Structural and methodological reform of public 
administration; 
15) 'Lei de Sociedades Anonirn.as'. 
The document added that all these themes (and others to 
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be eventually added) would be treated under the inspiration 
of the doctrine exposed in the Enc:Lclica 'Hater et 
Magistra' and framed wi thin the corresponding progra..r:une of 
action rep~sented by the 'Alliance for Progress'. 
Both these documents _ "lould be vulgarized by IPES, even 
under the form of commentaries to its thesis, vuth Jose 
Garrido Torres as the coordinator of the studies. 
(Plan for study of themes, !PES I'Mutes, 19th January, 
1962. See also IPES 11inutes, 29th },Iay, 1962. 
Co~ication from J. Garrido Tor~es to Gilbert Huber). 
4JJ 
60 A. Stepan, The }filitary in Politics, op.cit., pp. 186-187. 
61 In a letter from the CE to J. Garrido Torres, head of the 
Study Group, on 5th June, 1962, it '.'laS stressed that: 
nApos detida analise do relatorio apresentado pelo Chefe 
do Grupo de Estudos e 
- oonsiderando a necessidade de afirmar, junto a 
Opiniao Publica, a orienta~~o do IF~S, relativamente aos 
problemas nacionalesmais'em foco; 
- considerando 0 ritmo provavel em que tais assuntos 
ser~o discutidos no Congresso; 
- considerando os compromissos assumidos pelo Chefe do 
Grupo, em decorrencia de decisao anterior; 
- considerando, finalmente, a justa observa~~o do mesmo 
Chefe, de que "uma das maiores dificuldades encontradas 
ate agora no funcionamento do orgao tem sido a falta 
de comando e a de entrosanento nos setores do IPES; 
o Comite ~~ecutivo resolve solicitar ao Chefe do Grupo 
de Estudos as seguintes providencias: 
1) Coordenar as atividades de seu Grupo, de modo que cada 
urn dos trabalhos encomendados seja objeto de dois 
estudos; 
a) 0 primeiro, mais urgente, fixando a orienta~~o 
do IPES quanto as linr~s gerais que convem sejam 
observadas na elaboraQao do anteprojeto; as 
conclus5es do Grupo de Estudos, discutidas e 
aprovadas pelo Comits Executivo, serao enc~~adas 
ao Grupo de Opini~o Publica, nao apenas com vistas 
a uma campanha de esclarecimento e conquista de 
apoio, mas tambem para afirmar a presenQa do 
IPES; 
b) 0 segundo - necessariamente mais demorado -
visando a elabora~ao do anteprojeto de lei e 
respectiva justifica~ao, com todas as suas 
injun~5es de ordem tecnica. 
2) Progra8ar estas duas categorias de estudos, de modo que 
em cada reuni~o semanal do Grupo com 0 Comite Executivo 
sejam apreciadas as conclus5es a que se refere a Ietra 
a acima, cobrindo inicialmente os seguintes t{tulos: 
Ref orma Agraria 
LegislaQao Antitrust 
Reforma Tributaria 
Reforma Eleitoral 
Participa~ao nos lucros 
Telecomunica~5es 
Reforma or~amentaria 
Reforma Bancaria. 
3) A)resentar 0 or~amento mensal de despesas do Grupo 
para atender aos enco.rgos solicitados acir:JE.". 
62 IPES Minutes, 5th Februa~J, 1962, J. Garrido Torres, 
Glycon de Paiva, J. Behring de Mattos and I. Klabin. 
In IPES CE, 2nd May, 1963, it was decided to 'publish 
all the '!dorks of technical studies under the nane of 
lPES', and to 'deliver to deputies and senators all the 
bills of l?-w for presentation'. 
63 !PES CE, 28th June, 1962. 
64 !PES Rio Communication J. Garrido Torres to CD, 
29th May, 1962. Communication J. Garrido Torres to 
General L.A. Hedeiros, CE, 28th .June, 1962. 
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65 Minutes of working session of the group on 16th March, 1962. 
66 !PES Minutes, 20th March, 1962, J. Garrido Torres to 
General Herrera. 
67 Letter from Hario H. Simonsen to J. Garrido Torres, 
23rd February, 1962, Rio. Also J. Garrido Torres to 
CD nES, 29th May, 1962. The study i'laS budgeted at 
800.000 cruzeiros to be paid to Simonsen. 
68 Communication J. Garrido Torres to IPES CD Rio, 11th Hay, 
1962. Paulo de Assis Ribeiro's agency and Jose Arthur Rios 
and his agency vlere also involved in the study of Urban 
Reform, a research and policy paper for ,,,,hich Glycon de 
Paiva contacted Sandra Cavalcanti and~. Borghoff (both 
Carlos Lacerda's political associates). It vlaS 
J. Garrido Torres ,.;ho sought Lacerda's support. This 
study '!Nould take 6 months to finish and vTaS costed 
at 3.600.000 cruzeiros. It ,.;as budgeted as 'normal 
expenses df the study Group', and beca::le the basic 
material for the liousing Reform proposals of IIES. 
IPES CE Rio, 20th February, 1964, J. Arthur Rios. 
69 Conmunication J. Garrido Torres to IP.r:.;S CD, 29th Nay, 1962, 
'in agreement with '!dha t was arranged with Harold C. Polland'. 
70 IPES CE, 25th May, 1963. 
71 IFES CE Rio, 28th August, 1962, Glycon de Paiva. 
Also IPES C:6, 27th December, 1962. PuC carried out 
for IPES an analysis of the 1962 Congressional elections 
and other important stu.dies for "'hich it had an appropriate 
academic infrastructure. IPES CD Rio, 20th Deceober, 1962, 
Glycon de Paiva. The Study Group also committed Paulo de 
Assis Ribeiro's technical agency to prepare a paper on the 
election process, pattern of voting and political 
behaviour, a study "Thich came to be known in its popular 
form as Quem Elege Quem (I'Tho elects 1:Thom). I?ES CE, Rio, 
5th November, 1963. Assis Ribeiro also received 
400.000 cruzeiros as paYl11ent for 'serviQos extra ordinari os , 
for the 'Levantamento do Roteiro da Reforna A~aria' 
(Survey of the Guidleline for Agrarian Reform). 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
IPES CE Rio, 5th February, 1962. 
J. Garrido Torres, A Democratiza~ao da Empresa no Brasil, 
in Cadernos Brasil eiros, No.4, July/Augus,t, pp. 14-18. 
See also Jorge Oscar de Mello Flores and Gilbert Huber, 
'Democratie;ac;~o do Capital', Paper at 4th Conference 
of Public Relations. (ESP, lOth October, 1963. 
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Denio Nogueira and Hilliam Embry .... ,ere contracted for 
200.000 cruzeiros. The bill and its justification cost 
200.000 cruzeiros. (Communication of J. Garrido Torres to 
IPES CD, 29th May, 1962). T\.;o further studies '.'lere 
prepared. The first \-laS an analysis and criticism of 
the substitutive presented by Senator Sergio Narinho on 
the project 3.55 of the Chamber of Deputies. The 
second ,.,as released in the Monthly Bulletin of I?ES, 
defining the institute's stance on the matter. The 
convener and spokesman of this group vTaS Denio Nogueira. 
IPES CE, 5th June, 1962. Also Communication of 
J. Garrido Torres to General Herrera on 29th May, 1962. 
Gilbert Huber arranged financial backing for the project 
and the Sao Paulo Doctrine Group also gave its support. 
IPES CE, 27th December, 1962. 
IPES CE, 25th September, 1962, Harold C. Polland. 
Also IPES CE, 25th September, 1962, Harold C. Polland. 
On the Reform of the Legislative and the Public Administration, 
IPES received wide collaboration. Dom Helder Camara provided 
Polland with an analysis on the mechanisms of Congress, 
prepared by Nelson Mota, son of Candido Mota, the former 
integralista. 
IPES document 10th Janua~J, 1962. 
79 IPES CD, 3rd April, 1962. Also G. Huber, Report to 
the CE Rio, April, 1962. 
80 H. Cehelslq, The Policy Process in Brazil: Land Reform 
1961-1969, Ph.D. Thesis for the University of Columbia, 
:He',., York, 1974, p. 130. 
81 N. Bailey, op.cit., p. 220. 
82 AQao Denocratica, Rio de Janeiro, Febru.a~J, 1962, p. 12. 
83 Jose _~thur Rios, et ale RecomendaQoes sobre a Reforca 
Agraria, Rio de Janeiro, Edicoes do IBAD, 1961, p. ~CXV. 
84 Denio Nogueira, Dirceu Lino de Hatos, Padre Fernando 
Bastos D'Avila, Gustavo Corcao, Jose Irineu Cabral, and 
Moyses Rosenthal presented papers. OSSP, 13th June, 1963. 
T. Lynn Smith i<TaS a senior agricultural analyst for the 
US Departnent of State. He also belonged to the Institute 
of Brazilian Studies, Vanderbilt University and to the 
University of Florida. Jose Bonifacio Coutinho Nogueira 
i-ras the O'tmer of Usina Ac;ucareira Ester, Cia. Agrlcola 
s~o Quirin 0 , Comercial Agucareira e Cafeeira and Cia. de 
Administraqao e Representaqao Ester. 
85 IPES CE, 25th July, 1963. 
86 IPES Iunutes, 20th March, 1962. 
87 !PES IUnutes, 18th May, 1962. Among those to come out 
publicly in favour of an agrarian reform such as that 
supported by IPES was CONCLAP. .Q!&§E, 14th June, 1963. 
See also Paulo de Almeida Barbosa in A Gazeta, 8th ~fuy, 
1963; statement by the Federation of Industries of 
S§:o Paulo in Folha de Sao Paulo, 16th Nay, 1963. 
Another project yTaS delivered at the beginning of 1963, 
also appearing without the na~e of IPES. !PES GE, 
5th March, 1963, J. Garrido Torres. 
88 Julian Chacel, CNI/Conselho Economico, Position paper 
prepared for the Study group on the 'substitutivo 
Afranio Lage' on the Law of Agrarian Reform. 
89 These men ,.,ere , respectively, directors of Banco 
Portugues do Brasil; Boa Vista financial and industrial 
group; Bethlehem Steel and Companhia Brasi1eira de 
Explosivos; Funda9aO Getulio Vargas; Conselho Brasileiro 
de Produtividade - CBP; CONSULTEC, Light S.A., IBAD, 
SPLAN, CBP, ESSO, ABCAR, US Steel Corporation. 
These technoentrepreneurs and entrepreneurs, linked to 
big petrochemical, industrial, construction and ~ineral 
groups, strongly favoured the interdependence betYleen 
the rural and the industrial sector. 
90 J."\l. Rovle, op.cit., p. 82. 
91 See IPES Hinutes, 18th Hay, 1962, 25th r-fay, 1962, 
1st June, 1962, 4th June, 1962, 8th June, 1962, 
15th June, 1962, 22nd June, 1962, 27th June, 1962, 
29th June, 1962, 4th July, 1962, 11th July, 1962, 
18th July, 1962, 23rd July, 1962, 25th July, 1962, 
27th July, 1962, 31st July, 1962, 3rd August, 1962, 
8th AUo~st, 1962, 13th August, 1962, 15th August, 1962, 
27th August, 1962, 3rd October, 1962, 11th October, 1962, 
18th October 1962 and 9th November, 1962. 
92 !PES GE, 25th July, 1963. Through the Parliamentary 
Action Group, IPES sought its friends in Congress and 
individuals i'Tho had an important role to play in the 
articulation, such as Deputy Padre Godin.."}lO, ifere put 
on guard, as the organic elite braced itself for a 
political offensive against the labour sponsored 
agrarian reform. !PES prepared the naterial for 
Depu ty Aniz Badra' s bill of laYT ;"Thich carried 212 
signatures and \{as of an omnibus type, including 79 
articles dealing 'Iii th a broad range of I'la tters relating 
to agriCUltural assistance, land reform and rural living. 
For a text of the bill, as introduced, see Correia da 
NanM, , Rio de Janeiro, 7th August, 1963. 
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93 lPES Study Group to CD, 29th May, 1962. See also 
'sUmula de Atividades Desenvolvidas nelo Gruno de 
Estudos no Periodo Comnreendido entre Barco de 1962 a 
Fevereiro de 1963', and IPES Hinutes, 18th Nay, 1962. 
IPES militants roamed the length and breadth of the 
countryside participating in a varied array of events 
and organizing ideologically, politically and otherwise, 
the rural dominant classes. An example of such flurry 
of activity ,.,ras the Patos meeting of 23rd August, 1962, 
,\.,rhere Paulo de Assis Ribeiro and a team of IPES militants 
participated. !PES militants ,vere also active in shaping 
right \Ving party positions on the agrarian question and 
canvassing support among the lando\VDing classes through 
these political organizations, once their proposals had 
been accepted. Thus, for the 1963 UDN convention in 
Parana, convened to debate agrarian matters, came a 
delegation of politicians and entrepreneurs from 
S~o Paulo bringing a thorough economic-political 
propos~ ·non. Among the main points ,'rere the rejection 
of the proposed CGT - General iilorkers' Trade Union, 
the regulation of the right to strike, a modernizing-
conservative agrarian reform, the creation of a central 
bank, carr.ying out a banking reform and an electoral 
reform and finally, the establishment of an economic 
policy of government stimulus to export activities, 
control of inflation and wage austerity. The delegation, 
headed by UDN politician-entrepreneur Roberto de Abreu 
Sodre ,also comprised lPES activist,s, Herman de Norais 
Barros, Os~mldo Breyne da Silveira and Ariovaldo de 
Carvalho. In OESP, 28th April, 1963. Tlle theses "Here 
adopted. - -
94 Carlos Jose de Assis Ribeiro prepared a Project of 
Constitutional Amendment on Agrarian Justice and 
Jose Arthur Rios produced a paper analyzing Project No. 
93 of the 1963 Senate, disposing on the Statute of the 
Land. IPES GE, 23rd May, 1962. Other studies prepared 
by IPES ~lere: 'The Agrarian S truc tU.re of Brazil', prepared 
by a team composed of Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, C.J. de 
Assis Ribeiro, J.A. Rios and Jose Garrido Torres, 
Julian Chacel and idanderbil t D. Banos. Glycon de 
Paiva ,vould introduce it at the tir::e of the Congress on 
the Basic Reforms, in January 1963, L~troduction to 
'A Estrutura Agra:-r>ia do B-rasil', Glycon de Paiva, IPES, 
5th November, 1963. Another Ver'-J inporta...YJt ,.,rork for its 
impact on the post-64 government, prepared by an IPES/IThu) 
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team yTaS a study that beca:::e a book, 'A Reforr.la Agraria: 
problemas - bases - soluQ5es' (The Agrarian Reform: problems 
bases - solutions). The individuals uho composed this team 
were: Glycan de Paiva, Harold C. Polland, Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, 
J. Garrido Torres, Jose Arthur Rios, Denio C. Nogueira, 
Carlos Jose de Assis Ribeiro, Edgard TeL~eira Leite, 
Julian Chacel, Luis Carlos I1mcini, J. Irineu Cabral, 
1.landerbilt D. de Barros, Nilo Bernardes; General Golbery 
and General Herrera also participated. Letter P.A. Ribeiro 
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to Luis Viana Fi1ho 'Notas sobre a Imn1antaxao da Reforna 
Agraria t w/date in Paulo de Assis Ribeiro Archive. See 
also Jose J. de Sa Freire A1vim 'Os NUmeros reve1am a 
neoessidade de Reforma Agraria, in 'A Defesa Naciona1' 
No. 587, July 1~63, pp. 31-36; Study on Agrarian 
Reform, 1aunohed in January 1964 in five languages 
acoording to Letter from H.C. Polland to Joao Goulart, 
CESP, 10th January, 1964; J.A. Rios, '0 que e e 0 que nao 
: reforma agraria', in Cadernos :Brasi1eiros, No.4, 1963, 
July/August, Rio, pp. 45-50, M. Diegues Junior 'Antecedentes 
da Reforma Agraria no :Brasil', in Cadernos :Brasi1eiros, 
196;, No.4, July/August, Rio, pp. 51-54. J.V. Freitas 
M.arcondes, '0 Estatuto do traba1hador rural e 0 problema 
da terra, in Cadernos :Brasi1eiros, No.4, 1963, July/ 
August, Rio; C. Guin1e de Paula Hachado, Reforma Agraria, 
in Cadernos :Brasi1eiros, No. 1, January/Februa~J, 1963, 
pp. 72-77. 
95 "0 !PES, se~ao do Rio de Janeiro van mes.mo rea1izando um 
movimento de esc1arecimento em tomo das chamadas 
reformas de base, 1anQando manifestos com ?rincipios 
expurgados do 'virus' tota1i tario e comunista", 
Joao :Baptista Leopo1do Figueiredo, quoted in ~, 
7th March, 1963. See also George N. :Bemis, or.cit., 
pp. 58-59. 
96 General Edmundo !>facedo Soares, Interpretac~o dos 
Interesses e das ASDirax~es do Povo :Brasi1eiro, 
F~~lise Eoonbmioa, ESG document, C-25-63,pp. 29-36. 
97 IPES eE, 8th January, 1963. 
98 They "Jere scheduled to start on 9th December, 1962. 
They were published eve~J Sunday from January om-rards, 
IPES memo, 21st November, 1962. 
99 Letter P. Assis Ribeiro to J. Garrido Torres, 5th February, 
1963, Rio de Janeiro, in Paulo de Assis Ribeiro .~chive, 
Rio de Janeiro. 
100 IPES eE, 29th November, 1962. Telegram from G1yoon de 
Paiva to Senator Hem de Sa. 
101 The Reform of the Policy of the Use of Natural Resources 
'.vas prepared by Paulo de Assis .Ribeiro and G1ycon de 
Paiva. See also IPES minutes of: CE, 14th Au[ust, 1962, 
eE, 16th AU~1st, 1962, eE, 17th August, 1962, CE, 20th 
August, 1962, eE, 27th August, 1962, CE, 28th August, 1962, 
eE, 5th September, 1962, eE, 6th September, 1962, 
eE, 10th September, 1962, eE, 11th September, 1962, 
eE, 12th September, 1962, CE, 13th September, 1962, 
eE, 17th September, 1962, CE, 18th September, 1962, 
eE, 19th September, 1962, eE, 20th September, 1962, 
eE, 24th September, 1962, eE 25th September, 1962, 
eE, 27th September, 1962, eE, 28th Se9tember, 1962, 
eE, 11th December, 1962, eE, 19th December, 1962, 
eE, 20th December, 1962, eE, 27th December, 1962. 
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102 Valentim BoUt~as 'vas a director of the follOi·ri.ng 
multinationals and associated cornorations: Swift do 
Brasil; ITT; Cia. Brasileira de ~terial Ferroviario -
COBRAS~~; ServiQos Hollerith; National Cash Register; 
Panair; Listas Telefonicas Brasileiras; Addressograph-
Hultigraph do Brasil; US Bethlehem; ADlerican Bank Note Co.; 
Coca-Cola; Cia. Nacional de M8quinas Conerciais; Goodyear; 
Ferroenamel and Cia. Imobiliaria Santa Cruz. His son, 
Jorge Bouc;as vTaS also a director of Addressograph-
Multigraph, ServiQos Hollerith and Cia. Imobiliaria 
Santa Cruz S.A. 
103 Letter from Manuel Linhares de Lacerda, Bras{lia, 
30th April, 1964. Motive: "Audiencia com Presidente. 
Assunto: Solicitar soluQao para 0 conteudo do dossier 
encaminhado a Presidencia da Republica por intermedio 
do General Ernesto Geisel". In Humberto Alencar 
Castello Branco Papers, CPDOC Archives, Rio de Janeiro. 
104 Lieutenant Colonel Adyr Fiuza de Castro, '0 Fim de Um. 
Exercito~ in A Defesa Nacional, No. 586, July, 1963, 
pp. 3-16. The same article \Vas basically reproduced 
later in the pages of ~, 17th September, 1963. 
105 Jean Marc van der \{eid, an opposition student leader in 
the mid-1960s, recalled that a meeting took place in his 
home in 1963 vTi th various representatives of the com-
munications media and the advertising-industry, including 
the head of the second largest advertising company in 
Rio de Janeiro (McCann-Erikson) and a manager of 
American Light and Power. The purpose of the meeting 
"ras to discuss means of participation in the D3.A1)-IPES 
campaign against Goulart and the labour left. Van der 
1,l}'eid's uncle, deputy Fabio Sodre, i'lho '.-las chief legal 
counsel for American Light and POi,rer and a close friend 
of Niles Bond, the cultural attache of the US Embassy, 
became involved in the campaign. Jan Knippers Blacl:, 
op.cit., p. 81. 
106 IPES CD Rio, 29th Nay, 1962. D3AD prepared 50 stereotyped 
questions and anSi'Ters which were re:produced in all states 
and on all Radio and TIT stations. For example, answering 
the question of the intervie'l,re::." on the grmring Co:r.:u::.unist 
threa t to Brazil, the in tervie'.-ree had to say tha t 
"Communist threat is growing, :principally because of the 
authori ties omission. He should then ci"tie tlle cases of U11E, 
The Peasant Leagues and the public pronounce::'1ents of 
Governor Brizzola. He should also talk of the action of 
the trade unions, controlled by COllJUnists and of red 
infiltration in all the principal sectors of activity of 
of the countrJ ". J08.0 Doria, '!BAD: ConspiTaQ8.o 
Internacional contra as reforr.las~ in Pol{tica e Herocios, 
Rio de Janeiro, 4th November, 1963, p. 10. 
107 !PES CE Rio, 30th May, 1962. A mixed line of 
'Dogmatismo com Problemas Pol{ticos'. 
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108 !PES CE Rio, 4th June, 1962. Guidelines for TV Programme 
'Encontro de Democratas com a Na~go'. 
109 !PES CE Rio, 3rd July, 1962. Also CE }lemo "Ti th list of 
'Nomes Lembrados para TV'; IPES Ch. Gr. Sgo Paulo, 
28th August, 1962; IPES General Meeting Sgo Paulo, 
23rd October, 1962. 
110 Official letter from IPES Sgo Paulo (Flavio Galvao) to 
!PES Rio, 16th November, 1962. Protocol 667.1962. 
111 It is interesting to note some of the renarks made on 
the side of each name. General Golbe~J's participation 
was considered not to be 'convenient'. General Mamede 
was 'not able to participate'. Herbert Levy, Hem de Sa, 
Carlos Lacerda, Armando Falcao and Carvalho Pinto were 
deeply inv 01 ved in the TV campaign of !PES. IPE S CD, 
19th June, 1962. 
112 This programme was on 25th October, 1963. 
113 It "laS shoim on 2nd July, 1963. 
114 The address took place on 4th August, 1963. Admiral Heck 
,.,as accompanied and met at the airpor~ of Congonhas ,.,here 
he landed, by several lPES/IBAD affiliates. 
115 Shovm on lOth February, 1963. 
116 Pol{tica e Negocios, 19th August, 1963, p. 30. 
117 IPES CD, 27th November, 1962. Contracted by H. Villela. 
118 IPES CE, 20th March, 1962. Supported financially by 
Fabrica de Geladeiras Consul and by Coco Serigy among others. 
119 IPES Internal Communication from General Liberato da 
Cunha FriedXich to Flavio Galvao of Sgo PE.ulo, 
29th April, 1963. According to General Liberato, 
through the collaboration of VASE Airline the videotape 
of Armando Falcao's speech on TV Rio - Channel 13, of 
19th April 1963, was sent to Sgo Paulo. Denisson 
Propaganda, which arranged the recording, asked the 
Secretary of IPES Sgo Paulo to enter into urgent 
comnrunication vTi th Radio Rio Ltda. (of the :2missoras Unic1as) 
to make a copy of the recording, in order to relay it to 
Bras{lia for the programme 'Frente a Frente I, of 1st Hay, 
1963. 
120 N. Blume, ou.cit., p. 216. 
121 ~,No. 445, 16th r.:iarch, 1977, p. 6. 
122 OESP, 7th November, 1963. See also Jo~o Doria, op.cit., 
p. 10. 
123 IPES CD, 22nd Hay, 1962. 'Iilien arguing in favour of 
cutting sponsorship of his programme, R~ Gomes de 
Almeida noted that 'The gun is ours. 1dill "Te let 
the other announce it and shoot us?' . See also Nelson 
'derneck Sodre', A Histciria da Inmrensa no :Brasil, 
Rio de Janeiro, CivilizaQao :Brasileira, 1966, p. 480. 
124 Genival Rabelo, 0 Canital Estrangeiro, Rio de Janeiro, 
CivilizaQao Brasileira, 1966, p. 219. 
125 .ABA's thirteen founding members '-lere A..-q,.1Il'0 S.A., 
Atlantic Refining Co. of Brazil, :Burroughs do :Brasil, 
Cia. Gessy Industrial, Eletro Industria "'ali ta S .A., 
Ford Motor do :Brasil S.A., General Electric S.A., 
General Motors do :Brasil, S.A., Philips do :Brasil S.A., 
Shell :Brazil Ltda., Texaco Inc. (:Brazil), The Coca-Cola 
Export Corporation and Willys Overland do :Brasil, most 
of them related to IPES, as contributors or through their 
directors. Other companies vThich joined the .ABA '-lere: 
Aluminio do :Brasil, Mobil Oil do :Brasil, Frigorifico 
\-Tilson do :Brasil, Mercedes :Benz do :Brasil, Pirelli S.A., 
Cia. SVTift do Brasil, Anderson Clayton y Cia., ArIDaQ5es 
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de AQo Probel S.A., Pneus Firestone, Cia. Goodyear do 
:Brasil, Sao Paulo Alpargatas S.A., :Bendix do :Brasil Ltda., 
Vemag S.A., Volks'\'Tagen do :Br3,sil, Philco Radio e 
Televis~o, Avon Cosmeticos, Irmaos Lever S.A., Brastemp 
Aparelhos Domesticos Ltda. and Farloc do :Brasil S.A., 
again a vTide list of IPES members and .contributors. See 
Rabelo, op.oit., pp. 218-219. 
126 IPES CE, 8th June, 1962. 
127 IPES, Relatorio das atividades do !PES, Sao Paulo em 
1963. See also N. :Blume, op.cit., p. 217. 
128 Robinson Rojas, Estados Unidos en :Brasil, Santiago de Chile, 
Prensa Latinoamericana, 1965, p. 153. 
129 ~, 18th October, 1963. 
130 C.S. Hall, on.cit., p. 142. See also in Chapter VIII the 
activities of IPES/IBAD '\1ithin the military. 
131 IPES CD, 24th July, 1962, Dario de Almeida l'Tagalhaes 
and H.C. Polland. 500.000 cruzeiros '\{ere paid to both 
for 'expenses t. 
132 In his report to the CD of IPES, on 13th November, 1962, 
seconded by Helio Gomide, he comnented on the issues that 
were the focus for the campaign of the national-reformist 
bloc (inflation, foreign capital, process of e:~loitation, 
advantages for the docl-c I-lOrkers, etc.). He recomDended 
that counter material be produced for 'local stations' 
and assessed the advantages of radio over "Tri tten press. 
133 IPES f'Iinutes, 25th Hay, 1962, General GolberJ. 
134 IPES General Meeting Sao Paulo, 9th October, 1962. 
135 N. Blume, ou.cit., p. 217. 
136 The Council for Latin America Release, 'Intercambio' 
explained to its readers - companies that integrated 
the Sao Paulo based Fundo de M;ao Social - that" Alert 
companies are using cartoon format to reach labour. and 
rural populations with limited reading abilities. 
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Case in point: Caterpillar Tractor's 16 page fEl Camino 
Hacia El Futuro', a comic book ,·,mch tells the story of 
joint government-campesino road building efforts in a 
small La tin AI:!erican village. :r.leanwhile, it plugs 
Alliance for Progress objectives and soft-sells 
Caterpillar (only through the trade-mark on the road-
building equipment pictured). One million copies in 
Spanish and Portuguese have been distributed to date by 
USIA in 14 countries - generally in cooperation ,-lith 
local Caterpillar dealers". "The reaction? Extremely 
favourable, according to a survey conducted subsequently 
through USIA field pos ts" • In 'Intercarnbio', July, 
1965, Vol. 1, No.4, p. 1, USA. 
137 IPES ChI Gr., Sao Paulo, 8th January, 1963. 
138 !PES General Meeting 9th October, 1962. 
139 IPES CE and CD Sao Paulo, 20th Novemb&r, 1962, Joao 
Baptista Leopoldo Figueiredo. 
140 N. Blume, op.cit., p. 217. 
141 IPES CE and ChI Gr. Sao Paulo, 8th January, 1963. 
142 Gilbert Huber would take charge of the expenses of 
a film on 'the modifications in the concept of company 
man' costing 2 million cruzeiros. IPES CE Sao Paulo, 
2nd April, 1963. 
143 From time to time, films T •.,rere readjusted and updated 
to changing circumstances. For the retaping of 
'Portos Paral{ticos' and of 'Econom{a Estrangulada' , 
IPES paid 750.000 cruzeiros. IPES General Heeting Sao 
Paulo, 16th October, 1962. 
144 IPES CD, 7th AUg;.lSt, 1962. 
145 IP2S CD, 28th August, 1962. 
146 Cooperation f rom outside sources l/laS follovred up by the 
Council for Latin America after the COUD of 1964. In its 
report of October, 1965, it ldas stated"'that "Day to day 
assistance to local groups ranges from provididng ideas for 
ne,.,r groups on relatively simple and inexpensive initial 
projects to assisting established groups vri th inforr:ation 
and resources for major activities". The Council for 
La tin America even tually als c supp orted films, among 
them, the .... Tell-known 'Sermon of Campinas', which had 
been seen by some 13.000.000 Brazilians; the 'Price 
of Life', "'Thich documented the contributions of the 
in terna ti onal drug indus try to health and 'l1elfare; 
'Forbidden Land', which sho .... Ted hO .... T pri va te capital 
converted a dry, desert like section of Northeast 
Brazil into a garden of abundance; and 'This is my 
Life', a story of the progress that a .... TOrker had made 
under free enterprise. CLA also provided 'blue-printG' 
for public speeches and press and radio material, such 
as the following: 
CLA-CRC-Circular 52/65. 
Ref: ENTREGA DE COHEHTllliIOS PARA A RADIO E nIPRENSA 
Junto a esta circular temos 0 prazer de remeter-
lhes os seguintes artigos: 
1) 0 PAPA E A PAZ DiTERIOR 
2) A CENOURA E A V A...Tffi 
3) SUEARNO NO OCASO 
4) SERA ISTO ADmA COHmITS!10? 
5) SERA 0 TEL.'mORISHO UNA FORQA PARA 0 PROGRESSO 
SOCIAL? 
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Lembramos que este material pode ser usado editando-o 
ou sem editar, com a assinatura do autor e prefer2velmente 
adaptado ao estilo local. 
Recordamos novamente a necessidade de receber seus 
recortes, i1Tf9ress ces e conselhos. l1ui to Obrigado. 
NOTA: ~ favor usar esta mesma folna Dara os seus , -
comentarios que serao bem recebidos. 
C OIljEl'1TARI OS : 
8 de Outubro de 1965. 
Every .... ,eek CLA sent five or six original articles to some 
100 press and radio outlets in Latin Anerica. The basic 
purpose of these articles ,.;as to strengthen attitudes which 
fostered i'lha t they smT as 'democratic development'. An 
exchange agreement vTas reached 'Hi tIl the S1]3 )ress services 
",hereby the forDer "TaS to use CL.u. press and radio material 
and CLP4 ,.;ould distribute SIB materi2.l to Spanish speaking 
countries. Radio dramas ',rere also offered ( a series of 
either 50 or 60 half hour chapters). These radio dra~as 
contained a pro-capitalist message amid the entertainment, 
fostering a message of 'social mobility and choice'. See 
Council of Latin America Report, October, 1965, He .... ' York, 
pp. 2-4. 
147 IP~S Minutes 23rd October, 1962. 
148 IPES General ~fueting Sao Paulo, 25th September, 1962, 
Ricardo Cavalcanti de Albuquerque in his report cn the 
use of six dccumentaries. 
149 IPES General !1eeting Sao Paulo, 9th October, 1962. 
150 Ch. Gr. Sao Paulo, 25th September, 1962. 
151 The films "ITere budgeted at 1. 700.000 cruzeiros each. 
lPES Memo, 21st November, 1962. 
152 IPES CE Rio, 14th June, 1962. See also Noniz Bandeira., 
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o Governo Jogo Goulart, As Lutas Sociais no Brasil 1961-
~, Rio de Janeiro, Civiliza~ao Brasileira., 1977, p. 74. 
153 lPES GE, Rio, 8th June, 1962. 
154 Every possible means of communication and pressure (papers, 
conferences, articles, symposiums, private meetings, 
professional and business pressure) ,'Tere used to shape 
the mines and vrin the hearts of the entrepreneurs. These, 
in turn, were expected to take 'into their enterprises 
the democratic ideas of IPES', IPES CE Rio, 29th November, 
1962, General Liberato. See also IPES Hinutes 27th 
November, 1962, on the attempts to organize IPES as the 
roof of the commercial associations. .The idea of creating 
an IPES 'in each enterprise' was developed at lPES, 
as vTell as stimulating the parallel actions, such as 
those of the Association of Christian ~~nagers of 
Enterprises - ADCE, which, according to Jorge Frank 
Geyer, "Tas 'already a sort of IPES'. IPES CD, Rio, 
27th November, 1962. 
155 'Seminarios do lPES', Rio, w/date, p. 1. 
156 Idem, p. 4. The follmnng directors of IP':'S vTere to 
'guide' the seminars: Antonio Carlos do Amaral Osorio; 
Augusto Trajano de Azevedo Antunes, Candido Guinle de 
Paula Macnado, Glycon de Paiva, Harold C. Polland, 
Israel Klabin, Joao Baptista Leopoldo Figueiredo, 
Jose Luiz Moreira de Souza, Jose Rubem Fonseca, 
Jose Ulpiano de Almeida Prado, Mauricio Villela, 
Miguel Lins, Os"raldo Tavares, Othon Barcellos Correia, 
Paulo Ayres Filho, Paulo Reis Ha,salMes, Rui Gomes de 
Almeida and Zulfo de Freitas !fJ.all:mn. iintonio C .A. Osorio 
was designated general coordinator. 
157 A selection of themes for IPES sponsored and organized 
seminars 'vhich reflects the sophisticated level of the 
organic elite in its campaign to i1-:Ln over the bourgeois 
bloc and disarticulate its class adversaries can be seen 
in Appendix :,r. 
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158 Social and sport clubs have been, traditionally, the centres 
of informal communicationbetween entrepreneurs, bureaucrats 
and politicians. Policy articulation, interest aggregation 
and politico-military conspiracies have been established, 
settled or arranged at such places. The. social, 
regional and ethnical cooposition of their members reflected 
and shaped class and status divisions, as \'1ell as reinforcing 
these identities. On the actual participation of these 
social and sport clubs in the civilian-military movement, 
see Chapter VIII. The military also had their 'political' 
clubs. The Clube I~litar and the Clube Naval were 
significant centres of policy discussion and conspiratorial 
bases until 1964. Their importance as centres of free 
discussion declined sharply after the coup. 
159 IPES Minutes 20th November, 1962. An idea of the type 
of ideological formation i'lhich was being developed 
is hinted at "rhen considering the subheadings of one of 
the papers delivered at such conferences in one of the 
Paulista society clubs, which one ,",ould have thought vTaS 
hardly the place for such a lecture. The paper vTaS 
called 'Strengthening of the National Potential -
Planning'. The paper treated: 1) The meaning/sense of 
the problematic of National Security - the 'Conscious 
Generations t ; 2) Power and National Potential - ~ro 
diverse perspectives of the srune reality; 3) Spheres of 
planning in the field of National Security; 4) The 
natural dynamic of the strengthening of the potential; 
5) Conscious intervention in the process; 6) The 
totalitarian 'dirigismo' (direction) and democratic 
planning; 7) Strengthening of the economic potential 
and development. It vTaS prepared by General GolbeI"J. 
Document 1To. 1, 'Fo::-talecimento do Potencial Nacional' 
Planejamento, vr/d. 
160 It took place be~Teen 13th August, 1963 and 29th September, 
1963. Lecturers were Alceu Vicente \1ightman de CaI"lalho, 
on Economic and Social Dnplications of the Demographic 
EXPlosion; Sandra Cavalcanti, on Housing Problems; 
Achilles Scorzelli Junior, on Problems of Health; 
Jose Arthur Rios, on Social Differences; Paulo de Assis 
Ribeiro, on Access to Education; Odylo Costa Filho, on 
Social ~-:elfare for Infancy and Youth; T:1oaC;YT Velloso 
Cardoso, on The Truth on Social ':Tel fare; Fabio Vl8.cedo 
Soares, on Regional Disequilibriums; Nario Hen:dque 
Simonsen, on Social, Political and Econouic L~ulications 
of Inflation; Nerio Battendiery, on The Salar,r Question; 
Jorge Du:?rat de Brito Pereira, on Unenuloy:::ent and 
SubemDloygent; Jayme Magrassi de Sa, on SubconsvDDtion; 
Handerbil t Duarte de Barros, on Tensions deriving from the use 
of the land; Benedi to Silva, on Inadeou2oc;r of the 
governmental structure. 
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161 Courses versed on 'Political Democracy and Economic 
Democracy' , Entrepreneurs and the dynamic of state 
structures', 'The Political and Economic meaning of 
Democratization of Capital', 'Shares as expression and 
Instrument of Capital', 'Strategy of pressure groups 
against Democratic Capitalism', 'Planning and Capital'. 
Among the lecturers were: Carlos Jose de Assis Ribeiro, 
Denio Nogueira, Luiz Cabral de Menezes, Octavio Gouveia 
de Eulhoes and Themistocles Erandao Cavalcanti, for the 
seminar on Democratization of Capital; Joao Eaptista 
Vianna, C.J. de Assis Ribeiro, Eudes de Souza Leao, 
Paulo Mario Freire, F. Mbielli de Carvalho, Ary Campista, 
General Anapio Gomes, Erigadier Joao Mendes da Silva, 
Milton Monteiro, Affonso Almiro,for the seminar on 
,Private Enterprise and National Security; C.J. de Assis 
Ribeiro, Affonso Almiro, General Poppe de Figueiredo, 
Glycon de Paiva, Padre Francisco Leme Lopes (SJ), Paulo 
de Assis Ribeiro, Vicente Earreto, Gilbert Huber, 
Gilberto de Ulhoa Canto, Joao Carlos Noreira Eessa, 
162 
J. Garrido Torres, on Analysis and Diagnosis of the 
Erazilian Reality. 
lPES CE 6th June, 1963. Also OESP 2nd August, 1963. 
163 The organic elite was able to follow up these discussions 
with pUblications which made a strong impact in the 
entrepreneurial community andamong the military alike. 
One such influential book was Seguxanga Nacional, which 
had articles by Octavio Narcondes Ferraz, A.C. Pacheco e 
Silva, General Edmun10 Naced.o, Soc:..res, General Lyra Tavaren 
and General Humberto Alencar Castello Eranco and which was 
published by the Forum Roberto Simmonsen, of FIESP in 
1963. 
164 N. Eailey, on.cit., p. 220. 
165 OESP, 18th October, 1963. 
166 It was aimed at being recognized as the 'Christian 
Answer to Erazil in crisis'. IPES CE Rio 19th December, 
1962. Also letter from Glycon de Paiva to Pontificia 
Universidade Cat6lica, IPES 62/1716 of 20th December, 1962. 
A list of participants and themes provides what by now 
must be familiar names and themes: Alceu Amoroso Lima 
(Analysis of the National Crisis); Oswaldo Trigueiro 
(Options and Objectives of the Easic Reforms); Sucupira 
(Historical evolution of social ideas); Oswaldo Trigueiro 
(Reform of the Political structure); Jose Nurta Ribeiro 
(Judiciary Reform); Lucas Lopes (Reform of the Public 
utilities Services); Paulo de Assis Ribeiro (Administrat-
ive Reform); J. Garrido Torres (Nan and International 
Order); Dias Carneiro (Foreign Policy); Joao Camilo de 
Oliveira Torres (Foreign Trade Policy); Alexandre Kafka 
and Joao Eaptista Pinheiro (Foreign Capital); Daniel 
Faraco (Man and Economy); Hario R. Simonsen (Tributary 
Reform); Carlos Jose de Assis Ribeiro (Eudgetary Reform); 
cont ••• 
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Anibal Villela (Anti-Trust Reform); Oscar Barreto 
Filho (Reform of the market of capitals); Octavio 
Gouve<ia de Bulhoes, Joao Luiz Horeira de Souza (Private 
Enterprise); J. Queiroz Filho (Participation in 
Profits); Frederico Rangel (Labour Legislation); 
Carlos Jose de Assis Ribeiro (Social Security); Jose 
Arthur Rios (Social Structures); Paulo de Assis Ribeiro 
(Dignifying of Han); Julian Chacel (Agrarian 
Structure); Luiz Carlos Nancini (Housing Question); 
Pactre Helder and Luiz Alberto Bahia (The Right of 
ExPression and its social function); Silvio Froes de 
Abreu (Conservation of Natural Resources). Other 
themes were Electoral Reform, Legislative Reform, 
Education as a factor in the formation of Man, and 
Health and Sanitation. The seminar was sponsored jointly 
with the Pontificia Universidade Catolica of Rio de 
Janeiro, who shared the costs. See lIES CE 29th November, 
1962. lIES also planned a seminar with the Instituto de 
Estudos para 0 Desenvolvimento Social Economico, of Jose 
Arthur Rios and Padre Lebret. lPES CE Rio 28th March, 1963. 
Paulo de Assis Ribeiro also sought the collaboration of 
Raquel de Queiroz for the elaboration of a cartilha on 
the fundamental reforms needed by the country. Letter 
from P.A. Ribeiro to J. Garrido Torres 5th February, 1963 
- In Arquivo Paulo de Assis Ribeiro. 
lIES CE Rio 19th June, 1962. For Dario de Almeida 
Magalhaes, 'A Tatica e faze!: ~ ~ ... ~~ ~ ~_, __ ~ -~_. 
uma poriao de biombos } 
o Cardeal est~ firme'. 
168 N. Blume, o;p.cit., p. 216. 
169 Al though Padre Crippa was displaced by Cardinal Mota 
from Sao Paulo, and sent away to Campinas, he returned 
on a regular basis to continue his work in'Gonvivium~ 
170 See further in Chapter VII 
171 lIES CE and CD 4th December, 1962. In December, 1962, 
Padre Crippa presented a plan of action for 1963, which 
was studied by Paulo Edmur de Queiroz. Padre Crippa's 
plan included the establishment of a Superior School of 
Leadership, the expansion of the Institute for the 
Formation of Leaders and the TIews Agency Planalto, as 
well as the foundation of an ideological and political 
seminar. J.B. Leopoldo Figueiredo asked Paulo Edmul.' 
de Queiroz to be the liaison with Padre Crippa so that 
the latter would present his budget and determine the 
priorities. lPES CE and Ch.Gr. 18th December, 1962 for 
the project which was eventually set uP. 
172 lPES Sao Paulo - Relatorio das Atividades 1963, P. 2. 
173 lPES CE and Ch.Gr. Sao Paulo 31st January, 1963. 
174 Jose Ely Coutinho, who succeeded Adalberto Bueno Neto 
in the contacts IPES held with the ADM, linked up with 
Joao Nogueire Lotufo, as ACM leader,who was also an 
active member of the American Chamber of Commerce -
IPES Sao Paulo, General Meeting 16th October, 1962. 
175 OESP 20th October, 1963. 
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176 IPES Letter 64/0128 to Frei Metodio, by General Liberato 
18th February, 1964. 
177 IPES CE and Ch.Gr. Sao Paulo 18th December, 1962. Also 
IPES CE 21st May, 1963. 
178 ~ - Cycle of Conferences 12th December, 1963. 
179 As Ganeral Joao Baptista Tubino stressed, -IPES, among 
its highest stated goals should aim at the perfecting 
of the civic and democratic conscience of the different 
classes of Brazilian society". IPES Document - Curso de 
Atualidades Brasileiras, p. 2. 
180 IPES Minutes, 28th November, 1962. 
181 IPES Document No.3 - 6th June, 1963 Rio de Janeiro -
'Vagas Disponiveis' 
182 IPES CE Rio 29th :November, 1962. "):-.1£:0 concebo exito para 
qualquer a~ao que salvaguarde 0 regime democratico se nao 
for apoiada em ideias. Uma ideia so se combate efetivamente 
com outra ideia melhor". "Por que nao se cria uma 
insti tui~ao para prega~ao dos ideais danooraticos" • J • 
Garrido Torres to CD 29th Nay, 1962. 
183 IPES Grupo de Integra~ao, report November 10th<1964. 
The idea of formalizing the existence of ADIPES arose in 
view of the necessity to re-supply the cadres of IPES 
which were depleted by their integration within the 
government after the coup of April 1964. The director-
ship of ADIPES, in August 1964, comprised Harold C. 
Polland, Leopoldo Figueiredo Junior, Jorge Frank Geyer, 
Alberto Yenancio Filho and Narzy Haia. Report of ADIPES, 
by Ormy Rosolem, Rio de Janeiro, Janu~J 21, 1965. 
184 IPES Document No.4. 6th June, 1963, Rio de Janeiro. -
'Temas a Considerar'. This document provides a list of 
the themes available for these courses: Brazilian Reality; 
Democracy and the totalitarian regimes; Democracy and 
the Church; The Development of the Country and Foreign 
Policy; Economic Progress and Social Progress; Democrat-
ization of Capital; Brazilian LabolIT Legislation and the 
Enterprise; Plans for Development; The process of Basic 
Reforms in Brazil; Tributary Reform; Banking Reform; 
Entrepreneurial Reform; Agrarian Reform. 
185 IPES - Re1atorio 1963, p.3. Also IPES Document Ho. 1. 
6th June, 1963, Rio de Janeiro. 
186 'Objetivos do Curso'. Lecturers of the courses, some 
of which were given even after 1964, were, among others: 
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Harold C. Polland (Significance of the CAB); Alceu 
Amoroso Lima (Erazilian Reality); Them1stocles Cavalcanti 
(Democracy and the Totalitarian Regimes); Gustavo Cor~ao 
(Democracy and the Church); Delfim Netto (Economic 
Progress and Social Progress); Carlos de Assis Ribeiro 
(~lans for Development); :Hario Henrique Simonsen (Tributary 
Reform; Political, Social and Economic Implications of 
Inflation); Denio Nogueira (Eanking Reform); Aims and 
implications outcoming from Nonetary Reform); J.L. Noreira 
de Souza (Entrepreneurial Reform); Democratization of 
Capital); Jose Arthur Rios (Agrarian Reform, Reform of 
Housing Policy); Paulo Sa (Labour Laws and Enterprises); 
Paulo de Assis Ribeiro (Process of Reforms); Joao Camillo 
de Oliveira Torres (Democracy and the Totalitarian 
Regimes); Octavio Gouveia de Eulhoes (The Development of 
the country and Foreign Policy); Roberto Campos (Foreign 
Policy and the Development of the Country); Helio Drago, 
Fabio Nacedo Soares Guimaraes (Physiographic aspects of 
Erazil); Jose Garrido Torres, }1oacyr Veloso Cardoso de 
Oliveira; \{anderbil t Duarte de Earros. List assembled 
from IPES Eoletim l1ensal, Nos. 19 to 39. 
Lecturers and themes after April 1964 were, among others: 
Antonio Saturnino Braga (Aspirations of the Brazilian 
People); Luiz Alberto Eahia (Political Context and 
Economic Nodels); Helio Eel trao (Policy of Administrative 
Reform of the Government); Colonel Relio Gomes do Amaral 
(National Policy of Telecommunications); Colonel 'Iiilson 
Moreira Bandeira de Hello (Science, Research, Technology 
and Development); Glycon de Paiva (Population and 
Development, Hineral Production); Eudes de Souza Le8:o 
(Vegetal Production and Agrarian Policies); D 1It'Val Garcia 
Nenezes (Eeef Cattle); Colonel Antonino,Dbria Hachado 
(Industrial Production, Steel Industries); John Cotrim 
(Sources of Energy); A. Trajano Antunes (Internal Savings, 
Investments); ltlalter Lorch (Transportation Policy); Sergio 
Paulo Rouanett (Policy of Foreign Trade); Achilles Scorzelli 
Jr. (Health Policies); Geraldo Danemmann. 
187 It is w.orth noting how both military rank and company 
affiliation are juxtaposed. The com~osition of one such 
group was as follows: 
t'RA.BA.lHO IE GR uro 
GB.tJR): C U'RESENTA~O: 9-.m-1964 
'11iKA: INFa~. POUPAN~ E INVESmlE}lTOS NO WSIL 
CX»a'OOIQ1O : 
Dlr1gent.e - KaunUo Anguato sun. 
Vice-illIirante R. lim (ESSO) 
RelAtor - Octav1o !In. Velho 
General Div1ai.o Bl (~a) 
OoIzponante. (Tantu) 
PARlli 
DfFlA.C;lO 
~ 
INVESl'DlENTOO E 
roUPJ.N~ 
PARTE 
OPINIlO PI1Bu CA 
( Un w l!4r.!.a Vi eira 
( kOilaaist& - Pro!eesor Catedratico UniT. Fed. lat.. Rio 
( Antonio Carlos FerI"'$lra de Queiro: 
Ecollllmiata - Min. Jl.ims e Energia 
( Newton Arguello 
( iCOnOi1sta - Dir. Rev1sta Arlaqio Astron&ut1ca 
{ Femando Hibielli d, Carnlho.. .. 
Advogado - Professor Fae. Nac. Ci,nciu EconOmic:u 
Jeronimo Baptista Bastos 
!i...ajCr-El"igadeiro F..R - (b~) 
Sergio Pinheiro 
S11be,,~t. Vanda.a - (i:SSO) 
C1</t;:~ ~'I ::It /--~It: 
_ /. [",,-
-7"7""'l?'j~(""',/ A.oH;~··~~"-:;,,*"'-<'~.0~t9>~r:o~><">.o-""::"", I.' ~1!!J-:. e< HVL,.( t //(S11. (7,-.C.c/~1 ,_ Z~ 
7~1~' d~ ._/_\~-~-----
188 IPES CE 29th November, 1962. - Jose Rubem Fonseca. 
At the beginning of 1963, General Tubino received from 
General Golbery a copy of a master plan for the first 
Curso Sunerior de Estudos de Atualidades Erasileiras. 
Its blue print .... ras a course whichhad been started in 
July, 1962, lasted lllltil November, 1962, had 34 classes 
twice a week. (See also Plan from General Golbery to 
General Tubino in IPES 6.5.63). 
The course was to be delivered at the Sindicato da 
Industria Farmaceutica, tUlder an agreement secured by 
Villela. 'l'he staff comprised Hei Peixoto do Valle, 
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J. Garrido Torres and Jose Rubem Fonseca, "'ho had the 
help of the Study and Doctrine grouP. Fixed secretarial 
expenses ",ere calculated at arolllld 600.000 cruzeiros 
montEly, not including the material .... 'hich .... ras needed for 
the courses. Forty-five students participated in 
the first grouP. Among them 10 of IPES, 3 of the 
Armed Forces General Staff - EMFA, 3 of the Trade 
Unions, 3 of the leadership of IPES, 1 of the Council 
for National Security - CSH, 1 of the Hinistry of 
Industry and Commerce, 7 of the r.linistr'J of Education, 
4 of entrepreneurial associations, 3 professionals 
and 4 students. 
The following were listed by IPES as the teaching 
pool of the courses: Alceu Amoroso Lima and Dantom 
Jobim (Socialism and Democracy); Erico Verissimo, 
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J. Garrido Torres, Joao Eaptista Leopoldo Figueiredo 
and Joao Pinheiro Baptista (Capitalism and Democracy); 
General Golbery and Helio Jaguaribe (Democratic 
Nationalism) ; General Jurandir Hamede (Armed Forces and 
Democracy) ; General llIacedo Soares (Democracy, National 
Security and Industry); Dom Helder Camara (Church and 
Democracy); Jose Luiz Moreira de Souza and Gilbert Huber 
(Democratization of Capital); Luiz Carlos :Nancini and 
Jose Arthur Rios (Economic Progress and Social Justice); 
Helio Jaguaribe and Gilberto Freyre (Northeast and 
Development); Padre D'Avila (Church and Economic Progress); 
Candido Guinle de Paula Hachado, Eliezer Burla and Odylo 
Costa Filho (The entrepreneurs and public opinion); 
Candido r.1endes, Nario Henrique Simonsen and Helio Beltrao 
(Research and Economic Planning); Edgard Texeira Leite 
(Foreign Capital); Nehemias Gueiros and Daniel Faraco 
(Sociedades Anonimas), J. Garrido Torres (Extraordi~J 
Profits; Latin American Common Harket); Harold C. Polland 
and Paulo Ferraz (Transport); Hajor Nauricio Cibulares 
(Supply Neasures; Energy); Glycon de Paiva (Hinerals and 
subsoil); J. Carlos Vital and Lucio Costa (Transport and 
Urbanization); Daniel Faraco (Inadequate Legislation); 
Paulo de Assis Ribeiro (Agrarian Reform; Tributary Reform, 
Banking Reform, Anti-Trust Lm'/s); Hario Gibson Earbosa 
and Carlos Chagas Filho (Cultural Exchange); Orlando 
de Carvalho, Flexa Ribeiro and Herbert Chamoun (University 
Problems); Ambassador Araujo Castro (Foreign Policy). 
It seems obvious from the above mentioned list of names 
that the capacity of IPES to articulate at this stage an 
intellectual-political position of the 'centre' was 
remarkable. 
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Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to describe some of the central 
actions of the organic elite in different areas of political activity, 
and to indicate that some events hitherto regarded as unconnected, 
or as 'spontaneous reactions' of segments of the population, we re 
in fact co-ordinated by the organic elite centred in IPES/IBAD. l 
The political~tivities of the organic elite were remarkably 
varied in nature and. wide in scope, covering a number of separate 
operations designed to support and complement one another and to 
have a cumulatively significant effect. The strategic goal of the 
organic elite was to establish itself in state power and bring about 
economic, administrative and political changes required by the 
interests represented in IPES. Tactically, IPES/IBAD were engaged 
in a wide campaign which attempted the manipulation of public opinion 
and the indoctrination of the entrepreneurial social forces, shaping 
these interests into a class for itself. FUrthermore, IPES/IBAD 
were engaged in a wide campaign which aimed at disrupting working 
class solidarity, containing peasant trade-unionization and mobili-
zation, supporting the right-wing ideological cleavages in the eccle-
siastical structure, disaggregating the student movement, and blocking 
the national-reformist forces in Congress while mobilizing the middle 
classes as the organic elite's own masse de manoeuvre. Horeover, the 
tactical moves were necessary for another crucial reason: to bring 
the social structure to a point of crisis where the Armed Forces, 
whose support had been simultaneously and intensively canvassed, 
would be brought into action under a co-ordinated leadership. 
Throughout Goulart's presidency, 'historical conspirators' such as 
General Cordeiro de Farias, Admiral Silvio Heck, General Golbery do 
Couto e Silva, General Jurandir Bizarria Mamede, General Heitor 
Herrera, General Liberato da Cunha Friedrich, Brigadier ~duardo 
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Gomes, Admiral Augusto Rademaker Grune'\~ald, General Nelson de Mello, 
Brigadier Fleiuss and a growing number of newcomers, among whom were 
General Olympio Mourao Filho, General Carlos Luis Guedes and General 
Amauri Kruel were busy building up their respective and in many cases, 
interlocking commands for staging a successful coup. An account of 
some of these manoeuvres shall be given in Chapter VIII. However, 
as long as the various conspiratorial groups acted as isolated units 
engrossed in their petty feuds, direct action could not be 
contemplated, or it would fail again as it did in 1961 - an event 
which in the words of General Golbery had been a disaster for the 
Army.2 As long as the situation involved one of several would-be 
leaders disputing the leadership, responding to regional, sectoral 
and other pressures, so long as the military did not overwhelmingly 
condone the movement for a coup against Goulart, and felt their mili-
tary intervention was legitimized by civilians, delaying tactics had 
to be employed against the executive, the popular organizations of 
the working classes, the traditional populist forces, and last but 
not least, against impulsive officers and the action of small 
conspiratorial factions. 3 
The delaying tactics, aimed at creating political tension and 
a middle class condemnation of the executive and labour-left policies 
and activists, fell within two general categories: those with ideolo-
gical characteristics and those with strongly political or military 
overtones. They were all of a covert and even secret nature. For 
these activities, develo~ed within the student popUlation, the rural 
and urban workers and the middle classes, IPES counted upon a structure 
of action of 4,000 student and trade union activists, professionals, 
middle class housewives and functionaries of the state bureaucracy.4 
For its activities within the legislature and the military IPES/IBAD 
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relied on their networks within the Armed Forces, and the politicians 
gathered under the political umbrella of the ADP, the leadership 
of the centre-right wing political parties and on the direct involve-
ment of leading entrepreneurs. 
Action among Students, in Cultural Activities and for Popular Mobili- . 
zation 
By the end of the 1950s, students, intellectuals, politicians 
and party militants, clergymen and military developed a general move-
ment to inculcate in the masses some notions of group or class inter-
ests and some ideals about the role of the state and the desirability 
of certain national goals. This effort was known asconscientiza9ao, 
the stimulating of consciousness of the masses, a rational and planned 
effort to awaken a sense of awareness among the masses of their true 
and potential value in order to prepare them as participants and 
beneficiaries of social change. 5 Various organizations became involved 
in the process: the A9cLO Popular - AP (Popular Action), which was a 
socialist off-shoot from the Juventude Universitaria Cat6lica - JUC 
(Catholic University Youth) and radical sectors of the Church through 
the Movimento de EducaQao de Base - N8B (Basic Education Hovement); 
the Uniao Nacional de Estudantes - UNE (National Union of Students), 
through its Popular Centre for Culture, which took to slums and work-
ing'class suburbs a militant art and music, and which had a publishing 
house which released material with critical social and political con-
tents; the Ministry of Education and the state secretaries of Education 
through their Commission for Popular Culture and a variety of literacy 
programmes, basically using the Paulo Freire method of teaching 
literacy together with political conscie~tization.6 
By the early 1960s, the mf8 presented a comprehensive set of 
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demands covering issues such as educational and university reform, 
inflation, foreign capital, imperialism, independent foreign policy, 
support for Cuba, solidarity with striking workers, literacy campaigns, 
agrarian reform and technical assistance to the rural syndicalization 
movement. By 1961, the ONE became an integral part of the national-
reformist bloc and eventually an important component of the Popular 
Mobilization Front which assembled all the political and cultural 
labour-left organizations and institutions.? These developments 
coincided with the ascendancy of Ayao Popular within the student 
movement, with the election to the presidency of UNE in 1961 of Aldo 
Arantes, a 'Goiaro' stu den tan d leader of A2. ~antes was succeeded 
by another A2 leader, the mineiro Vinicius Caldeira Brant in 1962, 
and in 1963 another AP leader, Jose serra, was elected president of 
8 
t.JNljj • 
An important landmark in the political development of the 
student movement was the Declaration of Bahia, an ideological-political 
conclusion of the 1st National Seminar on University Reform which 
took nlace in Salvador, in 1960. In the conclusions of the Declara-
tion, Brazil was perceived as 'a capitalist nation in a stage of 
development', with 'an agrarian infrastructure under control of 
powerful foreign groups' and an 'oligarchic state' riddled by contra-
dictions which 'indicated the failure of the liberal bourgeois 
structure'. As a solution to such a state of affairs, the document 
proposed the 'socialization of the fundamental sectors of the 
economy', an end to the alienation of the proletarian, the 'effec-
tive participation of the workers in the government organs' and the 
'creation by the Government of conditions for the complete develop-
ment of proletarian organizations,.9 These were the strategic aims 
of the student movement. However, they recognized the lack of a 
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tactical perspective which would help them to realize their goals. 
Consequently, the 2nd National Seminar on University Reform was 
convoked in Curitiba, in 1962. The political and ideological conclu-
sions of the gathering were assembled in the Carta do Parana, which 
became a most important document of the student movement. Signifi-
cantly, university reform was included, in the sectiona the Carta 
which dealt with the 'tactical scheme of struggle', among the Basic 
Reforms, which were beginning to be widely discussed by the national-
reformist bloc, the government and eventually even by the modernizing-
conservative bloc. This proposal was the stepping stone in an 
eventual political alliance of workers, students and peasants, bind-
ing the movement for university reform todher po~ular claims. lO 
The student organizations envisaged the creation of an 'alliance 
with workers, peasants, progressive intellectuals, the democratic 
military, and other sections of national life' so that their united 
claims would be strong. They made the agrarian reform the banner-cry of 
the students. On the other hand, they expected that transformation 
in the teaching system Hould become the 'Object:live- and subjective aspirations 
of the Horkers and the peasants'. This belief was so widespread 
that the U1fE sought to synthesize those claims in its programme of 
university struggle as the need to 'increase the Peasant-Worker-
Student Alliance,.ll 
It was against the efforts of AP and liNE that the organic elite 
developed a tough campaign of containment and disaggreg;\,tion 
directed especially against the U1r~, but also against its younger 
equivalent, the Uniao Brasileira de Estudantes Secund~rios - UBES 
(National Union of Secondary School Students), and also against 
other popular oriented student organizations such as the Juventude 
Estud.3,ntil. Cat6lica - JEC (Catholic Student Youth), the C!atholic 
457 
University Youth, and the Uniao Metropolitana de Estudantes - liME 
(Metropolitan Union of Students).12 
IPES supported these actions by financial, technical and admini-
strative help, ranging from involvement in student elections, fund-
ing of publications and activists, to subsidies for specific activities, 
projects and individuals, and the sponsorship of trips to the USA for 
students. 13 However, IPES leader Antonio Galotti had visualized from 
a very early date IPES action in the student movement not only in 
terms of monetary support. He had also seen the necessity to infil-
trate 'democratic elements' among the student militant population, 
an activity which was perceived as central. 14 Furthermore, IPES 
leader Duvivier Goulart pointed out the need for political action to 
be carried out also through lecturers, in so far as these were the 
permanent elements in the educational structure. On this point he 
was contested by lPES leader C~ndido Guinle de Paula l'lachado, one 
of the main activists in student matters, who stressed that action 
would be efficacious only if it emanated from the students themselves. 
The most that IPES could do was to guide them. IPES had to provide 
logistical support for student militants and to avoid spontaneous 
reactions from student leaders and groups. The matter was left in 
the hands of Paula Hachado.ln practical terms, IPES/IBAD acted, 
according to the circumstances, through both students and staff, 
as supporters of organized action and as direct executors in limited 
areas. 15 IPES even made its influence felt in the higher academic 
and administrative echelons of the Universidade do Brasil, mainly 
through the important connections of IPES leader Oscar de Oliveira;6 
in its efforts to disrupt the student movement. 
General Golbery, as head of the Conjunctural Survey group, 
was personally in charge of the supervision of the organic elite's 
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campaign within the student target population, for matters which 
required broad strategic planning. Such was the case of the univer-
si ty elec,tions in Sao Paulo, 17 where IPES was working with an associa-
tion of ex-student leaders, of which a prominent figure was Paulo 
Egydio Martins, who lent his accumulated experience as a former Sa'o 
Paulo and national right-wing student leader in the attempt to influ-
ence the university PUblic. 18 In Rio de Janeiro, IPES was involved 
in university action through the Academic Centre Machado, of the 
Pontificia Universidade Catolica, and through student leader Manoel 
da Rocha, of the Academic Centre Candido de Oliveira - CACO 
of the Faculdade de Direi~ (Law). Manoel da Rocha approached lPES 
for support, asking for money to win the'elections (which they 
eventually lost). Collaboration was urged by lPES leader Mauricio 
Villela, on the grounds that CACO was to be one of the main centres 
of action for the organic elite.19 Contributions were approved by 
IPES leader Joviano Rodrigues de Moraes Jardim, who was in charge of 
the caixinha (kitty).20 IPES also attempted to influence the elec-
tions of the Metropolitan Union of Students, as well as the univer-
sity elections in Pernambuco, where support for prospective governor 
~aguel Arraes and for the Peasant leagues had to be neutralized,21 
and where an anti-communist, t1arco Antonio Haciel, was elected. The 
organic elite, operating under the cover of IBAD also penetrated 
the stUdent movement. It went into action against the tfrB with 
various degrees of success through the Movimento Estudant~l Demo-
cr~tico - MED (Democratic Student Movement), founded and funded by 
/ 22 lPES lBAD. IBAD also penetrated the student movement through the 
Frente da Juventude Democratica - FJD (Democratic youth Front), 
sponsored by IPES and led by right-wing student activists Duval 
Vianna and Alain Araujo.23 Furthermore, lPES sponsored the Grupo 
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de Ac;ao P3. triotie3.' GAP (Group for Patriotic Action), led by 
Arist6teles Drummond and composed of middle and upper class students, 
who together with the FJD, the Anti-C:ommunistMovement - NAC and f1ED, 
operated as bully-boys against sympathizers of UNE and UBES, as well 
as against propagandists of national-reformist positions within the 
student movement. 24 IPES/IBAD provided not only financial support 
25 
for electioneering~tivities, but also supplied political expertis~, 
media coverage, produced and distributed propaganda material adverse 
to the UNE leadership and the national-reformist blocJand trained 
student activists. IPES also encouraged direct entrepreneurial con-
tribution, by advertising in friendly student newspapers, such as 
Juventude Universit~ria, and supporting the FJD newspaper Jomal 
Universit~rio or the right-wing Correio Acadgmico, as well as pub-
lishing 'professional material' through Editora &gir, the publishing 
house of Ca~dido Guinle de Paula MaChado. 26 ~he idea of funding 
and founding student newspapers arose as early as April 1962, after 
an analysis of the national student situation made by the Conjunctural 
Survey group which gave the guidelines for action. 27 IPES leader 
Alvaro Americano was in charge of budgeting for the student news-
papers action in Rio. 28 Another student newspaper, of Recife, was 
passed on to entrepreneurs A. C. Henezes and Bezerra 11enezes for 
support. 29 However, despite the' enormous resources and means at 
the disposal of IPES, their activities until the crucial elections 
for the national£adership of Ulffi, in July 1963, had met with mixed 
success. 30 
By mid-1963, the university movement was leaning heavily 
towards the labour left and experiencing a political ups'YTing. The 
UNE was engaged in a wide range of political activity, taking posi-
tions on every issue that appeared, from south-African apartheid 
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policies to the need for agrarian reform. Furthermore, students 
were actively engaged in national campaigns for adult literacy, and 
participated en masse in sanitary campaigns in the countryside pro-
moted by the National Department of Rural Endemics of the Ministry 
for Health. Such campaigns made real the theoretical tenets and 
ideological goals of m~, namely the Workers-Students-Peasants grand 
alliance. Moreover, through the m~-Volante (flying squads of U1~), 
the Popular Centre of Culture was developing a strong political cam-
paign among the working cIa s s throughout the length and breadth 
of the country. It was against this background of student mobiliza-
tion, that General Golbery himself offered to take the direction of 
the countercampaign for the national elections to the ONE leadership.Jl 
The 2Jrd annual Congress of the UNE was held between the 22nd 
and the 28th of July, 1963, in Santo Andre, a la,rge 
_;industrial city n ear S a"'o P a u 10. The outcome of the Congress 
would determine the line of political action of the mrn: in a critical 
period. Efforts to capitalize on the Moscow/Peking split and side-
track the students from their own political discussion about Univer-
sity and Basic Reforms were attempted and failed. J2 The press reaction 
was extremely unfavourable to the liNE leadership in particular and 
to tDe Congress in general. 0 Estado de S~o Paulo and the Folha de 
Sao Paulo especially gave the Congress intensive coverage and much 
unfavourable editorial comment. The most important opposition ele-
ments to the labour-left incumbents in the elections of new m~ 
officers 'VTere the IPES-sponsored Democratic youth Front, which the 
American Consul in SB:o Paulo, Daniel H. Braddock described as 'an 
extreme rightist group. The violence-prone leaders of the FJD had 
made all kinds of hair-raising plans. They were reportedly prevented 
from bombing and machine-gunning the Congress more by police frisking 
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than by common sense. It is well that they refrained, for violent 
action would only have attracted public sympathy for the incumbents, 
especially if martyrs had been created. More responsible opposition 
leaders deliberately avoided contact with the FJD. The newspaper 
o Estado de Sao Paulo, while not defending the organization, gave 
prominent news coverage to ~s various manifestos denouncing Communist 
control of the students •• 33 
The opposition slate was headed by Luis Fernando Ferreira, a 
candidate from the University of Sao Paulo !1edical School. The 
Ferreira slate was publicly branded as Ibadeana. An outstanding 
architect of the slate was none other than Luis Fernando Levy, an 
activist together with his brothers in the IPES-organized groups of 
action for the student, syndical and military sectors in S6LO Paulo, 
and a son of the UDN leader Herbert Levy.34 Ferreira, stretching 
his luck, might have received the votes of up to 200 delegates. To 
10 this would have required getting the support of delegates from 
Pernambuco, whose State Student Union president, Marco Antonio 
Maciel turned out to be for American observers the biggest puzzle 
of the Congress. Although he publicly presented himself as an anti-
Communist, he didnot seem to commit himself to the degree that was 
expected of him. Furthermore, to obtain the vote of 200 delegates 
also meant mobilizing several delegations that did not even show up 
at the convention. There were several dozen eligible Sao Paulo 
delegates, for example, who opted for the beaches of Guaruja, at 
the last minute, after having promised to do their part. Moreover, 
a Rio Grande do SuI delegation of some 40 members was prevented from 
coming at all, because of a last minute quarrel with IPESUL who was 
paying for their air fares. 35 After all "these mishaps, when the 
counting of cast votes was finally made, Ferreira received a poor 
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55 votes, which seemed insignificant when com~ared with the 679 
votes for the incumbent national-reformist 'Unity' slate. The 
students had made clear where their sym~athies lay. Jose Serra, 
the Paulista AP candidate was elected ~resident, and lPESjIBAD had 
lost a crucial battle. 
The student action of IPES was not limited to the manipulation 
of university activists or interference with university elections. 
lFES also intervened in the student elections of the highly combative 
Associa9~ Metropolitana de Estudantes Secund~rios - A1'~S (Metropoli-
tan Union of Secondary Students). IPES leader Helio Gomide was 
authorized to be paymaster for student activities in this vital 
field, ~n batches of up to 100,000 cruzeiros each time, both for 
AlI[ES and UHE. 36 In Sao Paulo, through the Uniao C{ vica Feminina, an 
organization of middle class female activists, lPES assisted the 
Congress of the Uniao Paulista de Estudantes Secund£rios - UPES 
(Paulista Union of Secondary Students) and the Christian and Demo-
cratic Convention~ Secondary students. 37 
As seen elsewhere, other forms of action by IPES involved the 
sponsorship and endorsement of culturalrotivities and university 
groups and the su~port for established cultural institutions which 
had ideological or ~olitical significance. In charge of such opera-
tions was IP~S leader Paulo Edmur de Souza Queiroz. 38 Among such 
groups and institutions were the Associa9~o de Cultura Brasileira-
Conv{vio, which gathered together university lecturers and ~ublished 
the magazine Convivium; the Instituto Universitario do Livre - IUL; 
the Hovimento Uni versi tario de Desfavelamento - 1100 (Uni versi ty 
Hovement for 'De-slumming'); the soft intellectual magazine Cadernos 
Brasileiros; the InSitute of Political and Social Studies - IEPS, 
of the Pontiff cia Universidade Cat6lica of Rio de Janeiro, which 
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pUblished sintese: politica Economica Social; and the Campanha de 
Educayao Civica - GEC (Civic Education Campaign).J9 
IPES was connected with the Pontificia. Universidade Cat61ica 
of Sao Paulo through the support of Barota Rangel and Manoel Ferreira, 
although their activities and presence in this university were 
sternly opposed by Padre Corazza.40 The IEES Commission which estab-
lished the conv~nio (agreement) with the Universidade Cat61ica com-
prised General Golbery, Jose Luiz Nogueira Porto and Paulo Galvao. 
other lPES members involved in the co-ordination between the organic 
elite and the entities which received support were Jose Ely Viana 
Coutinho and General Agostinho cortes.4l With the PUC of Sero Paulo, 
IPES established a Social and Political Research and Documentation 
centre.42 lPES strove to further this project with the creation of 
an Instituto Universitario de Ciencias Sociais consisting of two 
main departments: the Superior School of Political and Social Sciences, 
and the School for the Formation of Leaders - EFL. The latter was 
a project to be launched, under the auspices of IPES, by Monsignor 
Enzo Gusso. 43 The Documentation Centre provided IPES with a data 
bank and in particular, it played a subsidiary role for the political 
and ideological activities of the Doctrine and Study Group, by keep-
ing a specialized library, film archive and picture archive, tapes, 
video-tapes and microfilms. 
lPES was also connected with the Universidade Catolica de 
Campinas, establishing in 196} the Course of Social and Political 
Sciences of the Faculty of Philosophy, Science and Letters. The 
course strove to help in the preparation and organization of lec-
turers in Social Sciences and Politics, who would perform in p01i-
tical and 'civic' activities. Seminars on current affairs were 
organized, where were discussed such varied topics as: 'The Northeast 
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of Today and Tomorrow'. 'Woman in the Brazilian Conjuncture', 
'Illiteracy in Brazil and the World', 'Growth and Economic Progress', 
and 'The Influence of Human Dynamism in the Economy t. In Campinas, lPES 
also organized politically-loaded evening courses for adult alphabeti-
zation, in which the values of the organic elite were disseminated. 
Another cultural and political centre with whom IPES had special _ 
links was the Centro de Estudos Sociais Brasi1eiros - CESB (Centre 
for Brazilian Social Studies). This connection was facilitated by 
sheer geographical location, as the CESB operated in the same bui1d-
ing where IPES Rio had its headquarters. The person who served as 
link man was Dr. Ca1afate, one of the directors of CONCLAP, which 
also had its headquarters in the same building.44 
IPES supported the Brazilian Association~ the Congress for the 
Liberty of Culture. Through this organization, which had interna-
tional ramifications, IPES disseminated its own ideas on the Student 
Movement, and the . nat u reo f the U n i v e r sit y. '!his 
operation was carried out under the responsibility of IPES leaders 
A. Venando Filho, JoslDuvivier Goulart and Oscar de Oliveira, who 
worked as a team of the Study and Doctrine group, on the University 
Problems' unit. 45 
As already mentioned, IPES set up the University Institute of 
the Book - IUL, in 1962. The IUL served as a channel for the dis-
tribution of political books at low cost prices, the promotion and 
publication of 'didactic' books of what IPES deemed to be of 'real 
university interest', and the printing of leaflets and apostilas 
(basic text papers). The rUL also served as an institution 'granting' 
scholarships for 'special courses', and a forum for the promotion 
of studies of the political conjuncture in the form of seminars, 
series of lectures and conferences of interest for the 'universitarian 
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class' (classe universit~ria). In the area of the printing and 
distribution of leaflets, pamphlets and aEostilas the IUL co-ordinated 
efforts with, among others, the Faculdade Paulista de Direito (the 
F a cu 1 t Y of Law of Sao Paulo), the Faculdade de Direi to Hackenzie 
(the Law Faculty of Mackenzie University), the Escola Tecnica de 
Qu{mica Industrial of Ribeirao Preto (Technical School of Industrial 
Chemistry), the Faculdade de Economia Sao Luiz (Faculty of Economics 
Sao Luiz), the Faculdade de Filosofia Sedes Sapientae (Faculty of 
Philosophy Sedes Sapientae), the Faculdade de Engenharia Maua (Faculty 
of Engineering ~iaua). 46 The directorship of IUl comprised Jose Ely 
Viana Coutinho, Paulo Egydio Martins, Carlos Eduardo Corbett, Eduardo 
Figueiredo and Maria Lucia Coutinho Galvao.47 
lPES provided for the direct interaction of entrepreneurs and 
university people by instituting a Department of Apprenticeships 
(Estagios), whereby university students were introduced and exposed 
to the practices of the business world in Sao Paulo, both commercially 
and ideologically. IPES sponsored public book fairs, which served 
as outlets for their favoured books and magazines.48 It also spon-
sored the Centre for Social and Economic Documentation - CEDES.49 
Jos~ Ely Coutinho and Eduardo Figueiredo were involved in these 
t ' 't' 50 ac :LV:L :Les. 
IPES was also concerned with indoctrinating young people and 
strove to establish its ideological presence through high school 
and primary education as well. Moreover, through middle class chi 1-
dren, IPES was able to reach their parents, mobilizing also in this 
~rocess the 'school establishment', attempting to neutralize or 
integrate if possible the teaching staff in its wider political 
campaign in manipulating public opinion. ·IPES Sao Paulo sponsored 
the distribution of printed material throughtout the school system, 
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such as Uma Escola Social (A Social School) produced by Dom Emilio 
Jordan, who had been connected to IPES through Paulo Ferraz. Dom 
Emilio Jordan was also responsible for the preparation of a plan to 
set up a school for the formation of 'leaders', which was duly for-
warded to and taken up by the Doctrine and Study group of IPES Sao 
Paulo. 5l The plan also involved the organization a civic and reli-
gious instruction in lay schools. 52 
IPES intervened in the area of workers' education, and was 
behind the idea of launching a Universidade do Trabalho in Campinas.53 
It was for such a project that Monsignor Salim, the rector of the 
Catholic University of Campinas, who was already connected to lPES 
through Jose Ely Coutinho, and Padre Narciso, asked the organic elite 
for subsidies which would allow them to work during the first year.54 
IPES was even behind the constitution in 1963 of the Instituto 
de Forma2a~ Social - IFS (Institute of Social Formation). The aims 
of the IFS were to provide basic indoctrination courses for all 
sectors of the public. The IFS organized courses of executive level 
for enterprise managers, of middle level for employees, sales person-
nel, students and middle class women, and evening courses for indus-
trial workers. The IFS also organized special indoctrination courses 
of Leadership and Syndical Administration, as well as courses of 
Rural Trade-unionization. 
IPES was also interlinked with the Coimbra Bueno Foundation,55 
which was dedicated to social, cultural-civic action and philanthropic 
activities. The Coimbra Bueno Foundation was a convenient channel 
to reach the lower middle classes and the working classes, a public 
in which IPSS had an obvious interest. 
Finally, an important landmark in the ideological struggle 
against the national-reformist student movement, which had serious 
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repercussions in the intellectual, political and military environments 
was the setting up of the famous book liNE - Instrumento de Subvers~o 
(liNE - Instrument of Subversion), a lurid exnose of left-wing acti-
vities in the Universities in general and, in particular, in the 
Faculdade Nacional de Filosofia of Rio de Janeiro, which accounted 
for much of the book's impact. 56nuring the period from 1960 to 1964, 
the Faculdade Nacional de Filosof{a played the role of a cort of 
higher echelon of the student movement, a spearhead of politicization 
and awareness and the forum for intellectuals such as Jean Paul Sartre 
and politicians such as Leonel Brizzola and Miguel Arraes to put 
their views and cases across to the student movement. What happened 
at the F1W had obvious. national repercussions, given its role as a 
pacemaker for student activities and with a student union controlled 
by one offue most active labour-left blocs led by Enylton de Sa Rego. 
It was, then, quite useful to discredit the activists involved and 
their activities. And this, the book set out to do thoroughly. 
The book was written by Sonia Seganfredo, who in 1962 was a 
student in Rio de Janeiro. She had entered the Curso-Pre-Vestibular 
of the Faculdade Nacional de Filosofia in 1958. From the beginning 
Seganfredo took a stern anti-communist stance. In 1962, she denounced, 
in a series of interviews published in 0 Globo, the activities of 
both the liNE and the national-reformist Superior Institute of Bra-
zilian Studies - ISEB. It was then that she was approached by rEES. 
In 1Tovember 1962, Lieut. Heitor de Aquino Ferreira, who was General 
Golbery's personal assistant, established contact with Seganfredo. 
After sending her books and other publications analyzing the political 
situation and the student movement,57 Lieut. Aquino decided to make 
himself known and explain to Seganfredo why he had contacted her. 
Lieut. Aquino assured Seganfredo that they were both engaged in the 
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same struggle and on the same side. He went on to explain to her 
that 'Our group in the army - which the left insists always in calling 
golpista (coup-supporting) - continues to exist, although it is 
quite weakened, among other reasons, by a lack of leadership, after 
some of our m 0 r e enlightened 1 e a d e r spa sse d to the 
reserves - some of them even on account of the excellent reason that 
outside the Army they could work with greater results. I mention 
this because the fact has links with the problem I want to discuss 
with you. We have printed ourselves and channelled to friendly pub-
lishers several works of great value as democr~tic propaganda, anti-
communist propaganda. ,58 Lieut. Aquino then mentioned some of these 
publications, the majority of which would soon be released, such 
as Conversations with Stalin byM. Djilas, 'which will be published 
back home (em minha terra) by Editora Glob059 to whose director I 
am related by ties of friendship'; strausz-Hup~, The Protracted Con-
flict; Suzanne Labin, 11 est Moins Cing; Raquel de Queiroz, Crtnicas 
Engajadas (Committed Chronicles); George Orwell, Animal Farm, and 
60 
several others. 
Sonia Seganfredo was then invited by Lieut. Aquino to co-operate 
with IPES by publishing a book based on the articles she had written 
for the national newspapers, denouncing the 'broad left', the nation-
alist ISEB and the liNE. IPES financed the book, which was published 
by the GRD Editora of S~o Paulo. The GRD Editora, which had released 
so many other books distributed by IPES, was able to sell cheaply 
liNE - Instr~~ento de Subversao because of the subsidies provided by 
IPES, who also 'succeeded in getting American help for its pUblicat1on,.61 
IPES asked Seganfredo to keep the secret of its participation in the 
publication, because it could not become «involved in an overt manner 
in these activities. 62 Distributed gratis in its tens of thousands, 
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sold cheaply in the book stores and receiving wide coverage from 
the IPES co-ordinated press, Seganfredo's book was an important part 
of the attempt by IPES to contain the student movement, denigrate the 
reputation of U1r~, and create a climate of suspicion and rejection 
against the National Union of Students, especially among the 'middle 
of the road' students, their families and, most important, among the 
military. 63 
However, despite this effort and numerous actions such as those 
mentioned earlier, the student movement continued to lean towards the 
labour left. The assessment of such a trend was made by the organic 
elite, when the UNE, the UME, the UB~S, the AMES and the Diretbrios 
Acade~icos of the various Faculties of the Universities appeared 
among the sponsors and organizers of the Com{cio Pelas Reformas de 
Base (public Rally for Basic Reforms) of March 13, 1964, the mass-
mobilization which the national-reformist bloc engineered to press 
for their demands. Jose Serra, the UNE president was even one of 
the speakers at the rally, side by side with President Goulart him-
self, who addressed the mass of participants by attacking the latifundio 
and imperialism as two of the main factors for the ills of Brazil. 
student delegates of all the states of Brazil, together with working 
class organizations and trade unions were then able to hear Fresident 
Goulart announcing the signature of two presidential decrees of the 
highest importance: one expropriating property bordering roads, rail-
roads, dams, federal water holes (a<;udes) and areas benefited by 
improvement works accomplished by the Federal government within ten 
kilometers - areas which were declared of social interest. The other 
decree nationalized private refineries of oil, strengthening the 
state monopoly in this sector. The Ulffi saw these decrees as the 
realization of some of their demands and the public rally as effec-
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tively strengthening the Peasant-Student-Worker alliance. Stimulated 
by these events, on the 28th of March the Diretorio. Acade1nico. ' of 
the Faculdade'" Naciona:l de Direito - Q~CO, the Diretbrio Acade1nico 
of the Faculdade de Filosofia da Universidade do Brasil and even the 
Diret6rio Acad~ico of the Faculdade de Sociologia of PUC, as well 
as AMES, launched a simultaneous manifesto in support of those 'military 
who struggle for the realization of the structural transformations 
which are needed: by Brazilian society'. 
other means had to be sought by the organic elite in order to 
deal with the student movement. Three days later, military interven-
tion, the removal of President Goulart, the imprisonment of the 
student leaders, the invasion of the universities and banning of the 
UNE would shatter the students' illusions about the power of their 
alliance. 
Middle Class ~obilizatiQn and Female Support 
The most significant achievement of IPES in the field of poli-
tical and ideological mobilization was the utilization of the middle 
classes as the new political clientele and the development of means 
to mobilize them successfully as a masse de manoeuvre, an effect 
which the traditional parties and fronts had not been willing or 
able to accomplish. The mobilization of the middle classes gave the 
appearance of wide popular support for the organic elite, and the 
activities of these mobilized middle classes were given ample cover-
age by the IPES co-ordinated media. In the elitist atmosphere of 
Brazil, middle class demands were portrayed as the referential point 
for the identification of legitimate popular expression. In contrast, 
the popular support of the working classe's for the government or for 
labour-left politicalgroupingsand individuals was portrayed as the resul t 
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of subversive incitement of the masses by the executive and the 
national-reformist bloc. But above all, the mobilization of the 
middle classes was an offensive campaign, resigned to enhance the 
atmosphere of unrest and insecurity and provide the appearance of a 
popular appeal to the Armed Forces for military intervention. 
The organic elite's preoccupations and aims were clearly stated 
in a position paper produced by Arlindo Lopes Correa for the Bxecu-
tive Committee of IPES, appropriately called the Conguista das Classes 
M~dias para a Axao Pol!tica em Grupo (The Conquest of the ~uddle 
Classes for Political Action).64 In this document, Arlindo Correa 
described the existence of a gradual 'etatiste' trend of the country, 
which was assumed to be the 'final objective of the strongest current 
of Brazilian communism'. Several factors contributed to the 'e~atiste' 
trend, among them the militancy shown by communist activists. For 
Arlindo Corr~a, the 'prestige of the communists in the working class 
milieu derived primarily from the capacity for leadership which its 
militants have shmm in the demands for salary improvements. I Such 
demands, Arlindo Corr€a argued, l'rere ' being exacerbated under the 
real or artificial pretext of the rising cost of living'. Both the 
militance of the communists and the causal manifestations of their 
success had to be contained. Among the causes of their success were 
inflation, which gave them a leitmotiv for struggle. Arlindo Correa 
detected in the middle classes the political dyke against the commu-
nist demands. Arlindo Correa argued that 'the components of the 
middle class, who once were well remunerated, have witnessed the 
generalized deterioration a the real value of their income, and a 
constant decrease of their social status.' This fact was 'easy to 
prove', and the logical argument for thi's point was, according to 
Arlindo Correa, to 'compare the incomes of civil servants, civilian 
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and military, officers and employees in cOmnlerce wi ththose incomes of 
workers of the Merchant Navy, Dock and Railway who were considered 
to be the privileged segments of the working class as well as political 
trouble-makers.' Then Arlindo Correa argued that 'a layer of society 
which is suffering a process of impoverishment as the middle classes 
can be easily reunited around democratic ideals'. The middle classes 
had 'never pressed decisively and collectively' in the sense of 
obtaining the salary advantages achieved by the 'privileged segments 
of the Brazilian working class: railwaymen, maritime workers, dockers, 
because it had never been organized as a class'. However, 'dissatis-
faction', he stressed, 'bears the great social movements'. Further-
more, Arlindo Correa argued that it was 'easy, also to prove that 
the transformation of Brazil into a "Syndicalist Republic,,65 was 
correlated to the impoverishment of the middle class and its 9~mpres-
pion by lowe r salary 1 evels. Moreover, to demonstrate the 
identity between syndicalization of the republic and the progress of 
communism is not difficult'. Arlindo Correa then stressed that the 
rallying issue for the aggregation of the middle classes must be, therefore, 
the salary question. The tactical objective had to be to combat against 
inflation; the final objective the combat against esguerdiza2ao Q;>ushing to 
the left) of the country'. Arlindo Corr~a observed that the 'leader-
shi~ of the middle class may seem difficult or even impossible, as 
a consequence of the in d i v i d u a liz e d consciousness 0 f 
each of its members. We think, nevertheless, that it is not difficult. 
We merely consider that this segment of society never felt the neces-
sity of uniting. .Now the times are rough for its members and the 
motives have emerged ••. ' Moreover, Arlindo Correa argued, the middle 
class being the smallest one, electora11y speaking, 'the Brazilian 
politicians never could call themselves the Champions of its defence, 
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because acting in this way they would be committing electoral suicide. 
Nevertheless, the middle class did identify among the variqus candi-
dates to elective posts those which best attended to their claims.' 
Arlindo Correa also pointed out that in a mistaken assessment 'the 
Brazilian politician considers that the middle class is impervious 
to emotional arguments and only accepts rational theses', while in 
relation to the masses, the Brazilian politicians considered that to 
reach political success, it was a sine qua non to present illogical 
theses, under an appearance of logic or based on emotional terms. 
'Luckily,' Arlindo Correa argued, 'the middle class is not totally 
deaf to socio-political emotions, if the latter contain. an element 
of apparent rationalism. In short,' he concluded 'the conquest of 
the middle class has to be made through a propagandistic activity 
which mixes rational arguments with emotional arguments. Thus, the 
leadership of that class shall be obtained.' 
Arlindo Correa then argued that the 'next step will be to con-
vince the middle class that the containment of the salaries of the 
working class sectors, infiltrated by communists, must be obtained 
at any price; equally, that inflation has to be identified as its 
big enemy. Finally the middle class must be used as an instrument 
of political pressure in the same way and by the same means as the 
working classes: maritime workers, dockers, railwaymen, etc.' For 
Arlinda Correa, the best way 'to win proselytes for the cause is the 
individual conquest of the members of the middle class, through 
pamphlets, propaganda through the media and, afterwards, in a more 
advanced chronological stage, through public rallies'. Finally, 
Arlindo Correa recommended that the 'classes' to be 'initially "worked" 
must be the military and those of the liberal professionals in public 
f,/ places' .)0 
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Arlindo Correa's arguments were not lost to the IPES leadership. 
The theme of the Republica Sindicalista was extensively handled by 
the press. Middle class opinion was stirred by the unruly behaviour 
OI railwaymen, dockers and maritime workers and their 'exorbitant' 
wage claims. The lowering of socio-economic status was a powerful 
argument among the military, and the middle classes, 'aided' in their 
identification of the 'right' candidates, were finally rallied as a 
most important masse de manoeuvre. 
For the organic elite, the organization of such activities was 
not difficult. IPES/IEAD activists and affiliates were also members 
of many class organizations and social institutions which campaigned 
through.the media, in conferences and by pamphleteering, as part of 
the anti-communist drive of the 'cold war' period. Their message 
appealed precisely to the literate middle classes. IPES had also 
been successful in co-ordinating the so-called movimentos paralelos 
(parallel movements), i.e., social organizations, class associations 
and cultural institutions which shared some of the values and tactics 
of IPES. 67 The co-ordination of the parallel movements, which at 
its peak numbered J,OOO, was the responsibility of lPES leader Helio 
Gomide and through them, the great thrust of 'democratic' public 
o~inion was channelled and relayed. 
Among the 'cold war' organizations whose propaganda campaign 
coincided with that of IPES it is worth mentioning the AssociaQao 
dos Amigos das Nac&s Cativas (Association of the Friends of Captive 
Nations) and Moral Rearmament. The Association was a strongly anti-
communist umbrella institution, ~ith similar bodies in the United 
states, whose leadership in Erazil comprised Gustavo Cor~~o (president), 
Glycon de Paiva (vice-president), G. B. ltTeinschenk (treasurer). Among 
its directing council were a number of lPES/IBAD associates and 
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activists. Some of the affiliates were: Dario de Almeida Magalhaes, 
Eugenio Gudin, ~1onsignor F. Bessa (SJ), Padre F. Leme Lopes (SJ), 
Joao Camilo de Oliveira Torres, Raul Fernandes, Prudente de Morais 
Neto, Carlos Povina Cavalcanti, Carlos Guinle, Alberto Barreto de 
Mello, Manuel de Azevedo Leao and Gladstone Chaves de Hello. The 
Association was also an outlet for anti-communist propaganda, pro-
duced in other countries as well as in Brazil. 
The other institution which added to the anti-communist scare 
drive was Moral Rearmament, the American based international 'cold 
war' organization, which was very strong in the early 1960s. Moral 
Rearmament, which reached a wide spectrum of middle class public 
opinion engaged in its activities some very prominent military 
officers of that period. General Juarez T~vora campaigned for their 
cause, which he made his own. In 1962, General Tavora, prior to the 
Congressional elections of October of that same year, appeared for 
Moral Rearmament in several public engagements in several urban 
centres. In Petrdpolis, the middle class mountain resort above Rio 
de Janeiro, where a highly publicized conference of Moral Rearmament 
was taking place, General T~vora signed jointly with Marshal Henrique 
Teixeira Lott, the former Ninister of War and PSD presidential candi-
date for the elections of 1)60, a declaration of support and adherence. 
In Ibirapuera, together with General Hugo Bethlem, brother both of 
Colonel Belfort Bethlem (who belonged to General Ernesto Geisel's 
cluster of officers) and of reserve general Agricola Bethlem, an 
lPES affiliate, General Tavora introduced r10ral Rearmament to Sao 
Paulo. 68 Moral Rearmament also maintained a programme of ideological 
training whereby military officers and other opinion shapers were 
sent to the United States for a period of ideological guidance and 
political -preparation. The then Air Force Colonel l"loreira 
Burnier, former leader of the Jacareacanga and Aragar~as military 
revolts was among those sent abroad in the framework of such a 
programme. 69 Moral Rearmament also provided propaganda material to 
IPES, ranging from films to pamphlets geared towards different sec-
tors of public opinion, and its effectiveness was felt even within 
the dominant classes in shaping class awareness. The aims of the 
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Moral Rearmament team operating in Brazil, with whose representative, 
a Mr. Zimmerman, the IPES leader Jose Rubem Fonseca was connected, 
were to impress upon entrepreneurs reluctant to co-operate with the 
organic elite, the needs and the urgency of the hour. 70 lPES Sao 
Paulo was channelling funds to r·1oral Rearmament, as an independent 
operation from IPES Rio.?l 
Among the 'parallel movements', so active in the anti-populist 
and anti-popular campaign were the Uniao Hacional de AssociaQ~s 
Femeninas (National Union of'Female Associations),72 the already 
mentioned AC;.1 - Christian Youth Association, and the Association of 
Christian Enterprise Managers - ADCE, which according to IPES leader 
Jorge Frank Geyer was 'already a sort of IPES,.7J Influential 
figures of the ADCE were the entrepreneurs Paulo Egydio Martins, 
Severo Gomes and Murilo Macedo. IPES-linked Padre Fernando Bastos 
D'Avila, a PUC and ESG lecturer, and the ideologist of the/Christian 
Solidarity Doctrine/was the ADGE's ecclesiastical assistant. The 
ADCE was important in mobilizing the smaller entrepreneurs and the 
middle classes through the organizationcf conferences and lectures 
and in supporting the campaign of IPES. 
But what IPES regarded as one of its most successful exploits 
was the 'discovery' of female pressure groups, so widely and effec-
tively used ten years later against the ,,constitutional government 
of Salvador Allende in Chile, and for which the Brazilian experience 
provided the blueprint. 
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Singling out the middle class housewife as the potential rally-
ing point for the counterattack against Goulart was of singular 
importance. In doing so, IPES was aiming directly at the wives, 
sisters, and mothers of the military, the professionals, the commer-
cial employees and the techno-bureaucrats. IPES is said to have 
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imported anthropolOgists and sociologists; who advised IPES on the 
great influence that mothers and grandmothers wielded in Brazilian 
society. It seems that it took the entrepreneurs one year to learn 
how to use the techniques of middle class mobilization, but once 
they did, it was a 'steam roller' which did not stop. Glycon de 
Paiva considered it to be the perfect example of an 'Idea-Force', 
possessing organization, money.and slogans. 74 
The organized women were to provide a significant part of the 
powerful and far reaching propaganda machinery (Caixa de Resson~ncia), 
'vhich the organic elite needed. Female organizations (generally with 
a body of male political and organizational advisers)75 were both 
instrumental in the dissemination, as well as being the target, of 
the 'red scare' campaign which the organic elite unleashed. 76 During 
the early part of 1964, the female organizations and Catholic groups 
provided the most visible civic action in Brazil against Goulart, 
and the national-reformist forces especially in Minas Gerais, Sao 
Paulo and Guanabara. 
IPES funded, organized and guided politically the three most 
important female organizations: the \'!omen' s Campaign for Democracy -
CAMDE, of Rio de Janeiro; the Feminine Civic Union - UCF, of s~o 
Paulo, and the Campaign for Civic Education - CSC. IPES also 
assisted financially, provided organizational expertise and politi-
cal orientation to such Catholic conserVative and 'family oriented' 
groups as the Campanha da 11ulher Brasileira - (Campaign of the 
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Brazilian i{oman); the Hovimento de Arregimenta2ao Feminina - MAF 
(r1ovement for Fe male Regimentation), headed by Antonieta Pellegrini; 
the Liga Independente para a Liberdade -- (I n d e 1> end e nt L~ague for 
Liberty), headed by Haria Pacheco Chaves; 77 the Hovimento Familiar_ 
CTistao- ~WC (Christian Family Movement); the Confedera9a~ das 
Familias Cristas - CFC (Confederation of Christian Families); the 
Liga Crista Contra 0 Comunismo -~ (Christian League Against 
Communism;78 the Cruz ada do Ros~rio em Familia - CRF (Crusade of 
the Rosary in Family); the Legiao de Defesa Social - (Legion of 
Social Defence); the Cruzada Democratica Feminina do Recife - CDFR 
(Democratic Feminine Crusade of Recife); the Associacao Democr~tica 
Feffiinina - ADF (Democratic Feminine Association) of Porto Alegre; 
and the Liga de ~1ulheres Democriticas - LIMDE (',{oman's League for 
Democracy) of Minas Gerais. 79 
Although the Movement for Feminine Regimentation began in 
1954, as an organization protesting against the rising cost of living 
and the lack of civic education in public schools, its manifestly 
political role developed in the early 1960s. In an increasingly 
radical politiC~l atmosphere, the MAF devoted increasing efforts to 
'combating Communism and corruption' by pamphleteering, public rallies, 
petitions, and door-to-door propaganda. The directorship of MAF 
comprised exclusively members of very high status from traditional 
Paulista families, and its action was restricted to &ro Paulo. Its 
president was the sister of Julio de i'iesqui ta Filho, the owner of 
o Estado de S~o Paulo and many of the IPES activists who performed 
as advisers to l'lAF were connected to the nevlspaper. I1AF had about 
6,000 members and its funds came from lEES sto Paulo. BO 
The Feminine Civic Union was organized in Sab Paulo in 1962, 
aiming at the 'enlightenment' of Public Opinion, the 'defence of the 
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democratic regime' and to 'awaken the civic consciousness of women'. 
The UCF disseminated its views mainly through lectures, conferences 
and basic indoctrination courses provided to housewives, and workers, 
on such varied issues as the Social Doctrine of the Church and Prob-
lems of Brazilian Economy, and Politics. 
The UCF was also active in~traordinary heckling activities, 
and their action had little to do with the attitudes of Brazilian 
housewives. They represented the propaganda pIOng of the IPES-led 
machinery whose other prong was organized para-military activities. 
In these activities, the UCF was supported by Governor of Sao Paulo 
Adhemar de Barros and his tough state police, disguised as students. 8l 
Paulo de Tarso, Miguel Arrais, Leonel Brizzola, Almino Afonso, Joao 
Pinheiro Neto and Eloy Dutra were special targets for the violent 
activities of these organized groups.82 The UCF was instrumental 
in providing the 'chorus line' for the mass demonstrations against 
the visit of Yugoslavian President Tito, as well as against a host 
of governmental measures. The UCF stormed into television stations 
to make their views known, and sent busloads of anti-Communist 
'students' and bully-boys,to participate in student union elections,8] 
The UCF was also a channel of funds and a source of political sup-
port for other groups and organizations, such as the Paulista Union 
of Secondary School Students. It was through the UCF, that promotion 
and public relations conferences in favour of the government of Rio 
Grande do Norte, in the troubled northeast, were organized. These 
activities related to the launching of the IPZS inspired plan of 
development for the state, which happened to have been one of the 
key states chosen for the show-case policy of promoting 'islands of 
sanity' designed to counteract through a massive influx of financial 
resources~r impact projects and other means, the growing unrest 
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of the labour~ft and to prop up the images of the respective governors, 
Aluisio Alves, the Governor of Rio Grande do Norte also happened to 
be a business associate and relative of IPES leader Jose Luiz Moreira 
de Souza. The plan designed by IPES provided for the state of Rio 
Grande do Norte to become a show-case of what private initiative could 
do for the northeast, striving to solve the problems of the region 
by the establishment of the Company for the Development of Rio Grande 
do Norte - CODERN. The company was established with 500 partners, 
destined to evaluate the economic possibilities of the state for 
the centre-south industrial and banking investors. The UCF promotional 
activities also had a mutual reinforcement effect. 84 
The UCF had fewer members than MAF, but a more extensive net-
work of action nuclei, spreading into neighbouring Pararut state. It 
is interesting to note that after 1964, the UCF occupied itself with 
favela social work, and consumer protection. It also maintained an 
Archive of Politicians, with personal biographical data as well as 
informati~n on their voting record. 85 
IPES organized in 1963 the nationwide Campaign of Civic Edu-
cation - CEC, with a programme involving the 'awakening of the 
nation's civic awareness' and 'patriotic stimulus for the great 
masses, principally the middle class, the workers and the youth'. 
The UCF with other IP3S-led organizations was a joint sponsor of 
CEC. The activities of CbC were co-ordinated by a central committee 
formed by university lecturers, journalists, professionals, and 
incorporating members of the female action groups, selected workers 
and students, of the IPES-sponsored movements and groupings. CEC 
was involved in middle class mobilization and propaganda, as well 
as the indoctrination and organization o~ student and workers' acti-
vists, and its activities coincided mostly with those of the most 
prominent of all the women's groups, the Cam,;panhan da rlulher pela 
Democracia - (Woman's Campaign for Democracy). 
The Woman's Campaign for Democracy, presided over by Amelia 
t<lo1ina Bastos, sister of Gal. Antonio de Mendon9a Holina, owed its 
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prominence to its very active promotional programmes since its incep-
tion in 1962 up to the coup in 1964, to ~s rapport with important 
political and military elites and with the national press, especially 
o Globo, and last but not least to its particular role in public 
agitation in the days preceding the coup. 
The idea to create CAMDE shortly before the legislative elections 
of 1962 reportedly came from three men: Leovigildo Balestieri, the 
Francis~an vicar from the upper middle class suburb of Ipanema, 
Glycon de Paiva and General Golbery do Couto e Silva. 'They argued 
convincingly that the Army was undermined by "the vice of legalism", 
that it would move only if "legitimized" by some civilian force, 
and that the middle class and upper class women were the most con-
cerned and easily mobilized group of civ-ilians.,86 The immediate 
reason for the creation of CAMDE was the necessity to mount an effec-
tive 'popular chorus' to prevent Santiago Dantas from becoming Prime 
Minister by stimulating unfavourable repercussions to his nomination 
and against whom the 'Caravana a Brasilia' (Caravan to Brasilia) was 
organized. 87 CAr·IDE' s first meeting, symptomatically, was held in 
the auditorium of 0 Globo and the Rio news9aper and radio network 
ensured the maintenance of CAI1I)E in the limelight of events from 
there onwards. 
CArIDE carried on a steady campaign of 'esclarecimento' (enlight-
enment). The organization was effectively used during the election 
campaign of October 1962, sponsoring lec'tures for its members on 
the peril of 'Communist subversion', holding public meetings, handing 
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out pamphlets and collecting signatures on protest~etitions. It put 
up rabid anti-Communist banners and posters depicting a child urging 
citizens to 'Vote for a Democrat so that tomorrow I may still be 
free'. CAMDE activists also appeared on television endorsing a 
great variety of political, religious and social personalities which 
lPES set up through their 'speakers' bureau'. 
C~~E set up public protest meetings, wrote tens of thousands 
of letters to congressmen, and in the same way as IBAD did, it put 
pressure on commercial firms to remove advertisements from pro-Goulart 
or labour-oriented newspapers. CAMDE distributed millions of circu-
lars and booklets prepared mainly by IPES/IBAD and it produced its 
own literature aimed at the concerns of the housewife. These pam-
phlets were distributed in hundreds of thousands per issue and efforts 
were concentrated on the wives of members of labour controlled unions. 88 
CM'ID~ was also used in the build-up of organized public pressure on 
the Foreign l1inistry at the time of the Cuban Hissile Crisis, attempt-
ing to disrupt Brazil's neutralist foreign policy. 
CM"IDE worked in collaboration with sister associations in Sao 
Paulo and elsewhere, such as GEC, UCF, HAF, iHIDE, CDFR and ADF, 
among others, and with other IPES/IEAD outlets, such as the Democra-
tic Student Movement, the Democratic Syndical Movement and the 
National Confederation of Christian \vorkers. It received direct 
collaboration from IPES-Rio through one of its leaders, Oscar ~e 
Oliveira, from the Commercial Association of Rio, and from the 
Erazilian Association of r1unid.pali ties - ABM, which also functioned 
as an IPES outlet. CAr·IDE was also instrumental in the seizure of 
alleged 'subversive' literacy material being used by the Hovement 
for Easic 2ducation - !£D and in the hysteria campaign unleashed on 
top of it. Horeover, CA11DE was responsible for the mass demonstrat:ion 
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of one million people in Rio in support of military intervention 
against the government and suppression of the left. Hhen President 
Goulart came to Rio to deliver his famous speech at the public rally 
for the basic reforms, on t1arch 13, CAMDE engaged in a telephone 
campaign asking people not to attend the rally, urging wom.en to stay 
at home and to light candles on their windows, as their sign of pro-
test and Christian faith. 
The culmination of the efforts of the IPES-guided women's asso-
ciations came six days later, on the day of st. Joseph, patron of the 
family, with the co-ordination of the 'March of the Family, with God, 
for Freedom' which took place in Sao Paulo. An estimated 500 thousand 
people turned out to protest against Goulart's comfcio of ~arch 13. 
The idea of organizing such a march had been voiced by Federal Deputy 
Antonio Silvio Cunha Bueno, a wealthy landowner and director of Wi11ys 
do Brasil; Deputy Concei9ao da Costa Neves; Jose Carlos Pereira de 
Souza, an official of the National Confederation of Commerce; Sister 
Ana de Lourdes; and Oscar Thompson Fi1ho, the Secretary for Agricu1-
ture in the state of Sao Paulo. The actual organization of the 
march took place at the Brazilian Rural Society - SRB premises, under 
the supervision of IPES members of the Commercial Association, the 
Federation of Industries, the Federation of Rural Associations, the 
Club of Retail Merchants and the civilian-military general staff of 
IPES. 89 Another important institution which assisted in the organiza-
tion of the march was the Council of Democratic Entities, which 
functioned as a peak association for a wide variety of specialized 
professionally based 'democratic' parallel associations. 90 The 
General Secretary of the CED was IPES leader Oswaldo Breyne da 
Silveira. The march had the added suppor~ and participation a C~C, 
the local YHCA, FACUR, the Federation of ~Iorkers' Circles, the 
Federation of Parent-Teacher Associations and the propagandistic 
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expertise of HacCann Ericsson, the multinational publicity company.91 
At the offices of the SRB, which also housed the Independent 
League for Liberty,92 posters, banners and flags were made. Some 
called for 'Down with Red Imperialism', 'Resignation or Impeachment', 
others supported 'Reforms yes, with Russians No', while others still 
reminded the public that 'Getulio arrested the Communists, Jango 
rewards Communist traitors'. The governor of Sao Paulo, Adhemar de 
Barros joined in the organization and provided facilities. The organic 
elite made sure that airplane and bus companies offered free trans-
portation for representatives from all of Sao Paulo's municipalities 
and from other states, not a very difficult proposition since many 
of the transport companies' executives were themselves IPES members 
or supporters. Among the leading participants in the march were 
Auro de !1oura Andrade, 'who was the president of the Congress, Carlos 
Lacerda and General Nelson de Mello, of the civilian-military general 
staff of IPES, who addressed the throng: 'For the Christian conscience 
of Brazil we ar e present at this demonstration. This is a deci-
sive day for the existence of Brazil. We have faith in the armed 
forces; we have faith in democracy,.93 
The march was ostensibly an upper class and upper middle class 
affair, and a very restricted one at that, as only half a million 
people were mustered in a city of eight million. As Ambassador 
~incoln Gordon noted in a letter to the American 3ecretary of state, 
Dear Rusk on April 2, 1964: 'the only sad note was the obviously 
limited participation of thebwer classes in the march,.9+ The march 
was followed by lesser ones in Bela Horizonte, Curitiba, Porto Alegre 
and Santos. 95 According to lPES and SrtB leader Salvia de Almeida 
Prado, one of the~fective organizers, the march was hailed as 'a 
miracle of faith',96 although, as seen earlier, a more mundane cause 
was at hand.97 
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The most important thing to bear in mind is that 'The Army, it 
is generally agreed, would have been hesitant to move had there not 
been strong indications that public opinion was favourable, and it 
is quite possible that spectacular demonstrations, such as the Barch 19 
"Harch of the Family, with God, for Freedom'" in Sao Paulo I were deci-
sive in convincing the strictly military sector of the "Revolutionary 
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I"Iovement" that the time was ripe'. This assessment was corroborated 
by Colonel Vernon Walters, the USA intelligence officer, who observed 
that 'Until the marches took place there was a fear that the movement 
to overthrow Goulart would not succeed,.99 Whether the coup support-
ing sectors of the Armed Forces intervened feeling themselves justi-
fied by the appeal of the marchers, in an increasingly radicalized 
atmosphere which provided the emotional background, or whether the 
military had to intervene by anticipation, in view of what could be 
easily argued was the slack support they received after so much hard 
work is still open for discussion. But less than two weeks later, in 
response to the 'yearning of the people', Goulart was deposed. lOO 
Containing the Peasantry 
Brazil has had a long history of rural unrest, but the increase 
in rural tensions throughout the 1950s was rapid. Unlike the urban 
industrial sector, the agrarian sector had not been a part of the 
corporatist syndica~i~ation effort during the Zstado Novo and even 
during Vargas' second presidency. Rural unionization remained illegal 
throughout the 1950s, and rural workers of all kinds remained under 
the unchallenged control of the hrge landowners until the mid-1950s. 1vl 
The roots of the drive to organize the peasantry could be found during 
the 1940s in the 1wrk of the Brazilian Communist Party initially, by 
establishing a network of Ligas Camponesas, which should not be confused with 
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the Peasant Leagues later associated with Francisco JUliao. Organiza-
tional~tivity among the peasantry re-emerged in the mid-1950s in 
Galil~a, first with the establishment of the Agricultural Society 
of Planters and Cattle Ranchers of Pernambuco ),assisted by a former 
Communist Party:member,Jos~ dos Prazeres) and) then, by the formation 
of civil and legal rights societies which soon grew~ throughout the 
northeast under the leadership of Ju1iao~ into a network of Peasant 
leagues --as they were called by the landowners -in an attempt to 
confuse them with the defunct Communist Ligas. 102 
As talk of agrarian reform became widespread, in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s, and as the politica1'climate for rural mobilization 
became more favourable, other agrarian organizations began to func-
tion or were re-activated. Among the more important were ULTAB, the 
Union of Tillers and Agricultural Workers of Brazil, originally 
created by the Communist Party in 1957, and l,fAST8R, the Hovement of 
Landless Peasants, created by Rui Ramos and endorsed by Leonel Brizzola 
in Rio Grande do Sul. To combat their influence the Catholic Church 
began to sponsor and organize rural syndicates to counter the 'godless' 
ligas in various parts of the northeast and the south. lO) The rural 
labour movement demonstrated impressive vitality growing in regions 
where virtually no organization at all had existed just a couple 
of years earlier. The demands of the organized peasantry ranged 
from the abolition of the cambao -the obligation to work for the 
estate owner for a number of days per week or per month at a iower 
l~ than normal wage - to better wages and requests for rural social, 
services and public utilities - schools, water, sewerage, housing 
and roads. The demand for land reform was inchoate. Nevertheless, 
in November 1961, the First National Congress of Labourers and Agri-
cul tural ~Jorkers was held in Belo Horizonte, CBsembling l,400 delegates 
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and over 2,000 other participants who endorsed JUliao's call for a 
radical land reform. Among the proposals of the Congress were: 'the 
radical transformationa the existing agrarian structure, with the 
elimination of a majority of land ownership by the latifundistas; , 
; 
principally by expropriation of the large estates by the federal 
government, substituting, for monopolistic proprietorship, peasant 
ownership in individual or partner form and state property,;105 the 
free distribution of unoccupied lan~and rent at moderate rates of 
the land expropriated from the ~tifundistas; the right of independent 
organization of the peasants in their class associations; the effec-
tive application of labour legislation already in existence but hither-
to only applied to urban workers, as well as development of adequate 
labour~gislation for the rural workers; immediate recognition of 
the rural unions and effective and immediate assistance for the 
peasant economy of all types. It was against this background that 
the Goulart administration began to press for land reform and actively 
and officially supported the rural labour movement, finally legaliz-
ing rural unionization through the rural labour statute at the begin-
ning of 1963. 
However, the period of most intense activity in the field of 
peasant organization began-by 1961, when the organic elite decided 
to challenge the Ligas through the promotion of rural labour unions 
organized by a segment of the Catholic clergy, an effc·rt which coin-
cided with that of conservative sectors of the Church. By the early 
1960s, the peasant context was perceived by IP~S/IBAD as a political 
and ideological powder keg, and,likewise, the attention of the rest 
of the nation was at the time focused on the progress of the rural 
labour movement, especially that Hhich had been developing in Pernam-
buco for a number of years under the leadership of Juliao, as well 
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as the efforts to trade-unionize the rural workers by the Communist 
Party. The organic elite's specific aim was to counteract what it 
considered to be the subversive activities of the Peasant Leagues, 
es~ecially those in Pernambuco, the key state of the northeast. 106 It 
was obvious that the vision a a mass of 40 million mobilized peasants 
breaking the rural yoke and overrunning the cities was a terrifying 
prospect for landowners and bourgeoisie alike. 107 As a conse~uence, 
the organic elite strove to contain rural politicization and disrupt 
the incipient peasant mobilization, not only in the northeast, where 
it was more pressing, but also in the south and centre of the country. 
For IBAD, the looming revolution in the northeast would be 
avoided only by the 'Christian and democratic reforms of the estatuto 
da terra', within the framework of the plan for agrarian reform pro-
posed at their Symposium on Agrarian Reform, of April 1961. However, 
while the re~uired reform was not implemented IP);S/I::aAD attempted to 
contain popular awakening and buy time for other events to take their 
course. 
IPES/IBAD could not disregard the popular yearning for agrarian 
reform and other social changes demanded by the peasantry, the stu-
dent movement, intellectuals and politicians of the national-reformist 
bloc. Agrarian reform of some sort had to be an issue if the hearts 
and minds of the peasantry were to be won, and IPSS/I::aAD had to pay 
at least lip service to it. However, even to pay lip service to 
agrarian reform created serious problems for the organic elite in 
their uneasy relationship with lando'l'rners and their class associations. 
The most recalcitrant segments of the agrarian oligarchy condemned 
even the mild modernizing endeavours of IP0S/IBAD as being of 'commu-
nistic' inspiration. Furthermore, IPZS/IBAD could hardly afford to 
antagonize the landowners, as their political strength in Congress 
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remained massive. To tread the golden path between the landowning 
bloc and the mobilized peasantry was not easy. Nevertheless, the 
organic elite tackled its dilemma and decided to 'launch itself in 
the arena of political war'. One of the forms this step took .was 
for IBAD to indicate to the rural population their choice of politi-
cians for regional and national elections. lOB In these activities, 
IPES/IBAD were aided by sympathetic members of the rural class asso-
ciations represented in IPES, and abetted by the tight control which the 
'0° landowners exercised over their rural Norkers and employees, J. -"and which 
favoured the voto de cabresto (bridle vote). Another form of inter-
ference was to meddle directly in peasant affairs, by competing with 
labour left organizations for the minds of the peasantry. This action 
which involved some degree of trade-unionization.-·anathema to the 
landowners in general- was carried out by proxy, mostly.through 
peasant organizations established by right-wing Catholic clergy, 
which provided a convenient outlet and thus concealed the action 0 f 
IP3S/IBAD from the public,in general) and from the recalcitrant land-
owners in particular. 
Violent containment of the peasant leagues was left to other 
organizations and individual action by landowners who did not have 
ostensible connections with IPES/IBAD. 
In order to organize their vTOrk, two IBAD activists, the lawyers 
Frutuoso Osorio Filho and Herculano Carneiro,went to Recife, the 
headquarters for the northeastern region, and., in conjunction vii th 
local civilian and military personnel belonging to the ADEP cells 
and to IPES;l? organized the organic elite's class disruptive action, 
fostering the formation of ideological cleavages and political right-
wing enclaves vTithin the peasant movement. Side by side with its 
facade as a welfare agency dispensing medical services and food, 
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handing out seeds and basic tool~ rBAD operated as a propaganda 
centre and political action unit in the countryside, gathering intel-
ligence on peasant political organization and the individuals involved 
as activists, engaging itself in scare campaigns against labour-left 
militants and stimulating the fear of 'Communism'. IBAD sought, 
with rather mixed success, to counterpose the Paulo Freire method of 
alphabetization, and that of the Movement for Basic Education spon-
sored by the f.finistry of Education, with its own system of Courses of 
Democratic Formation for peasants and rural leaders. III 
The activity of rBAD was carried out also through the framework 
of the Rural Orientation Service of Pernambuco - SORPE, which served 
as a channel for the organic elite's strategy of containment and 
detraction of peasant mobilization. SORPE had been founded at a 
meeting of some 26 rural priests promoted by Dom Sugenio Sales/the 
Bishop of Natal and a few bishops from Pernambuco, including Dom 
Carlos Coelho and Dom Hanoel Pereira. SORPE was set up under the 
direction of Padre Paulo Crespo, the principal strategist of the 
movement,and Padre Antonio Melo, himself the son of a senhor de 
engenho. The SORPE's primary task was to occupy itself with the 
training of potential peasant leaders, able to combat revolutionary 
political organizations and ideologists, while keeping the rural 
masses ''\>ri thin the Church' .112 SORFS also encouraged the formation 
of co-operatives and provided literacy courses which ran counter 
to the HEB and other groups using the Paulo Freire method. ll] 
SORPE entered the arena of polftica reivindicatoria in direct 
competition with the more radical Peasant Leagues of Juli~o and 
against the embryonic trade union movement of rural and urban workers 
of the northeast. which 'Has perceived to .be more important in the 
mecli urn range than the -league s • Beti-reen 1961 and 1961.). SORP}:; created 
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ten rural trade unions and through Padre Melo another twelve were 
created in Pernambuco. 
SORPE was assisted by a group of local and southern lawyers 
and professionals and received the support of local rural entrepreneurs. 
SORPE was also one of the major beneficiaries of CLUSA, the Co-opera-
tive League of the United states. CLUSA, in its turn, was partly 
funded by contributions from institutions which served as recipients 
of United states CIA funds. Between 1963 and 1965, CLUSA received 
over half a million dollars from these institutions. 114 11any of the 
CLUSA field experts helped SORPE as advisers, and CIA agents worked 
under their cover. The young CLUSA field worker who advised SORPB 
that, 'in convincing the peasant that the misery of his condition is 
unnecessary, one must be careful not to push him to the extreme of 
revolt against the authorities and vested interests who have held 
him in his present state " Has on the CIA payr~ll. 115 
Although the links between IPES/rBAD and SORPE were kept as 
low-key as possible, by late 1963 Padre 1:1elo was openly accepting 
finance and other assistance from IBAD, denouncing Miguel Arraes, 
the national-reformist governor of Pernambuco and publicly endorsing 
ultra-right wing candidates for public office, asSORPE had done in 
the Legislative elections of October 1962. IPES was also active 
through its povrerful mass media network with which it provided the 
necessary coverage for the operations of SORF~ and others, as well 
as the negative media exposure of Juliao, Arraes and the Peasant 
Leagues. 116 IP"28 leader Nei Peixoto do Valle, of the Public Opinion 
Group, took care of Padre Helo's media coverage. II? 
The influence exerted by Padre Crespo and Padre :-:e10 was, at 
least in the short run, effective and clearly counter-revolutionary, 
a fact duly noted by intelligence officials in Ylashington. l1B l;ot 
492 
by chance did the CIA contingent treble, while the number of vice-
consuls went up to fourteen. A host of special advisers was estab-
Ii shed in Recife, which became the biggest sub-regional operation 
anywhere of the US - American Agency for International Development -
AID, while the northeast became a special target area for the American 
Institute for Free labour Development. The CIA did indeed enjoy 
some success in the containment and disruption of peasant mobilization 
through the proxy action of right-wing organizations operating in 
the northeast and in particular through SORPE. 119 Serafino Romualdi, 
the Inter-American representative for the American Federation of 
Labour, who also had a hand in Brazilian urban and rural trade union 
affairs120 paid his tribute to the activities of these right-wing 
organizers. For Romualdi, who was also the principal CIA agent for 
Labour Organization in latin America,121 the Brazilian right-wing 
trade union movement had to feel 'greatly indebted to the Capuchin 
Frei Celso of Sao Paulo, Father Velloso of Rio de Janeiro and the 
Reverend (sic) Padre Cres~o of the northeast', as well ,as to others 
who were responsible for 'the breakthrough in the rural areas where 
Catholic inspired unions succeeded against many odds in organizing 
the agricultural workers,;22 Frei Celso, Padre J. Velloso and Padre 
Crespo were all sponsored and assisted by IPE3 in their particular 
'~3 operations, and functioned as. field organizers for IP~S.-~ 
As mentioned earlier, the conservative sectors of the Church 
were also involved in their own efforts to contain peasant mobiliza-
tion and to oppose the activities of the Peasant Leagues. These 
efforts in many cases coincided or were even co-ordinated with those 
of IPES/IBAD and their supported unions. Historically, the Church 
had taken its influence over the rural ma'sses for granted, but Hith 
the formation of the ligas in the rura~ areas, and their subsequent 
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rapid spread, the Church's influence was no longer so secure. Partly 
as a reaction~and,partly as the continuation of its own efforts, 
Church involvement in rural unionization began in 1959, when Dom 
Eugenio Sales gave his full support to unionization through his move-
ment the Servi~o de Assistencia Rural - SAR, an essentially paternal-
istic and ameliorative organization which had been active since 1949 
promoting limited social change at the local level in the state of 
Rio Grande do Norte. Beginning in Natal, the movement caught on and 
by 1961 had also become established in Fernambuco, where the meeting 
of rural pastors that gave birth to SORP~ had taken place. By 1964, 
there were Church rural union movements in about half the states, 
including all those of the northeast. These rural unions included 
the SAR in 5io Grande do Norte, SORPE in Pernambuco, FAG in Rio 
Grande do Sul, in direct opposition to the Brizzola sponsored union 
!1ASTER, F A:2 in Sao Paulo, and FAG in Goias, Radical sectors also estab-
lished their own rural unions, such as I"lEB in Naranhao and ;'!inas 
Gerais and variations of m~B and A!;a6 Popular in several other 
12''-!-
states. 
The Church unions for the most part were not the 'revolutionary' 
ones, most often they attempted to enforce the existing hws rather 
than embark in more polarized, radical strategies. 125 An important 
issue in rural unionization was legal recognition of the rights of 
the workers, ffi well as of the unions that fought for the enforcement 
of the existing lavTs. However, a particular union had to be recog-
nized by' the government to be legal. Furthermore , legality ensured 
privileges concerning dues and ultimately questions of control of 
larger organizations as unions begat state level organizations, the 
federations, which in turn gave rise to the attempts to create con-
federations of a national character. (A confederation could be 
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constituted according to the law only once three federations had 
been established and recognized by the Hinistry of Labour.) 
By 1962, the Church had organized some 50 unions, but none had 
been recognized by the government. In Hay of that year, these unions 
met in the First Congress of Rural Workers and Tillers of the North 
and Northeast which took p..ace in Itabuna in the northeastern state 
of Bahia. Representatives of Church-controlled unions dominated 
the meeting~)which was sponsored and financed by the big rural entre-
preneurs and some of the more 'modern' landowners. After a certain 
amount of bargaining and pressur~i)the Minister of Labour, Franco 
Montoro, an important figure of the Christian Lemocratic PartYD who 
had been invited to the Congres~ agreedtoreoognize some 22 Church 
unions. 
By 196J, the Church was openly competing in the founding of 
unions with several other political groupings, even with President 
Goulart, governor Arraes and the Communist Party, while in June of 
that year, a group of Pernambuco unions banded together to form a 
state-wide Federationcf Rural Syndicates. The Federation was under 
the firm control of Padre Crespo and his SOaPhi associateq,'l and vTaS 
.y 
assisted by the same group of lawyers who advised SORPB. 126 by then, 
Goulart, who had been cautious initially not to antagonize the land-
owner bloc, had lost their support completely~ and was in open con-
fronta tion with their representatives in Congressi' vrho Nere part of 
the IP~S/IBAD-run machinery of the AD? The support Goulart gave to 
unionization served several purposes: it counterbalanced the growing 
Communist Party's influence among the peasantry and provided the 
President Nith his own rural masse de manoeuvre with which he could 
" 
bring pressure to bear upon the landowners and their political repre-
sentatives. It also marked the turning point for the ascendancy of 
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national-reformist unions. 
By mid-1963, the Ministry of Labour, in consonance with Goulart's 
aims to mobilize the peasantry and introduce social reforms in the 
rural areas, set up the National Commission for Rural Unionization -
CONSIR, made up of three representatives of the i1inistry, three of 
the Superintendency for Agrarian Reform and one peasant appointed by 
each. By July 1963, five federations existed: three conservative 
Catholic ones in the northeast, SORPE included; the IPES-sponsored 
Federation of Workers' Circles in Sao Paulo (whose conception of 
the role of a trade-union movement was to a large extent modelled 
on that of the AFL-CIO, the confederation of labour unions of the 
United States, and on that of its Latin American off-shoot, the 
Inter-American Labour Organization - ORIT), and, finally, one federa-
tion run by ULTAB, the Union of Tillers and Agricultural Workers of 
Brazil, influenced by the Communist Party, in Parana. ULTAB, though, 
had another eight federations in preparation. The rural area became 
a true field of battle for these rural federations and, in all 
instances, the key issue vras the legal recognition by the government, 
vrhich it duly vri thhell or granted according to its own political calculations. 
By mid-1963, the four Christian federations - set to win the 
grand prize, the establishment of a national Confederation - met in 
Recife and founded the National Confederation of Agricultural ~lorkers -
CONTAG, in a gathering to i .. hich the Parana Federation was not invited 
in time to participate. The legality of the founding meeting and 
Church-Unions' held elections which ensued lfere then called into ques-
tion by ULTAB, vrhose demands vrere supported by the government's 
CONSIR. The government refused to accept the results, declaring 
that Parana had not been invited in time and that many federations 
were then in the process of being recognized, a fact vrhich gave rise 
to suspicions that the meeting took place precisely to pre-empt the 
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probable dominance of the rural labour movement by the national-
reformist forces. By December 1963 a second gathering was held, to 
which were invited all the federations existing up to that tim.e. By December 
31, the I1inistry of Labour recognized 256 unions and ten federations, 
while 557 unions and 33 federations were awaiting recognition. These 
figures contrasted sharply with the situation before the early 1960s 
when only 6 rural lli1icns existed in all Brazil and give a clear 
measure of the wide peasant mobilization and the intense process of 
~oliticization occurring in the countryside. Eventually, CONSIR 
invited twenty-four federations to the December gathering. UiTAB 
controlled the largest group of delegates (ten federations), Six 
federations had a more or less moderate to conservative Catholic 
orientation, .while eight were inclined towards the student movement 
Popular Action - AP and the !-lEB. The AP, and a large part of the 
r1EB ended up forming a front with l'LTAB. The National Confederation 
of Agricultural 1rlorkers was under control of the national-reformist 
bloc. The Church groups, including SORPE, FAG, 3AR, the Horkers' 
Circles and some of the more moderate MSB achieved no control in 
COrITAG. 127 
Despite all the time and energy wasted by the national-reformist 
leadership in fending off the diversionist tactics of IPE8/IBk~ 
and the initial success the orbanic elite enjoyed in containing 
the ?easant ~eagues, the peasant movement, and)~hat is more, the 
trade-unionization of the peasantry had hardly been contained by 
lS'tJ. '3y 196'+, they seemed poised on the way to unification under 
the control of a reform oriented leadership vrhich even received 
legal and financial support from the Goulart governme nt. 123 iii th 
~TA3 holding the presidency in CONTAG and A? the general secretariat, 
other solutions to arrest peasant mobilization Hithin a comprehensive 
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political fra~ework had to be found by the organic elite, as not 
much more time could be bought by the right-Hing rural organizations. 
Action amonp; the Industrial Forking Classes 
The corporative structures which had been established in the 
1930s to provide the ruling elites with institutionalized control 
over the working class began to weaken by the early 1960s and falter 
under Goulart. Brazil's significant post-war industrial expansion 
and economic development had led, by the 1960s, to extensive moder-
nization which favoured political mobilization. The amorphous, indi-
vidualized clientele , held together by personal contact and patron-
age, began to give way to specific constituencies organized around 
clearly definable social sectors and classes, although the number of 
unionized workers was small, gaining a far greater measure of poli-
tical leverage than the populist model had hitherto allowed, This 
made it much more difficult for the holders of power to buy off these 
constituencies simply by distributing modest amounts of patronage to 
their leaders. Organized labour began to seek redistributive policies, 
i.e., changes in the allocation of resources among social groups 
and classes. 
For the labour leaders political Everage accrued from two major 
sources by 1960: the positions allocated to them in the official 
corporative institutions where they benefited from state patronage, 
and offices in the trade unions where they led major strikes whose 
economic and political impact increased their bargaining pOv,er with 
the nresident and other political actors. 129 In the early 1960s 
the frequency of strikes multiplied indtcating the groHing strength 
and combativity of the Horking classes and their leadership.~30 Among 
the allegerl motives for the outbreak of strike movements, economic 
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reasons - mainly defending the buying povTer of their salary - were 
uppermost. The strikes were rarely started for political reasons~ 
however,other political actors sought to give them a broader politi-
cal connotation. During Goulart's administration strikes began to 
. bear a deliberate political stamp such as the general strike of 
July 1962, which was considered to be much of a landmark, although 
even this strike was not free from hmediate and explicit economic 
objectives. The demands that united a vast number of different 
working class gr:oups and organiz_ations were: 
the fig h t . a g a ins tin f 1 a t ion and product shortage s; 
the implementation 0 f a radical and immediate agrarian 
reform, ~ith recognition of the rural workers' unions; the introduc-
tion of urban reform as the only possible solution for the housing 
problem; bank reform and nationalization of deposits; electoral 
reform giving illiterates, N.C.O.s and soldiers in the armed forces 
the right to vote; university reform and the participation of students 
ina.ssemblies and departmental and university councils; the con-
tinuity and expansion of neutralist and Third Horld oriented foreign 
policy; repudiation a the financial policy of the International 
Monetary Fund; approval of the law guaranteeing the right to strike; 
expropriation of all foreign enterprises exploiting public utilities; 
control of the entry of foreign capital into the country and restric-
tion of remittance of profits; workers' participation in profits; 
revocation of all and any agreements injurious to national interests; 
strengthening of Petrobras, with a state monopoly responsible for the 
importation of crude oil, the distribution of derivatives for the petro-
chemical industry and the expropriation of private refineries; effec-
tive measures fer the implementation of ~letrobras and the creation 
of Aerobra's, thereby instituting a state monopoly in electric energy 
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and commercial aviation: the sea transportation of at least 50 per 
cent of all imports and exports by national merchant vessels and 
the approval of the law instituting the payment of the thirteenth-
month salary (bonus payment).131 United in a single platform were 
the current demands of the national-reformist bloc encompassing the 
claims of the trade unions, the peasant movement, the student move-
ment, politicians and even of some nationalistic military. vlhat 
made the general strike fully political was that it was launched to 
press for a cabinet which would support such measures. The strike 
enabled the labour leaders of the national-reformist bloc to expand 
their already growing political power, which was reinforced by the 
general strike of September 1962.132 The organized labour movement, 
although still responding to populist leaders, was increasingly 
breaking out of the political and ideological,constraints of the 
corporatiye structures. 
Faced with such a critical situation, IPES/IBAD launched them-
selves into a campaign aimed at containing popular mobilization and 
disrupting the incipient class consciousness and militancy which 
the working masses were acquiring. Action among the industrial 
working classes was carried out through ideological and political 
means. The ideological activities encompassed general propaganda, 
welfare schemes and even clientelistic manipulation. The political 
activities involved the creation or support of existing right-wing 
organizatio~s within the labour movement. In these activities 
IPES/IBAD acted on their own or as channels for other organizations, 
even from outside Brazil. 
The socio-ideological activities of IPE3/IBAD stressed the 
'social function of capital' .133 ~nis was a calculated propagandistic 
effort to give the working masses a clearly visible stake in the 
500 
economic system, the idea of profit sharing, indirect social property 
and co-managerial responsibility. Such action had two purposes: to 
improve the public image of private enterprise, equated with demo-
cracy, and to delay a_violent upheaval until suitable political action 
could be developed. 1Y+ In this sense, ideological activities employed 
by the organic elite were strongly anti-mobilizational. The complex 
of ideological measures was believed to be necessary in order to 
contain those elements of the working classes and the rural workers 
most directly aware of social reality, in order to prevent what the 
organic elite perceived as the impending social chaos.135 As General 
Moziul Moreira Lima, one of the IPES/IBAD activists in Sao Paulo, 
stated at a meeting of the IPES leadership of Sao Paulo, the problem 
lay in that 'in the eyes of the people those guilty of the exploita-
tive process were the entrepreneurial classes rather than the govern-
136 
ment'. 
Ideological action was carried out through literacy campaigns, 
training of trade union leadership, the setting up of schools of 
political indoctrination for business and popular sectors and the 
projection of an imitative model of development, basically patterned 
on the United States, as mediated by the image transmitted by the 
Alliance for Progress. The ideological campaign of IPES/IBAD also 
included the distribution of propaganda material in the forms of 
books, pamphlets, films, booklets, and the establishment of training 
~entres for intermediate managerial staff, as well as the dissemina-
tiQn of reading material through mobile libraries and the employment 
of the audio-visual media to carry their message. The Group of 
Doctrine and Study in S~o Paulo and the Public Opinion groups of 
Rio and Sao Paulo were responsible for these operations. The 
assumption t hat . n a r row e con 0 m i c demands were permissible 
but a questioning of the social system was not were instilled 
through a meticulous campaign of indoctrination. 
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Areas of propaganda preferred by the organic elite were those 
in which national-reformist forces had made inroads through their 
political struggle to change the basic conditions of existence of 
the working masses, such as housing, health and other community 
services. The activities which the organic elite developed to 
counter the impact of the national-reformist bloc were encompassed 
under the general heading of Community Action, which included the 
sector of Social Works and the Group for Social Activities of IPES, 
and carried out basically as welfare schemes and social philanthropy. 
For Community Action lPES was offered direct assistance by Bnno 
Hobbing, the director of the USA based and sister organization 
Committee for Economic Development, through ~he special services 
of OED field man Gabriel Kaplan and his Community Action unit.137 
Community services were operated mainly in Pernambuco, where lBAD 
had developed its welfare programme to the fullest and inthe big 
centre-south urban concentrations of working class.138 
The organic elite developed several different schemes of welfare, 
all of which aimed at the creation of 'isll'tnds of content I among the 
working classes.. These 'island~ served to delay ideological class 
solidari ty and political organization of the working classes. IPES 
created a Corpo de Assistentes Sociais \Social Workers I Corps - CAS), which 
paternalistically provided material and human resources in favour of 
localized popular demands for communi ty services. l39The CAS acti vi ties 
coalesced with the work carried out by other lPES sponsored action 
units, such as the Movimento Universitario de Desfavelamento. This 
University Movement for 'De-Slumming' - MUD, attempted to emulate a 
project which had been developed in Sao Paulo by uni versi ty students 
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aiming at the provision of basic services to the slums and to stimu-
late the social consciousness of the slum dwellers, so as to organize 
them into pressure groups and teach them to demand their rights. i'ItID 
attempted to counter this action by regimenting various right-wing 
university groups under its own aegis and engaging in its own brand 
of civic action, the widely publicized community services. They 
promoted a 'rag to riches' image as an alternative to social struggle 
while dampening attempts at politicizing the plight of the slum 
dwellers. The Favela do Vergueiro, the ~avela da Mooca and the 
Favela do Tatua~e, comprising altogether 600 families were intended 
140 to be shoH-window cases.-
Through welfare schemes, IPES also gave material and pro pagan-
distic support to friendly trade union leaders and to would-be sup-
porters, so as t~ shore up their prestige and to strengthen their 
I OtO I °to 141 po ~ ~ca pos~ ~ons. 
To counteract increasing political motivation for working class 
mobilization, IPES concentrated on narrow socio-economic issues 
clearly meant for the consumption of the masses. Such a policy was 
made obvious after the return of an IPES delegation from one of the 
Nassau meetings which were held from time to time, to co-oxdinate 
policy and exchange information among the sister organizations. On 
. 
his return, IPSS leader Harold C. Polland stressed the need for IPES 
to pass into the offensive and not remain in the sphere of abstract 
principles, presented through newspapers, declarations and pamphlets. 
IPES had to focus upon material objectives, more in the reach of the 
masses, which the people themselves would feel were real. For such 
action Polland was sure of American support. Furthermore, IPES had 
to take advantage of the fact that people in the government itself 
would be objectively interested in such sensitive projects as popular 
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housing, a problem always present as a political issue , given a Jarge 
homeless urban population and one living in down-trodden conditions. 
Polland recommended that IPES establish contacts with the banking 
network, with a certain Mr. Frias in Puerto Rico and with Ambassador 
Teodoro Moscoso, the Puerto-Rican born ALPRO official, so that the 
policy and techniques which were implemented and tried in the Carib-
bean island could be extended to Brazil. Moreover, Polland observed 
that IPES ,should be attributed with the role of creator of the idea.. 
IPES would then have to be portrayed through the media machinery 
of its own organization, and hopefully be perceived as a sort of 
flag-bearer of real, objective goals.142 It was also felt in IPES 
that the organic elite needed totackle down-to-earth issues and win 
over the sympathy of sectors of public opinion before they could 
launch themselves into public debate over more delicate problems, such 
as defending the right to free royalty remittances by multinational 
corporations to their matrices, which was rightly considered to be 
an explosive issue. It was clear to the leadership of the organic 
elite that in early 1962 IPES still had not enough know-how (cancha 
para tanto) to deal with these problems in~e face of the national-
reformist arguments and the mood of public opinion.14) It would not 
take long for IPES to master the art of manipulation of public opinion 
and tackle not only the bigger issues, but to sway the ideological 
stance of the middle classes and make significant political impact 
among some of the working class. 
The political action of the organic elite among the working 
class and the trade unions was carried out largely through puppet 
organizations and clergy-based movements, which competed with labour-
left trade unions for the support of the working classes. The acti-
vities of organizations either created or supported financially 
and technically by IPES/IBAD were extremely varied. Among these 
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activities were the indoctrination of the rank and file of 
the labour movement and leadership training for militants, the run-
ning of seminars, conferences and congresses of the right-wing trade 
unions, breaking strikes and the staging of counter-demonstrations 
and other counter activities to the labour-left leadership, and to 
the executive, By these nieans lPES/IBAD were able to sap a~ay at the roots of-
the national-refo~mist trade union movement. The ,right-wing trade 
unions under the aegis of IPES/IBAD were also mobilized in conjunc-
tion with other student and middle class organizations controlled 
by the organic elite. lPES/IBAD, in their action among the working 
class were not only prime-movers, but also served as channels for 
the action of other political agencies, even foreign and international. 
An important achievement for IPES was to sponsor and inspire 
the political action of the right-wing FederaCa'o de C{rculos de " 
Trabalhadores Cristaos (Christian Workers' Circles Federations), 
which had been founded by ?adre Leopoldo Brentano. The Workers' 
Circles Federations were established in seventeen out of the 22 
states in the Brazilian Federation, and by th3 early 1960s they 
numbered approximately 400 across the length and breadth of the 
country. According to their own estimates, "they had 435,000 mem-
be r 80144 The centre-south, where the, industrial belt was localized, 
was of prime importance for the organic elite. Accordingly, IPES 
sponsored and guided politically the Christian ;~orkers' Circles 
Federation & Sao Paulo - FCO, an umbrella organization for around 
80 circles and assembling approximately 250,000 affiliates. The 
FCO was led by Jose Rotta, who was leader of the Tailors and Dress-
makers Trade Union, which was engaged in political disruptive action 
and ideological co-optation of workers. Rotta was also an activist 
in CO.NTAG. Another Horkers' Circles Federation which received 
.50.5 
particular attention from IY~S was the Fluminense Federation of 
Christian Workers' Circles - FCOF, of the state of Rio de Janeiro. 
The FCOF accomplished a series of significant tasks in the field of 
ideological indoctrination and political training which were supported 
financially by IPES. In a letter to IPES of Ni~e~oi, capital of the 
state of Rio de Janeiro, the FCOF leadership explained that they had 
bought a small property in Cachoeira do Macau, with the help of the 
Cooperativa Agrfcola de Cotta, of which Fabio Yassuda was the General 
secretary.145 The property was designed to serve as a meeting place 
for the right-wing syndical leaders of the state. Padre Antonio da 
Costa Carvalho, one of its mentors, arranged for Dom Altivo Pacheco, 
the bishop 0 f Barra do Pirai, to lead the courses and to canvas 
support among the urban and rural working class population for the 
defence of democracy, which was equated with the system of private 
enterprise. Dom Al ti vo was considered by the FCOF leaders to 
be a 'priest with great syndical tarimba' (experience), who did not 
allow himself to be 'swaddled by communist manoeuvres'. He was 
important to the organic elite, because his diocese included Volta 
Redonda, the biggest steel complex in Brazil and a regional centre 
f t ' f T '1 ' t' 146 or a s r~ng 0 worK~ng c ass commun~ ~es. 
With the aid of Padre Leopoldo Brentano, the organic elite/ 
under the cover of lEAD, organized the National Confederation of 
Workers' Circles - CNCO. IBAD was supported in this activity by 
Frei Celso, mentioned earlier in relation to his activities with the 
peasantry, who was in charge of a project on trada union penetration; 
by Padre Velloso, a former rector of the Fontificia Universidade 
Catolica of Rio de Janeiro; and by Padre Pancracio Dutra. IPES 
also supported financially and technically the CNCO. 147 Through the 
CNCO, the organic elite participated in the.f.ormation of right-Hing 
506 
t d · ddt· . t 148 ra e un~on lea ers an ac ~v~s s. 
Furthermore, in c i vic action which intended to enhance their 
prestige, the Workers' Circles offered legal, medical, dental and 
hospital assistance, consumers' co-operatives, credit co-operatives, and 
house-building co-operatives. They also offered varied courses, such 
as dactilography, industrial design, artistic design, propaganda 
design, architectural design, commercial practice, industrial chem-
istry, dress-mrucing, home economics and an agricultural beginners' 
course. 
IPES sponsored national congresses of the Workers' Circles. One 
of the outcomes of the Seventh National Congress of the \'lorkers' 
Circles was the launching of a Escola de Lfderes Operarios - S10 
(School for Workers' Leaders), in twelve different state capitals. 
The enterprise was put into~tion by Padre Vel~oso. of IBAD and 
directed by Gilberto !·1achado. The ELO provided two tY]?es of courses ~ 
Popular Courses for labour Preparation in the working class districts 
and Intensive Courses of Leader Formation. Both courses prepared 
the individual for right-wing counter activities in the fray against 
the labour left and aimed at shaping the political attitudes of 
selected members of the working class. The Popular Courses aimed 
at neutralizing the participational potential of the working class 
in shoring up national-reformist proposals and theses. The Intensive 
~ourses aimed at the formationcf militants capable of steering aHay 
from national-reformist mobilization if not the whole Horking class 
movement, at least groups and sectors wi thin it. lLf-9 According to 
IBAD's mouthpiece, ACa6 Jemocratica, the ELO was to make a test of 
extraordinary importance, i.e., to verify the receptivity among the 
wor:<ing class of the Christian Social Doctrine. 150 Padre Velloso's 
project for the formation of 'popular~aders', which aimed to interfere 
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in the trade union sector, and which was referred in IPE;S as being 
a 'plan for shaping attitudes' ,was co-ordinated by Candido Guinle 
de Paula Machado, who was also active in student matters. 151 Guin1e 
Machado, when justifying the need for continued support of such 
groups as the Workers' Circles, explained that it was an active move-
ment "'hich J?repared trade union leaders with a course of 6 months, 
for their political syndical career. That they prepared trade union 
pelegos was in no doubt. They were, as Guin1e Machado put it simply, 
'men that respond in our favour' .152 Another organization was spawned 
from the ELO, also funded by the entrepreneurs. This was the l1ove-
ment for Trade Union Guidance - MOS, which was set UJ? to act directly 
within the labour movement, in the shape of 'fifth columnists' and 
'orienters' of trade union action and opinion. Their role viaS simi-
lar to that of the IPES/IBAD-supported Movimento Renovador Sindica1 -
HRS, which also had a religious orientation. The Sao Paulo branch of 
lBAD 's Promotim S. A. headed by Claudio Hass1ocher, the brother of 
IBAD president Ivan, had as one of its syndical 'clients' the local 
sectioncf the HRS, which was led by Geraldo Meyer, a former journa-
list of the 0 Estado de Sa'o Paulo. 153 Heyer also ran a magazine 
called Corr~iQ8indical (Syndical Courier), which was supported finan-
cially by advertising from 0 Estado de Sao Paulo and from Acucar 
Esther, the sugar industrial complex belonging to Jose Bonif~cio 
Coutinho Nogueira, 13AD's candidate to the governorship of Sao 
P ul 15'+ a o. 
lPES also sUJ?ported Padre Velloso's Brazilian Confederation 
of Christian Workers - CBTC, of which he was the ecclesiastical 
assistant. As the political participation of the CBTC grew, it 
would become indistinguishable from the Confederation of Horkers' 
Circles, finally merging into one organization. 
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Following the same pattern adopted by IPES/IBAD of stimulus 
to the syndical activities of the clergy members in the trade union 
movement, General Golbery and General Liberato endorsed the assist-
ance to Padre Carvalho for his programmes of 'leader formation' in 
Campos rod petropolis. 155 IPES also funded the School of Leaders of 
the Pontiflcia Universidade Catolica. 156 
IPES Sao Paulo also provided regular support for rural and 
urban trade union activities and the formation of trade union mili-
tants,157 channelling funds to S~I, its sister organization, for the 
maintenance of a Centre of Leader Formation, which had an output of 
350 militants per year.158 Funds were also channelled as well as 
directives transmitted through IPES activist Hladimir Lodygenski, 
who was in contact Hi th German trade unions and from whom the IPES 
Executive Committee received regular reports on discreet actionm 
trade union activities. 
Another organization with which IPLBS linked. up was the Brazilian 
Democratic Hovement - :'lDB, of Sao Paulo, also connected to SEL The 
r.1DB had a s!tio-escola (farm-school) in Sao Paulo, where they admini-
stared four monthly courses for trade union and working class militants. 
Its ideological line was basically 'anti-communist'. According to 
an IPES report, the movement originated out of the need for Nacedo 
Soares at the Itamaraty to have accurate information on trade union 
movements. IP~~S activists who made the contact with MDB were 
i~pressed by the efficiency and the amount of resources at their 
disposal. According to IPES leader Rui Gomes de Almeida, he knew 
of at least 12 Sao Paulo based firms which were contributing heavily 
and anonymously. The ~IDB became a channel for the ideological and 
political activities of IP3S (distribution of propaganda material, 
pressur·3 on union activists, heckling), who also plaCf(i articles 
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in the MOB-sponsored newspapers and bulletins which circulated among 
the working class. The MDB also received support through IBAD~59 
Another operation sponsored by IPRS was the Centro de Orienta2~o 
Social - COS. The Centre for Social Orientation was formally consti-
tuted in 1963, with the aim of: a) analysing trade union and general 
socio-political problems; b) penetrating ideologically the trade 
unions through publications, courses, conferences and other means; 
c) stimulating the improvement of employer-employee relations, the 
increase in productivity, the improvement of civic and social con-
sciousness, 'bearing in mind the superior interests of national 
development'. The COS operated both in urban and rural environments. 
It gathered information on trade union activists and the working 
class movement and published a weekly fact sheet on trade union 
activity for mass consumption, which was distributed both to indivi-
duals and to hundreds of organizations. 
The organic elite also controlled several labour organizations 
outside the direct sphere of influence of the Church. IPES/IBAD 
were in control of the rabidly anti-communist Movimento Sindical 
Democratico - MSD (Syndical Democratic !1ovement), which operated as 
a 'political pet' of Adhemar de Barros, the governor of Sao Paulo, 
of Herbert Levy the UDN leader, and of the Sao Paulo entrepreneurs. 
The MSD also provided the working class constituency of Guanabara 
Governor Carlos Lacerda, who had helped to establish the Rio de Janeiro 
branch of the trade union. 16l 
The MSD, led by Antonio Pereira Magaldi, was particular strong 
among commercial employees. Hagaldi was also head of the Union of 
Pharmaceutical Horkers and was acting president of the National 
Confederation of Commercial Bmployees - CNTC, which he used to fur-ther 
the ends of his anti-communist Movimento Sindical Democratico. 
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The r~D had extraordinary facilities in audio~visual_media 
to get i tB points across to the general public, thanks to the coverage 
of IPES. The MSD disseminated its political position throughout 
the trade union movement by intense pamphleteering, and publications 
of its o~m making as well as of other sources. The MSD served as a 
focus of anti-Goulart and anti-socialist propaganda, aiming especial1y-
at the military and skilfully playing upon middle class fears. The 
!>!SD was also heavily supported by the tJDH, and Antonio Pereira Magaldi 
appeared together with Herbert Levy and other trade union~aders 
supported by IPES, such as Jose Rotta, in political programmes spon-
sored by the • speakers' bureau' of IPES. The HSD was responsible for 
spreading among the middle class in general and the military in 
particular the fear of Goulart's purported attempts to establish a 
Republica Sindicalista, a bogus neo-corporativist Feronista-like 
regime with working class manipulation and the stifling of the middle 
class. 162 Such a belief demoralized many of the working class sup-
porters of Goulart, while it reinforced military antagonism'. 
Furthermore, the MSD organized trade union conferences and 
Courses of Syndical Orientation, preparing ideologically and train-
ing politically trade union activists. These lPSS/IBAD oriented 
courses constituted the practical framework in which 'neo-capitalist' 
indoctrination of the workers was carried out. 
IPES/IBAD also controlled REDSTRAL, the Democratic Resistance 
of Free Horkers which was launched by Deocleciano de Hollanda and 
led by Floriano da Silveira Naciel. To R8D.ii:THAi- of Guanabara be-
longed among others Ary Campista, the archetype of the 'pelego', 
and Jose Campello. The Rio branch of lBAD's PromotionS.A. produced 
media coverage of REDETRAL. 163 
The type of ideological message that IP0S/lBAD succeeded in 
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instilling or fostered in the political struggle they waged throughout 
the working class was well characterized in the final declaration 
of the prolific 7th National Congress of Workers' Circles, on one 
of the fundamental issues: private property of the means of production. 
The declaration read: 'Property is based on the natural right of man 
and is necessary to his full development. Property has a social 
function, and so have the goods it produces. The facility of access 
of all men to property is an imperative of democracy. Not (to be) 
all proletarians, but (to be) all proprietors. The improvement of 
the personality, the widening of individual capacity and the security 
of the fundamental liberties demand the defence of private property, 
including that of the means of production,.l64 As for the state's 
role in the economy, it ought to reduce itself to a 'supplementary 
role' (panel supletivo) for private capital. 
International support for the IPES/IBAD-controlled HSD 
came from ORIT, the Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers. 
ORIT was the regional affiliate of ICTFU, the International Confedera-
tion <f Free Trade TTnions. In both ideology and practice, OiUT mir-
rored the American Federation<f labor-Congress of Industrial Organiza-
tions, popularly known by its acronym, as AFli-CJ;o.165 ORI'r's prime 
goat has been 'to fight Communism~d to promote 'tlemocratic trade-
unionism"'. It preached 'reform within the existing capitalist 
system, denying the existence of class antagonisms', while pointing 
to the USA as an example of the rewards 'l<Thich the system could bestow 
upon the working class and upon organized labour. 
ORIT was organized in 1951 by Serafino Romualdi. The principal 
sources of ORIT's funding have been the AFi-CIO, ICTFU's International 
Solidarity Fund and other US agencies. 166 Furthermore, ORIT operated 
as one of the principal mechanisms for CIA labour operations.167 The 
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CIA exercised considerable control over ORIT. 
ORIT h~ been the umbrella organization for other trade unions 
besides the XSD, such as the National Confederation of Industrial 
Workers - CNTI; the National Confederation of Commercial Horkers -
CNTC (whose birth in 1953 was assisted by an entrepreneurial associa-
tion, the National Confederation of Commerce); and the National 
Confederation cf.' land Transport Horkers - CNTT, which was led by 
Mario Lopes de Olivei~a.169 The latter, together with Jorge Coelho 
Monteiro, of the National Federation of Workers of Telephone Enter-
prises; John Snyder, the representative of the Postal, Telegraph and 
Telephone International; Samuel powelJ, head of the CIOSL-ORIT mission 
in Brazil; and Joaquim otero, of the InternaUonal Federation of 
Transport Horkers, formed the nemocratic and Free Syndical Hovement -
NSDL. The Syndical :t1ovement was important in co-crdina ting trade 
union activities against the government and penetrating the urban 
working classes Hi th right-wing ideology • 
Other trade union figures who joined their efforts and organized 
support for the disruptive endeavour of the organic elite were 
Raymundo Nonato Costa Rocha, of the Hotel and Tourism Trade Union; 
Ary Campista, of the Federation of Chemical Industries Horkers of 
Guanabara and Rio de Janeiro: and V. Orlando, of the Federation of 
Construction Industries' Horkers of Guanabara. 
IBAD was particularly active in the trade union movement of the 
politically key state of Parana, where they lined up support for 
Governor Uei Braga and where they sponsored several trade unions and 
their leaders. Parana was important because of its geographical 
proximity to Sao Paulo, and although not being among the top indus-
trial centres of the country, it had a large working class population 
in the rural areas and from the middle industries and service system 
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of the state. IBAD also organized the 1st Encounter of Democratic 
Workers of the State of Parana, with more than 200 representatives 
of trade unions. The table Has chaired by IBAD trade union :Eaders 
Marconi Pedroso, president of the Commercial Employees of Parana; 
Jorge de Matos, president of the Federation of Industrial Food 
Workers of Parana; Sa1~0 Pamp10na, of the Syndical Front of Parana; 
Alderico Reis Petra, president of the Leather Industry Workers of 
Parana; Miguel Krug, of the Trade Union of Metallurgy, Electric and 
.' 
Engineering Industrial Workers; Joao Wagner,of the National Confedera-
tion of Industrial Workers; and Astrogi1do Souza. The slogan of 
the Encounter was, appropriately, 'anti-Communists always, reaction-
aries never', which appealed both to workers in the commercial sect~ 
services, the upper layers of the industrial Horking class, the 
middle classes and the rank and file of the Armed Forces. Their 
programme stressed their opposition to 'totalitarianisms of right 
and left', and included demands for the security and rentability 
for foreign capital, the complete integration of Brazil into the 
Latin American Free Trade Association, the Organization of American 
states, and the Alliance for Progress, and the need to fight for the 
'dissemination of private property together with educational and 
financial assistance'. 
IBAD also organized the well publicized 'Inter-State ~ncounters 
of Democratic Syndicalism' For their all important meeting in 
Guanabara (the 'reverberation boJ{' of the. Nation) in 1962, previous 
to the legislative elections, IBAD counted upon the presence and 
support of Governor Carlos lacerda; right-Hing trade union leader 
Antonio P. Nagaldi: Rego Honteiro: ADP /IBAD Deputy J oao Bendes; 
Governor General Juracy Haga1haes: UDN/ADEP Deputy ;e;ur:Lpides Cardoso 
de Menezes; Padre Ve110so: and IP2S trade union activist F10riano 
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da Silveira ~aciel, all of whom chaired the event.170 
These national and regional congresses, symposiums and confer-
ences of trade union leaders organized by IBAD, which counted upon 
the presence of professional politicians and representatives of the 
entrepreneurial syndical associations and Armed Forces, were of 
extreme importance. Their aim was to project their day-to-day mili-
tant trade union activity with events that had a serious impact on 
public opinion and carried weight among the middle classes and the 
military, who were receptive to the well publicized denunciations of 
the government and the national-reformist bloc. The congresses and 
conferences alsorerved as rallying points for renewed organized 
action with the labour movement and reinforced the disposition a 
IPES/IBAD-supported labour groups to dispute political ground with 
labour-left organizations. 
Support for lPES also came from the Moral Rearmament movement, 
for which IPES served as a channel of propaganda.17l A secondary, 
though not to be dismissed, form of propagandistic action was carried 
out directly by the lPES entrepreneurs themselves. Heads of business 
concerns and industrial plants called regular meetings of their 
employees where the meaning of what was happening in Brazil was dis-
cussed and where the employers thrust .into the hands of their workers 
'informative' pamphlets which equated the current situation in Brazil 
to that of Hungary in 1956 and where the. negative aspects of the 
political situation were explained in terms of an imminent foreign 
inspired communist take-over, lllegitimate state expansion into areas 
where private enterprise should command the economy and unreasonable 
barriers to foreign capi tal.172 
Last but not least, action within the unions came through a 
variety of other political organizations to which lPES/IBAD were 
linked, and which had an international and foreign dimension. 
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IPES/IBAD were linked in particular to one key input centre, 
the American Institute for Free Labour Development - AIFLD, a politi-
cal bedfellow of US-American labour, entrepreneurs and governmental 
agencies such as AID and CIA. AIFLD came into official existence in 
the united States in October 1961, a short while before IPES did in 
Brazil, as an off-shoot of theAFL-CIO, under whose policy direction 
it remained. According to Serafino Romualdi, first full-time execu-
tive director of AIFLD until 1966, the latter was a 'successful insti-
tution with a mUlti-million dollar budget and branches in practically 
every country of Latin p~erica and the Caribbean area:173 
AIFLD had relied singe fts inception up 0 n business sponsor-
ship and was essentially 'trade conscious rather than class conscious,.174 
About 60 giant US corporations, among them Anaconda Co., Pan American 
Airways, I. T. T • ,EBASCO and Merck & Co. contributed to the AIFLD budget 
Its chairman of th8 board was J. Peter Grace, president of W. R. Grace 
Corporation,175 a leading membercr the Committee for Economic Develop-
ment and head of the influential Committee on the Alliance for Progress -
COHAP, of the USA Department 0 f Commerce, with whom IPES leaders were 
linked and visited in their trips to iiashington~ Peter Grace, a 
founding father of the AIF1D and front man for CIA-Labour operations, 
had been sponsored to the post in CO~~ by his friend John F. Kennedy.176 
One of COHAP's tasks was to evaluate the Alliance for :Progress and 
dra"l'T up recommendations for its future role .177 COHAP also focused 
on short-term ways of increasing the flow of private investment in 
latin America. COHAP, which '(Tas composed of the presidents and vjce-
presidents of 25 major l:S concerns provided executive members for 
AIFlD,17Q and when the business association vTas replaced by the 
Business Group for Latin America - PGLA, it was the latter who sup-
'7 r plied the business representatives for the AIFiD's Board of Trustees.~ / 
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It is necessary to note that many of the leading entrepreneurs of 
IPES were directors of the Brazilian subsidiaries of American multi-
national corporations that made up first CONAl? and then BGLA, or 
of local companies associated with them. Moreover, COr~ and BGLA 
corporations in Brazil were financial contributors to lPES/IBAD. 
Besides Serafino Romualdi and J. P. Grace, other board members 
of the AIFLD Board of Directors included AFL-CIO boss George Meany 
(president); Berent Friele, an old Brazilian hand associate of 
Nelson Rockefeller and senior vice-president of the American Inter-
national Association for 3conomic and Social Development (vice-
chairman); Joseph Beirne, president of the Communication i'lorkers of 
America,and a collaborator in CIA-Labour operations through the Post, 
Te legraph and Telephone 1.1 orkers International (secretary treasurer); 
and i'Iilliam C. Doherty Jr., of the Postal, Telegraph and Telephone 
International (administrator). Other US-American entrepreneurs who 
have held executive positions in AIFLD include Charles Brinckerhoof, 
crairman of the board of the Anaconda Co.: Hilliam M. Hickey, presi-
dent of the United Corporation; Robert C. Hill, director of 11erck 
and Co.; Juan C. Trippe, chairman of the board of Pan American ilorld 
Airways; Henry S. Uoodbridge, chairman of the board of T:ru-Temper 
1 "0 . c Copper Corporatlon. 
Completing AIFLD's tripartite structure was its association 
Hith the Department of State; the Agency for International Develop-
ment - AID; and the CIA. It was through AI:;) contracts that AIFUJ 
became the principal instrument of the US Government for supplying 
technical assistance to Latin ~~erican trade unions (political educa-
tion, and training of trade union activists as well as the develop-
c ment of social projects), vrhich in the language of the day was covered 
under the label of 'civic action' .182 .P1oreover, AIFl.D was a CIA 
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controlled labour centre financed through AID. The extent to which 
AIFLD was under the aegis of the CIA was highlighted by the fact 
that Serafino Romualdi, while at AIFLD, was still an agent of the 
CIA's International Organizations Division. Through the International 
Organizations Division Romualdi and William Doherty Jr. exercised 
day-to-day control of AIFLD for the CIA. IS) 
AIFLD porsonnel have been given de facto ~uasi-official status 
in the formation and implementa~ion of US-latin America,labour pOlicy.l84 
AIFLD was engaged in a variety of activities within the field of 
general propaganda, the so-called 'social projects', which ranged 
from education to low-cost housing projects, credit unions and labour 
banks, co-operatives and community services. 185 However, the major 
task of AIFLD, similar to that of ORIT has been to organize anti-
communist labour unions in Latin America. To this end, AIFLD set 
up training institutes ,'lhich carried on the teaching of courses 
given by AIFLD members, and although the administrative control of 
the training institutes in l,.[ashington would be lcept wi thin the AIFLD 
fold, it was expected that the institutes themselves would be headed 
by salaried CIA agents under operational control of the local CIA 
station. 186 In addition, AIFLD underwrote periodic hemispheric 
educational gatherings and published books and pamphlets, being also 
involved in the field of social and community activities, the so-
called impact-projects. However, specifically, the AIFLD dedicated 
itse1f to what was termed 'labour education' •187 
AIFLD operated on three principles. First 'divide the working 
class by attempting to create a Q~ionized, privileged labour aristo-
cracy that would defend material gains against unemployed people 
and non-uni onized workers. Second, fign't labour militance by fight-
ing militant workers t "prevent Comm1.l.c'1ist infiltration and where it 
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already exists, get rid of it'. And finally, deny class struggle 
by arranging a "consensus" between management and labour based on 
enforcing a higher productivity for labour. AIFLD was also eminently 
suited to serve as a subtle intelligence gathering network due to 
. t .. .. .. t ,186 ~ s pos~t~on ~ns~de Lat~n Amer~can labour movemen s.' 
The ideological horizons of AIFLD were clearly stated by George 
Meany, in his 1965 address to the Council of America, which had suc-
ceeded the Business Group for Latin America. Heany said: ''lie believe 
in the capitalist system, md we are members of the capitalist society. 
tie are dedicated to the preservationcr this system, which rewards 
the workers ••• we are not about to trade in our system for any 
th ,189 o ere 
To undermine Goulart's support throughout the organized labour 
movement, ICFTU, ORIT, AIFLD and the US-American Embassy worked 
hard to support right-wing ~~ions and oppose the left-dominated 
General l;Torkers Command - CGT, which had. become Brazil's largest 
and foremost national confederation of unions. The IPES/IBAD-con-
trolled Syndi'cal Democratic Hovement - }lSD, with its i1otto 'God, 
private property and free enterprise', was one of the recipients of 
AIFLD aid and advice in sponsoring meetings and setting up their 
trade union courses.190 Noreover, the efforts of the AIFLD were 
realized at the third National labour Congress of 1962, when US 
labour specialists, vrho had been flown in specially for the occasion, 
were able to undermine the CGT's efforts to unify the labour move-
191 mente 
AIFLD's programmes in Brazil have been conducted mainly through 
its local affiliate, the Sao Paulo based and IPES-sponsored Labour 
Cultural Institute - leT, for which it provided So per cent of the 
192 funding. The rCT trained labour personnel and disseminated anti-
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communist propaganda throughout the labour movement, press, and 
general public. The ICT also had a branch office in Recife, for 
the training of rural leaders. In response to the groYling popular 
movements in the rural northeast, AIFLD initiated a series of train-
ing and aid programmes for right-wing peasant activists and rural 
workerst leaders.193 According to AIFLD official "lilliam C. Doherty, 
the rCT had successfully trained by 1964, when it had been operating 
for some two years, more than 12,000 Brazilian trade union leaders 
and activists from all walks of life and in all trade unions.194 
According to the ICT' s first director, J. V. Freitas Marcondee" 
of the Technical Council of the Federation of Commerce of Sao Paulo, 
the Instilute offered regional courses, varying from one week of 
studies to one month, for trade union and peasant leaders. 195 From 
the regional courses, the best students (who ?hm·red promise in union 
leadership qualities) were re-selected. These candidates were then 
offered grants to attend a three month intensive trade union Eader-
ship course of eight hours daily, in Sao Paulo. 196 The most outstand-
ing graduates YTere then taken to attend three month-long advanced 
courses in the United States, YThere AIFLD operated a full-time 
training school, the ren01med Front Royal Institute in Virginia. 197 
At the end of their courses, the AU'LD graduates returned to Brazil 
under a nine month salaries programme as full-tim8 organizers, which 
allowed the trade union activists to engage professionally in politi-
10.0, ( 
cal activities.--"· A list of graduates from these courses can 
be seen in Appendix P.) AIF1D graduates and trainees played a sig-
nificant role in the coup which brought dOlm the government of Joao 
Goulart. 199 At the beginning of 1963, AIFLD trained a special all-
Brazilian class of thirGy-three participants atEs Virginia based 
institute. :'Then they returned to Brazil, some of the trainees 
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were sent to the countryside onresignments to organize political 
action and conduct indoctrination~tivities, while others served 
in their unions in Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Santos and other indu~,­
trial centres. 200 One of those instructors, the FDC-linked 'pe1ego' 
Romu10 Marinho, secretary of the Brazilian labour Federatio~Ol 
established 'anti-communist' seminars for telegraph workers, warning 
key workers of coming trouble, and preparing them for a crisis 
situation. When the coup was finally staged, the national-reformist 
unions and the labour Eft called a generalarike. But to their 
dismay, the co-ordination of the trade unions 'of as made impossible, 
as the wires kept humming, and the army was able to co-ordinate troop 
movements at ease through their own communications network. 202 
William C. Doherty, Jr., of the Post, Telegraph and Telephone Inter-
national - PTTI, AIFLD and Front Royal Institute official, bragged 
about his institute's role shortly after the coup: 'Some of the 
(Brazilian trainees) were so~tive that they became intimately 
involved in some of the clandestine operations a the revolution 
before it took place on April 1. What happened in Brazil on April 1 
did not just happen - it was planned - and planned months in 
advance. Hany of the trade union ::leaders, some of whom were actually 
trained in our institute, Here involved in the r evolution, and in 
the overthrow of the Goulart regim~t20J 
The activities of IP:t;S/r:BAD met .wi th relative success. They 
were able to create and sponsor a great number of varied political 
agencies and organizations ,,.Thich engaged in delaying tactics to 
:prevent the consolidation of Horking class awareness and solidarity. 
Through their plurality of organizations canvassing for working 
class support, they Here able to establish a political impact of 
significance Hi thin the 1oforking classes and engage the national-
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reformist unions in a strenuous fight for supremacy, which diverted 
energy and resources from other aims. However, despite their 
efforts, other trade unions veered to the left, in support of a 
.-----------
national-reformist programme, and in support of the creation of 
the labour-left oriented Central Unica dos Trabalhadores, the umbrella 
organization which was de facto growing out from the Comando Geral 
da Greve (General Strike Command) which had initially been consti-
tuted to mobilize public opinion to ensure Goulart's assumption of 
government after Quadros' resignation, and which ~as onthewayto-becom-
ing the Comando Geral dos Trabalhadores (General Horkers' Confed-
eration).204 Nevertheless, by the time the leftward swing of the 
trade unions was effectively felt, the military movement against 
_Goulart had bee.n effected~_· The lPES-IBAD-sponsored 'organizations 
had been able to buy off critical time. 
Poli tical Action on Political Parties and Congre,ss 
As seen in Chapter IV, the populist polity was in a process 
of disaggregation and this was reflected in the internal di.ssensions 
among the centre-right political parties and the polarization of 
positions within Congress leading to the formation of centre-left 
blocs and the leftward trend of the electorate. Congress, in spite 
of being a locus of oligarchic representation was also becoming the 
forum where popular demands gained e~{pression. The control of Con-
gress was essential for the national-reformist bloc and in particular 
for the executive, in order to implement its ambitious programme 
of reforms. Hevertheless, the conserva ti ve and reactionary political 
forces attempted to remain in control of the Senate and the Chamber 
of Deputies in order to block the enactment of legislation conducive 
to substantial national reforms. Congress was transformed into a 
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most crucial battlefield. As the central national political forum, 
parliament became a focus of pro p a g a n d.a by the Parlia-
mentary Nationalist Front and the Democratic Parliamentary Action, 
who presented their cases not only on the merit of the issues but 
aimed at gaining the sympathy and active support of the various 
sectors of public opinion. In a way parties, groups and individuals 
as never before canvassed their respective constituencies through 
their performance in Congress which was relayed to the public by the 
audio-visual media. The coverage and treatment by the media of 
political events and actors became critical. 
Against this background, the strategic goal of IPES/IBAD was 
to bring the political structure to a crisis point, in which the 
civilians would support extra-constitutional solutions and the mili-
tary would feel compelled to intervene as moderators in what was 
by 1962 a highly polarized political system. The tactics of the 
organic elite were aimed at influenc'ing political decisions by block-
ing the government's reformist policies and those of the labour-left 
bloc in Congress, fostering the isolation of the E:<ecutive from 
middle class support and stimulating the withdraHal of institutional 
backing for the administration's policies. By blocking Congress to 
legislation by the Executive, the organic elite constrained the govern-
ment into appealing to popular mobilization to support its proposals, 
which in order to be turned into policies had to be implemented by 
decree. Hm·rever, popular mobilization from the J:;;·:ecuti ve dovmwards 
alienated the support of a wide spectrum of opinion within the Armed 
Forces and stimulated the disaffection of middle class 'public' 
opinion, conveniently highlighted by the media netHork of IESS/IBAD. 
The mirldle classes vrhich Here at the same time being mobilized by 
IP"::S/IBAn '!rere feeling their socio-economic status was being threatened. 
523 
Moreover, the middle classes Here confronted 'IIi th a degree of poli-
tical agitation to which many years of elitist politics had unaccus-
tomed them. 
IPES/IBAD displayed a resourceful range of means to put pressure 
on the polity.205 Their main action in Congress and on the political 
parties was carried out through the Democratic Parliamentary Action -
ADP, which operated as the political front and ideological channel of 
t ' '1' t' l' t d' , bl' " 206 ne organlc e 1 e ln par lamen an vls-a-vls pu lC oplnlon. 
As seen in Chapter III, the ADP was a multi-party bloc of conservative 
and reactionary federal deputies, mostly of the UDN and FSD and organ-
ized through a countrywide network of Popular Democratic Action -
ADEP gro~ps, and which even had counterparts in many state legislatures 
d "I '1 207 an munlclpa counCl s. IPES and IBAD reached a decision of 
establishing themselves in Congress208 , and the agreed strategy for 
action of IPES/IBAD was to co-ordinate the efforts of IBAD with 
those of the Parliamentary Action Group of IPES, i.e., 'to establish 
the axis Ivan Hasslocher-Nello Flores inihe Chamber of Deputies and 
the Senate'. The main channel for action of such 'axis' was the 
Democratic Parliamentary Action, through which IPES/IBAD were made 
, , 209 ~ 
one ln covert actl0n. The ADP, led by UDH deputy Joao Nendes, 
established the political presence of IPES/IBAD in Congress and thus 
allowed the organic elite of the multinational and associated bloc 
to meddle in national politics and shape public opinion through one 
further channel. It was by means of the AD? that the dominant 
economic bloc expressed its demands, translating its socio-economic 
power into ideological and political authority.210 In Brasilia, 
site of the Congress and the Executive, IP~S leader Jorge Oscar de 
Mello Flores took care of what was consid~red to be 'discreet action' 
in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, thus £reeing IP~S of 
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bl " "b"l"t" \ 211 pu ~c respons~ ~ ~ ~es. 
The ADP had a dual role. It was both the focus in Congress 
for the action of the Parliamentary Action Group and Conjunctural 
Survey Group against the Executive and a significant outlet for the 
activities of the Study and Doctrine Group, which, covered by the 
Public Opinion Group, made the ADP an effective 'reverberation box' 
stimulating the public's support for IPES/IBAD-inspired tactics 
and policy proposals. ADP members introduced in Congress motions, 
bills of law and law amendments prepared by the Study and Doctrine 
Group of IPES. ADP also criticized the government's projects and 
those of the national-reformist bloc. By employing bloc-voting, the 
ADP was also able to defeat governmental policy proposals. 212 The 
massive ADP bloc of friendly parliamentarians sponsored by IPES/IBAD 
and ably co-ordinated by the Parliamentary Action Group, numbered 
approximat~ly 200 by December 1962, 213 almost half the Chamber of 
Deputies. The ADP was crucial in the endeavour to block Goulart's 
attempts to implement reforms by legislative approval, forcing the 
government to use presidential decree~ delaying the E:cecutive in 
the implementation of its plans, wearing it out in lengthy procedu-
ral battles and creating an atmosphere of Congressional impasse and 
ingovernability, which stimulated the search and legitimation for 
extra-constitutional solutions to what was perceived as the impending 
crisis of the regime. 
The following were influential political figures who consti-
tuted the ADP bloc in Congress and in state assemblies: 214 
From the North and Northeast: 
Amazonas - Jaime Araujo (UDN) , Djalma Passos (F~) 
Para - Deodoro de Mendon9a (PSP) , Joao Menezes (PSD) 
Maranhao - Cid Carvalho (PSD) 
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Ceara - Adolfo Gentil (PSD ),215 Costa Lima (UIiN) , Dias l'lacedo (PSD) 
Rio Grande do Norte - Jesse Freire (PSD) , Djalma Harinho ,UDH) 
Paraiba - Janduhy Carneiro (PSD) , Plinio Lemos (PL), Ernani Satiro 
(UDN) , Joao Agripino (UDN), Abe lard 0 Jurema (PSD) 
Pernambuco - Dias lima (UDN) , Gileno de Carli (PSD) , Padre Arruda 
Camara (PDC), AIde Sampaio CUDN) , Aderbal Jurema (psij 
Alagoas - Jose Maria (PTN) 
Sergine - Lourival Batista (UDN) 
Bahia - Aloisio de Castro (PSD) , Antonio Carlos Magalhaes (UDN) , 
JOM I'lendes (UDN) , Luiz Viana Filho (PL), Niguel CaIman (PSD) , 
Rubem Nogueira (PSD) 
~sp{rito Santo - Alvaro Castelo (PSD) , Dirceu Cardoso (PSD), Oswaldo 
Zanelo (PRP) 
Amana - Amilcar Ferreira (PSD) 
From the Centre-South and East: 
Rio de Janeiro - Pereira Pinto (UTIN) , Raimundo Padilha (UDN), Satur-
nino Braga (PSD), Moacyr Azevedo (PSD) 
Guanabara - Gladstone Chaves de Nello (pnc), Danilo I'Tunes (UDN), 
Aguinaldo Costa (u~N), Hamilton Nogueira CUDN), Nelson Carneiro 
Cpsn) , Harshal Mendes de Norais (PSD), Mauricio Joppert CUDN) , 
General Menezes Cortes (UDN), Amaral Neto (OON), Adauto ::"'ucio 
Cardoso CUDN), Lopo Coelho (PSD), Raul Brunini (UDN), General 
Juracy Magalhaes (OON), Gabriel Chaves de i·lello (PDC), Raimundo 
de Brito (UDN), Eur1.pides Cardoso de I:lenezes \ UDN) 
~linas Gerais - El1.as Carmo (UmI), Feliciano ?ena (PR), Geraldo Freire 
CUDN) , Jose Humberto (UDN) , Leopoldo Haciel (UDtI) , Honteiro de 
Castro, (UDN), Nogueira Rezende (PR), Padre Vidigal (PSD), Pedro 
Aleixo CumI) , Pinheiro Chagas (PSD) ," tiitimo de Carvalho (PS]) , 
Rondon Pacheco (UDn) , Bias Fortes (PSD), Gustavo Capanema (PSD), 
Jose Bonifacio (TIDN) 
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Sao Paulo - Carvalho Sobrinho (psp,) , Cunha Bueno (PSD) , Ferreira 
Martins (PSP) , Afranio de Oliveira (PSB), Hamilton Prado (PTN) , 
Horacio Lafer (PSD), Mario Beni (PSP) , Olavo F'ontoura (PSD), 
Herbert Levy (UDN) , Arnaldo Cerdeira (PSP) 
.Mato Grosso - Rachid Mamed (PSD) 
~rana - Mario Gomes (PSD) , Othon Mader CUDN) , Munhoz da Rocha CPR), 
Plinio Salgado (PRP) 
Rio Grande do SuI - Alberto Hoffman (PRP) , Daniel Faraco (PSD) , 
J oaquim Duval (PSD) , Ra.ul Pila (PL), Tarso Dutra (PSD) 
Santa Catarina - Antonio Carlos (UDN) , A. C. Konder Reis (UDN) , Carneiro 
Loyola (UDN), Celso ~anc9 (UDN) , Laerte Vieira (UDN) 
Goias - Anisio Rocha (PSD) , Benedito Vaz (PSD) , Emival Caiado (UDN) 
As is evident from the above mentioned list of parliamentarians 
forming the multi-party bloc, the ADP reunited traditional conser-
vative and modernizing conservative members mostly of the PSD and 
the UDN. In order to be in the ADP, some of the most influential political 
figures of each state had to overcome long-standing regional and personal -
conflicts and even family-power feuds. This gives a measure of what was at stake. 
The IPES/IBAD/ADP interconnection in Congress was made explicit 
in a highly significant letter from the head of the Parliamentary 
Action Group and electoral paymaster of IPES, Jorge Oscar de Hello 
Flores to IPES leader Glycon de Paiva. In this letter, ~~ello Flores 
set out the guidelines for measures to be taken by the appropriate 
study and action groups of IPES-Rio in relation to points previously 
discussed by the IPSS leadership. He stressed t~at if the organiza-
tion in Brasilia Has to be reinforced, he could then c;ctivate the 
introduction of bills of law in Congress •. , Hello Flores urged Glycon 
de Paiva to speed up the preparation of the proposals of basic 
reforms on issues which 'the leftists, Petebistas and demagogues 
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consider as vital for our country' (sic). Drawing upon the Reformas 
de Base 1'Thich 1PES had prepared as the core of the Congress on Basic 
Reforms, held in January 1963, these bills of law were eventually 
presented by ADP deputies. 216 Mello Flores saw as urgent the present-
ation in the Chamber of Deputies and through the ADP, of 23 de-
nationalizing (desestatizantes) and 'anti-demagogic' (sic) bills 
of law, some of which 1'Tere already prepared by 1PE3. According to 
Mello Flores, the -most important bills of law amongst those prepared 
by 1PES would be introduced in the Senate as well bytheADP, thus 
opening new fronts of action. 217 
Once the final texts were discussed at 1PES, the bills of law 
would then be forwarded to the ADP, for their introduction in Congress. 
The bills of la1-T Hould be presented as being of the ADP' s making, so 
as to enhance its prestige. According to Hello Flores, several 
advantages Hould accrue from such a 'tactic': the 'technical projetos' 
of IPES/1EAD Hould be counterposed to the 'demagogic' bills of law 
of the agitators' (sic). Furthermore, the large number of basic 
reforms produced by 1PES/1BAD~larger than the one offered by the 
national-reformist bloc)would help to place the entrepreneurs and 
the ADP in a more favourable position vis-a-vis public opinion. Nore-
over, it would also be publicly demonstrated that there Here no objec-
tions to the realization of basic reforms on the part of the entre-
preneurs. 11ello Flores also$serted that such IP~S/1BAD tactics 
would help to 'counterbalance the effects of the introduction of 
anti-demagogic and de-nationalizing laws' by the ADP bloc in Congress 
and 1-Thich were ' susceptible to being dubbed as reactionary action' • 
Together "Ti th the presentation of 'basic reforms', these tactics 
would 'define the position of the producing classes and of ADP, 
as defenders of the democratic principles in a developed and progressive 
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sense'. Finally, Mello Flores emphasized, the tactics he recommended 
would 'place the leftists, petebistas, and demagogues on the defen-
sive, reducing their possibilities of successfully formulating and 
introducing their own bills of law', and would 'measure the force 
of the leftists, petebistas and demagogues, both in the Chamber of 
Deputies and in the Senate'. Mello Flores concluded his letter by 
urging the lIES leadership torelp set up 'investigating committees' 
in Congress and the formulation for the ALP parliamentarians of 
requests for information to be raised on the floor of the Chamber of 
Deputies. Such requests were aimed at obtaining 'self-fulfilling 
answers' to corroborate the points of view contained in the lP,;jjS-
prepared proposals as expressed by the ADP onthe necessary reforms 
to be applied to the country. On top of enhancing the prestige of 
the ADP, these propOsals aimed at placing the national-reformist 
bloc on the defensive. 
Action within the houses of Congress also meant the 'necessity 
of anticipating the intentions of the national-reformist legislators, 
wi thdra,-ring a 11 the elements of surprise from their bills of law. ' 
To pre-empt their surprise effect, a structure of 'data-gathering' 
and insight-action was to be mounted. General Golbery's team n~de 
sure that ~'lello Flores was able to gain cccess to amendment proposals 
and bills of law which were to be introduced in Congress by the 
national-reformist bloc well before this actually happened. 21b 
There were two events of the highest political significance in 
which the ADP was instrumental, co-ordinating the opposition to the 
gove~nment and the national-reformist bloc. One was the co-ordination 
of the rejection by the Chamber of Deputies of the nomination of 
" 
Santiago Dantas, an entrepreneur and poll tician of the ::::TB, for the 
~ost of Prime Minister. The other major event in which the ADP 
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served as an lPESjIBAD channel was the crucial legislative elections 
of 1962. In these elctions, the organic elite threw all its legiti-
mate and illegal political and economic muscle behind the thrust to 
ensure the elections of a conservative, and when possible, moderniz-
ing bloc of deputies, senators and governors of several contested 
states, which were expected to operate as the political backbone for 
the future action of the ADP in the remainder of Goulart's government. 
The rejection of Dantas, an able political figure representing 
the industrial entrepreneurs within the PTE, who had an authoritative 
presence in the centre-left of the Brazilian political spectrum, 
forced Goulart into a constant cabinet reshuffling. This reshuffling 
in turn was reinforced by the changing alliances the Executive had 
to make to survive the pressures of an ADP-commanded conservative 
bloc and plunged the government into a crisis-ridden period which 
led it down the political slope to a coup d'etat. Santiago Dantas 
represented the last opportunity for a consensual government led by 
the bourgeoisie. 2l9 The rejection of Dantas was in effect the rejec-
tion by the dominant classes of an alliance with labour. Against 
Dantas' nomination, the ADP was able to muster a wide spectrum of 
parliamentarians, in what lEAD hailed as the 'great victory comman-
220 deered by the AD?'. 
By far the most effective vray to influence Congress and exert 
pressure on the government was for IPESjIBAD to secure a majority 
AllP bloc in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate and this is vrhat 
the organic elite set out to do. Hhat could be considered as the 
most comprehensive operation~er of the organic elite in the electoral 
field of action, involving all the resources of IPSSjI~AD and paral-
lel organizations vras their overt and covert intervention in the 
elections of October 1962.221 In these elections, the organic elite 
530 
achieved some of its most significant victories and also some resound-
. d f t 222 ~ng e ea s. 
In the elections of October 1962, the whole of the seats of the 
Chamber of Deputies (409), part of the Senate (45) and 11 state 
governatures were contested. At stru<e in those elections was the 
essential composition of the congressional machinery which would 
legislate throughout the Goulart presidency until 1965, and which 
would condemn to failure or success any attempt at basic reforms by 
the national-reformist bloc. The elections 1-Tould also decide whether 
or not Goulart would have poli tical-insti tutional backing for his 
government. Moreover, those elections would also decide whether the 
conservative-modernizing bloc would be able to hold on to an opera-
tional majority, sufficient to contain the Executive while enabling 
it to develop its campaign until the Armed Forces and the ;Joli tical 
atmosphere were conducive to more drastic measures. 
The organic elite had already interfered in previous elections. 223 
IBAD, as already noted, had taken upon itself the organization of a 
national movement to support centre-right candidates, and their 
presence in the electoral process had already been felt in the 
national elections of 1960. After Quadros' resignation, IBAD 
attempted to 'buy the rights of Castilho Cabral's ~1ovimento Popular 
Janio Quadros', in order to capitalize on its name and prestige and 
be able to act under its cover. According to Castilho Cabral, the 
IBAD leader Ivan Hasslocher, who conducted the negotiations, had 
as his intermediary in the contacts John 1tl. Foster Dulles, YTho, as 
seen previously, Has at the time a Hanna Hining executive • Castilho 
Cabral asked Hasslocher what financial resources Here available, 
and the lBAD director confided that he coUld count on '60 to 70 
financiers of the "producing classes" of Sao Paulo and Rio, ready 
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to raise one billion cruzeiros,.224 This sum was then offered to 
Castilho Cabral, in exchange for Hasslocher being able to choose 
(escolher a dedo) the candidates for the Senate and the Chamber of 
Deputies. 225 
In the elections of October 1962 IPES/IBAD subsidized candi-
dates for office, formulating their programme for the elections in 
return for financial assistance. According to lPES/IBAD activist, 
Jose Arthur Rios, the Popular Democratic Action - ADEP prepared its 
list of candidates, and assumed the responsibility of financing 
their electoral propaganda. The list, which was never published, 
named what the organic elite perceived as 'full hearted democrats 
(democratas convictos) and anti-Communists of the first order'. 
Criteria for selection as IP£S/IBAD/ADEP beneficiaries were not 
according to party affiliations, but accoIding to ideological orien-
tation, which cut across party lines. Candidates were reportedly 
required to sign an ideological affidavit (compromiso ideologico) 
whereby they pledged their loyalty to IBAD above the loyalty to their 
party and vrhich committed them to fight Communism and defend foreign 
investment. 226 Furthermore, the candidates supported by IPES/IEAD/ADEP 
signed an affidavit pledging them to JOln the Parliamentary Democratic 
Action - AD?, led by UDN deputy Jo~o Mendes. 227 
IPES/IBAD mobilized public opinion in the selectioncr candi-
dates and used modern and expensive techniques of public opinion 
2 ~ polling to guide campaign strategy, 2u stimulating the greater poli-
tical participation of the middle classes in general and the female 
vote and involvement in particular, through their" controlled organi-
zations. IPES/IBAD also stimulated more direct electoral~tivity 
of the clergy through its lay political organizations and through 
influential right-wing personalities. 
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The organic elite also ~ponsored and formed organizations 'specifically 
created to intervene and have a weight in the elections, ranging 
from the Electoral Alliance for the Family - ALEF (formerly known 
as Catholic Electoral League), to the Adult Catholic Action Hovement 
and other diverse institutes and parallel movements. 229 Prominent 
members of AIEF, which was led by Navy Commander Moura, 11ere Rui 
Santos (UDN-Bahia), JoaNo. Hendes d a- C-osta Filho., (um ... 
Bahia), Regis Pacheco (PSD-Bahia), Hei tor Dias (UDN), Theodulo 
Albuquerque, and Oscar Cardoso. ALEF, which was backed by the 
Brazilian Council of Bishops,230 studied candidates for their stances 
and electoral possibilities and indicated a selected number as l10rthy 
of. Catholic support, and proved itself an effective legitimating 
device for the 'approval' of right-wing candidates sponsored by 
231 
the IPES/TBfu)/ADEP neb1ork. 
Furthermore, I~S/IBAD mobilized the sectors which they controlled 
o~ the working class movement and clergy-led organizations, as well 
as other minor parallel action~oups in an attempt to create an 
atmosphere favouring a right-wing backlash which could influence 
the result of the elections. 232 
However, the e~trepreneurs acting through I?~S/IBAD were not 
the only ones who interfered rrith illegitimate and illegal means in 
the electoral process. For one, the Brazilian elections of October 
1962 were upheld as being the climax of one of the US CIA Uestern 
Hemisphere Division'S largest ever operations of political~tion. 
For most of 1962, the Rio de Janeiro station and its many bases in 
conSUlates throughout the country, Hhich had been appropriately 
increased in number, were engaged in a multi-million dollar campaign 
to finance the election of anti-communist' candidates in the federal, 
state and municipal offices being contested. 233 The CIA was not 
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alone in the efforts of the US government to intervene in the 
Brazilian electoral process. Other forms of intervention Here the 
'contextual actions', l<Thich had significant direct support from the 
United states government whereby social projects of great propagan-
distic impact were developed to impress the population. 'Contextual 
actions' Here organized so as to create favourable conditions for 
centre-right candidates or holders of offices to operate in their 
constituencies and create a positive image of themselves and their 
programmes, ~uite independent from the central government or party 
leadership. According to Philip R. SchHab, an informant of the 
Agency for International Development - AID, the American Embassy 
'began to seek out those places in the Brazilian political picture 
whereroility, stability, and democratic convictions presented suffi-
cient dimensions tg allow cooperative ventures to be undertaken. 
Those places for persons) represented in Brazil's dark and stormy 
seas, democratic "Islands of Sanity"'. 231+ This policy follo"Vred the 
broad guidelines President Kennedy had laid out in February 1962, 
in a message to Fowler Hamilton, the administrator of AID.235 The 
'island of sanity' policy (a phrase coined by Ambassador Gordon) 
favoured direct assistance through AID to federal states in Brazil, 
headed by friendly governors, instead of assisting the central 
government. Among the most frequently mentioned recipients of such 
support were Carlos Lacerda, of Guanabara; Adhemar de Barros, of 
Sao Paulo; Cid Sampaio, of Pernambuco; Aluisio Alves of Rio Grande 
do Horte; and Jose de Hagalhaes Pinto, of ninas Gerais. 2J6 rrhus AID 
became the channel for the US government to put at the disposal of 
these chosen political actors large quantities of money, yThich could 
be useCl to finance 'impact projects' to infi-uenee public opinion. 
The si6nificance of the October elections was obviously 
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understood by Ambassador Gordon. In a telegramme to the Department 
of state, he stressed that 'As ~'!ashington authorities must certainly 
be aware a political 1-rar of great importance is taking place in this 
country which 1-rill determine its domestic and external orientation 
and with it most of the continent. He have large stakes in the out-
come and are trying to use our influence skilfully to bring about a 
favourable one. All elements of this Country Team have been vigour-
ously instructed by the President and all the parent agencies to 
contribute to this process. In any kind of war strategic and tac-
tical timing of actions can easily be decisive. This pre-election 
week is one unique strategic moment. ,237 
The elem~nts of the 'Country Team' to which Ambassador Gordon himself 
referred were the following lines of action which had been drawn up 
in the United states. A 'Memo for the Latin America Policy Committee' 
for its meeting of July 12, 1962 provided a 'Plan of Action for the 
period to October 7, 1962'. The objectives vrere to 'strengthen 
moderate and centre elements in Brazil'. The Plan of Action recom-
mended, among others in the Economic area of action, the concentra-
tion of US financial assistance in 'sound economic and social projects 
of high visibility, rather than in balance of payments assistance or 
financial support of stabilization measures'. The Plan of Action 
also recommended the support of elements 'working to defeat or modify 
the bill passed by the Brazilian Chamber limiting profit remittance 
and othervrise restricting foreign investments'. Furthermore, the 
P~an of Action aimed in the area of Public Affairs to 'increase sub-
stantially the programme for translationcr books into Portuguese 
and their distribution in Brazil'. In the military area of action, 
the Plan recommended to 'maintain a milit~ry aid level adequate to 
provide internal security equipment and material, engineer battalion 
535 
support and equipment for civic action activities, and support for 
anti-submarine warfare'. The Plan also recommended the utilization 
of 'local currency available under the provisos of the '~heat fund", 
i.e., the PL 480 section 104 C in this effort,.238 Moreover, the 
Plan recommended to 'maintain and increase insofar as possible con-
tacts between the US ·and Brazilian military , with emphasis upon the 
Brazilian National ~rar College (sic), upon those elements of the 
Brazilian Army known to be pro-US and anti-Communist and upon those 
pro-reform elements who might be won over to a pro-US and anti-
Communist position'. Finally ,the Plan recommended that through 
the US Service Hission, attempts should be continued to 'persuade 
the Brazilian military to focus closely on counter-insurgency and 
internal security' .239 After the elections of October 1962, at the 
Executive Committee of the National Security Council a short-term 
policy was decided upon, Vlhich included 'continuing to encourage 
Brazilian moderate democratic elements in Congress, Armed Forces 
and elsewhere, vrho advocate democratic and foreign policies (which) 
we can support'. Moreover, the decision highlighted the role of the 
military, stressing the fact that 'Because of their oganization 
and possession (of) physical force, (the) armed forces (are) obvi-
ously (th~key element which in (the) Brazilian case have strong 
tradition (of) moderate behaviour as ultimate political censors and 
guardians of (the) constitutional system' .240 
It is interesting to have a close look at the internal proceed-
ings of IP::;3 in their preparation for the October elections and ~o'l'l' 
they built up the potential of their Parliamentary Action Group. 
Their leadership meetings rev e ale d the i n ten s e 
poli tical manoeuvring and financial dealings in which th~y were 
involved and which up to now had been a.ttributed solely to isolated 
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action by lEAD. 
In an Executive Committee meeting of mid-May 1962, in the presence 
of Glycon de Paiva, Jost! Rubem Fonseca, Joviano Jardim I·10raes, Gilbert 
Huber, General Golbery, General Herrera, General Liberato and the 
head of the Parliamentary Action Group, Jorge Oscar de r1ello Flores, 
they discussed the problems of raising the material and financial 
requirements and preparing the human resources of lF3S/IBAJ-oriented 
t · f th . C . l~' t' 241 ac lon or e oncomlng ongresslona_=ec lons. As part of the 
preparations for the electoral campaign, j'1ello Flores informed 
those present that it was necessary to get hold of JoaO Nendes, the 
UDN a.ctivist in the Chamber of Deputies and draw up a definitive' strategy 
and str1,lcture for the Parliamentary Democratic Action - ADP. Hello 
Flores also asked those present to give the authority to convene 
meetings to Paulo Watzel, a functionary of the Chamber of Deputies, 
who acted as go-between for ADP and IPES. Another problem raised 
by Hello Flores was the selection and appointment (indicaQa:6) of 
candidates favoured by IPES/lBAD to key positions who for one reason 
or another were not available. He gave the er::ample of Hendes 
Gon<;alves of Parana, l'l'ho as second in the list Has not re-elected, 
thus creating the contingency of having to choose an appropriate 
substi tute between Raymundo Padilha, :lader Gon9alves and Dirceu 
Cardoso. For all these operations, 11ello Flores needed money and 
complained that he did not have enough of it. Hello Flores also 
needed resources, both h~~an and material, to set up the Analysis 
Group which 0 was to w 0 r k wi th him in Brasilia. This unit 
studied the political conjuncture and specific cases of potential 
recipients of aid who required public image promotion. Nello Flores 
also intended to use the services of Bahia Congressman 
R u i Santos, 0 who 0' a C cor di n g'~o this report, received 
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finance from two places: the state/private Brazilian-Japanese joint 
venture USI~rrNAS and the Brazilian-American Chamber of Commerce. 
Mello Flores adied that a lot of money was needed for him to go 
to Brasilia and suggested that Gilbert Huber could supplement the 
payments from his own parallel sources. He also required a pass 
from the airline Panair, which was to be obtained through the 
services of Celso Rocha Miranda, its director. Hello Flores 
wanted somebody to be pernamently based in Brasilia to do what he 
called ' preventive work'. t-lhenever an amendment came out, this 
person would collaborate with Nova Press, the IPES-controlled news 
agency for the distribution of relevant material to the most impor-
tant newspapers. For the initial part of his project for political 
action, Hello Flores required a basic sum of 3 million cruzeiros, 
a monthly sum for the salaries of the permanent staff and funds 
to furnish rooms which would serve as centres of operation, as 
1 . 242 weI as resources for transportat~on. 
In terms of financing and providing political expertise, Mello 
Flores considered the problem to be a question of dealing directly 
with the cupulas (leadership) of the PSD and the u~N over jeeps and 
other types of material and technical aid. There were, according 
to him, 17 favourable senators, "lith whom he wanted to f>rm a 'demo-
cratic resistance'. For this, again, resources were needed for the 
cupulas of the parties. He gave the example of Amaral Peixoto, president 
of the PSD, who was in reed of six jeeps , either on :favourable finan-
cial terms or simply on donation. To complete the operation, cash 
on a monthly basis was also needed and extra funds should be avail-
able if necessary. As for subsidies for Federal Deputies, Glycon 
de Paiva recommended the re-election of 'individuals, good anti-
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communists, of character'. Hello Flores explained the procedures 
for subsidizing candidates. 'In general, agreements are made with 
federalreputies according to the coeficiente eleitorar (electoral 
quotient) or vote getting capacity. Calculations were also made 
regarding electoral residuals and security margins (safe places). 
As for the money needed, ~,[ello Flores asserted that he thought of 
approaching initially 50 deputies, '.forth 300 million cruzeiros, each 
deputy costing 6 millions. Glycon wanted to obtain a clear idea of 
the money needed and asked if 11ello Flores could 'get by with 6 
million per head', to which Nello Flores ansHered that such was 
the price for Paraiba candidates and those of the other minor states. 
Already in Ceara the price was higher and in Bahia it was higher 
still. Mello Flores pointed out that Sao Paulo and Rio candidates 
"tl"ere much more expensive, 243 thus the most sensible average was of 
15 million per capita. The need was for financial aid of the scale 
24L~ 
of 1,000,000 dollars. G. Huber remarked that he would have to 
'interest more people from outside'. 
Mello Flores also explained the payment procedures. In general, the 
matter involved three stages. Ini tially 1+0 to L}5;S of the sums 
were paid out to cover for immediate needs. Subsequently, smaller 
quotas were paid out until the election day. During the election day 
money had to be made available for transportation t~ and feeding of 
activists and voters at, currais eleitorais (concentration sites of 
the practically captive voting populatio~ which was the practice in 
the hinterland and peripheries of the big urban centres). This 
operation amounted to about 100 million cruzeiros per month. 
Hello Flores Hould start the project Hith Rui Santos, while he would 
ap~ear in Brasilia in periods of prontidao (political emergency). 
General Golbery recommended that Jorge Behring de :!lattos should be 
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sought and have explained to him the case of Pernambuco, where the 
organic elite was bracing itself for a crucial election. 245 
General Golbery himself was to visit the Centro Industrial of Rio 
de Janeiro, to articulate with Jorge Behring de I1attos, its presi-
dent, a campaign to create and impinge a feeling of urgency upon 
the potential contributors246 in order to increase the industrialists' 
financial co-operation. Another decision of that meeting was that 
Relio Gomide would be projected as the ostensible element involved 
in these operations, so as to cover other sensitive figures. Glycon 
de Paiva and General Herrera assured those present that they would 
see to everything on the next trip to Sao Paulo in a few days time, 
where they would have an important meeting at the headquarters of 
IPES Sao Paulo, the main recipient of finance from the big multi-
national and associated corporations. 
The Sources of Finance 
Political campaigning for the elections of October 1962 was 
affected more than previously by the influence of large scale finan-
cing and patronage. Big business, largely through IPES/IBfill gave 
heavy assistance to right-wing and centre-right candidates. A 
re:')ort from the US American Departnent of state noted that 'Business 
groups and producers organizations, not aligned Hith a particular 
party have always been influential behind the scenes and this year 
are quite openly mobilizing their resources to support their kind 
of candidates and to combat the edreme leftists. i'[ost of this dir8ct 
poli tical action is taking place through ne .... !ly forf.led "fronts", 
such as the Institute of Political and Social Studies - IPES ,sic), 
"'i l ,.,! 
rather than by the long established organizations themselves. ,':'''r 
The direct forms of contribution ranged from straight financia~ aid 
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to the candidate or party, to providing other costly material needs, 
such as transportation, TV and radio time and newspaper apace, propa-
ganda material (billboards, pamphlets). Indirectly, the organic 
eli te assisted the campaign of its candidates by creating a favourable 
political climate through the media, giving extraordinary projection 
to their candidates, neas and supplying their candidates with intel-
lectual aids, namely well prepared blueprints for public pronounce-
ments and other forms of congressional intervention. This array of 
activities was the result of a co-qrdinated effort by the Public 
Opinion Group, the Parliamentary Action Group, the Study and Doctrine 
Group, the Conjunctural Survey Group and the Integration teams. 
According to former US Ambassador lincoln Gordon, he could 
not refute the existence of finance from American sources in the 
elections of 1962. Moreover, he could not deny the e . dstence of 
'lor 2 American dollars in 199y, when the coup finally occurred. 248 
Ambassador Gordon ::tressed that in the crucial elections of 1962, 
'many people Nere after money. They ~ept asking everyone they could 
get hold of. They were certainly after the American entrepreneurs, 
all the American functionaries they could get near to. Therefore, 
the idea of having that kitty for political eApenses appeared and 
developed, as was made clear in other cases, such as Chile. The 
CIA was used to having political funds. bverything started in Italy, 
in l~y8, when American funds helped the strengthening of Christian-
Democracy. ,249 Ambassador Gordon then affirmed that in the electims 
of 1062, American enterprises and American officials contributed 
with a sum that ranged from 1 to 5 million dollars, for the campaigns 
of candidates adverse to the Goulart government and his Programme of 
B . R f 2~O aSlC . e orms.- Furthermore, the American Embassy was denounced 
as using in the electoral campaign, funds that were destined for the 
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'wheat fund': The 'wheat fund', which was placed at the BlfDE and Hhose 
accounts the American Embassy operated, 40~ of which had no account-
ability, consisted of the cruzeiro surplus accumulated by US-American 
wheat sales to Brazil under the PL 480 proviso,251 and from which 
the Embassy derived large amounts of local currency for its own 
usage. (As previously observed, the use of funds from PL 480 sources 
had already been recommended by the US-American government's Plan 
of Action for the period to October 7, 1962', in order to shore up 
civic action~tivities with the Brazilian military.) 
Those 1"ere not the only sources of finance of the organic 
elite's action~oups =or its intervention in the election process. 
IBAD and lPZS were denounced as having three main sources of income: 
the Wheat Fund, already mentionGdj foreign aid; and the Caixinha 
(kitty), sponsored by foreign and national enterprises. 252 'Ylhen 
Niles 50nd, the former US Charge ~'.~faires, was as~ed if lEAD had 
been funded by the CIA, he responded that1he did not know who else 
l" b f d' t h ,253 WOU_Q nave een .un ~ng em. 
Ivan Hasslocher, D3AD, AD::.:;P and Promotion S.A. held accounts and dreH 
money from the Brazilian branches of three foreign banks: the Bank 
of Boston, the First rational City Banl{ of Neci York and the Royal 
Bank of' Canada, and from the Banco !,!ineiro da Prod u<fao, :Eanco ria 
=avoura de ~~inas Gerais, Banco de ereeli to Real de 7'linas Gerais, 
Banco Nacional de '.linas Gerais and Banco Andrade Arnaud. I'he Banco 
Hovo ?,'1undo, Banco Irmaos Guimaraes and Banco :t:acional do Horte Here 
also regarded as channels for the IBAD/AD':":.F nehrork. II':::;;] had 
accounts in many 0= t:10se ban..l(s, several of whom l,ere corporations 
who contributed to InS, or Hhose directors and owners Here HES 
affiliates and activists. 254 Both the former secretary-general and 
the former treasurer of AJ3? affirmed that in the hundred and fifty 
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days preceding the 1962 elections, ADEP alone spent more than one 
billion cruzeiros. 255 (According to Fundayao G~tulio Var~as infla-
tion indexes, calculated in 1977, this sum vras by then the equivalent 
of roughly 62 million new cruzeiros, or appro:dmately 5 million 
dollars.) 
For the financing of 250 incumbent and candidate deputies, IBAD 
spent more than five billion cruzeiros. Budgets were administered 
by IPES leader Dario de Almeida Magalhaes and Arthur Oscar Jonqueira, 
the AD~P treasurer. 256 Hasslocher affirmed that his operations in 
IBAD were funded by 98 industrial and commercial firms, mainly from 
Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. He refused to name the financiers 
who depo.si ted these sums at the Royal Bank of Canada (to which IPES 
leader Joao Baylongue was linked), or in any of the other banks 
named above. Although no national firm or entrepreneurialffisociation 
acknowledged contribution to the IBAD/AD=F/Promotion S •. A./IPES funds, 
Hasslocher affirmed that 126 corporations and wealthy individuals 
from Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Guanabara, Santa Catarina, Parana 
and Rio Grande do SuI, contributed to ADEP a basic sum of 950 
million cruzeiros. Among these 126 firms vrere 86 or 83 (sic) IBAD 
257 sponsors. 
In spite of the smoke-screen that has been cast over the sources 
of finance for the electoral campaign, some of the enterprises that 
have been identified as being contributors were: Standard Oil of 
New Jersey, U.S. Steel, Texas Oil, Gulf Oil, Hanna Corporation, 
Bethlehem Steel, General rIotors, ',Hllys Overland, '\1ho deposited in 
the accounts of DAD, AD::;P and Promotion S .A. IBAD was also reported 
as having IB~C, the Rockefeller group's commercial spearhead in 
'!l • 1 f . t . b f' t 2,5S ~raZl , as one 0 1 S maJor ene_ac ors. 
','ThAn the Congressional elections of October 1962 vrere finally 
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held, the organic elite, through the lPES/IBAD/ADEP/ADP/Promotion S.A. 
had assisted 250 candidates in their attempts to become federal 
deputies, 600 candidates aiming to become state deputies, 8 candi-
dates for state governorships and several senators, prefects and 
municipal councillors. More than a third of the Chamber of Deputies 
were on the receiving end. From a total of 110 parliamentarians, 
whose mandate depended on lPES/IBAD/ADEP money, and which in turn 
bought the position~ each one against the structuralre£orms which 
the national-reformist executive asked for, 46 belonged to. the 
UDN, 37 to the PSD, 5 to the PRP, 5 to the PTE, 4 to the PTN, 4 
to the PSP, 3 to the PDC, 3 to thePR,l to the PL, 1 to the PRT 
and 1 to the MTR.259 
Out of the 8 supported candidates to governor's offices, 5 were 
defeated by the national-reformist forces, in ~ite of all the 
efforts by the organic elite. These defeated candidates were Paulo 
Neri (Amazonas), Leandro Maciel (sergipe), General Edmundo Macedo 
Soares (Rio de Janeiro), Fernando Ferrari (Rio Grande do Sul), and 
Joao Cleofas (Pernambuco). Elected beneficiaries were former 
Goulart Transport Minister, Virgilio Tavora, of Ceara, supported 
by a PSD-UDU coalition; and Antonio Lomanto Junior, of Bahia. 260 
The most resound i.ng campaign of them all, for the publicity it 
received and the high stakes involved, was that of Pernambuco, where Joao 
Cleofas, a conservative candidate linked to Orquima S/A, the uranium 
consortium, was running against the candidacy of Miguel Arraes, a national-
reformist regional leader of considerable national projection and a pr()-
spective presidential candidate for 1965. The defeat of Arraes was deemed 
to be of the utmost significance in conservative circles. The right-wing 
elements in the centre-south of Brazil realized full well the dangers posed 
.544 
by Arraes and his movement and so tried to nip it in the bud. Their 
weapon was lEAD, which quite early in the campaign set up shop in 
Recife. Colonel Astrogildo Correa, of lEAD and a leading member 
of the Frente Patribtica Civil-Hilitar, was the general co-ordinator 
of Promotion S.A. for Pernambuco and in charge of the right-wing 
candidate's campaign. 26l Cid Sampaio, the incumbent governor, who 
was guiding the Cleofas campaign, assigned one of his brothers-in-
law to act as liaison between IBAD and anti-Arraes, pro-Cleofas 
forces. The support for Cleofas262 came from the funding of oil 
corporations Texaco and Shell, pharmaceutical groups Pfizer, Ciba, 
Gross, Schering, ~nila and Bayer, the banking establishments Banco 
Nacional.do Norte, Banco IrmaOs Guimaraes, and Banco Novo Nundo, 
the mercantile institutions &~d companies Herman Stolz, LOjas 
Americanas, the te_ctile group Tecidos l"undgreIJ" .. fooQ..-stuffs compa.nies 
Coca-Cola and Standards Bran,ds', the General Electric Co. ,IBM, 'Perfumes 
Coty, Remington Rand, the steel comple~( Siderurgica Belgo-runeira 
(so important in the coup operations in the state of Ninas Gerais), 
the Companhia AEG de ~lectricidade, and the Commercial Federation 
• 26':1 
of Reclfe. ~ 
A central thrust of the strategy to neutralize Arraes was to 
play upon the fears of 'atheistic communism', harboured by many 
middle class and lower middle class Catholics, v-rhich, as seen else-
where, vras a hallmark of IPEs/rBAD propagandistic action. A group 
known as the 'Adult Catholic Action l'Iovement'ran daily front-page 
advertisements in one of the Recife nel'lspapers, railing against the 
'red. threat' to family, property and tradition. Cleofas also received 
support for his media campaign through local raclio stations (i1adio 
'I'amandare, Radio Clube), the television station TV Cana~ ::, anc. 
/" , 
Di'3.rio 0.e Pernambuco, 2(~" and th~ supDort of right-v-ring intellectuals, 
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such as Gilberto Freyre, who denounced Arraes for his acceptance of 
Communist backing. 
Other less subtle techniques were used, playing upon the deep-seated 
fear of communism. Supporter~ of Cleofas built a replica of the 
Berlin ~'Tall in dOHnto'l'Tn Recife at the 'Sulacap' building, to suggest 
Nhat thE future held. for the population if Arraes was elected. Pictures 
were distributed shO'l'ring Arraes on his knees, in prayer, Hi th rosary 
beads from which dangled, instead of a cross, a hammer and sickle. 
The Diario de Pernambuco ran a story which told of candidate Arraes 
being invited by the local mayor of Tambe to have lunch in the 
latter's residence. As Arraes passed through the mayor's residence, 
there fe.ll to the ground with a shattering crash a framed picture of 
the Sacred Heart of Jesus. The columnist then printed a poem which 
referred to Arraes as the 'Anti-Christ' and told his readers of 
the efforts of Tambe residents to eAorcise the evil spirit. The 
clima.': of the campaitp1 was reached on the day of the election, when 
a full-page in Diario de fernambuco reproduced a cartoon sh01'ring 
Arraes constructing his own 'Berlin Hall', vri th Fid.el Castro holding 
the blueprint, Krushchev pushing a wheelbarrow full of planes and 
guns and marked 'commercial cgreements ' , and Communist Party secretary-
general Luis Carlos Prestes piling bricks. They were all looked on 
by entrepreneur Jose' Ermirio de noraes, stirring a vat marked 
,t cement'. Ermirio de Moraes, who was running for, the senate t 
was a leading contributor to Arraes' camp aign. His 
properties i nth e nor t h - _e as tin c 1 u d e d sugar mills, 
farmlands, the 0 n 1 y c e men t.· factory in Pernambuco, brick 
and tile factories and limestone quarries. The captior. at the 
. °0 bottom of the page read 'The Price of Liberty is Eternal Vigilance.~ 
To top off the religious aspect of the ~ampaign, Father Patric~ 
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Peyton, of the international/Family Rosary Crusade~ carried out a 
cam~aign of daily prayer in family gatherings, holding a public 
rally just before the ~oting took Place. 266 According to a report 
from the American Consulate in Recife, Father Peyton IS activities 
proved 'extremely effective in eliminating confusion and in weening 
many Catholics from any tendency to support Arraes, now more clearly 
identified with Communism' .267 Eesides Father Peyton's activism, 
the campaign against Arraes included a Pastoral letter by the local 
Archbishop on the Christian duty of all citizens which, without 
naming names, preached the protection of the family and the defence 
from the dangers vri th which it was threatened. 268 Cleofas also 
asked for the American Consulate's assistance with anti-communist 
material and very specifically, any films depicting conditions in 
'Castro's Cuba', which he 'could very effectively use'. The officers 
of the American Consulate promised Cleofas to 'do what they could. to 
find any such available material', and they strongly recommended the 
US-American Department of state 'that such films, possibly put 
together from newsreels and vrithout at tri bution, and cartoons, (should) 
be immediately sent (to) Recife for use in (the) campaign'. In 
the meantime, the Consulate officers were making available to 
Cleofas' organization 'substantial quantities (of) anti-Communist 
cartoons, books on Cuba and pamphlets on Berlin'. 'However', they 
reminded the Department of state, 'nothing has the immediate popular 
appeal of motion pictures' •269 
Perhaps the anti-Arraes campaign would have been able to carry the 
day had the counter-candidate been someone other than the hopeless 
Cleofas, who alloHed himself to be photographed in the midclle of . 
the campaign, sitting on the veranda of his sugar plantation, 'Hear-
ing riding boots, and looIdng for all the world like an old slave-
5+7 
owner' ,270 He had nothing positive to say beyond his anti-Arraes 
and anti-Communist line, and Horse than that, from a political point 
of vie1-T, he Has popularly identified as t:1e candidate supported by 
the United States and a representative of the reactionary and corrupt 
'colonel' system. In spite of the seemingly endless funds available 
to Cleofas and the media support he received, Arraes was able to 
clinch a narrow and crucial victory, Ermirio de !'10raes won his Senate 
seat and Francisco Juliao, the leader of the Peasant .Leagues was 
elected to the federal Chamber of Deputies. The national-reformist 
bloc in Pernambuco had obtained a significant triumph. IBAD closed 
dOlm its Recife office, but Cid Sampaio' s brother-in-law and the 
entrepreneurs linked to IPES through the Commercial Association of 
2"-'1 Pernambuco kept the anti-Arraes forces organizationally intact. (~ 
Among the influential beneficiaries of -the organic elite's 
financial support and the recipients of technical and administrative 
assistance, Hith whom co-ordinated political action was established 
before anct after the election, one should mention: 272 
In the state of Guanabara: deputies Hamilton Nogueira; ~urfpides 
Cardoso de T1enezes (Umn; Aliomar Baleeiro CUDN); F, Santos do 
:.. Amaral Netto CUDN); ArnaldoXogueira (UDN); i1auricio Joppert (umr); 
General Juracy ~~agalhaes (LTDlT and candidate to senator) j Lopo Coelho 
,~ 
. (PSD)j DaniI~ Nunes (UDN)j Raul Brunini (UDN)j Gladstone Chaves 
de Me,llo (PDC) j' Raimundo de Brito (UDN); and Governor Carlos Lacerda. 273 
In r·1inas Gerais, l!~ out of the 1+2 elected deputies Here supported 
and their poli ticc..:::" 2,;:::ti vi ties articulated through the AIEP / AD? 
nehJork. The following politicians received assistance: Te6fL.o 
Pires (Partido :ie"!)ubJ.icano - P:i); Abel Rafael (:PR:; Celso I'1urta (PR); 
Aecio Cunha Q?R); Elias de Souza Carmo (TIDN)j Guilhermino de Oliveira (PSD); 
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Jose Bonifacio CumT); i':anoel Taveira (umI); Geraldo Freire CUlm) i 
!logueira de Rezende CPR) j Ormeo Botelho (UDN); Oscar Dias Correa (OON); 
Jose Humbertc (UDN); Padre NODre (pT]); Padre VidigC!J. (PSD). 27.5 It was 
reported that Francelino Pereira(OON); and Ozanan Coelho (PSD) were-also 
, 
recipients -of IBAD!IPES funds ~ 276 Moreover, .the ADEP h~nded over to 
Arthur Bernardes Filho, himself an important IP;S contributor and 
president of the Partido Republicanq the sum of three million 
cruzeiros £or the electoral campaign of that party.277 Furthermore, 
Hasslocher stressed that he had also maintained 'entendimentos' 
(understandings/conversations) with the governor of }1inas Gerais, 
Jose de l'Jagalhaes Pinto, one of the leaders of the UDN, over the 
?'7Q 
electoral campaign. '-- ,--
In Pernambuco, the organic elite helped 7 candidates to federal 
deputies and 31 to state deputies. IBAD assisted federal deputies 
Costa Cavalcanti, Augusto Novais, Alde Sampaio (brother of Cid 
Sampaio), l1onsenhor Arruda Camara, Jose f,leira and Aurino Valois, '-iho 
were all elected. Also supported were Jose Lopes de Siqueira Santos 
(of Usina Ri beirao Estrcliana, vlho was not elected), Nilo Coelho, 
1)ias- Lins, and the elected state deputies Antonio Correa, Felipe Coelho, 
Suetone Alencar, Olimpio Ferraz, Francisco Sampaio Filho, Antonio 
Iuiz Filho, Draiton Nejaim, Olimpio Hendonya, Antonio Barreto Sampaio, 
EI1.as Jibanio, Adauto Jose de ~!elo, Antonio Farias and Au<iomar 
Ferraz. 279 In Rio Grande do SuI, according to Senator Daniel 
Krieger, in the elections of October 1962, the centre-right consti-
tuted in Rio Grande a coalition that received the abbreviation ADP -
Popular Democratic Action. It Has comprised of the PSI), the lJD:r, 
the PI, the PDC and ths PRP. 2 So Ildo t1eneghet ti, who became governor: 
of the state, stressed that local industry and commerce under the 
aegis of IPESUI contributed to the victorious 8ampaign. 28l Other 
':<. 
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poli tical figures. who assisted were Clovis Pestana (fo~mei Minister of 
Transport with Janio Quadros); Raul Pilla, leader of the Partido 
Libertadori Federal Deputy Daniel Faraco (PSD); Colonel Peracchi 
Barcellos (PSD); Euclides Triches (PDC) j Cid Furtado'; Ll).ciano MachaGo; 
and R~bem Bento Alves. ._ 
In the north and northeastern states the following deputies received 
assistance: 
Piaul - Souza Sc=mtos 
Parafba.- Ernani Satiro, Flaviano Ribeiro, Jandul Carneiro, Luiz 
Bronzeado, Plinio Lemos, Raul Goes 
Alagoas - Medeiros Neto, Ozeas Cardoso, Segismundo Andrade 
Bahia - Aluisio de Castro, Joao Hendes, Oscar Cardoso, Regis Pacheco, 
Vasco Filho, Ruben Nogueira 
Esp:i:rito Santo - Dirceu Cardoso, Floriano Rubim, Oswaldo Zanelo 
Para - Gabriel Hermes 
Amazonas - Abrahao Saba, Leopoldo Peres 
Rio Grande do Norte - Djalma Marinho,~avier Fernandes, Aristo'fanes 
Fernandes 
Ceara - Armando Falcao, Paulo Sarazate, Fu~~ado Leite, ieao Sampaio, 
r-iartins Rodrlgues, OssIan A.raripe, Uilson noriz 
Maranhao - 1uiz Coelho, Pedro Braga, i..ister Caldas, ~urico liibeiro, 
Alberto Aboud. 
Some other Hell known names who received assistance VTere: 
Mato Gl.'OSSO - Correia da Costa, Saldanha Derzi, Rachid Hamed 
Goias - Anisio Rocha, Es~edito Vaz, Castro Costa, bmival Caiado, 
Alfred 0 l'Tasser 
Santa Catarina - I.aerte Vieira (UD:;) , Albino Zeni, Antonio Almeida, 
Orlando Bertolli, :?'edro Zil1lr.'.':T, Jomicio (rei tas, General Centil 
Barbato, Gil Vel')so,. Afonso Anschad (UDt-T) 
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Parana - Munhoz da Rocha (PR), Ivan Luz (PRP) , Othon Nader (UDN) , 
Plinio Slagado, and Nei Braga (PDC and governor of the state). 
In Guanabara the following political figures received assistance: 
Theofilo de Andrade, General Menezes Cortes (leader of the UDN in 
the Chamber of Deputies under Janio Quadros and until his death at 
the end of 1962), Marshal Juarez Tavora (PDC). In Rio de Janeiro 
Raimundo Padilha, Daso Coimbra, Edilberto Castro, Napoleao Fontenele, 
and Amaral Peixoto, president of the PSD, received assistance. 
Chagas Freitas, the PSD-clientelistic boss of Guanabara and owner 
of the 0 Dia-A Noticia newspaper complex, and Nelson Carneiro (PSD) 
were also denounced as having received assistance. 28J 
In Sao Paulo, the follOl-ring were assisted: Aniz Badra, Arnaldo 
Cerdeira, Herbert Levy (president of the UDN), ~1ario Covas, Padre A. 
Godinho, Jose r1enck, Antonio Feliciano, Carvalho Sobrinho, Celso 
Amaral, Cunha Bueno, Diaz Menezes, Derville Alegretti, Hamilton Prado 
(director of Cia. Anta'rtica de Bebidas), Helcio r1aghenzani, Jose 
Henrique Turner (director of r.1AFERSA), Lauro Cruz, Nicolau Tuma, 
Tufy Nassif, Yukishigue Tamura, and Ranieri Nazzili, president of 
the Chamber of Deputies. 
In concrete te~ms, the organic elite had shown itself able to 
rally the centre-right in the country. But in spite of the massive 
support the centre-right received from the entrepreneurial pOHer 
bloc and the intense ideological campaign it exerted upon public 
opinion, when the electoral dust settled down it showed that the 
political balance kept swinging to the popular and national-reformist 
forces. 
In Sao Paulo, the organic elite suffered a resounding defeat for 
their modernizing-conservative programme, when the populist candidate 
Adhemar de Barros 1-laS elected governor of the state over the candidacies 
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of Janio Quadros and J088 Eonifacio Coutinho Nogueira. Rio de 
Janeiro state elected a PTE candidate, Badger da Silveira, as their 
governor. leonel Brizzola, contesting a federal seat in Guanabara, 
although an outsider and still technically governor of Rio Grande 
do Sul, moved to the centre of the political scene, receiving an 
unprecedented vote, of six times the necessary electoral quotient 
and nearly two-thirds of the total vote received by the entire PTB-
PSB slate. Eloy Dutra, the PTB-PSB supported candidate and a parti-
cularly unpalatable figure for the IPES/IBAD elite, which he con-
sistently denounced, won the vice-governorship of Guanabara, thus 
being able to breathe down the neck of incumbent governor Carlos 
lacerda.. In Sergipe, Joao Seixas Doxia was elected on a national-
reformist platform, adQing strength to the northeastern victories 
of Arraes and Juliao in Pernambuco. In the Federal Senate, Hhich 
had 66 seats altogether, the UD:; senators Here red uceel to 15, the 
PS;) Has 1-9ft 'l'ri th 21 seats, and tly} FTB i'ient up to l:? 
The proportion of popular votes for each ~ajor party's congressional 
cand idates varied from their previous results. 'l'he :?3D feE. from 
JJ.6'~ in 1)5'+ to 2~.:;:[, in 1962, The m:{ r030 from 20,':;% in 195'-} 
to 2J.Z~ in 1962, and the :FT3 rose i'rOl.: :~. Sj>~:- i:: =-~5'~ to 2;·.Q~ in 
1:;62. Tr.e PSP dropped from 11.Y( to 4.7: a:.1d the :EDG rose from 2.yj 
to 5. TI. It is interesting to note that both the tJJli and the P:UC 
hail. among their rank and file a significa:.1t tendency "'hich aligned 
0::':1 
itself Hith the popular national-reformist forces."-··~ The percen-
tags of total valid votes obtained by the major parties shoHed a 
<iecrease of the centre-right positio:.1s. The :23J dro?ped from 22.o;~ 
in 10 5'1 to 15.t ~ in lo62~ the tc:: dropp8d from l;,.C to 1l.2~ 
and even the PTE drop:neo from l'J·.?: to 12.1 '.:. Farty alliances gr8)" 
,,. , . . , :-; . , " .. , 2~-5 from 2'5.'7-i to~l. and the b-'.anK vot::: rose from~ •.... to .L5.1,). 
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In terms of the distribution of seats in the Chamber of Deputies, 
the PI'B became the second largest party, with 10+ seats, 41 of which 
~fon in alliances. The PSJ received 119, 40 of which won in alliances, 
and the UDN received 97, !+2 of 'I'l"hich i>fOn in alliances. 286 
IPSS gave to the elections their due significance. In llovember 
1962, General Golbery sought ways and means to produce a competent 
1 . f th It 2R7 ana YS1S 0 e resu s. -, The most important conclusion that 
surfaced was that in spite of the massive efforts of the organic 
elite, there 'I'l"as a constant labour-left trend of the electorate, 
ylhile the ::::;xecuti ve managed Hi th direct appeal to the masses over 
the effective blocking of Congress by the modernizing-conservative 
forces, to push forward its reforms. If changes in the state Here 
to be achieved, Hhich Hould satisfy the entrepreneurial bloc, they 
had to be imposed. For the multinational and associated interests 
a military solution became inevitable. 
The unprecedented large sums of money spent by IBAD/IP~3/ADBF/ 
Promotio~ S.A., at least the equivalent of some 12,500,000 dollars, 
possibly as much as hlentymillion, aroused Hidespread suspicion 
concernin.g th2 nationality and the political aims or those contribu-
tions, and elicited demands for investigations into their activities. 223 
~'Ioreover I lEAD I s publicly denounced attempts to turn the 1962 elec-
tions by giving iEegi timate financial and other support to right-I'ling 
General Nagessi for the presidency of the Clube Hilitar against other 
candidates, forced the Hinister of Har, General Jair Dantas ?ibeiro, 
to join those Hho were calling for a congressional investigation 
into the activities of IF~S/IEAD.2S3 A Parliamentary Commissionof 
Inquiry Has established in 1963 to probe into the activities and 
sources of fund.ing of the IP2S/TBAD/ AD:~? nehTork and investigat,~ the 
alleged irregularities in the elections of October 1962. The n'~~s 
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president, Joao Baptista Leopoldo Figueiredo, called to testify 
before the Parliamentary Commissioncr Inquiry, was able to declare: 
'Slections are a manifestationcr the people which assumes its most 
sacred right, that of choosing its representatives. We. have said 
already and turn to affirm that lPES is strongly against the pressure 
of the private or government economic pO .... ler. The purchase of votes, 
the economic pressure on voters or on candidates, the monopoly of 
the means of information, etc., are anti-democratic practices. ,290 
The Commission '\'las somewhat handicapped from its inception, 
as at least five of its nine members had been themselves beneficiaries 
of those secret funds. 291 In spite of such handicaps, the inv~sti-
gations. Ner8 able to reveal that IBAD and its related. and counter-
part organizations had been responsible for a process of electora~ 
corruption. But it failed to establish lin.1.cs betl-reen 113AD ance IPES, 
whether through common sources of finance, overlapping militants 
and. leaders or joint action. 292 On September 7, 1963, President 
Goulart signed the decree suspending IBAD and ADEP activities on 
account of their unconstitutional behaviour. A couple of days 
later, IBAD-linked deputy Amaral Netto, of -:he liD::. set up'the 
National Committee for the Defence of Democracy \ Comite ?iacional 
de Defesa do. Jemocracia). 
ADP memoers floc:-ced to it. Its first members Here: rtaul Filla; 
deputies Flores Soares (t.TD::-:\GS;; :--:;urlpides Cardoso de Henezes (U1J~;-
GB;; Abel :r\afael (PRP-~'~G;; Os,'Talclo Zanelo (n1.F-2::;); Costa Cavalcanti 
(Ul"'I',T_ Dc' '-. , \ _.1 .1. _. ~ , PI ' 'T !l1""v"-'1:'\ 01 C t '1'''''- ·y:.' - t .lnlO Lemos '\ ~,,_,-r~); _avo os a " ::>1)-.'.u); ,;"aar e 
Vieira (Tm p _,::(' \ • 
" ,_ -i...I.t; • ..J\j) , T -,.., '(Un .- ..... -, ,,-cl" C _ eao ,::ampalo \ ;.u. -\...0. ; j :.'.J las arm 0 (r"'-"'1,T 7'<fr.\ 'Qer:;';s \" I.!J).;.,-. ~ ..... r I J,.~ 0-
Pacheco (PSD-BA)j ?loriano 'J.ubin . , ... \ . / V".l.3-.:.::; ;' ) \ ~ .. =~zeauias costa (S-\-lL,::j 
'! Q t ..:l ,.r:' - ~ , d (Un"l'T ~ r' ) "Ollra ,an os anlL;U O{l""Q ,;.Ylscna \ '...;.,-;:'v • rEhe cO~lI'li tte8 too;, Ul,) 
the :;Jo:a tica::" anc. ideological banners H~ich IBAJ/.:W:':;:;: haC. been 
carrying up to the period. of the investigatio~. ADEP and lEAD 
offices were finally closed down by decree in October 1963. By 
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then most of its activists Here integrated vithin the IP~S net\'1Ork 
anyhm-r. 
Th9 Executive had been able to hit at IBAll/AD-::P in general and Ivan 
Hasslocher in particular, but it was impotent to probe into deeper 
matters. IF;::3 T"as acquitted from charges. 293 Years later, protest-
ing (insurgindose) against the inclusion cf only Hasslocher in the 
electoral crime (delito eleitoral) investigated by the Parliamentary 
Commission cf Inquiry, Deputy J oao Hendes, leader of the AE?, declared 
that if a crime had been committed, four ministers of the Castello 
Branco government, among them General Juarez Tavora and Daniel Faraco, 
Herbert Levy, the president of the UDN, and Amaral PeL~oto, president 
of the PSD, and 8'7 deputies and 9 senators should have been prosecuted, 
?Ci~ 
as all of them were beneficiaries of resources provided by I3AD!-'· 
Qonclusio'1 
:::Jesnite their resourceful political action in the various sec-
tors of rub] ic opinion described above and their attempts to ra.LiY 
the dominant classes behind their lead, U:2;S/I.BAD Here unable to 
impose themselves by consensus on Brazilian society. l'ieverthel ~ss, 
IP?:S/IBAD succeed8d, through their ideologicai and :9oiitical ca.'llpaign, 
in ')re-,"mpting homogeneous support for the ~(ecutive ar.d Here abie 
to stimulate Hidespread reaction against the nationai-ref'ormist 
bloc. 
The acti vi ties of the la~'sq mU!lber of members and liMed 
activists Hhich I?'-~S/IBAr; had accYUf;d throughout the J.engtl1 and 
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breadth of the country ';Tere strategically co-ordinated in Rio de 
Janeiro. The various Groups of Study and Action of lP:SS Here funda-
mAn tal in the preparation, co-ordination and implementation of the 
different ideological- and political activities (see Appendix S). 
lPES/IBAD acted on their own and in association a~d collaboration 
with a large number of local parallel ore;anizations and groups. 
lP"SS/lBAD also collaborated .. rith and received the support of foreign 
organizations, agencies and individuals. 
As seen in this chapter, the organic elite's endeavours were 
met with mixed results in their various areas of action, and with 
the exception of their influence among the middle classes IF~S/lBAD 
Here strongly resisted and even defeated in other sectors. These 
defeats and partial successes were notable in the student movement, 
where lF~S/IBAD stimulated the formation of right-wing organizations 
and para-military groups Hithin the student popt:lation, but were 
unable to deter the leftllard trends withiilthe National Union of 
Student3. 
In the Deasant sector and amone; the industrial YTor~dne; classes lF8S/ 
lBAD were able to stimulate e:~isting right-'-ring organizations and. 
trad2-unions and even create new groups which H8re instrumental in 
the campaign to delay the acquisition of class sO-Lidarity and class 
awareness. HOrrever, they were unab13 to block in the final instance 
the constitution of national lli~brella organizations with a labour-
left orientation among the :?2asantry and the ind.ustrial Horking 
cJ.asses, and the consolidation of a national labour-left leadeyshi:p 
of the rTorkers. 
Th~y HAre partly successful in the el2ctoral field Hith the election 
of a large n1L'llber of conservative politicians belonging to the 
c[2ntre-right 1)0 li tical -parties for th", contested seats o~ th::: 
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Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, and the governorships of some 
important states. Nevertheless, they were unable to contain the 
ascendancy of politicians belonging to the National Parliamentary 
Front, and they were not able to fend off the election of some very 
influential figures of the national-reformist bloc. Furthermore, 
IPES/IBAD were unable to stem the integration of the various labour-
left forces within the student movement, the peasants, the industrial 
working class and the national-reformist politicians into a Popular 
Mobilization Front, whose incipient activities were abruptly cut 
short by the coup d'etat of March 31, 1964. 
Nevertheless, the political activities of IPES/IBAD were central in 
the realization of the crisis of the populist historical bloc. 'I'hey 
stimulated an atmosphere of political unrest and were able to bring 
about the intervention of the Armed Forces against 'chaos, pop:ulist 
corruption and the communist threat'. As shall be described in the 
next chapter, lPES was able to co-ordinate and integrate the varfuus 
military groups plotting against the government and, in a sense, 
to provide the required strategic thinking for the coup. 
FOOTl'TAjTES. Chapter VII 
1 This chapter is not a historical review of the period. 
A description of the full political and social process 
is beyond the scope of this thesis. Accounts of the 
period under consideration can be found in a variety of 
sources, some of which are listed in the bibliography, 
although none adopt a similar emphasis to the one offered 
here. 
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2 A. stepan: The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in 
Brazil, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1971, p. 189. 
Harold Polland and Glycon de Paiva agreed that "in the 
hour of the crisis, what generally is missing is the support 
to the men and the good ideas -'a caixa de ressonancia!, 
so as to avoid the mistakes of the crisis of August 1961". 
lPES CE 8th June, 1962. 
3 Telegram from Ambassador Lincoln Gordon to the Department of 
State, May 22n, 1963 No.2275 "Current plotting is typically 
Brazilian in not being unified and in suffering from the 
presence of too many would-be leaders. All groups, however, 
of which we know, recognize the need for any such movement 
to be countrywide". It was obvious that Ambassador Lincoln 
Gordon was aware of the efforts to oust Goulart by force. 
See also J .A. tangguth, Hidden Terrors, Ne\v York, Pantheon 
Books, 1978 pp.84-85, 101. 
4 Robinson Rojas, Estados Unidos en Brasil, Santiago de Chile, 
Prensa Latinoamericana, 1965, p. 71. 
5 Leonard D. Therry, "Dominant PO'.oJer Components in the Brazilian 
University Student Novement Prior to April 1964" in Journal 
of Inter-American Studies, Vol. VII, No.1, Coral Gables, 
Florida, University of Hiami, 1965. p. 35. 
6. P. Schmitter, Interest, Conflict and Political Change in 
Brazil, California, Stanford University Press, 1971, 
PP. 65-66. See also Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, 
Great Britain, Penguin Books, 1973; Paulo Freire, Cultural 
Action for Freedom, Great Britain, Penguin Books, 1972; and 
Paulo Freire, Extension 0 Comunicacion?: La Concientizacion 
en el medio rural, MeXico, Sigle XXI, 1979. 
7 On the political participation of students and a history of 
the student movement, see Arthur Jose Poerner, 0 Poder Jovem, 
Rio de Janeiro, Civiliza~ao Brasileira, 1968, and I<Iarialice H. 
Forachi, 0 Estudante e a TransformaSao da Sociedade Brasileira, 
Sao Paulo, Companhia Editora Nacional, 1965; See also: 
B~yan \'i'edge" Problems in Dialogue: Brazilian University Students 
and the United states, Institute for the Study of Hation2-1 
Behaviour, Princeton, New Jersey, 1964, and Leonard D. Therry, 
op.cit o 
8 Although the UNE and AP students promoted university reforms 
because it was there that their immediate interests lay, they 
understood the limits of the 'University situation' and the 
possibilities opened by it. They understood that the specific 
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social and political relations in the university environment 
were also manifestations of broader political and social 
relations in the national society, thus establishing real 
connections between university reform and the general trans-
formation of society. Octavio Ianni, Crisis in Brazil, 
New York, Columbia University Press, 1970. p. 108. 
9 A.J. Poerner, op.cit. pp 200-203. 
10 Movimento (Magazine of the UNE) No.12, Rio de Janeiro, 1963. 
p.24. 
11 ConstituiQao, National Union of Student, Rio de Janeiro, 
1963, P. 3. 
12 P.Schmitter, op.cit., P. 206. 
13 R.Rojas, op.cit., p. 71. 
14 IPES CD 27th March, 1962. IPES Leader Jose Luiz Horeira 
de Souza favoured direct contacts with student activists, 
but as IPES Leader Candido Guinle de Paula Machado noted, 
the students would not come to the IPES headquarters. 
These contacts, therefore, were to be made in what was 
dubbed as 'neutral territory'. Guinle Nachado strongly 
argued that 1PES/IBAD should not be seen to be meddling in 
student affairs, which was accepted by the IPES leadership. 
IPES Leader Coimbra Bueno stressed the need for IPES to truce 
on the function of coordination, but not to do too much in 
a direct form. IPES CD 21st August, 1962. 
15 At the end of August 1962, the discussion centred around 
Haroldpolland's proposal: the organization of a command 
of lecturers and students for the political Ire-orientation' 
of the universitarians, which IPES assumed to be confused in 
the face of the crunblil\g of right-win,; student groups in 
Rio de Janeiro. The point was also made that the movement 
against Ullli, which had had mixed fortunes in the regional and 
national elections, as well as in the campaign of denounciation 
throughout the media, should not be left to die out, once the 
elections were over. IPES CD 21st August, 1962. 
16 IPES CD 27th November, 1962. 
17 IPES CD 3rd April, 1962. - Gilbert Huber. 
18 On Paulo Egydio Nartins' previous role Hi thin the student 
movement, see A.J. Poerner, o~.cit., p. 190. 
19 IPES CD 27th November, 1962. - I1auricio Villela. 
20 IPES CE 31st July, 1962. 
21 IPES CE 12th June, 1962. - Harold C ..' Polland. 
22 R. Rojas, op.cit., p.74; Also P. Schmitter, op.cit., p.218 
and Jan Knippers Black, U.S. Intervention in Brazil, Manchester, 
}lanchester University Press, 1977, p.75. The MED participated 
in the ~rganization of the giant 'Democratic concentration' 
against Goulart, set up by the various IPES/IBAD organizations -
in June 18th, 1963. 
23 N. Blume, Pressure Grouus and Decision 11akin in Brazil. 
Saint Louis, Washington University, 1967 68. PP. 217, 233. 
Also J. Knippers Black, op.cit., p. 75. 
24 See further information on GAP in Chapter VIII. 
25 For specialized political action lPES was involved in 
the importing of 'students from Ecuador', where Quito, as 
seen previously, was the base of an important sister 
organization of IPES. IPES Minutes, 21st November, 1962. 
See also lPES CD 27th March, 1962. 
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26 lPES CD 13th I1arch, 1962. See also Robert O. !1yhr -'Brazil', 
in Students and Politics in Developing Nations, edt Donald K. 
Emmerson, London, Pall Mall Press, 1968, P. 276. 
27 lPES CD 3rd April, 1962. 
28 lPES CE 26th July, 1962. 
29 IPES CE 31st July, 1962. - Jose Rubem Fonseca - Alberto 
Carlos Menezes was the owner of Cotonificio Moreno 
30 Although General Golbery expressed optimism in his view of 
the situation in Sao Paulo as positive results had been 
obtained in the student sector, in late 1962, Candido Guinle 
de Paula Ma9hado was forced to conclude that the general 
situation was grave, especially in Rio de Janeiro, considering 
the unfavourable trends and election results at PUC-Rio and 
other places. IPES CD 27th November, 1962. 
31 IPES CE 8th October, 1962. 
32 Telegram to the Department of State from Rio de Janeiro and 
Brasilia, from Daniel M. Braddock, American Consul in Sao 
Paulo. Drafted by Embassy Officer, Datus C. Proper, August 
16, 1963, p.7. In NSF, JFK Archives. 
The telegram significantly was headed - 'Communist oriented 
students win national elections'. 
33 Daniel M. Braddock, idem. p.6. 
34 The American Consul reported that "Despite the attempts of 
the incumbents to characterize the Ferreira slate as reactionary 
and 'Ibadeana~ they presented a convincing _pic'ture of themselves 
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See also J. Foster Dulles - Unrest in Brazil: Political-Nilitary 
Crises - 1955-1964, Texas, University of Texas Press, 1970, 
p.218. 
35 Daniel N. Braddock, ibid., pp. 7-8. 
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36 lEES CD 22nd October, 1962. Sao Paulo in its turn 
spent in the university sector a minimum basis of 
500.000 cruzeiros per month; for the formation of 
student leaders, at least another 1,100.00 cruzeiros per 
month. lEES was to spend in the 'university sector' 
until August of that same year, at least another 11.000.000 
cruzeiros. These figures do not include the sums ear-
marked for student activities in the parallel budgets, nor 
contributions for specific targets. lEES CD 22nd l'Iay, 1963 
Joao Baptista Leopoldo Figueiredo. 
37 Relatorio das Atividades do IPES Sao Paulo, ~ L~S, Sao 
Paulo, 1963. 
38 lEES CE Sao Paulo 3rd January, 1963. - J. Ely C out inho • 
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November, 1963, lPES CE 31st January, 1963 and N. Blume, 
op.cit., pp.217, 233. lPES supported Dr. Rubem Porto's 
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Documentation belonged had already been created. In relation 
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41 lPES Ch.Gr. Sao Paulo 4th September 1962 and IPES Ch.Gr. 
Sao Paulo 12th February, 1963. 
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Edmur de Souza Queiroz. 
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See also IPES CE Rio 6th December, 1962. 
46 lPES Report 1963, p.2. 
47 lPES CE Sao Paulo and Ch.GR. 31st January, 1963. 
furni ture was owned by lEES. 
Even the 
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49 IPES CE 21st May, 1963. 
50 lPES General Meeting Sao Paulo, 4th October, 1962. 
51 IPES Ch.Gr. Sao Paulo 5th June, 1962. 
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plan the required subvention was 1.200.000 cruzeiros. 
53 lPES Minutes Sao Paulo 20th November, 1962. - J. Ely Coutinho. 
54 lPES CD and CE Sao Paulo 20th November, 1962. 
55 lPES CE 19th November, 1962. For appearances 
sake lEES leader Coimbra Bueno was asked to formally apply 
for lPES to participate in the work of the Foundation. 
56 For an overview of the FlWi role, see A.J. Poerner, 
op.cit., Chapter IX. 
57 "As the specialist you are", wrote Lieut. Aquino, "you will 
note certain weaknesses in the part referring to the student 
sector. True. It is even good that you note them. 
Perhaps you might even help me in the future in preparing 
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the offer". Letter from Heitor de Aquino Ferreira to Sonia 
Seganfredo-Rio, 25th October, 1962. See Appendix O. 
58 Letter Reitor de Aquino Ferreira, idem. 
59 Editora G1Obo was the biggest publishing house of Rio 
Grande do Sul, based in the capital city of Porto Alegre. 
60 Letter from Heitor de Aquino Ferreira, op.cit. 
61 N. Blume, oP.cit., p.215. 
62 Seganfredo would later complain that she received only 
420.000 cruzeiros in payment. Letter from Sonia Seganfredo 
to the National Intelligence Service - m·n, Rio de Janeiro 
19th November, 1965. pp.1-2. IPES Archive, Rio de Janeiro. 
63 J. Knippers Black, op.cit., p.99 
64 Arlindo Lopes Correia - A Conquista das Classes roledias para 
a A9aO politica em Grupo. Position Paper for discussion at 
CE and CD meetings - Rio de Janeiro 1962, lPES Archives, 
Rio de Janeiro. 
65 A rather blurred notion of what was assumed to have been 
Peron's Justicialista polity and party, and of which Goulart 
was portrayed initially by Carlos Lacerda, as the Brazilian 
counterpart. Goulart vias accused by the lPES/IBAD 
activists of leading the country to such a 'Republica 
Sindicalista' • 
66 Arlindo L. Correia, op.cit., pp.3-4 
67 The issue of the 'movimentos paralelos' was of importance 
to IPES. In April 1963, Helio Gomide, Harold C. Polland 
and J. Rubem Fonseca discussed the matter ... pointing to the 
encompassing meaning of 'integration' into IPES, and 
underlining the advantages of organizing certain social 
categories such as the parents associations and teachers 
associations, so necessary in the formation of a 'chain 
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of reverberation' of public opinion and which widened 
fFEs' influence in areas where the interest was not 
specifically of a financial nature. The goal of IPES was 
to create what it called 'The permanent great democratic 
opinion' on an every day basis, which would enable lPES 
to coordinate close to 3,000 associations and groups already 
registered for the organic elitelsaction. lPES CD Rio, 
27th November, 1962 - Helio Gomide. Helio Gomide 
gave the example of the Sindicato de Hoteis do' Rio de 
Janeiro. The Hotels in Rio had a daily intake of 
approximately 78,000 people who could be the target for 
IPES csmpaigns once the operation had been properly 
coordinated. Another example was that of the Clube de 
Professoras Primarias da Guanabara (Club of School Teachers 
of the State of Guanabara). IPES CD Rio. 23rd April, 1963. 
68 ~,6th January, 1962. General Hugo Bethlem, the former 
Ambassador to Bolivia (1952-1954), was eventually involved in 
the conspiracy which deposed Juan Carlos Torres, the Bolivian 
PreSident, in 1971, together with another IPES leader, H. 
Boilessen., In that· year f' Bethlem had been detained in Santa 
Cruz de la Sierra and expelled from Bolivia, accused of 
attempting to induce Bolivian military (against payment in 
dollars) to turn against Torres. ~,No.575, 12th 
September, 1979. p.40. 
69 ISTO ~, 8th Narch, 1978. p.9. Colonel Burnier would 
become one of the leading figures of the hard-liners after 
1964. 
70 IPES CE Rio 8th June, 1962. This was a general plan devised 
by General Golbery's team, and "'hich is not mentioned in 
detail in the Ninutes. 
71 IPES CE Rio 11th June, 1962. I Horal Rearmament' was not 
a priority of IPES Rio for its subsidies and expenses. 
General Golbery favoured the publication and distribution 
of lEAD's book 'Assault on Paxliament'. (Assalto ao Parlamento) 
against providing funds for certain activities to oe carried 
out by'Noral Rearmament~ 
72 IPES CE 13th AUa~st, 1963 and IPES CE 20th August, 1963. 
73 IPES cn 27th November, 1962. 
74 J .1d. Rowe, Revolution or Counterrevolution in Brazil: .Il.n 
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75 For the mobilization of the middle layers and, in 
particular, of the housewives, IPES built. up a special 
public opinion unit. This unit comprised among others 
Oscar de Oliveira, Eurico Castanheira, Nelson Parente 
Ribeiro and Coimbra Bueno. Oscar de Oliveira took part 
in the dissemination of anti-communist material, such as 
the Cartilhas Brasileiras, Nossos IIIales e seus Remedios, 
Suzanne Labin's publications and John Cotrim's Um Engenheiro 
Brasileiro na Russia, among the organized women, military 
and the state administration, in particular, and the middle 
classes in general. In Sao Paulo, Salvio de Almeida Prado 
and the activists responsible for 'sectoral mobilization' 
(Church, students, middle classes) were responsible for 
similar operations. 
Oscar de Oliveira provided Frederico Cesar Haragliano-, ot 
IPES Sao. Paulo \"i th the names of 100 people in the Alian<;a 
para -a F?;nilia and in the Campan.h.a da Hulher Brasileira, 
so that they could become targets and carriers for the 
dissemination o~ Cartilhas Brasileiras. IPES CE Rio 12th 
October, 1962. . 
76 Jose Luiz Noreira de Souza had once emphasized the fu:amatic 
aspect that the organic elite's causes did not have 
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adequate follow-up nor efficient public coverage and 
reverberation for its actions. vfuat was missing, according 
to Noreira de Souza, was the set up of a 'popular chorus', 
with institutes, syndicates, and the certainty that once 
an issue had been raised throughout the media, it would 
receive thousands of letters of censorship, or support. De 
Souza was of the idea that IPES needed 2000/3000 people who 
would write to the Minister of 1:lar and to other public 
figures forming what he called a 'Chain of Democracy'. 
The coordinated and controlled chorus-scheme had to be 
fabricated as authentic, in what was perceived as a similar 
system to that which Dom Helder Camara used to fill the 
Maracana Stadium. Horeira de Souza took upon himself the 
organization of these activities, asserting that he had even 
the money for them. IPES CD Rio 5th June, 1962. 
Under the superv~s~on of the Civilian-Milit~J Staff of IPES-Sao 
Paulo, the Independent League for Liberty was installed at 
the Brazilian Rural Society, where the IPES sponsored ,,,omen's 
organizations "Tere housed under the res:ponsibili ty of IPES 
activist Salvio de Almeida Prado. A similar sector 
operated in Sao Paulo through Blandina :t1eirelles. 
General Olympio Hourao Filho - Nemorias: A Verdade de um 
Revolucionario, ed. Helio Silva, Rio de Janeiro, L.& P.III. 
Editores Ltda, 1978. pp.183, 201. 
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Fleury led a similar parallel organization, ,,'hile another 
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Marques. General Nourao Filho, OT>. cit., p. 219. 
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for the Camoanha da Nulher Brasileira was discussed at the 
CE of IPES Rio. One vTeek later, Glycon de Paiva took hlO 
che que s of 100.000 and 45.000 cruze iros for CMmE. IPES CE 
26th July, 1962. See also J. YJlippers Black, op. cit., p. 72. 
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82 J.W.F. Dulles, op.cit., pp.257-260. 
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the COlUlcil, which continued to provide the business 
representatives to the AIFLD's Board of Trustees. Survey of 
the Alliance for Progress, op.cit., P. 582. 
180 r1oreover, executives from Gulf Oil International, Johnson 
& Johnson International, Ovrens-Illinois, as well as members 
of the Institute of International Education and the Fund for 
International Social and Economic "Education (both donees from 
CIA fronts) hold, or have held, senior AIFLD positions. 
See Ronald Radosh, American Labour and United States Foreign 
Policy, New York, Random House, 1969, p. 480. See also 
'Brazil and CIA' by Peter Gibbon in COUNTERSPY, April/Eay, 
1979. Vo1.3. No.4. p.13. and Spalding, oP.cit., p.67. 
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181 Survey of the Alliance for Progress, op.cit., 581. 
In Fact, AID was created almost parallel to AIFLD, on 
November 3, 1961. USAID had been created by the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961, and approved by the American 
Congress in September 1961. 
182 P. Agee, op.cit., p.600. Between 1961 and 1963, one 
source has claimed that the AIFLD received nearly a 
million dollars from CIA channels. Spalding, op.cit., p.67. 
quoting figures from Jim Nellen, 'Leaders for Labor-
Made in America', in North American Congress on Latin 
America - New Chile, Berkeley, California, 1972, p. 55. 
183 P. Agee, op.cit., p. 244. - See also P. Gibbon, op.cit., 
p.13. 
184 Survey of the Alliance for Progress, op.cit., p.588. 
See also Lenny Siegel, op.cit., pp. 122-125 on the inter-
relation of AIFLD, AID and the ALPRO. 
185 A partial acoount of AIFLD is given in Romualdi, op.cit., 
Chapter XXIV. 
186 P. Agee, op.cit',._, p.245. Also P. Gibbon, oV.cit., p.14. 
187 Eugene H. Methvin, 'Labor's New Weapon for Democracy', in 
Readers Digest, October, 1966, U.S.A., pp. 21-28. 
188 NACLA, 1976, OP. cit., p. 12. "In straight terms, AIFLD' s 
central functions consist of combating non-capitalist 
influences within the ranks of Latin American Labor ••••• 
and to strengthen both U.S. labor influence and business 
image in order to develop pro-capitalist, reformist unions 
while maintaining Latin America as a field for investment." 
Spalding, op.cit., p.66. 
189 S. Romualdi, op.cit., p.148. J. Peter Grace, AIFLD's 
former president and current Chairman of the Board, could 
have found little fault vlith these principles - "The AIFLD", 
he stressed, "urged cooperation between labor and management 
and an end to class struggle", in NACLA, 1976, op.cit., p.13. 
Moreover, J. Peter Grace emphasized that AIFLD must "vlOrk 
towards a common goal in Latin America, namely, supporting 
the democratic form of government, the capitalistic system 
and general well being of the individual". He continued, 
saying that AIFLD "is an outstanding example of a national 
consensus effectively at work for the national interest of 
the United States and for the best interests of the people 
of Latin America". H. Spalding, OD.cit., D.67, quoting 
the Survey of the Alliance for Progress, Labor Politics and 
Program, of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Sub-Committee 
on American Republics Affairs of the U.S. Senate, 90th 
Congress, 2nd Session, July 15, 1968. 
190 H. Spalding, op.cit., pp.70-7l. 
191 p. Gibbon, op.cit., pp.66-68. 
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192 J • V. Freitas Marcondes" Radiografia da Lideranga Sindical 
Paulista, Sao Paulo, Instituto Cultural do Trabalho, 1964. 
193 H. Spalding, op.cit., PE. 70-71. 
194 Survey of the Alliance for Progress, op.cit., p.586. 
In all, some 24,000 unionists and 3,500 peasant leaders 
from every state have received AIFLD-related training. 
in H. Spalding, op.cit., P. 71, quoting AIFLD Report, 
Vol.lO. No.5, l1arch 1972 , p.5. 
195 Up to 1966, AIFLD had trained over 49,000 people, directly 
involved in working class cultural and political life, 
through its field programs and up to 1973, 30,000 union 
activists were trained in Brazil, Erickson, op.cit., p.169. 
Brazil's members on the Board of Directors of AIFLD were 
Jose Barbosa de Almeida, of the IPES supported leT., who 
had been its president since 1963, as well as president of 
the Institute of Lawyers of Sao Paulo, and Helcio Naghenazi, 
also an ICT Director, J. I{nippers Black, op.cit., p.122. 
196 V.J. Freitas Marcondes, 'The Revolution of Labour Legislation 
in Brazil', in John Saunders (ed.) !'rodern Brazil: He", Patterns 
and Development, U.S.A. University of Florida Press, 1971. 
P. 152. 
197 It also operated 11 trade union centres in Latin American 
capitals, 'serving' 19 countries. 
198 R. Radosh, op.cit., p.421. 
199 Lenny Siegel, op.cit., p. 131. AIFLD officials vTere ,-rell 
acquainted with the ongoing plotting against Goulart, at 
least as early as the fall of 1963. In that time, Serafino 
Romualdt accompanied by Bererlt.Friele, an. old Brazilifu"l hand 
belonging to Nelson Rockefeller's entourage ••• visited 
governor Adhemar de Barros. Romualdi himself, on top of his 
other functions, had been lin.1{:ed to Nelson Rockefeller, 
working at his Inter-American Affairs office during the war. 
Adhemar de Barros confided to them plans that '-lere already 
"under way to mobilize military and police contingents to 
counter any attempt by Goulart to establish dictatorial 
control by force." Friele and Romualdi decided to acquaint 
U.S. Ambassador Lincoln Gordon vlith the substance of 
Adhemar's statements. Romualdi also drafted notes for the 
attention of Labour Attache John Fishburn. other regular 
contacts kept by Romualdi throughout this :period Here i-lith 
Guanabara governor Carlos Lacerda, trade union 'Delego', 
Ary Caopista, and with tpele7,ot Deocleciano de Hollanda 
Cavalcanti, long-time serving head of the Brazilian 
Confederation of Industrial \Yorkers, and a member of the 
Executive Board of the Internationl Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions - ICTFU. S. Romualdi, on.cit., pp. 226, 270-288. 
200 S.Romualdi, op.cit., p.289. 
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201 Another U.S.A. supported 'nelego' was Helio .~aujo, a 
trade union leader in Recife. For Romulo Teixeira Harinho' s 
activities and that of others, see \'Tilson Juvenato Reis, 
Notas de urn nirigente Sindical: Conquistas dos Trabalhadores 
Telegrhicos, Rio de Janeiro, Gr&ica Edi tara Sao hancisco 
Ltda., 1965. pp.10-13, 47, 57, 76-77 and 121. 
202 E. Methvin, of.cit., p. 28. 
203 W.C. Doherty, quoted in L. Siegel, op.cit., pp.13l-l32. 
For further activities of the AIFLD after 1964, see Ernest 
Ganey - 'Meddling in Erazil: The CIA Eungles On' inCommonweal, 
February 9, 1968, pp.553-554. 
204 For an account of the leftward trend of the working class 
and the growing militancy of the trade unions, as well as 
the rivalries and conflicts within the national-reformist 
bloc, see K. Erickson, on.cit., Chapter VII. 
205 On pressure techniques, see N. Eailey, op.cit., p. 220 
Among the forms of establishing the organic elite's 
influence on the political process were the pressures 
exerted on political parties through the members of their 
regional and national leadership, who, in many cases, were 
lPES/IBAD affiliates and activists. lPES also organized a 
national gathering of parliamentarians, in Harch 1962, at 
the Hotel Qui tandinha in Petro polis . which served to 
coordinate efforts of the modernizing-conservative bloc. 
In charge of the organization of the meeting were lPES 
activists Angelo :llorais Cerne and Nader Gonc;alves. 
206 lPES/IBAD made also use of personal influence in their 
relations with government agencies and bureaucratic-entre-
preneurial rings, which as mentioned in Chapter III "lere, 
in many cases, political strongholds of affiliates and 
activists of the organic elite. IPES also attempted to 
gain prominent positions in agencies, ministries and 
parliamentary cOmmittees, jockeying for positions within 
the government structure. Jorge Oscar de Mello Flores was 
able to report on his contact with Itamaraty, the foreign 
ministry, on foreign policy matters, having been invited by 
Renato Archer. According to Hello Flores, lPES was to be 
brought into the policy-making picture as an observer and 
representative in the Planning grouP. lPES Ninutes 27th 
Barch, 1962. 
207 Erazil: Election Factbook, op.cit., p.37. 
208 H. Cehelsky, oP.cit., p.130. See also lPES CE 12th Barch, 
1963. 
209 lPES CE 12th Harch, 1963. See also IPES CE Rio 2nd February, 
1962; lPES Rio Hinutes 20th Februar<J, 1962; IPES Hinutes 
17th May, 1962; lPES CD Rio 11th pecember, 1962. 
210 It is interesting to consider an example of hmv the TPES/IBAD/ 
ADEP organization operated. In mid l1arch 1963, Glycon de 
Paiva, J.Rubem Fonseca, General Golbe~J and J. Garrido Terres, 
met with I. Hasslocher, to discuss the strate~J for the 
presentation of the project of Agrarian Reform which IP3S/IBAD 
had prepared. It ,vas decided that the project would be 
cont/ ••• 
introduced under the name of a deputy of the ADP, for 
which PSD Armando Falcao, UDN J. Mendes and UDN Rainnmdo 
Padilha were considered. General Golbery supported the 
idea of a simultaneous introduction of the project in the 
Chamber of Deputies and in the Senate, by a group of 
senators and a group of deputies, preferably of several 
political parties, to disguise the source of the project 
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and generalize its message, a tactic which was eventually 
followed. While these operations proceeded,the personnel 
of the Study groups prepared a critique against the 
proposals of the government, and through the audio-visual 
media a barrage of criticism was launched against the 
executive and the national-reformist bloc on their proposals 
for agrarian reform. IPES CE 12th March, 1963. 
211 IPES CD Rio 22nd May, 1962. Glycon de Paiva. - See also 
Chapter V on the GAP. 
212 The question of introducing bills of law, amendments and 
general discussion in Congress was a delicate issue, which 
varied in form according to circumstances and themes and 
which was presented to the general public in several ways. 
At a meeting of the Executive Committee of IPES Rio, in 
August 16, 1962, Garrido Torres, head of the Study and 
Doctrine group, discussed the option open to IPES for the 
'presentation' of the bill of law on Agrarian Reform. 
Garrido Torres pointed out the 'idea of attempting to 
introduce IPES/IBAD's bill of law and project on Agrarian 
Reform by means of the National Council for Agrarian Reform -
CNR.A, "lith the help of councillors Edgard Teixeira Leite 
and \Vanderbilt de Barros, both incognito IPES/IEAD affiliates, 
who had participated in the preparatinn of the IPES/IBAD 
project on Agrarian Reform. The other suggestion was to 
deliver the bill of law to the Chmmber of Deputies through 
the IPES/IBAD Parliamentary Action Group (Assessoria Parla-
mentar). A week later, on August 23, at a meeting of the 
Executive Committee, Paulo de Assis Ribeiro raised the 
question again, referring himself to a bill of law that 
would be delivered (encaminhado) to the National Honetar'J 
COUllCil, to be transformed into a law-decree, introduced by 
Wanderbilt deBarros, of the CNRA. See also, IPES CE 
9th Nay, 1963, on discussion over Banking and Agrarian Reform 
bills of law and on Glycon de Paiva's recommendation to 
study Nil ton Campos' bill of law so as to introduce amend-
ments through friendly parliamentarians. Some of these 
parliamentarians involved in these manoeuvres were: Senator 
Hem de Sa, a leader of the PL and a most influential figure, 
Deputy Armando Falcao, Deputy Herbert Levy, president of the UDl\ 
D;puty Daniel Faraco and Deputy Aniz J3adra ("Tho introduced a 
bill of law on Agrarian Reform in AUc,cust 11, 1963). 
110reover, through Deputy 
Jesse Pinto Freire, the organic elite introduced a bill of 
law to sell to private interests the shares of the government 
in state enterprises, even those of Petrobras. The 
National Confederation of Commerce was mobilized in support 
of such proposals, also asking for the same measures to be 
applied to the Companhia Vale do Rio Doce - C'TRD, the J3anco 
do Brasil and the National Steel Company - C~l. See R. Rojas, 
oP.cit., 76-77. 
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213 lPES CE Rio lOth December, 1962. 
214 Osny Duarte Pereira, Quem Faz as Leis no Brasil?, Rio 
de Janeiro, Editora Civili~a~ao, Brasileira, 1963, pp. 
102, 138. See also AQao Democratica, issues of July -
December, 1962. Nelson v!ernek Sodre, A Hist6ria da 
Imprensa no Brasil, Rio de Janeiro, Civiliza~ao Brasileira, 
1966, pp.494-495. Plinio de Abreu Ramos, oP.cit., p.76. 
215 Adolfo Gentil was the brother of Ellsworth Bunker's son-in-
law. Telegram to the Department of state, from Ambassador 
Lincoln Gordon, Control No. 9447, August 2, 1962, in JFK 
Archives. 
216 Letter from Jorge Oscar de Nello Flores to Glycon de 
P'aiva, Rio, 15th April, 1963. \~ritten on correspondence 
paper headed with SULACAP logotype. A copy of this letter, 
which captures the mood and the political tone of the 
period is in Appendix Q. 
217 Such bills of law were on Agrarian Reform, which was already 
prepared and in the hands of the ADP; on Banking Reform, 
which Mello Flores considered easy to prepare on the basis 
6f the projetos of the commission appointed by Minister 
Miguel Calmon and the Congress on Basio Reforms in Sao Paulo; 
on Urban Refcrm, fundamentally restricted to the problem of 
private housing, already at a stage of advanced study by 
IBAD and coordinated vlith deputy Alvaro Catao, of the ADP. 
(Catao, the UDN congressman connected to the ADEP was also 
linked to Irineu Bornhausen, ore o:f trepoli tical bosses of the 
state of Santa Catarina, goveruor of the state and himself 
a business associate of lPES leader Antonio Gallotti. 
Eornhausen was also a Director of Eletro A~o Altona S.A. 
(Administradora Rex S.A., Wa.rn~ S.A. ,"; Agricultura, Comercio 
e Industria, Administra~ao Elumenau). Catao and Bornhausen 
were associates in the Cia. Erasileira Carbon{fera Aranangua. 
Catao was also responsible for introducing the bill of law 
on Urban Reform. 
Other bills of law were on Administrative Reform and 
Tributary Reform, which were already being studied at the 
GetUlio Vargas Foundation. (which had become, as seen in 
Chapter III, the ideological and political stronghold of a 
large number of lPES/IBAD affiliates), on Electoral Reform, 
which Nello Flores considered could be prepared on the basis 
of guidelines already set out by IPES and reaffirmed in 
the Congress of Easic Reforms of Sao Paulo, some of whose 
points would have to be reviewed, such as the vote of the 
illiterates, which Mello Flores recommended to be restricted 
to municipal elections. Mello Flores also urged the 
preparation of all the other bills of law being prepared by 
lPES which were not yet ready, so that they might be presented 
in the Chamber of Deputies while the very issues were being 
discussed. 
218 On 21st May, 1962, Nello Flores was able to send to Rio a 
bill of law and policy proposal which Sergio Hagalhaes, 
one of the leading members of the national-reformist bloc 
conti •• 
was to introduce shortly on urban reform (specifically 
on Housing Disappropriation). This project had been 
secured for General Golbery's team so that the GLC and 
the Study Group could prepare an effective counter-
strategy. - IPES Minutes 22nd Hay, 1962. See also 
IFES CE 15th May, 1962. The political action of IPES 
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was also strong on 'preparing events'. In a meeting of 
the CD, of 31st July, 1962, they discussed the 'line of 
action in relation to the crisis of 8th August' defined by 
Glycon de Paiva as the problem No.1. (On August 8, 
General Nelson de Mello, Minister of War, gave a strong 
speech in the Chamber of Deputies, exerting military 
pressure,.. The speech was considered to have originated 
because of 'pressures and equivocals, if not equivocal 
'('" ,; ,.. ,.. ~ ) pressures pressoes e eq~vocos, senao a pressoes eq~vocas • 
In Carlos Castello Branco, Introdugao a Revolugao de 1964, 
1st Vol., Rio de Janeiro, Artenova, 1975. pp.33-34. 
To add emphasis to their campaign for the orientation of 
public opinion, the IPES leadership decided to publish in 
o Dia, A Noticia and Luta Democratica (all newspapers from 
Rio de Janeiro), a manifesto to rally public opinion, for 
which a certain un1 was to give 200,000 cruzeiros. 0 Globo 
carried a similar manifesto. In IFES CD 31st July, 1962 -
Jose Rubem Fonseca. 
219 Dantas' bid for the premiership came under harsh attack 
from IBAD as a symbol of demagogy, and as the epitome 
both of Brazilian friendly relations with Cuba and the 
Soviet Union, considered an anathema by IBAD)and of a corrupt 
oligarchy which had ruled the country. AQao Democratica, 
July, 1962, p.6. 
220 The list of 174 deputies who voted against Dantas' 
nomination is to be found in Agao Democratica, July 1962, 
PP. 6-7. Sergio :Hagalhaes, the national reformist leader, 
was also rejected in his bid for the vice-presidencyof the 
Chamber of Deputies. 
221 For the dominant classes electoral politics had become a 
matter for class self-preservation. Former methods of un-
coordinated support for individuals were considered to be 
obsolete and self-defeating. Schmitter pointed out that 
for the first time, all the peak (employers') associations, 
civil and syndical, issued a joint manifesto announcing 
their sponsorship of an 'enlightenment campaign' in support 
of those candidates who would preserve 'our Christian heritage 
and maintain intact those institutions that signify the 
continuity of our national life and the defence of our 
sovereignty'. P. Schmitter, op.cit., p.278. 
222 In any ces~, it has been the most publicized action of the 
IPES/IBAD complex. ~ecause IPES strove to hide its involve-
ment carefully, this action has been perceived as an isolated 
endeavour accomplished by IBAD, a ~ort of 'bete noire' of 
the 1962 elections, than as a broad and all embracing class 
action, whose centre was located within IPES. The numerous 
action units, fronts, and organizations involved in the 
electoral campaign of the right, as well as the individuals 
committed to its platform acted publicly as if they were 
autonomous political agents, though ~ith coinciding 
conti •• 
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political stances. Once entrepreneurial involvement 
and interference in the electoral process became public 
knowledge, all the efforts went to cover up for the centre 
of action of the organic elite -IPES-, as well as 
attempting to blur the impression that there was an 
organized action of the entrepreneurial classes. The 
peripheral institutions were sacrificed and finally IBAD 
was made the scapegoat. No connection was established 
between the strategic and the tactical organizations of 
the entrepreneurial organic elite. See P. de Abreu Ramos, 
oE.cit., p. 72. 
223 lPES Leader, Rui Gomes de Almeida referred himself to 
three specific cases of lPES action in Brazilian elections 
at state level, namely in Rio, Pernambuco and Rio Grande. 
Gomes de Almeida added that the kind of action developed 
in those state elections had to be modified and adapted 
for the coming elections at national level. lPES CE 27th 
March, 1962. 
224 Castilho Cabral,- Q. Junamlira: Testimony at the Parliamentary 
Commission of Inquiry-Session of August 29, 1963, in 
OESP November 14, 1963. 
225 At the beginning of 1962, Hasslocher sought Castilho Cabral 
for him to lead a movement, for which the IBAD leader would 
secure a budget of 1 billion cruzeiros. Eventually Foster 
Dulles and Hasslocher came to see him.- In Po11tica e 
Negocios, Sao Paulo, August 26, 1963, p.21. 
Foster Dulles also wanted Castilho to c~J to Janio Quadros, 
who by then w.as in London, a report on Hanna, as he feared 
measures against the corporation. See also Edmar lYlorel, 
° GolFe Comeiou em '.[ashington, Rio de Janeiro, Editora 
Civiliza~ao Brasileira, 1965, p. 52; and Castilho Cabral, 
Testimony at the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry of 
August 29, 1963, in ~ August 30, 1963. 
226 Jose Arthur Rios, 'Os Grupos de Pressao' in Comportamento 
Eleitoral no Brasil (edited by Themistocles Cavalcanti and 
Reisky Dubnic, Rio de Janeiro, FGV, 1964, p. 149. 
227 J. Knippers Black, op.cit., p.73. See also Joao Doria, 
~AD: Conspiracao Internacional Contra as Reformas' No.III, 
in Po11tica e Negocios, Rio de Janeiro, November 4, 1963. 
IBAD was denounced as spending daily at least, 600,000,000,00 
cruzeiros in Rio de Janeiro, for the propaganda of the 
candidate through newspapers, radio stations and television. 
IBAD/ADEP had more than 80 weekly radio programmes, sponsored 
by IBAD, via Promotion S.A. The resources came from 
'open accoUnts' in The Royal Baru( of Canada, The Ba~~ of 
Boston and the National City Bank. See Po11tica e lJegocios, 
Sao Paulo, August 26, 1963, p. 20. 
228 IBAD member, A. Leopoldino, in his testimony before the 
Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry, - OESI'_, November 11, 
1963. See also N. Bailey, op.cit., P. 223. 
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At a meeting of the IPES leadership, Helio Gomide 
introduced a o.ocument on the 'Convenience of a Unified 
Command for the Struggle of Democratic Action'(~ 
conveniencia de um comando unificado ara a luta de A ao 
Democratica , which aimed at coordinating parallel and 
congruent efforts of other political actors. Gomide 
suggested arranging for J~A~ Leite Barbosa, the Director 
of the Boletim Cambial, to be in charge of the material 
:part of his plan. Leite Barbosa vIas to remain in charge 
of producing small articles and lectures on democracy, 
liberty, education, vida domestica (home life), all of 
which were considered to contribute to the correct voting 
of the citizens. IPES CD Rio 21st August, 1962. 
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Brazil: Short Term Action Paper (Action Pa:per for the period 
from now to October 7 - Brazilian Elections) - For consider-
ation of Latin America Policy Committee, July 12, 1962, -
NSF, in JFK Archive s • 
Jose Arthur Rios, Os Gru:pos ••• op.cit., p.144. See also 
p. Agee, op.cit., :Po 365. Political Synthesis 1962, in 
APEC yearbook, Rio de Janeiro, APEC, 1963, and P. Schmitter, 
op.cit., p.279. For details of ALEF's role, see Nelson de 
Souza Sampaio, 'Analysis of Bahia Elections', in Cavalcanti 
and Dubnic, op.cit., p:p. 26-27, 39-40, and Jose Arthur 
Rios, •. Os Gruposde Pessao' . in Cavalcanti and 
Dubnic, op.cit., PE. 145-149. 
~The principal components of the extreme-right wing groups 
within the clergy were Mfound among the top hierarchy of 
the Church. Some of its more outstanding members include 
the Archbishops of Rio de Janeiro, Diamant ina , Bahia and 
Curitiba. These leaders show a natural predisposition to 
support traditionalism because they have emerged from the 
old, conservative families and are beholden to them for 
financial support." 
"The ideological position defended by this group is 
violentlyanti-communist". 
"Domestically they accuse any manifestation against foreign 
investments anu any agrarian reform as being of communist 
origin". 
"Nembers of this group have found supporters in various 
segments of Brazilian society. They have attracted journal-
ists, and are, in fact, the principal inspiration behind 
o Globo, the Rio de Janeiro evening paper. Among politicians 
they count as adherents, Carlos Lacerda, Governor of 
Guanabara, and the leadership of the National Democratic 
Union (UDN) in Rio de Janeiro". 
In Nemorandum to the ifui te House (Hr. Schlesinger) from 
Department of State Il~RAR - John N. Plank, ~~ch 28, 1963. 
Subject - Political Systems Study - Brazil, Sanitized 
Version, PP. 64-65. 
233 P. Agee, op.cit., p. 254. 
234 Thomas Mann, the U.S.-American Assistant Secretary for 
Inter-American Affairs, testified that "we did not give 
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any money in balance-of-payments support, budgetary support, 
things of that kind, which benefit directly the Central 
Government of Brazil". Instead AID assisted "states which 
were headed by good governors we think strengthened democracylt 
(quoted in Carlos Dias Alejandro, 'Some Aspects of the 
Brazilian Experience with Foreign Ai~', Unpublished manuscript, 
December 1969, p.ll. cited by Peter Bell in Riordan Roett, 
Brazil in the Sixties, Nashville, Vanderbilt University Press, 
1972. p. 89. 
Alfred stepan has stressed that "the United states official 
policy - economic, political and military - was to we~~en 
the Goulart government, especially in its last nine months 
••• " "By mid-1963, the U.S. government, afraid of the 
growing radicalization of the Goulart government, moved from 
a position of mild support to one of opposition", which 
involved the support for political sectors operating against 
the Brazilian executive. "This policy of aiding the 
opposition forces \'las known by State Department officials as 
one of strengthening 'islands of sanity' in Brazil". A. 
stepan, op.cit., PP. 124-125. 
235 President Kennedy;'s message read: "I feel that we should do 
something of a favourable nature for Brazil before the 
election this Fall, which is going to be crucial. Perhaps a 
food, water or some other project could be proposed. \{ould 
you talk to Ted Moscoso about this and 'then discuss it vIi th 
melt. P Parker, op.cit., p.46. 
236 Thomas !~ was quoted by 0 Estado de Sao Paulo on June 19, 
1964 as saying that even before his occupance of the post he 
now held, there was a policy of strengthening the poli~ical 
position of certain state governors against the central 
government by selective economic aid. See Octavio Ianni, 
'Processo ~ol{tico e Desenv~lvimento Economico' in j1effort, 
Singer, Ianni and Cohn, Politica e RevoluQao, op.cit., p.61. 
237 Telegram from Ambassador Lincoln Gordon to Department of 
state, No.751, October 3, 1962 - nSF, in JFK Archives. 
238 On PL 480, see The Sources of Finance in this Chapter -
See also, li. Bandeira, Presen~a •••• op.cit., p.429. 
239 Hemo for the Latin American Policy Committee Heeting of 
July 12, 19£2. Plan of Action for Period to October 7, 
1962, JFK A:chives, - Sanitized version. 
240 Hemo for National Security Council Executive Committee 
Meeting, December 11, 1962, - U.S. Short Term Policy Towards 
Bl!azil. JFK Archive. See also Telegram from American 
Embassy in Rio de Janeiro to Department of State lTo.1315, 
January 14, 1963. - Sanitized version. 
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241 IPES CE 15th May, 1962. There had been a meeting already 
on the 11th IvIay, in which Mello Flores add:-cessed the 
Comissao Diretora and complained about the scarce monetary 
resources he had at his disposal to finance deputies. Hello 
Flores stressed that Pernambuco (where Arraes \,Tould take 
power according to General Golbery) was the worst problem. 
Hello Flores added that he had come to the meeting because 
of Cid Sampaio's needs; .he was the incumbent governor of 
Pernambuco and who had endorsed Joao Cleofas candidature. 
Mello Flores also remarked that "all the politicians have 
sought me and all I could do was to offer lunches" instead 
of being able to offer material support. All the deputies 
handling the Banking Amendment prepared by IPES were asking 
him for money. One of them even sent Mello Flores a· letter 
asking him for a loan by Sul America, the insurance company 
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of which Hello Flores was a director. 11ello Flores explained 
to the CD that one deputy required 6 million cruzeiros, if 
he was from a minor state and that a Sao Paulo deputy would 
require a great deal more. He said that he needed up to 
300 million cruzeiros for 30 deputies. 
Mello Flores also raised a tactical problem. He considered 
that he had to disassociate himself from IPES, as he was 
becoming too obvious in his activities. He added that he 
needed a room outside Congress, which \vould be rented by the 
Centro de Saguros, providing a discreet locus for his 
operations. 
Mello Flores had already explained to the CE of IPES in Rio 
in the first session of the meeting, the 'measures to be 
taken in Brasilia with the installation of headquarters and 
the contract of personnel, as well as the contract of se~rices 
with the publicity agency, Nova Press. Mello Flores foresaw 
expenses of about 3 million cruzeiros monthly. Glycon de 
Paiva, confirmed by General Herrera, remarked that the 3 million 
was 'no problem'. 
As the elections dre .... l closer, the budget for a candidate 
considered to be 'quiet', i.e., little known and of reduced 
electoral 'aggressiveness' was of 10,000,000 cruzeiros. 
(This included: sound equipment, 40,000 billboards, 600 strips, 
pictures, soft marketing, space in newspapers, records \,li th 
music and propaganda, radio and T.V. messages, gas, mail, 
help, etc.); 10,000,000 was the equivalent to the daily wages 
of 20,000 workers. 
On 15th Hay, 1962, at the meeting of the CE of IPES, Hello 
Flores expressed the IIproblem of supportinG' the election or 
re-election of 15 'approved' deputies, foreseeing a global 
expenditure of 300 million cr~zeiros for that end, the payment 
divided in three instalments". 
IPES CE 15th tlay, 1962. Handwritten i'Unut2s. 
Mello Flores explained to the leadership of IPES Rio his 
activities in Brasilia through the "ADP, which,according to 
him, controlled 158 deputies. He reported that because the 
seats in the Chamber of Deputies were to be contested, money 
for the campaign of the ADP members was a big problem. 
conti .••• 
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The situation in the Senate ,.,ras not that urgent, according 
to Mello Flores, as 21 members of the House, which had a 
clear conservative majority anyway, had four more years of 
mandate. Mello Flores also explained that the ADP needed 
administrative assistance, even more than technical assistance. 
lPES l'Iinutes CD 22nd Hay, 1962. 
In June 1962, 150 million cruzeiros for Nello Flores 
activities with the ADP in Erasl1ia were in the IPES pipeline. 
IrES CE 8th June, 1962. 
246 IPES CE 15th Hay, 1962. - Typed Summary of l"Iinutes. 
247 From Roger Hislman; Director of Intelligence and Research, 
Department of state, to Hartin Chammons, of the- Latin American 
Policy Committee, July 11, 1962. in JFK Archives. 
248 Roberto Garcia, 'Castello perdeu a batalha', in VEJA No.444, 
l1arch 9, 1977. P. 6. Clarence W. Hall in his vii de ly 
circulated Reader's Digest separata 'The Count~J that saved 
itself', who had first-hand knowledge from the lIES militants, 
asserted that "Future historians may well record the Erazilian 
Revolution as the single most decisive victo~J for freedom in 
the mid-20th Century. This was a home-grown, do-it-yourself 
revolution, both in its conception and accomplishment. Not 
one U. S. dollar or brain cell "las involved ••• " in Clarence Hall, 
0F.oit, p.137. 
249 Roberto Garcia, of.cit., p.6. 
250 Ambassador Gordon recalled that ItUndoubtedly , it "YTas much 
more than a million dollars, and I would not be surprised if 
it had been as high as five million dollars. Eut it "Ylas not 
an enormous sum, it "las not tens of millions of dollars It • 
Gordon still emphasized that Itthere was a ceiling per candidate ••• 
the money was to buy radio time, to print billboards ••• and 
you can be sure that many more re~uests were received than 
were actually complied v/ith ••• " Roberto Garcia, ou.cit., p.6. 
(Hy translation HAD). 
251 NonizBandeira, Presenga •••• oP.cit., p.429. P. Schmitter, 
op.cit., p.446. J. Knippers Black, of.cit., p.41. 
In the note released by Gordon, listing the expenses made by 
the Embassy vIi th the budget of the 1,'lheat Fund (PL 480 ) ,he 
referred only to the 2~o for the cost of diplomatic represent-
ation of his country, forgetting about the other 20/J "Y/hich ,.,ras 
handed to him for distribution as donations to be made 
according to his o"m criteria. Gordon also did not specify 
expenses he had made. He classified them as generic items: 
Hedical eX}:lenses, trips, various supplies and equipment, etc. 
Even so, he made it clear that -between Hay and A1.l.[,1.1St of 1952, 
that is, in the heat of the electoral campaign and in the most 
intense period of activities of IBKD, he spent t\'lO billion 
cruzeiros on printing, newspapers and jourDal subscriptions, 
office materials, etc. Under Item 'various supplies' the sum 
of 725,600,000,00 cruzeiros Has spent. T-rips costing 119 million 
cruzeiros and transport more th~~ 75 million cruzeiros. 
Communications (post, parcel, telephones and telegrams) took 
another 293 million cruzeiros. But ,-lith educationa.l exch~~se 
his expenses vlere more a.ustere: a mere 10 million cruzeiros. in 
o Semanario, ITo 349, September 11, 1963 - Rio de Janeiro. 
252 Cited in Moniz Bandeira, 0 Governo, op.oit., p.75. 
253 J. Knippers Black, op.oit., p.76. 
254 CPI of !BAD/ADEP/IPES in~, Ootober 17, 1963. Also 
J. Knippers Black, op.oit., p.74. 
255 !BAD activist Frutuoso Osorio Filho provided for the 
oampaign of Joao Cleofas, between May 30 and Ootober 1st, 
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the sum of 308,057,100 oruzeiros. Colonel Astrogildo Correia, 
general oo-ordinator of Promotion S.A. and a member of the 
Frente Patriotioa Civil Militar, who was among thom!BAD 
aotivists linking up with right-wing offioers of the 4th 
Arm:r, drew from the Banoo Mineiro da Produc;ao, in Reoife, 
during the period of eleotoral dis~te, the amount of 
63,359,247.60oruzeiros. Another agent of Hasslooher 
posted in Pernambuoo, Adeildo Coutinho Beltrao, did trans-
aotions at the Banoo Mlneiro whioh amounted to 26,720,000 
oruzeiros for activists related to the eleotoral oampaign. 
In Plinio de Abreu Ramos, op.oit., p.79. Many of the 
huge figures, broken into oents oould possible indioate 
foreign ourrenoy oonversions, as in an inflationary eoonomy 
suoh as that of Brazil in 1962-1963, it was oommon 
praotioe to round up figures. 
In an offioial letter of August 15, 1962, addressed to A.O, 
Junqueira, the treasurer of !BAD, Hasslooher enolosed 40 
million oruzeiros for ADEP operations. In August 21st, 1962, 
a oheque was enolosed for 16 million oruzeiros for ADEP 
operations and another one of 38,050,000 oruzeiros. 
Altogether, Junqueira dealt with 1 billion and 40 million 
oruzeiros. In Plinio de Abreu Ramos, op.oit., p. 77. 
In September 4, 1962, Colonel Casoais reoeived from 
Hasslooher the amount of 10 million oruzeiros for ADEP 
operations in his native state of Amazonas. Salvador da 
Grasia, of ADEP Parana reoeived 15 million oruzeiros. 
Osorio Filho reoeived in September 10, 1962, for the north-
eastern operations of !BAD, the sum of 25 million oruzeiros. 
Doouments in E. Dutra, op.oit., Pp. 81-91. 
256 Nelson Wemeok Sodre, op.oit., pp.494-495. 
257 ~,Deoember 12, 1963. - Claudio Hasslooher, testifying 
before the C.P.I. stated that '!BAD's money is from nebulous 
souroes'. Also ~~ Maroh,16, 1977 p.4. Eloy Dutra, op.oit., 
p.62; N. Werneok Sodre, OP.01t., p.496. 
258 J. Knippers Blaok, op.oit., p.76. 
259 He1oio Franya, testifying at the C.P.I. on !BAD/IPES, in 
~,No.445. Maroh 16, 1977. Ivan Hass1ooher, Testimony 
to the C.P.I. on !BAD/IPES, in~, Deoember 27, 1963. 
See also Po1!tioa e NegOoios, Sao "Paulo, August 26, 1963, 
p.20. Each one gained 1,000,000 oedulas. See further 
Plinio de Abreu Ramos, op.oit., p.77; Maia Neto, Brasil: 
Guerra Quente na Amerioa Latina, Rio de Janeiro, Civi1izac;ao 
Brasileira, 1965, pp.107-108, and P. Agee, op.oit., p.32. 
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260 ~,16th March 1977. pp.;-6. 
261 "One of the strongest pressures for Cleofas comes from 
IBAD which apparently conditioned an offer of assistance 
w-Governor (Cid Sampaio), insisting Cleofas be candidate". 
Telegram to Department of State from American Consulate in 
Recife, - Delgado/Arias, No.427, June 29, 1962. NSF in 
JFK Archives. 
The 'technical committee' of Colonel Astrogildo Correa 
consisted of Vicente Silva, Fernando Luiz da Camara Oascudo 
and Caio de Souza Leio. In~, September 1, 196;. 
262 Plinio de Abreu Ramos, op.cit., PP. 79-80. 
According to Governor Arraes, testifying at the C.P.I. in 
1963, the superintendent of !BAD in Pernambuco was Frutuoso 
Osorio Filho. Having ample power, delegated by Hasslocher, 
Osorio Filho, with Carlos Lavinio Reis and Bertelemy Beer, 
directors of Promotion S.A., operated in Pernambuco, between 
May ;0 1962 and October of that same year, with approximately 
500 million cruzeiros. Lael Sampaio, brother of Governor 
Cid Sampaio received 5 million cruzeiros through a cheque of 
Banco Mineiro da Produgio. See Adirson de Barros,op.oit q 
p .. 173~ 
In the same period, Hasslocher channelled ;50 million 
cruzeiros to Osorio Filho, which were to be distributed to 
the regional headquarters of !BAD. ~,16th March, 1977.p.6. 
According to Frutuoso Osorio Filho, testifying at the C.P.I., 
the bank flow of !BAD in the northeast was done through the 
Banco Nacional de Minas Gerais, while that of ADEP was done 
through the Banco Mineiro da Produgio. See~, August 1;, 
196;, and~, November 2, 196;. 
26; Another alleged channel for contribution was denounced at the 
time when the U.S. American government conceded high 
subsidies for the functioning of the Companhia Pernambucana 
de Borracha Sintetica'- COPERBO, an enterprise destined for 
the use of sugar in the production of synthetic rubber. Cid 
Sampaio had substantial interests in COPERBO. Ambassador 
Lincoln Gordon eventually admitted that the process of planning 
and approval of COPERBO was not carefully studied, due to the 
political aspects involved. COPERBO received 6.7- million 
dollars. See p. Parker, op.cit. p.47. 
264 ~,September;, 196;. 
265 AdirsondeiBarros, op.cit., P. 8;. Also J. Page, op.cit., 
pp.115, 117. 
266 J. Page, op.cit., p.116. 
267 Telegram to Department of State from Delgado/Arias, Recife, 
August 2;, 1962. No.105, NSF, in JFK Archives. 
268 "An Arraes COIDJ.Cl.O announced for 8 p.m. yesterday in Casa 
Forte section Recife was virtually deserted when local priest 
scheduled motion picture, showing same time at other end of 
square". - Telegram Delgado/Arias, No.105, op.cit. 
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Telegram Delgado/Arias, No.105. op.cit. 
J. Page, op.cit., p.117. 
J. Page, op.cit., p.118. 
The list of names has been reconstructed out of the following 
publications: Plinio de Abreu Ramos, op,cit., pp.18-l9; 
Moniz Bandeira, Presen~a, op.cit.: Moniz Bandeira, 0 Governo, 
op.cit., Adirson de Barros, op.cit.; Edmar Morel, op.cit.; 
Osny D. Pereira, Quem Faz, op.cit.; J. Knippers Black, op.cit.;. 
Eloy Dutra, op.cit.: Furthermore, several issues of 0 Estado 
de Sao Paulo of 1963, especially June 13, August 1, August 8, 
August 9, August 10, August 31, and November.7, as well as 
the IEES Archives in Rio de Janeiro. 
IEES CD 10 April, 1963. A. Leopoldino, Testimony at C.P.I, 
in~, October 10, 1963. See also Jose Arthur Rios, 
op.cit., P. 149. In a reference to the election of senators 
in Rio de Janeiro, Rui Gomes de Almeida asserted that "It is 
of our interest to elect the two senators (Gilberto Marinho 
and Lopo Coelho)', while Miguel L ins added that 'We will need 
much money for the elections' - IEES CD. lOth April, 1963. 
Brother in law of General Golbery and director of Cimento 
Portland de Minas Gerais s/A. After 1964 he was to become 
an executive of the Banco do Estado de Santa Catarina. 
A. Leopoldino, Testimy at CPI, in~, October 10, 1963. 
In his testimony at the CPI, Leopoldino the ADEP militant of 
Minas Gerais declared that he was not sure if Francelino 
Pereira (UDN) and Oznan Coelho (PSD) were 'helped'. A. 
Leopoldino - Testimony at OPI,in_~ October 10, 1963. 
A. Leopoldino, Testimony at CPI, in~, October 10, 1963. 
OESP, December 21, 1963. 
In spite of the support they received from IBAD the following 
were not elected: Aderval Torres, Agripino Almeida, Luis 
Oliveira, Alvaro da Cost Lima, Clodomir Moreira, Arnaldo P. 
Oliveira, Jose Em~io Lima, Justino Alves Bezerra, Clovis 
Correira, Antonio Pinto Ramalho, Francisco de Assis Barros, 
Jurandir Barros, D:!dimo Guerra, Constancio Maranhao and 
Francisco Falcao. 
Daniel Krieger, Desde as Missoes ••• Saudades. Lutas, 
Esperanyas, Rio de Janeiro, Jos~ Olympio, 1976. pp;, 158-159. 
Analysis of Rio Grande do Sul elections, in Comportamento 
Eleitoral no Brasil, edited by Them!stoc1es Cava1canti and 
and Reisky Dubnic, op.cit., p.268. 
It was A. Nasser, who as Minister 'of Justice of Joao Goulart, 
would dampen the public furc,.reurerthe alleged connections of 
the Movimento Anti-Comunista, -MAC and IBAD. See ~, July 1, 
1963. and July 6 to 16, 1963. 
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Oscar Junqueira, former secretary of the ADEP, testifying 
before the CPI declared that he did not remember if they 
had received support or financial aid. In ~, 
October 14, 1963. 
Election Fact Book, op.cit., 1'.58. 
Election Fact Book, .!9!!!!, 1'.60. 
Election Fact Book,.fE.g, 1'1'.64, 66. 
In that same month, at a meeting of the CE of Rio, the 
lEES leaders considered a budget to pay for the research 
on the elections to be c~out by the School of Sociology 
of PUC, through Padre Avila. The research was designed to 
discern the 'will of the people', as well as establishing 
opinion trends through geographic sectors. A European 
specialist was also sought. The study was budgeted at 
900.000 cruzeiros. !PES CE 29 October, 1962. The 
Study and Doctrine Grou~ of Rio also prepared several 
conjunctural studies and ~-depth studies' of the post 
election situation. A central study was that of Paulo de 
Assis Ribeiro, to which we referred in Chapter IV. 
P. Agee, op.cit., 1'.321. See also ~,June 13, 1963, 
June 20, June 30, August 21, August 28, September 28, and 
Correio da Manha. - 1963: August 1, August 8, August 9, August 
22, August 23, August 30 for developments in CPl. 
J. Knippers Black, op.c1t.,p.75. In fact it was lEES who 
contributed to the campaign of General Magessi. 
J.B. Leopoldo Figueiredo, Correio da Manha, Rio de Janeiro, 
March 23, 1962. Osny Duarte Pereira, Quem faz .... op.cit., 
1'.119. J.B. Leopoldo Figueiredo testified before the 
Parliamentary CongreSSional qommittee~_of Inquiry that lEES 
had never involved itself in partisan politics or contributed 
directly, or indirectly, to partisan electoral campaigns of 
any candidate. lEES Boletim Mensal, July 1963, 1'1'.3-7. 
See also N. Blume, op.cit., p. 223. 
Even Jose Aparecido de Oliveira, a member of the 'Bossa 
Nova' wing of the UDN, right-hand man of Janio Quadros and 
very close to Jose de Magalhaes Pinto was denounced by 
Deputy Athos Vieira as being IBAD supported. Pedro Aleixo, 
the president of the Commission, who was to become the vice-
president of General Costa e Silva's government, was allegedly 
articulated with IBAD/ADEP. 
In so far as lEES is concerned, the spokesman stressed that 
it was "a perfectly legal civil society sociedade civil) , 
whose statutes are consonant with the law que se enquadram na 
M.) and which prohibit party-political activities". The 
report went on to stress that "no vestiges are found of the 
participation of lEES in the contest (pleito), whether in 
financing deputies or in any activities not foreseen in its 
statutes" (Pedro Aleixo - Final Report of the CPI, quoted in 
~, November 14, 1963). The full contents of the final 
Rep~ have not been made available to the public. 
293 J.B. Leopo1do Figueiredo in his testimy before the CPI, 
declared that -there is no link between IPES AND IBAD-, 
attributing the confusion which is made with both 
institutions only to 'ill-feeling' (ma fa). In ~, 
July 26, 1963. See also IPES Bo1etim Mensa1 - Editorial, 
July, 1963. pp.3, 5. 
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294 In Diario de Noticias, of June 8, 1965, as cited by Revista 
Civi1izagao Brasi1eira No.4. p. 23. See also Joma1 do 
BraSil, September 6, 1965. General Juarez Tavora also 
received transportation equipment from IBAD. Moreover, 
General Tavora spoke, on several occasions on television 
programmes financed for the PDC by Ms. Pero1a Byngton, mother 
of Alberto Byngton, another PDC candidate for Guanabara. 
(Byngton was also an IPES leader, President ofOOUCLAP and 
financial courier betw~en sOurces i~ the U.S.A. and IPES in 
Brazil. Furthermore, General Tavora also received radio 
time on Radio Eldorado, owned by Julio de Mesquita Filho, of 
o Estado de Sao Paulo. es Marshal Juarez Tavora, Uma Vida e 
Muitas Lutas - Memorias, Volume III; Vo1tando a P1anicie, 
Rio de Janeiro, Jose 01ympio Editora, 1973, P. 151. 
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Introduction 
This chapter is concerned with the action of IPES/IBAD 
among the military. Despite the obvious difficulties in obtain-
ing detailed information about their activities because of their 
very secretive nature, some evidence appears in IPES documents. 
This information, coupled with the rich material which can be 
obtained in the recently published memoirs of senior military 
officersl and the information assembled by historians studying 
this period2 allows one to reconstruct many of the main military 
events in which the IPES/IBAD activists were involved. This 
chapter does not attempt to be a history of the several Bctional 
conspiracies among the military and the civilian-military move-
ments of the period in question, nor of the intricacies of the 
civilian-military campaign which toppled Goulart. This is a 
task beyond the scope of this section. Indeed there is a place 
for further research in this area. Despite the numerous :partial 
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accounts of these events there is still the need for a comprehen-
sive description and analysis of the political activities of the 
Armed Forces and of the interplay of personal ambition, ideoio-
gical commitment, political alignments and institutional constraints 
which shaped the course of action of particular military officers 
as well as of large segments of the military corporation. 
This chapter a2.so describes the invollTement of civilians 
and officers offue Armed Forces belonging to IPES/IBAD or linked 
to the various groups of the organic elite in the military strat-
egy against the Executive and the popular forces. IPES/IBAD 
activists, as seen previously, were at the centre of events 
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in other areas of public opinion. l'fhat has become clear through 
this research is that IPES/IBAD activists were also leading and 
organizing a civilian-military movement of their own making, 
based on an infrastructure of ESG officers, which placed itself 
at the centre of the political military campaign against Goulart. 
Moreover, IPES/IBAD military officers were also responsible for 
the military articulaQao) (co-ordination and integration of 
military factions and ring-leaders and of civilian groups and 
individ~~ls into a harmonious, organized civilian-military move-
ment) which encompassed the various plotting groups within the 
general politico-military campaign of the organic elite.4 In 
particular, this chapter attempts to draw attention to the 
fact that the ousting of the government came about as the cul-
mination of a civilian-military movement rather than a military 
coup of the Armed Forces against Goulart. The military network 
of IPES/IBAD, as well as officers be~onging to other groups, 
was cctively canvassed and operated in close co-operation with 
civilians, endorsing and reinforoing some of the political acti-
vities mentioned in earlier chapters. The action of IP~S/IBAD 
amongihe military was mainly directed towards involving a major-
ity of military officers in the popular mobilization against 
the government. The actual coup consisted of the deployment 
of military forces commanded by officers actively engaged in 
the conspiracy according to a ]2lan i'rhich.in real military terms 
amounted to no more than a giant simulated Har-game. 
Military operations as such were directed mainly towards the 
imprisonment of trade union and peasant "activists and the detentim 
of politicians, intellectuals and student leaders. 
IPES leaders were also in close contact with American 
officials.5 throughout their campaign and with the American 
government with a view to securing logistical support for the 
coup.6 
The organic elite was also involved in para-military action,? 
although they were most anxious not to be linked to any covert 
t ' 8 ac 10n groups. 
Furthermore, IPES/IBAD sought the support of national 
po1itical party figures and the governors of the key states of 
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sao Paulo, Hinas Gerais, Parana, Rio Grande do Sul and Guanabara. 
The governors of the states were instrumental in putting the 
police forces of their states at the disposal-of the civilian-
military movement against Goulart, a measure of the utmost impor-
tance in view of the strategic localization of the state militias 
in the urban areas, with fire-power, making them armies in 
their own right and special training to deal with civilians. 9 
In many respects, the state militias were much better equipped 
than the military themselves for direct intervention. The 
governors were also significant for the cover they could pro-
vide to the military subversive movement. Furthermore, the 
governors were important because in most cases they were 
national leaders of their respective parties, both expressing 
party pOl. icy and reinforcing partisan attitudes in favour of 
the civilian-military movement. Horeover, the governors were 
central figures in the aggregation of regional socio-
economic interests to the sectoral and class interests 
already represented in IPES. Last, but not least, their 
party machineries were key elements in the campaign of poli-
tical mobili ~ation which IPES launched through its Public 
Opinion group. 
The Presence of IPES!IBAD infue Armed Forces 
lPES/IBAD action within the Armed Forces aimed at 
neutralizing Goulart's popular dispositivo (backing, support, 
arrangement) and minimizing military support for socialist 
or populist policies. 
The organic eli te was also responsible for stimulating 
coup-favouring groups within the military. Their action was 
synchronized into a master plan, the scope of which the various 
components and participants were not always fully aware. This 
obviously meant the existence of insiders and outsiders, 
late-comers and core and, consequently, different levels of 
trust and involvement. 
The organic elite attempted to function as a co-ordinating 
uni t of the anti - Goulart and anti - popular campaign, mak-
ing factional conspiracies and lcosely connected movements 
10 
aware of' ,')ne another. It strove to place its men into 
the various factional conspiracies, subversive groups 
and civilian - military movements, in some cases 
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merely to keep~se1f informed of events, in other cases to contain 
and control these particular groups and in other cases even to co-
ordinate their efforts, securing the articula9ao of separate, though 
11 
congruent political actors. 
The offices of IPES sao Paulo, as well as those of IPES Rio 
provided discreet loci for civilian-military articulacoes.12 Many 
military officers, both those in reserve and on active duty reported 
regularly at IPES executive meetings, providing an important input 
of political assessment and information on the situation, as well as 
a steady flow of communication with the military throughout the length 
and breadth of the country.l) These contacts intensified towakds the 
end of 196). The presence of military personnel in these meetings 
was generally kept as little publicized as possible,14and in any 
case, many of the most active officers used code names for their 
contacts. The cover-up of these~nks was of vital necessity for 
the anti-popular movement led by entrepreneurs. 1S However, there 
was more systematic civilian-military interaction than that effected 
by the mere establishment of sporadic contacts or by family ties, 
very significant in a tightly knit kinship structure such as that 
of the Brazilian Armed Forces, where so many officers came from 
families with strong military background. IPES also established an 
action group which operated in the sector of Armed Forces and Intel-
ligence. This action group, operating in Rio and Sao Paulo under 
the name of the Conjunctural Survey Group and the Planning Unit, with 
sections in other capital cities, was responsible for the strategic 
preparationmd action~ the organic elite. As seen previously, it 
was General Golbery who was in charge of the general co-ordination 
of the Military and Intelligence operations of IPES, and his civilian-
military group was consulted on all military and political matters. 16 
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General Go1bery was not merely the national read of the sector in 
charge of strategic preparation of IPES, for which he had been hired 
by the entrepreneurs at the end of 1961.17 He also had a central 
role in the military campaign to oust Goulart from government, as 
the co-ordinator of the covert articulation between the various 
leaders of the movement.1S According to G1ycondePaiva, General 
Go1bery was the one who did the 'parte cerebral' (brain part) of 
the take-over. G1ycon de Paiva went as far as to stress that 'with-
out his work, the Revolution of March would not have been possible,.19 
The Conjunctura1 Survey Group was composed, as seen in Chapter V, 
by a large number of civilian activists, both in Rio and Sao Paulo, 
most of them entrepreneurs, whose activities were largely aimed at 
co-opting influential military officers for the movement against 
Goulart. 20 lPES leaders Herman de Moraes Barros, Teodoro Quartim 
Barbosa, Gastao Bueno Vidiga1, Octavio Marcondes Ferraz, and Adalberto 
Bueno Neto, as members of the Conjunctural Survey Group of Sao Paulo 
led by General Agostinho Cortes, and Gilbert Huber, Antonio Ga110tti, 
Harold C. Polland, G1ycon de Paiva and candido Guin1e de Paula 
Machado in Rio de Janeiro were extremely active in the articulation 
of the civilians with the military elements. 21 Especially important 
in these activities was Marcondes Ferraz, whose home was a centre 
of co-ordination and who synchronized his activities with those~ 
GeneralJosepinheiro de Ulhoa Cintra (son-in-law of former President 
General Dutra), General Cordeiro de Farias, General Menezes Cortes, 
General Jose Canavarro, Marshal Denys, Admiral Penna Boto, Brigadier 
Grun Moss and other high-ranking officers in active service and in 
the military reserve. Marcondes Ferraz was also a key figure in 
the political co-ordination of influential younger officers, such 
as the then Lieut. Col. Fernando Cerqueira Lima, Lieut. Col. Rubens 
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Resteel and Major Bozon. Other civilians who worked with Marcondes 
Ferraz in order to canvas support among the military were Julio de 
Mesquita Filho, the owner of 0 Estado de S~o Paulo newspaper; Herbert 
Levy, the UDN leader; Armando Falcao, the PSD leader; the influential 
lawyer and journalist Prudente de Moraes Neto, better known by his 
~ de plume Pedro Danta~and Eldino Brancante, of the American 
Chambers of Commerce of Sao paulo,22 all of whom had a most signifi-
cant participation in the campaign to oust Goulart from government. 23 
The civilian-military command also had an important stake in 
the creation of links within the military milieu for this purpose. 
One of the most active groups was led by E. Brancante, Adalberto 
Bueno Neto, Herbert Levy and Joao de Almeida Prado (of Banco de Sao 
Paulo s/A.) who were tireless in their links with the military. 
lPES leader Herman de Morais Barros recalled that it was through 
their 'skilfull and persistent work that a climate of friendship and 
trust was established' between civilians and tens of middle and lower 
rank officers, among which were Colonel Jose Thomas, Lieut. Col. 
Buitron, Colonel Erasmo D£as, Major Adalbert 0 , Major Geraldo Franco, 
Major Lauro Faria, Captain Herbis Franco, Major Ism~ 1 Armond, Lieut. 
Rui Machado, Lieut. Forjaz, Lieut. Queiroz, all of the lInd. Army. 
From the Air Force, they linked up with the commander of the IV Air 
Zone, Brigadier f1arcio de Souza e Melo and with Brigadier Roberto 
Brandini and Brigadier Paulo Vitor (one of the participants in the 
Jacareacanga revolt, with the then Col. Burnier and Col. Velloso) 
as well as with Air Force Colonel Luiz Maciel Filho, Col. Valente 
and Major Melo. In the Navy, they linked up with Commander Sa 
. 24 Bl.errenbach. 
On top of the civilian~tivists of lPES, General Golbery sur-
rounded himself with a group of young talented officers, among whom 
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were Captain Heitor de Aquino Ferreira, Lieut. Col. Gustavo Moraes 
Rego, Lieut. Col. Rubens Resteel, Lieut. Col. Joao Baptista Figueiredo 
(nephew of IPES leader Joao Baptista Leopoldo Figueiredo and brother 
of Lieut. Col. Diogo and Lieut. Col. Euclides), Major Leonidas Pires 
Gonoalves, Major Danilo Venturini, Major Octavio Medeiros, Colonel 
Ivan Perdigao and other military officers working in the state admini- I 
strati on or retired from~tive duty, such as Lieut. Col. Octavio Alves 
Velho and General Agostinho Cortes. 25 These young officers, who 
after 1964 occupied important posts in the military structure and 
in the public administration were of great significance in the cam-
paign co-ordinated by General Golbery against the government. 
From within the groups which surrounded General Golbery, it was 
Lieut. Col. Baptista Figueiredo who played an instrumental role in 
the leadership of a wide circle of middle-rank officers. These 
officers were part of the operational command of the coup campaign 
and allowed ESG general Jurandir Bizarria Mamede, an 'historical 
conspirator' and head of the General Staff and Command School of 
the Army - ECEME, to act as a true staff-chief of operations, by 
providing him with the necessary hierarchical and operational basis. 26 
These middle-rank officers were also functional in dismantling the 
government's dispositivo militar (military backing). They pressed 
and pushed their peers and senior officers into action against the 
Executive and infiltrated the political groups of lower echelons 
engaged in factional and limited anti-government 'conspiracies,.27 
Furthermore, these middle-rank officers provided the necessary 
support for the roving conspirator and trouble-shooter, General 
Cordeiro de Farias in his tenacious military-political articulation 
of the various factional conspiracies in·the 1st, IInd and IIIrd 
Army Regions. 
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The nucleus of these middle-rank officers was composed of, among 
others, Col. Edson de Figueiredo, Col. Ariel Pacca da Fonseca, Lieut. 
Col. Arnizaut de.Ma.tto~ Lieut. Col. Antonio Marques, Lieut. Col. Helio 
Galdino, Lieut. Col. Boaventura Cavalcanti (brother of Colonel Costa 
Cavalcalcanti), Lieut. Col. Heitor Caracas Linhares and Major Helio 
Mendes.28 These men were linked up with ESG colonel Mario Davi 
Andreazza, a personal friend of Colonel Baptista Figueiredo and with 
young General Arfonso de Albuquerque Lima, brother-in-law of IPES 
leader Jose Luiz Moreira de Souza and who was serving in the IIIrd 
Army.29 They also co-ordinated this action with General Ernesto 
Geisel and General Antonio Carlos Muricy, who were serving in key 
troop commands in Parana and Minas Gerais. 
As seen in chapters V and VII, many military officers were 
already working within the lPES/IBAD structure, some of them on a 
full-time basis. Furthermore, lPES/IBAD were 'able to constitute a 
powerful and widespread network of support within the Armed Forces, 
the so-called • lpesianos' and • Iba.dianos'. Among influential mili-
tary officers linked up with IPES, as anti-government activists and 
even as financial contributors were the following: 
General Pedro Geraldo de Almeida (former head of Quadros' Military 
Staff Office), General Agr!cola Bethlem)O (brother of the then 
Colonel Belfort Bethlem and of General Hugo Bethlem), General Jos~ 
de Campos Barros Goes, General Moacyr Gaya, General Arthur Levy, 
General Ademar de Queiroz, General Moziul Moreira Lima, General Luis 
A. Medeiros, General Fernando Meirelles Montagna, General Joao 
Batista Peixoto, General JaUl de Castro Pires, General carlos de 
Castro Torres, General Joao Batista Tubino, General Joao Funaro Bley, 
General Arist6bulo Codevilla Rocha, Gener~ Arthur Napoleao Montagna 
de Souza,31 General Silvio Walter Xavier, General Ernesto Geisel, 
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General Henrique Geisel,32 General Octavio Gomes de Abreu, General 
Adauto Esmeraldo,33 Brigadier Nelson Reynaldo de Carvalho, Brigadier 
Josino Maia de Assis, Brigadier Henrique Fleiuss,34 Brigadier Joao 
Eduardo Magalhaes Motta, Brigadier Paulo Emilio de Camara Ortegal, 
Major Brigadier Jeronimo Batista Bastos, Admiral MaurilioAugusto 
Silva,35 Admiral Milton Pereira Monteiro, Admiral Jose Claudio 
Beltrao Frederico, Admiral Amaury Costa Azevedo Osorio, Admiral 
Leoncio Martins, Commander Aniceto Cruz Santos, Colonel Jorge Augusto 
Vidal,36 Colonel Luiz Victor D'Arinos Silva, Colonel Walfrido J.A. 
de Azevedo, Colonel Haroldo Pereira Soares, Lieut. Col. Antonino 
Machado Doria, 37 and Major Hauricio Cibulares (head of Goulart's SUNAB 
and former assistant of General Juarez Tavora).38 
As seen from the group of officers mentioned above, military of 
the three services were working with IPES. Many of them had recently 
retired from active service. However, they were figures of prestige 
among -the military and their opinion carried weight. Many of these 
officers were, as expected, graduates of the Superior War College 
but other influential military who did not undergo training at the 
ESG were also part of the IPES/IBAD network, which included officers 
of all ranks, from four star generals to young lieutenants. Many 
of these officers were well-known opponents of Goulart's regime, 
being part of the group of colonels and majors who had released the 
anti-Vargas manifesto in 1954 and who were also members of Cruzada 
Democratica, the political grouping of centre-right military officers 
which disputed elections at the Clube Militar. Other officers, 
however, held key posts during the Goulart administration, and many 
of them were unsuspected of belonging to IPES/IBAD, or of being 
involved in active plotting against the government. 
It was not only under the cover of IPES that the organic elite 
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attempted to influence the Armed Forces. Retired military officers 
were hired and officers inactive service were engaged to influence 
officers in active duty and form a network of IBAD/ADEP military. 
The 'Ibadianos' were instrumental in establishing important cells 
throughout the Armed Forces and especially at the headquarters of 
the IVth Army Region and at the Superior War College. 39 Together 
with the lPES military they formed a formidable network of influence 
and a powerful group for action. The following high ranking officers 
were 'vanguard personnel' of the lPES/IBAD/AD~1? network:40 
General Nelson de Mello - former head of the Civilian Staff Office 
of president Kubtischek and Minister of War under Goulart41 
General Joao Segadas Vianna - former head of the DPC and Minister 
of War under Goulart, 
General Decio Palmeira Escobar - brother-in-law of General Pery 
Bevilacqua, who became commander of the lInd Army Region under 
Goulart, 
General Joao Gentil Barbato - head of the Department of Political 
Action of ADEP-Guanabara and secretary-general of IBAD for the 
states of ESplnto santo and Guanabara, 
General Joao Punaro Bley - secretary of IBAD-Minas Gerais, former 
interventor inEspiritoSanto and commander of the AD/I - Vila 
Militar garrison in 1962, as well as commanderin1963 of the 
4th Infantry Division in Belo Horizonte. 
General Victor Moreira Maia - representative of lBAD for the Central 
Region, wrote for lBAD's monthly A9~o Democratica, 
General Moziul Moreira Lima - secretary of lBAD-Sa-o Paulo, secretary 
of the regional directorship of the Partido Libertador in Sao 
Paulo and secretary of IPES Sao Paulo, 
General Estevao Taurino de Rezende - director of lBAD-Amazonas and 
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commander of the VIllth Military Region headquarters in Belem, 
state of Para. 
General Moniz de Aragao - secretary-general of ADEP-Guanabara and 
subsequently Head of Staff of General Castello Branco at the 
Ministry of the Army, 
General Mendes de Morais - secretary of ADEP-Guanabara and also a 
federal deputy for the.PSD, 
General Jose M. Ferreira Coelho - ADEP-Para, 
General Artur Teixeira Carvalho - IBAD-Maranruro, 
General Francisco de Assis Almeida e Souza - secretary of ADEP-Piaui, 
General Humberto Ferreira (Ellery or Helene) - treasurer ofIBAD-
Ceara and secretary of ADEP-Ceara, 
General Epaminondas Moncaro - IBAD-Bahia, 
General Ermelindo Ramos Filho - ADEP-Parana, 
General Pedro Paulo Vieira da Rosa - secretary of IBAD and ADEP in 
Santa Catarina, 
General Plinio Lohman de Figueiredo - IBAD-Rio Grande do Sul, 
General Walter M. Pereira de Andrade - Inspector Service of IBAD/ADEP, 
General Afonso Emilio - Inspection Service of lBAD/ADEP, 
General Antonio Faustino da Costa - Inspection Service of IBAD/ADEP, 
General Nemo Canavarro Lucas - IBAD/ADEP, 
General Ignacio de Freitas Rolim - one of the co-founders of IBAD, 
in charge of its funds, and former commander of the Ist Military 
Region, ESG lecturer, 
General Emilio Maurell Filho - sub-head of the General Staff of the 
Army and commander of the Ist Military Region, was attached to 
the Ministry of ~Tar in 1962, 
General Orlando Geisel - brother of General Henrique and General 
Ernesto, 
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General Moacyr Araujo Lopes - IBAD/ADEP, 
Brigadier Antonio Guedes Muniz - leader of the para-military Anti-
Communist Movement - MAC, and ADESG member, 
Brigadier Adil de Oliveira - MAC, involved in the investigations of 
the famous Galea·o Airport incident and commander of the IInd 
Air Force Region of Recife, 
Brigadier Ismar Brasil - former president of the Clube da Aeronautica, 
Brigadier Grum Moss - former minister of the Air Force with Janio 
Quadros, 
Colonel Jurandir Barbado - IBAD/ ADEP, 
Colonel Tem!stocles Trigueiro - director of ADEP-Amazonas, 
Colonel Adalberto Albuquerque Cavalcanti - director of IBAD-Amazonas, 
Colonel Cascais - in charge of IBAD-Amazonas, 
Colonel Arthur Frederico G. Kemp - IBAD-Para, 
Colonel Sabino Guimar~s - ADEP-Cear~, 
Colonel Murilo Borges Moreira - IBAD-Ceara, 
Colonel Carlos Almeida Naooimento - IBAD-Parana, 
Colonel Jurandir Palma Cabral - administrator.IBAD-Guanabara and head 
of the southern sector of ADEP, 
Colonel Osnelli Martinelli - IBAD-Guanabara, member of the Military 
College of Guanabara and head of the right-wing conspiratorial 
military faction LIDER. 
Colonel Ardovino Barbosa - IBAD-Guanabara and secretary of security 
of the state of Guanabara, 
Navy Commander Julio de Sa Bierrenbach - IBAD-Guanabara, 
Major Raimundo Cavalcanti da Silva - IBAD-Para, 
Captain T. Ramos Viana - IBAD-Guanabara, 
Lieut. Heitor de Aquino Ferreira.42 
As is obvious from this long list, some of the most influential 
figures of the Army in particular were within the IBAD/ADEP/IPES 
network. Many of them had under Goulart key troop commanding posi-
tions, but remained actively involved in the movement to oust the 
president. Again, as in the case of the 'Ipesianos', many of these 
officers were ESG graduates. 
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As part of the attempt to co-ordinate the various groupings, 
a Comando Geral Democratico (General Democratic Command), was formed 
within the Army, composed of middle-rank officers, ranging from 
majors to colonels. They monitored the activities of their own 
peers and those of lieutenants and captains. The General Command 
was centralized in Rio de Janeiro, co-ordinating the movement, gather-
ing information for the strategic preparation~r action. An important 
operation~ General Golbery's group in IPES was to convince a number 
of younger Army officers, mostly colonels and lieutenant colonels, 
to retire from~tive service, so that they could be placed in key 
positionsinin1ustryand communications and therefore penetrate the 
state administration, thus obtaining 'maximum infiltration into the 
present institutions of the Republic'. Consequently, the General 
Command handed down an order for all those involved to 'abstain from 
public debates or pronouncements ••• which would make their names 
known and become targets, thus harming the objectives of the movement,.43 
The officers involved in the IPES-guided campaign were constantly 
cushioned and shielded so as to enable them to reach key positions 
wi thin the Armed Forces as well. Every effort was made to remind these 
young officers against possible indisciplinary acts which might 
justify their displacement to geographical or administrative peri-
pheries. 
Once a network of 'Ipesianos' and 'Ibadianos' was organized, 
it served to collect a body of coherent and comprehensive political 
intelligence, especially regarding loyalties within the military 
establishment and in government enterprises and the public admini-
stration. Furthermore, it served to disseminate throughout the Armed 
Forces anonymous reports on political development, published by 
lPES.44 The political material and the dissemination of ideological 
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messages were aimed at middle-rank officers discrediting the govern-
ment and focusing upon an alleged 'communist takeover' of Brazil.45 
MOreover, lPES/IEAD intervened in the internal political and cul-
tural life of the military officers, by interfering in the elections 
of their influential debating institution, in particular the Clube 
Militar. by funding the campaign of the 'Ibadiano' General Magessi, 
who stood as candidate for the right-wing slate Cruzada Democratica46 
which congregated ESG and anti-communist officers. IPES/IBAD also 
exerted pressure on the officer corps by stimulating, as seen pre-
viously, close ideological and political rapport between the mili-
tary and the entrepreneurs, and through the media, preparing the 
climate for military intervention. However, the fundamental role 
IPES/IBAD was to play in the military sector was that of instrumenta-
lizing the Armed Forces and of leading a civilian-military movement 
. 47 that finally brought about the removal of president Goulart. 
The Political-Military Movements 
What has been regarded by some historians and political scien-
tists as separate political-military factional activities or as 
parallel actions48 which eventually ended up by joining together 
against a common enemy has to be qualified. Many of these actions 
were in fact connected movements in which the central figures were civ-
ilian and mili tary activists of lPES/IBAD. This is not to say that 
all the civilian-military factions were created or wholly directed 
by the lPES/IEAD leadership. In many cases, their medium and short 
range objectives and their tactics were congruent with those of the 
organic elite. In other cases, lPES/IEAD activists penetrated con-
stituted groups or stimulated existing ones to continue their action. 
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What can be said, though, is that the IPES/IBAD activists took part 
directly in most of the plotting and had a say in the affairs of 
many military factions. 
The several civilian-military movements which were identifiable and 
active in the early 1960s against the government of Goulart and the 
popular forces could be grouped, broadly speaking, into three encom-
passing tendencies which had national ramifications. These movements, 
centred in Rio and Sao Paulo concerned the lPESjESG cluster, to which 
were linked the 'hard-liners' and the 'historical conspirators', 
the 'right-wing extremists' and the 'traditionalists,.49 
The lPES!ESG cluster 
As seen earlier, the core of the ESG cluster was integrated in 
IPES/IBAD and its leading members overlapped with many among the 
lFES leadership and its activists.50 Accounts of the activities, 
the organization and the ideology of the lPESjESG cluster,have been 
produced already by students of Brazilian politics. I have also 
referred briefly in chapter III to such issues, so I will not 
pursue the matter beyond the points which have already been made 
about the lPES/ESG connection~5l I do however intend to single out 
some of its leading members. 
The ESG group within IEES, led by General Golbery, General 
Herrera and General Liberato, was linked to the wider movement which 
encompassed General Jurandir Bizarria Mamede, General Cordeiro de 
Farias, General Nelson de Mello, General Ademar de Queiroz, General 
Orlando Geisel, General Ernesto Geisel, General Augusto Cesar de 
Castro Moniz de Aragao, General Jose Pinqeiro de Ulhoa Cintra, 
GeneraJ. Idalio Sardenberg, General J oao Bina Hachado, General 
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Antonio Carlos da Silva Muricy, Colonel Heitor Caracas Linhares, 
Colonel Ariel Pacca da Fonseca, Colonel Lapiane, Colonel Ernani 
Ayrosa da Silva, Colonel Mario David Andreazza, Colonel Edson de 
Figueiredo, Lieut. Col. Walter Pires de Carvalho e Albuquerque of 
the Permanent Staff (Corpo permanente) of the Superior War College, 
Lieut. Col. Joao Baptista Figueiredo, Lieut. Col. Antonio Carlos 
de Andrade Serpa, Lieut. Col. Rubens Resteel, and Lieut. Col. Carlos 
de Meira Mattos.52 (Following the patterns of military organiza-
tional behaviour, many of these officers, especially those in active 
service,brought with themselves the allegiance of younger officers 
serving under their command or having done so in the past, thus 
effectively widening the military movement.) General Cordeiro de 
Farias, General Herrera and General Nelson de Mello were key figures 
in the co-ordination of the ESG cluster with other groups, mainly 
that of the 'historical conspirators', which included Admiral Heck, 
Marshal Denys, Admiral Pena Boto, Admiral Augusto R a d em a k e r, 
Brigadier Grun Moss, Admiral Melo Baptista, Admiral Vamp~ and 
Admiral Levi Aarao Reis. The lPESjESG generals were also the key 
links with other groups. 
General Cordeiro de Farias in particular had other important func-
tions within the general strategy of this group of officers. He 
was largely responsible for the disarticulation of Goulart's dis-
positivo in the lst Army and the neutralization~ its professional 
officers who were not indined to support a coup.53 General Cordeiro 
also carried out diversionary maneouvres. By appearing to be inten-
sely involved in the conspiracy, he attracted the attention of 
Goulart's security system, who then attempted to follow his steps. 
Surfacing unexpectedly in the most diverse cities, thanks tc the 
large support his group enjoyed, and contacting the most varied 
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conspiratorial factions, he was able to divert the attention of the 
government from the IPESjEsG civilian and military movement. 
A very crucial step was taken by the core of the IPES/ESG 
group, when they organized what was called the 'Informal General 
Staff' of the movement. The Informal General Staff was headed by 
General Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco, who had become an .IPES 
affiliate.54 The staff consisted of General Ernesto Geisel, General 
Ademar de Queiroz and General Golbery do Couto e Silva. General 
Ademar de Queiroz had been instrumental in bringing together General 
Castello Branco and the IPESjESG group of General Golbery, General 
Jurandir B. Mamede, General Heitor Herrera and General Ernesto 
Geisel.55 The purpose of this Informal General Staff was the con-
solidation of a network of military officers throughout Brazil and 
eventually, the co-ordination of the military move to oust Goulart. 
The Informal Staff was also to serve as a co-ordinating body which 
would ensure rapid simultaneous action and avoid partial and isolated 
actions by factions and groups or individuals which might run the 
risk of being easily crushed. 56 General Golbery, seconded by his 
long time friend General Herrera, exerted the functions of general 
co-ordination. The general staff of the military operation headed 
by General Castello Branco was finally enlarged by the integration 
of General Ernesto Geisel, GeneralUlhoa Cintra and General Mamede. 57 
It is in the parallel movements of extremists and traditional-
ists that the lPES/IBAD presence has not been obvious. Nevertheless, 
IPES/IBAD were decisively involved in the conspiracies and movements 
of the extremists and the traditionalists. 
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The Right-Wing Extremists 
The right-wing extremists were basically a fringe group with 
rabid anti-Communist and anti-populist positions, favouring conser-
vative industrial modernization, a point which they had in common 
with the mainstream of the anti-Goulart civilian.arid military movement. 
The figure who can be considered as representative of this trend was 
Moral Rearmament graduate Brigadier (then Colonel) Joao Paulo Moreira 
Burnier, who had headed the ill-fated Aragar<yas rebellion. His 
group consisted mainly of Air Force officers, with scattered contacts 
within the Army such as Colonel Jayme Portela,and to a lesser degree 
even in the Navy.58 They have been portrayed as isolated actors 
with circumstantial contacts with other groups, but evidence suggests 
otherwise. These officers were actually linked with some of the 
more aggressive associates of the Sao Paulo bTanch~ IPES and with 
Julio de Mesquita Filho, director of 0 Estado de Sao Paulo.59 
The group of paulista hard liners, who expounded a strong anti-
corruption and anti-Communist message was constituted, cccording to 
Roberto de Abreu Sodre,who was the UDN leader of Sao Paulo and pre-
sident of the state legislative assembly, by Lieut. Col. Resteel, 
Julio de Mesquita Filho, Ruy Mesquita, Brigadier Brandini, Flavio 
Galvao, Paulo Quartim Barbosa, Paulo Egydio Martins, Luiz Carlos 
Mesquita, Sergio Barbosa Ferrez and Herman de Moraes Barros among 
others. 60 Other civilians working with the right-wing extremists were 
Charles Herba, Luis Mendes Morais Neto, Roberto Sayao, Edmundo 
61 Wanderley and Fernando Wanderley. 
Together with Colonel Haroldo Velloso, Brigadier Burnier played an 
important role in the articulation of the conspiracy in the Air 
Force and as the organizer of the 'civilian resistance' of civil-
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military groups in Guanabara. He was the organizer of the civil-
military defence groups which guarded the Guanabara Palace (seat of 
the governor Carlos Lacerda), where many of the Guanabara based 
conspirators and known figures involved in the plotting and anti-
government activities took refuge on the day of the coup. Among 
them were ESG brigadier Eduardo Gomes, the Nabuco family, entre-
preneurs Demostenes Madureira de Pinho (Mesbla s/A, Olivetti S/A) 
and Mauricio Bebbiano, TV personality Flavio Cavalcanti and journa-
list Helio Fernindes,director of Lacerda's newspaper Tribuna da 
Imprensa. 62 
The Traditionalists 
Under this heading are included those officers who did not 
undergo ESG training and who were not part of. a socia~ political 
and economic proposal of change for Brazil, as elaborate and wide 
in scope as that of the IPEsjESG organic elite. They were against 
Communism, broadly defined, and wanted a halt to the politics of 
mobilization, rather than opposing populist attitudes themselves, 
of whose ideological and political fabric they were an integral 
part. The officers of this segment were no modernizers, but shared 
the conservatism of the lPES/IBAD and ESG group, hence their 'tradi-
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tionalism' • 
Two of these 'traditionalist' officers were in direct command 
of entire armies. Therefore, there was a basic need to engage 
their support for any military move against the government. There 
was also a need to keep a close watch over their political manoeuvres, 
so as to leep them in line with the IPEs/:rnAD campaign. 
One of these officers was General Justino Alves Bastos, commander 
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of the IVth Army, headquartered in Recife, which was responsible 
for the Northeastern and Northern regions of the country. The North-
east, as seen elsewhere, was a key region from a political point of 
view. Firm military support in the region was required by the 
IPES/ESG cluster to neutralize the Peasant Leagues, the rural trade 
unions and Governor Miguel Arraes and to contain them once the coup 
was unleashed. 
Therefore, General Bastos was soon drawn into the conspiratorial 
fold, and co-ordinated his efforts with the IPES/IBAD leadership 
after succeeding General Castello Branco in the command of the IVth 
Army. General Bastos, who took pride in calling himself the 
'hardest' of the hard-line officers,64 took as advisers for his 
military-political dispositivo some influential IBAD 'hidden acti-
vists'. These were ESG General Antonio Carlos da Silva Muricy, 
commander of the units in the state of Rio Grande do Norte, Colonel 
Helio Ibiapina and Colonel Antonio Bandeira, who was also General 
Bastos' head of intelligence,65 and who was strongly linked to the 
reactionary forces in Pernambuco. Aluisio Alves, governor of Rio 
Grande do Norte and business partner of IPES leader Jose Luiz 
Moreira de Souza, and Paulo Guerra, the vice-governor of Pernambuco, 
were also linked to IPES and lent their support to the military 
campaign against Goulart. The adhesion of Paulo Guerra, who was 
vice-governor to Miguel Arraes was especially significant for IPES, 
as it gave the organic elite a foothold in the governatorial palace. 66 
Other important military members of IBAD in Pernambuco were: General 
Antonio Sarmento, secretary general of ADEP for the Northeast, 
Colonel Astrogildo Correia, head of Promotion S.A. and one of the 
leaders of the pseudo-nationalist Frente'Patriotica Civil-Militar, 
Captain Emanuel Pereira Lima, IBAD executive secretary for Pernambuco~ 
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and Captain Atanasio, administrative manager of IBAD. 
The lPES/IBAD officers established an intelligence network which 
reported on the organization and action of the peasant leagues and 
trade unions. They were also significant in supporting the activi-
ties which IPES/IBAD developed in the northeast among the peasantry, 
the urban trade unions and the middle classes. But their main task 
was to immobilize resistance to the coup of March 1964, especially 
within the Armed Forces themselves, while the basic role of General 
Bastos' army throughout the campaign was to keep a watchful eye on 
regional developments and to perform a police function during the 
outbreak of the coup, neutralizing the peasant leagues, the Communist 
Party and Miguel Arraes. 67 
The other traditionalist officer in command of a regional 
army was the former Minister of War, General Amaury Kruel, ~ho was 
in charge of the powerful lInd Army, responsible for the key state 
of Sao Paulo and adjacent areas. General Amaury Kruel was the brother 
of General Riograndino, who was himself connected, from the very 
early stages of the movement against Goulart, with General Cordeiro 
de Farias and General Golbery in their activities in the south of 
the country. General Riograndino, together with his: nephew, Major 
Vinicius Kruel, were link-men between the Ist and lInd Army and 
the G.eneral Command headquarters in Rio. 68 
General Amaury Kruel has been reported as being a 'reluctant but 
crucial last minute adherent to the revolution of 1964',69 on account 
of his purported friendship with Goulart. However, according to 
a CIA report filed in Rio de Janeiro as early as f1arch 1963, General 
Kruel's position was otherwise. In fact, the report read that, as 
of March 13, 1963, a group of military leaders who were already 
plotting, directed by General Nelson de Hello, General Kruel (Who 
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was then the Minister of War under President Goulart), Marshal Denys, 
Marshal Dutra and Admiral Heck planned to meet in petropolis,70 to 
discuss plans for a coup against the government of President Goulart. 7l 
To this group of conspirators was attached General Olympio Mourao 
Filho,72 whose 'conspiracy' shall be examined in greater detail later 
in this chapter. These 'conversations' in petr6polis served to iron 
out the differences between the various groups and were instrumental 
in bringing an understanding between ESG activists and hard-liners, 
right-wing extremists and traditionalists, under the aegis of General 
Golbery, who was a key figure in their articulation. 7) 
A third outspoken~aditionalist officer in command of troops 
was General Olympio Mourao Filho, who carried out what seemed a 
personalized campaign against the government of Jo~ Goulart and 
who actually launched the coup of March 1964. General Mourao, a 
troupier, who showed contempt for the ESG, was the personification 
of the most unlikely military element to have been linked up by 
IPES/IBAD. However, General Mour.ao was in the mainstream of events 
and to a large extent, in spite of himself. General 140urao was 
connected by and integrated (articulado) with IPES/IBAD activists 
and leaders from the very early stages of his activities against 
the government. Nevertheless, as it appears from his recent memoirs 
and those of General Carlos Luis Guedes, his fellow-plotter and co-
launcher of the coup of March 1964, General Mourao rather surprisingly 
seemed to be quite unaware of the extent of this connection with the 
IPES/IBAD net'olork, which in Effect ran through the very fabric of 
his 'conspiracy', 'l'Thich he dubbed the 'greatest in the Americas' • 
General Mourao, who came to symbolize the troupiers in action, had 
been under careful surveillance by IPES/tBAD activists. In fact, it 
could even be said that his 'movement' had been nursed throughout 
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its development by the IPES/IBAD leadership. Yet only on a couple 
of occasions did General Mourao acknowledge formal contacts with 
IPES/IBAD elements, and was discouraged by' the contacts. Little 
did he seem to know, or at least acknowledge, that the network of 
civilians and military which he came into contact with in Rio Grande 
do Sul, Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais, - states where he held commis-
sions throughout the 1961-1964 period - was composed of IPES/IBAD 
affiliates and activists. 74 Moreover, it seems that he did not 
realize that the contacts he made in these states and also in the 
frequent trips to Rio de Janeiro, as well as the organized network 
he encountered in Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais and of which he became 
ostensible commander were inlact the structures mounted and co-
ordinated by the Action Groups of IPES/IBAD, and in particular by 
the Grupo de levantamento da Conjuntura under the over-all co-ordina-
tion of the Informal General Staff. Despite General MOur~o's lack 
of acknowledgement of the presence of IPES/IBAD leaders and activists 
within the organization and conspiratorial campaign he attempted to 
direct, it is worth noting that in all his central activities and 
those of General Guedes (both of which shall be considered in 
the following pages), the organic elite was a central part of the 
process. 75 
General Olympio r~ourao Filho' s 'greatest conspiracy in the Americas' 
There are two distinct phases in General Mourao's conspiratorial 
activities. One encompasses his experience in Rio Grande do Sul, 
where he was posted in 1961-1962. The other phase begins with his 
transfer to Sao Paulo in March 1963 and ends with General Mourao 
actually launching the coup, in March' 1964, out of Minas Gerais, to 
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where he had been transferred in August 1963. While in Rio Grande 
do Sul, General Mourao had been used, in very limited terms, by the 
anti-Goulart plotters. The impression one gets from his memoirs 
is that General Olympio Mourao while stationed in Rio Grande do Sul 
did not participate in the key manoeuvres of the lPES/IBAD anti-
Goulart campaign. He was initially sounded out about his positions 
and mistrusted by fellow conspirators, on~count of his flamboyant 
style 'and Pattonesque attitudes. General Mourao was· eventually 
tolerated as an active conspirator on account of his commission in 
the IIIrd Army, where he was useful to the plotters and subsequently 
even encouraged in his activities as an element of disruption 
against the executive's dispositivo militar in Rio Grande do Sul. 
His activities were also encouraged in so far as they drew the atten-
tion of the government's intelligence network upon himself, thus 
allowing a certain ease of operation for other individuals in Rio, 
Sao Paulo and Belo Horizonte. General Mourao established contacts 
with other high-ranking officers in the cities of Rio de Janeiro 
and Sao Paulo. In these contacts General Mourao was much more the 
informer of his own~tivities than the recipient of information 
about any structured movement against Goulart. The high-ranking 
officers he met kept their positions and information about their 
activities pretty much to themselves. 
Furthermore, the main efforts of the IPES/IBAD plotters were centred 
in Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Guanabara and Minas Gerais, which 
were areas of operation of the 1st and lInd Armies. Although the 
IIIrd Army was the biggest in numbers and fire power because of its 
frontier location with Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay, it had less 
political weight than the 1st or the lInd Army, to which the IPES/IBAD 
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campaign was chiefly directed. The IIIrd Army was also headquartered 
in Rio Grande do Sul, the political power base of the Vargas family, 
Goulart and Brizzola, and this constrained subversive activities 
against the incumbent PTE government. 
Towards the end of 1961 General Mourao was commander of the 
3rd Regiment of Infantry, in Santa Maria, Rio Grande do Sul. The 
commander of the IIIrd Army was then IBAD-linked General Nestor Penha 
Brasil, who was the brother-in-law of General Justino Alves Bastos.?6 
In December 1961, General Mourao received a cable from General Penha 
Brasil, asking him to house and provide facilities for about 400 
members of FARSUL, the powerful Federation of Rural Associations of 
Rio Grande do Su1, who were coming to Santa Maria for a political 
meeting of their organization. (By then IPESUL, the IPES of Rio 
Grande do Sul, was already acting as the political umbrella of the 
various entrepreneurial associations of Rio Grande do Sul.) After 
the convention, which took place at the beginning of January 1962, 
General Mourao, who had been actively canvassed by the FARSUL members, 
had his first conspiratorial talks with General Ramao Mena Barreto, 
his Chief of Staff. General Hena Barreto advised General Mourao to 
get in touch with the Minister of War, IBAD-linked General Joao 
segadas Viana.?? 
A few days later, General Mourao went to Porto Alegre, headquarters 
of the IIIrd Army and asked General penha Brasil to arrange a meet-
ing with Saint Pastoux, president of FARSUL, for mid-January. Accord-
ing to General Mourao, General Penha Brasil was by then 'more aware' 
than he had been of the problems facing the country, thus the support 
General Brasil had been giving to FARSUL.?8 
General Mourao discussed with Pastou:;< and" General Penha Brasil the 
lines of action for a struggle against the government. It was agreed 
616 
that they needed' to work in phases. The first phase would last up 
to the legislative elections of 1962 which had to be won, securing 
the election of as many favourable deputies as possible as well as 
mobilizing other forces against the government. Commerce and industry 
had to mobilize the financial resources to support on the one hand 
the elections and on the other the counter-revolutionary movement 
and accordingly a financial committee had to be established. The 
military personnel would be in charge of the articulations in the 
field of military operations proper. The tactics agreed upon between 
IBAD General Penha Brasil, General Mourao and Pastoux, not surpris-
ingly, befitted the lines of action of lPES/IBAD. 79 According to 
General Mourao Filho, the meeting he had with Pastoux and General 
Penha Brasil was 'the first civil-military reunion, the beginning 
of the conspiracy against the Government of Joao GOulart,.80 
Little did he know that other forces were at work. In November 
1961, a meeting bad taken place at the Edificio Avenida Central, 
headquarters o~ IPES-Rio, where General Golbery's Army and Intel-
ligence network functioned in 4 out of the 13 offices rented by the 
, l't 81 organ~c e ~ e. 
From SaNo Paulo Herman de Horais Barros, General Reinaldo 
Saldanha da Gama and Am~rico Oswaldo Campiglia came to this meeting. 82 
The meeting was presided over by Admiral Silvio Heck, and as sec-
retary acted Carlos Eduardo D'Alamo lousada (who subsequently acted 
as link-man to General Emilio Garrastazu Medici, who by 1964 was 
the commander of the t1ilitary Academy of Agulhas Negras-ANAN). In 
this meeting the need to topple the government was discussed. 
However, in order to avoid a similar fiasco as in 1961, there was 
a unanimous opinion that without unequivocal manifestations of 
public opinion, the Armed Forces would not feel authorized to 
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interven&.j3 This was a central point in General Golbery's argument 
for military mobilization against the government and regime, ever 
since the failure of the preventive coup against Goulart's assump-
tion of office, which had cost the former his military career. 84 
The mobilization of public opinion in every sector of the population 
was a task left to the co-ordination of IPES, which it did, and 
quite efficiently in some case~as described in the previous chapters. 
Immediately after this encounter in Rio, the Paulistas'repre-
sentatives met with Julio de Mesquita Filho, owner of 0 Estado de 
Sao Paulo, and with Antonio Carlos Pacheco e Silva, Octavio Marcondes 
Ferraz, Teodoro Quartim Barbosa, Luiz Antonio da Gama e Silva, Paulo 
de Almeida Barbosa, Rafael Noschese and Waldemar Ferreira, those 
comprising the militant leadership of !PES Sao Paulo. Furthermore, 
they also secured the support of Francisco Mesquita, Herbert Levy, 
Senator Joao Arruda and many others. 85 IPES leaders Teodoro Quartim 
Barbosa and Gastao Bueno Vidigal were later to be singled out by 
entrepreneur Paulo Egydio Martins,86 an associate of lPES leader 
Alberto Byngton, as the civilian leadership of the subversive entre-
preneurial-military movement to which he himself was linked. 17 
Moreover, officers of the Armed Forces, representing the 'historical 
conspirators' Admiral Heck, Marshal Denys and Brigadier Grun Moss 
went to Sao Paulo and met with Julio de Mesquita Filho and presented 
him with a document in which they expounded their views on the norms 
that should eventually guide the future government to be installed 
by the Armed Forces after Goulart had been ousted. 88 This group 
of right-wing officers which comprised also General Cordeiro de 
Farias, General Nelson de Mello, General Jose Pinheiro de Ulhoa 
Cintra, General Punaro Bley and General 'Orlando Geisel among others, 
had in mind that 'a discretionary regime' would have to be installe~ 
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at least for five years.19 
In this period and throughout these meetings, the IPES/IBAD activi-
sts and their fellow 'historical conspirators' and ESG officers 
had begun the active preparation of the civilian-military movement 
to oust Goulart. 
IPES leader Herman de Morais Barros and his companions set up 
a 'revolutionary committee', which was then articulated with the 
movement which was being co-ordinated among the military by General 
Cordeiro de Farias in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo under the general 
supervision of General Golbery. Herman de Morais Barros together 
wit h Colon e 1 Cid Osorio and lieut. Col. Rubens Resteel, as a 
result of .' meeting held in the house of IPES leader Paulo Quartim 
Barbosa, constituted a General Civilian-Military Staff which would 
take care of the planning for the mobilization of Sao Paulo. Decision-
making was left in the hands of a team composed of Julio de Mesquita 
Filho, Octavio Marcondes Ferraz, Teodoro Quartim Barbosa and Antonio 
Carlos Pacheco e Silva. This General Staff had several tasks: to 
formulate a line of action for the realization of successive operations; 
to raise financial resources necessary for the conspiratorial campaign; 
and to co-ordinate the industrial mobilization necessary to its 
fulfilment. 
The General Staff was structured and composed as follows: 
Togistics: J oaNo Soares do Amaral Neto (!PES Sao Paulo); Colonel 
Pecanha (II Army); Vitorio Ferraz (IPES Sao Paulo); Paulo Egydio 
Martins fIPES-linked leader of ADCE); and Roscio Castro Prado. 
Actions: General Ivanhoe Goncalves Martins (known by his code name 
of 'Dr Ivan Teixeira' supposedly a doctor of UNESCO and personal 
representative of General Cordeiro de'Farias, whose codename for 
these operations was 'Jardim')j90 General Sousa Carvalho (IPES); 
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and Silvio Toledo Piza (IPES Sao Paulo). 
Promotion and Propaganda: Andre de Faria Pereira Filho (linked to 
IPES Sao Paulo) and Flavio Galvao (IPES Sao Paulo). 
Information (Intelligence): General Agostinho Cortes (IPES Sa~ Paulo), 
who also co-ordinated the action of civilian organizations. 
Executive: Herman de Morais Barros (IPES Sa~ Paulo), Daniel Machado 
de Campos (IPES Sao Paulo) and Gustavo Borghoff (IPES Sao Paulo)91 
On the financial side, IPES leaders and bankers Herman de Morais 
Barros, of Banco Ita&, Gastao Eduardo Bueno Vidigal, of Banco Mercan-
til de sero Paulo and Aloysio Ramalho Foz, of the Banco do Estado de 
Sao Paulo secured the financial help of the other banks of Sao Paulo. 
Significant contributions came from other sources as well, thanks to 
the work of among others Antonio Candido Gomes, Marcelo Amaral and 
Jos~ de Souza Queiroz Filho, of lPES Sao Paulo. 92 
lPES leader Herman de Morais Barros also linked Adhemar de 
Barros, the governor of Sao Paulo and leader of the PSP, to the IPES-
led movement. Morais Barros had even made the condition of his 
participation in the formation of a 'revolutionary committee' that 
this body should be acceptable to Adhemar de Barros, who was also 
connected through Ruy Mesquita. 93 The co-operation of the governor 
of Sao Paulo was sensibly seen as essential, fundamentally in the 
sector of Public Security, for which General Aldevio Barbosa de 
Lemos was responsible as Security Secretary for Sao Paulo. After 
all, Governor de Barros had at his disposal in Sao Paulo alone a 
For2a PUblica (militarized police) of 15,000 men and a Guarda Civil 
of 10,000 strong, which equalled the number of soldiers in the whole 
of the lInd Army. It is interesting to note that it was General 
Aldevio who organized the bugging of Goul~rt's phone calls into Sa~o 
Paulo. 94 Moreover, it was to be in the office of the Security 
i 
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secretary that the IFES-sponsored Rede da Democracia, the centre of 
the network of radio stations co-ordinated by the Public Opinion 
group of IPES, was installed, under the supervision of General 
Aldevio Barbosa de Lemos himself, who was by then working in co-
ordination with the civilian and military General Staff organized 
by IPES in Sao paulo. 95 
By the time General Mourc(o began 'his conspiracy', the IPES/ 
IBAD network was fully operational. Nevertheless, little did he 
seem to know about it, although this was the structure he would 
encounter in Sao Paulo and even 'lead'. After this brief and 
necessary excursus, the story of General Moura()'s 'conspiracy' can 
be taken up again. 
By the beginning of 1962, General Mourao was contacted by 
journalist Tadeu Onar, who himself had connections with the entre-
preneurs of Porto Alegre, where IPESUL was headquartered. Onar 
became an important link-man for General Mourao Filho. It was through 
him that General Mourc(o had connections with Coelho de Souza, of the 
Liberator Party of Rio Grande do Sul. Onar was also General Mourao's 
contact with IPES leader Edmundo Monteiro, a key figure in staging 
General Mourao' s frequent trips. Honteiro was the one who fixed 
airline facilities for General Mouroro to travel at ease in pursuit 
of his conspiracy. 
By the end of Janauary 1962 General Ir1oura~o went to sao Paulo. 
There he was to have a meeting with 'a group of important men of 
industry', which was organized by IPES leaders Edmundo Monteiro and 
Othon Barcellos Correia. The meeting took place in a house which 
he candidly admitted not 'knowing where it was', A large number of 
entrepreneurs were present, among whom he recognized IPES leader 
Joao Baptista Leopoldo Figueiredo. 96 
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From Sao Paulo, General Mourao went to Rio de Janeiro, where he 
spoke to the Hinis ter of ~-iar, !BAD General J oao Segadas Viana. 
General Mourao also had contacts with Admiral H&ck, Marshal Denys 
and General Cordeiro de Farias about his conspiratorial endeavours. 
Both in the Sao Paulo and Rio encounters, General Mourao was left 
with the impression that not much was going on in terms of active 
plotting against the president. General Mourao was at this stage 
obviously mistrusted politically and on sheer operational grounds, 
to the extent of even being considered by some as an agent provoca-
teur of Goulart. In any case, General Mour.ao was left inthedark 
with regard to any deep-seated movement organized by the IPES/IBAD 
leadership. General Mourao's diary still records another passage 
through Sao Paulo in March 1962. There he met General Nelson de 
Mello, who by then was a leading figure of the IPES/IBAD/ESG plotting. 
General Mourao informed. him of his connections in the south. General 
Nelson de Mello's uncommitted remark, not surprisingly, was that 
they both were 'in the same boat,.97 
After the conversations with the entrepreneurs in Sao Paulo 
and his contacts with the military leaders in Rio, General Mourao 
returned to Porto Alegre where he was kept busy attempting to tighten 
up his network of coup-supporting officers. General Mourao's Revo-
lutionary General Staff during his stay in Rio Grande do SuI was 
composed of young officers, the then Colonel Ramao Mena Barreto 
(head of staff), Lieut. Col. Athos Teixeira, Lieut. Col. Paulo 
Braga (brother of Parana Governor and conspirator Colonel Nei Braga), 
Lieut. Col. Xavier, Lieut. Col. Ivan (General Mourao's nephew) and 
Lieut. Col. Freitas.9~ 
Obviously the military figures within the IIIrd Army Hho carried 
political weight and personal prestige within the Armed Forces, and 
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who were in command of key positioned troops, such as General Poppe 
de Figueiredo, General Hugo GarrastazU, General Ernesto Geisel (who 
was working closely with Governor Nei Braga), General Alvaro Tavares 
do Carmo, General Adalberto dos Santos, General Cunha Garcia, General 
Mendes Pereira, General Jair Acioly Borges,_General Franklin Rodrigue~ 
de Morais and many other high-ranking officers were not part of his 
staff, although General Mourao kept in contact with them. 99 These 
officers were linked with colleagues in Rio and Sao Paulo, being part 
at that time of the network of plotting cells operating together 
with the Sao Paulo and Rio civilian-military staffs described above. 
Contacts with IPES leaders were frequent throughout 1962, 
especially with Edmundo Monteiro and Othon Barcellos corxeia. In 
June 1962, General Mourao had a meeting with lPES leader Edmundo 
Monteiro and with Assis Chateaubriand, the owner of the Diarios 
Associados media complex, whom. he asked for support of the centre-
right political forces in the coming October elections. General 
Mour~o also had a conversation with IPES leader Othon Barcellos 
Correia, who promised financial support for action in the Northeast, 
an area whose political situation deeply worried the military officer. 100 
Helped by Onar, who developed an important work of articula-
tion between military and civilians during two years, General j·1ourao 
connected himself with the president of the Federation of Commercial 
Associations. General l1ourao was also connected with PSD politician 
and entrepreneur Ildo Heneghetti,lOl the IPES/IBAD supported candi-
date to the governorship of Rio Grande do Sul and with Federal 
Deputy Colonel Peracchi Barcellos, also linked to IBAD. I02 
Back in Santa Maria, site of an important Air Force base and the 
centre of a network of army units, General Nourao linked up Hi th the 
prefect of the city, Miguel Sevi Vieira and with the Bishop, Dom 
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Vitor Jose Sartori, by whom he was invited to a meeting in his home. 
This encounter, which took place in September 1962 proved to be 
significant ,for the influential TIES-linked Senator 11em de Sa:' (PL) 
and Senator Daniel Krieger (UDN), as well as the Federal Deputy 
Barcellos (PSD) and entrepreneur and PSD Federal Deputy Tarso Dutra103 
were present. Also p:resent were Sevi Vieira and lawyer J oao Dentice, 
secretary of the electoral campaign of Neneghetti (who by then was 
involved with IPESUL and FARSUL). This meeting, coming, as it did, 
one month before the Congressional elections of October 1962 served 
to bring together and co-ordinate the action of major political 
figures of the Rio Grande do Sul anti-populist and anti-PTB coalition 
l~ 
who had operated as a 'democratic front' for almost 10 years. 
Following the norm that money should not be put directly in the hands 
of the candidates by the IPES/IBAD leadership, General Mourao was 
provided by IPES leader Othon Barcellos with 30 million cruzeiros 
to be used in the campaign for the Congressional and governatorial 
elections of October 1962.105 
In November 1962, General 110urao went to Rio, re-establishing 
his contacts with General Nelson de l1ello, Marshal Denys, General 
Cordeiro de Farias and Admiral Heck. I'Then in Rio, he went to Petro-
polis, one of the centres for co-ordination of the ESG/IPES hard-
line military movement. There, General Mourao met BSG GeneralAffonso 
, 
de Albuquerque Lima, a hard-liner, who was in the house of IY~S 
leader Jose Luiz Moreira de Souza, his brother-in-law. General 
Mourao also had a meeting at the home of General Segadas Yiana, 
where he met General Nelson de Mello and General Penha Brasil. 106 
Nothing spectacular came out of these encounters. General .t1ourao 
kept these officers informed of his activities, but was not made 
aware of their own military movement against Goulart. His trips 
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continued rather unobtrusively on a regular basis until February of 
the next year. l07 
Then suddently, in March 1963, General Mourao was transferred 
to Sao Paulo, appointed to the command of an important army post, 
the 2nd l1ilitary Region of the lInd A:rmy, substituting ESG General 
Lyra Tavares, and consequently thrust in the centre of the entre-
preneurial-military movement. For the lPES/ESG group, the best 
had to be made from an unexpected situation. General Hourao had 
acknowledged qualities. He was described as a dynamo, whose energy 
had to be harnessed and put to good use, as well as taking advantage 
of his new commission for the cover-up of IPES-centred articulations 
within the military in Sao Paulo. On the other hand, his impulsive 
character and his views , quite out of step with the IPESjESG complex, 
had to be neutralized. Furthermore, and as a side effect, the atten-
tions o£ the government would, from now on be'focussed upon the 
activities o£ General Hourao in Sao Paulo, all01fing others to 
operate at ease. It so seems that General Plourao became, somewhat 
involuntarily, part of a diversionary manoeuvre.108 In this respect 
he accomplished, in spite of himself, what others such as General 
Cordeiro were attempting, namely, to draw attention on himself 
leaving free fellow activists. l09 
General Hourao was to be allowed an active and effective conspira-
torial role in so far as he contributed to the general effort of 
stirring up anti-government feelings among the military and did 
not damage the main thrust of the entrepreneUIial military movement. 
His activities, therefore, had to be t i g h t 1 Y m 0 nit 0 red 
by IPES. 
Suggestions for the formation of General Nourao's general 
sta£f began to pour in as soon as he was on his way to Sao Paulo. 
ESG General Lyra Tavares, a member of the General sta£f of General 
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Peri Bevilacqua who was then commander of the lInd Army, suggested 
that l1ourao appoint Cavalry Colonel Ramiro Tavares, who was to become 
head of his military conspiratorial staff. 110 It was also suggested 
to General Mourao that he take on ~~jor Figueiredo, the younger 
brother of Lieut. Col. Joao Baptista Figueiredo, who belonged to 
General Golbery's team and who was a nephew of Joao Baptista Leopoldo 
Figueiredo, the president of IPES-Sao Paulo. At the end of f1arch 
1963, General Mour~o requested that ~~jor Figueiredo become his 
'assistant secretary'. The circle around General Hourao was tight-
III 
ened. 
This control went even further. Soon after his arrival in 
Sao Paulo, General Hourci'o was invited to the house of Antenor Edmundo 
Horta, a mineiro public figure of the small town of Diamantina _ 
(birth-place of General Mourao and Juscelino Kubitschek), where he 
was again put in contact with prominent £aulista entrepreneurs and 
military. Among those present were Bldino da Fonseca Brancante, of 
the American Chambers of Commerce (who according to General 11ourao 
'lent immense services to the conspiracy of Sao Paulo'), Brigadier 
Neto dos Reis, Salvio de Almeida Prado, Jorge Alves Lima, ~ugenio 
dos Santos Neves and Ernani Bessa. 1l2 General Mourao was being 
'co-ordinated I with the centre of the IPES/SSG m 0 ve men t • 
Hewa s also placed in contact with Reserve General Sebastiab 
Dalisio r':enna Barreto, who was linked to the General Staff of the 
Sao Paulo IPES entrepreneurs and military, heading a section of 
the civilian-military movement. General Menna Barreto, an old hand 
in conspiratorial and political affairs, since his days of the 1932 
paulista revolt and a former chief of the Department of Public 
Securi ty of Sao Paulo, soon became General Hourao I s head of what the 
latter thought was a newly mounted civilian-military conspiratorial 
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staff, but which had already been structured by General Henna 
Barreto as part of the General Staff formed in November 1961 and 
described earlier on .113 Although General Mourao became the osten-
sible head of a civilian-military conspiracy, General Menna Barreto 
was the effective surrogate of the former on matters related to his 
sector of the civilian-military movement. The fact that the movement 
was basically a civilian-military one was highlighted by the struc-
ture for action of General Menna Barreto's staf~ by the selected 
fields of operation and by the operations themselves. 
The structure for action under General Menna Barreto's direct 
command, which drew on the material and human resources of the Sao 
Paulo based Action and Study Groups of IPES, comprised four action 
sectors. These action sectors, which encapsulated the pattern of 
action of IPES, were the Departments of Psychological Preparation 
of the Masses, Intelligence, ~1obilization and Finance. The Depart-
ment of Psychological Preparation of the Masses comprised the follow-
ing SUb-sections: a) Press, b) Radio, c) Television, d) Propaganda 
(billboards, production and release of manifestos, leaflets and 
pamphlets) and e) female organizations. The Department of Intelli-
gence had the following SUb-sections: a) intelligence gathering, 
b) counter-intelligence, c) sabotage. The Department of Mobilization 
was divided into four sub-sections: a) mobilization proper, b) organi-
zation, c) command and d) transport. Operations in the Department 
of Mobilization were carried out by the Group of Special Agents, 
responsible for liaisonmd special transport. 114 During the coup 
itself, social clubs and class associations served as headquarters 
for communication and mobilization. The centre for special trans-
port was established at the IPES-sponsored School for Democratic 
!,eadership, organized by IPES leader Paulo Quartim and under the 
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direction of Frederico Abranches Viotti, which as shall be seen, had 
other functions as well. 115 
Material and financial support was provided by IPES leaders Fernando 
Lee and Juan C. Llerena. Furthermore, executives of the Federation 
of Industries of Sao Paulo and the Federation of Industries of Minas 
Gerais, who were integrated in IPES Sao Paulo and IPES Belo Horizonte, 
had collected one and a half billion cruzeiros (over a million dollars) 
for the cause, as well as supplying vast amounts of food, clothing 
and transportation for the military forces. 116 
General Menna Barreto co-ordinated his activities with General 
Reynaldo Saldanha da Gama, who was heading another section of the 
civilian-military movement and leading an armed group of 80 selected 
men. (General Reynaldo Saldanha da Gama was one of the three paulista 
representatives at the November 1961 meeting in Rio with Admiral 
Heck, described earlier on. General Nenna Barreto's civilian-
military$aff was directly connected to Admiral Heck through Carlos 
D'Alarno louzada.) Among the activists involved in the section~d 
by General Saldanha da Gama were Colonel Armando de Figueiredo; Dr. 
Paulo Murgel; Benedito Lobo Rosa, vice-president of the American 
Chambers of Commerce of Sao Paulo, who headed a unit specifically 
engaged in operations of a mobilizational purpose and in psycholo-
gical warfare; Nemesio Bailao, the personal medical doctor of Gover-
nor Adhemar de Barros' family; Andre Telles de Hattos (who represented 
the Sao Paulo based Institute of Engineering)t Herman Fickel, a 
former officer in the Navy Police; Werner Golts; Joao Ravache and 
a number of student and Catholic workers' leaders belonging to the 
groups and organizations described in the previous chapter. 117General 
Menna Barreto's civilian-military staff was co-ordinated by General 
souza Carvalho, who, besides leading a group of civilians and a 
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contingent of FEB reserve officers, was also one of the co-leaders 
of the sector of Actions of the IP~S-led General Civilian-}ulitary 
Staff formed in the wake of the November 1961 meeting in Rio with 
119 the IPES leaders. 
Furthermore, the civilian-military staff of General Dalisio 
Menna Barreto was supported by other action units, which were led 
by Federal Deputy Juvenal Sayao, Paulo Cardoso de Hello, Eldino 
Brancante, B. M. Lobo Rosa, Paulo Yazbek and Antonio Vicente de 
Azevedo (whose home had turned into what Brancante called an anti-
c~mara conspiratoria (conspiratorial ante-chamber). 
Deputy Juvenal Sayao had been involve~ through Alberto Badra, a 
director of the 110nte L1bano social club and a relative of IPES-
sponsored Federal Deputy Aniz Badra. In Sayao's action unit parti-
cipated IPES leaders Ernesto Leme and Luiz Antonio da Gama e Silva. 
From their group came the 'suggestion' made to General Mourao that 
General Reynaldo Saldanha da Gama (who participated secretly in 
Brancante's group) should become the commander of the Civil Guard 
which would co-ordinate the civilians and provide police protection 
to the conspirators. Through IPES leader Luiz Antonio da Gama e 
Silva another request Has forwarded to Governor Adhemar de Barros 
for Juvenal Sayao to become part of the Department of Political 
and Social Order - DOPS, so as to control the movement of the adver-
saries and safeguard the Plotters. 119 
Paulo Cardoso de Mello publicized the movement and was in charge 
. of W'ri ting up pamphlets and leaflets. He was also a source of finance , 
together with Antenor Horta, for the purchase of arms. The civilian-
military staff also secured the co-operation of Desembargador persival 
de Olive ira, \-Tho was not a member of the·. Civilian Staff, and that 
of his son-in-law Ricardo Capote Valente, who worked closely with 
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General Dalisio Menna Barreto. 120 
The leadership and operational support for the activities in 
the sector of Armed Forces and Intelligence came from IFES General 
Agostinho Cortes, who was connected with officers in active service. 
General Agostinho Cortes co-ordinated the military side of the actim, 
through his Conjunctural Survey Group. An outstanding activist in 
this sector was Lieut. Col. Resteel, who in collaboration with General 
Nelson de Hello and General Agostinho Cortes was organizing the sub-
versive movement within the IInd Army. 
General Agostinho Cortes was also involved in the field of 'public 
opinion', i.e., the organization, co-ordination and stimulus to the 
parallel action of shock-troops, geared towards bullying tactics 
against labour-left students, trade union leaders and activists, as 
well as carrying out operations of a disruptive nature in public 
meetings, conferences and rallies. These actionmits were under the 
leadership, among others, of IPES leaders Jos~ Ely Vi anna Coutinho, 
Eduardo ~evy and Sergio Barbosa Ferraz, and received the co-operatim 
of Luis Carlos Prado, Arnaldo Vieira de Carvalho, Sergio Broteiro 
Junqueira, Vicente Mammana Neto, Luis Pinni Neto, Rodolfo de Freitas 
Filho, Humberto Golfi and Silvio Luciano Campos. The organization 
of these shock-troops, made up mostly of young middle class males, 
was under the su~eTVision of IPES leader Paulo Quartim, who also co-
ordinated their activities with other groups. Among these groups 
was the School for Democratic leadership - ELD, directed by Frederico 
Abranches Viotti. The ElD was involved in the preparation and indoc-
trination of hecklers and agents provocateurs to prepare them for 
participation in public debates, conferences, meetings and 'comicios' 
(public rallies), as well as in the preparation of activists in 
trade unions, peasant and students affairs. The shock-troops were 
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also aimed at the protection of these activists, and the violent dis-
t - f t- 1 f - t t- -t- 121 rup ~on 0 na ~ona -re orm~s ac ~v~ ~es_ A series of actions 
planned under the direction of Frederico Viotti were aimed at neut-
ralizing the presence of the federal government in Sao Paulo. Accord-
ing to IPES leader Herman de Morais Barros, in some cases well-known 
political figures and ~ven ministers of state went through unsuspected' 
scares'. Joao Pinheiro Neto, director of the Superintendency for 
Agrarian Reform and Mario Donato, his representative for Sao Paulo, 
were some of the political figures ~ho were attacked. 122 
In these disruptive activities, General Agostinho Cortes received 
the support of the IPES Sao Paulo sector of Public Opinion, and 
especially from Fernando and Roberto Levy, sons"of the UDN leader 
entrepreneur Herbert Levy, as well as that of the Sao Paulo-based 
Institute of Engineeringl23 and that of Adhemar de Barros' police. 
Hembers of the police force, sometimes disguised as students, parti-
cipated in 'stormy receptions' ~anted to government officials. One 
such well publicized occasion was when the intended address of Paulo 
de Tarso, the Minister fbr Education, at the l1ackenzie University of 
124 Sao Paulo was disrupted by some 300 of Adhemar de Barros' 'students'. 
One of the most active groups formed in 1962 as a by-product 
of IPES action was the Grupo de Atua2ao Patriotica - GAP (Group for 
Patriotic Action), which operated in Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais 
and Sao Paulo. Its rank and file was composed of young students 
between the age of 17 and 26, mostly of the upper-middle and upper 
classes. 125 
It had as its programme for action the combatting of: reforms pro-
posed by Brizzola and Goulart; legalization of the Communist Party; 
the system of student representativity and UNF~ and UBES; the take-
over of private refineries; the occupation of key posts in the 
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administration by elements aonsidered to be communists; the influence 
of trade union leaders in the affairs of the country; the purported 
censorship of speeches of political leaders of the opposition (Amaral 
Netto, Carlos Lacerda and Raimundo Padilha) on Radio and TV; and the 
governmental blind eye to strikes and agitation of a political and 
subversi ve character. The GAP benefited from wide coverage from the 
press, especially from 0 Globo and the Diarios Associados. 
On one particular day, Aristoteles Drummond, GAP's leader, was 
interviewed for a radio programme where he expounded the determina-
tion of GAP torefend liberty and property, as well as the conviction 
that such action could only be guaranteed by the military. The 'Voice 
of America' re-transmitted the interview. Afterwards Drummond received 
a telephone call fromfue American Embassy, asking him for a meeting. 
Two men came to Drummond's apartment, where he was carefully sounded 
out about his political ideas. A few days later they came back, and 
offered their help to Drummond, which the GAP leader accepted. A 
few weeks later, a truck unloaded in Drummond's apartment a cargo of 
50,000 books and pamphlets of anti-Communist propaganda. The CIA 
had made its contact and Drummond would do the rest. 126 
According to Drummond, the GAP aimed at taking the message of 
the young not engaged with ~~ to the student population and to 
help in the formation of a current of public opinion which would be 
conscious of the 'communistic and anarchistic paths' along which 
the government was leading the country. By means of the 'Rallies 
for Democracy', realized by Deputy Amaral Netto and with the pre-
sence of ADP parliamentarians from allover the country, the GAP 
'_eader preached in the name of the students the need to react against 
the government. Drummond also took part in the 'Network of Demo-
cracy', the IPES/IBAD sponsored propaganda activity which opposed 
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itself to the' Chain of Legality', organized by Leonel Brizzola 
against the impending coup. Through the 'Network of Democracy' , 
Drummond preached armed mobilization~ainst the peasants of Fran-
cisco Juliao and the 'Groups of Eleven' of Leonel Brizzola. 
GAP's action was closely linked to that of Admiral Heck's action 
unit. Drummond and his fellow GAP members served as carriers of 
weapons and messengers between Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Belo 
Horizonte. The GAP base was once busted by the military police, 
but Drummond and two of his friends managed to escape, although 
incriminating material was found. As a consequence of this incident, 
a general clamp down on para-military groups was ordered by the 
government. The headquarters of the parallel 'Vigilantes Action of 
Brazil', in Rio de Janeiro, were invaded by Goulart's police and 
weapons seized. The Vigilantes Action was led by one of Admiral 
Heck's top men, Paulo Galvao, who was also in charge of the opera-
tional part of connected para-military groups linked to lacerda. 
Paulo Galvao was also linked to the Sao Paulo military intelligence 
group led by General Agostinho Cortes and to Lacerda. 127 Another 
of their bases, which was taken by assault was located in Jacarepagua, 
in the outskirts of Rio, where arms were also found. Weapons were 
also found in a farm in Sitio Alegre, where a Major Lopes de Souza 
operated, in charge of supplies for Admiral Heck. When the police 
arrived, Paulo Galvao managed to flee with three truCks. 123 Deposits 
of weapons, uniforms and other necessary material, as well as mili-
tary training grounds were scattered allover the country, hidden 
in rural properties or churches, as well as in specially acquired 
places, such as the Educandario Nossa Senhora de Fatima, in Niteroi 
or the Fazenda Arizona, which belonged to the Vigilantes Action 
of Brazil Group;Z9 
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After these raids on their bases, Drummond remarked that 
luckily, the Police Military Inquiry which was ordered by the Vdni-
ster of vTar was confided to General Idalio Sardenberg, a member of 
the military core group which had founded ESG. Drummond went to speak 
to General Sardenberg, in view of the press exposure of GAP's con-
nection with the affair and with Admiral Heck's activities. General 
Sardenberg, after listening to Drummond's explanations, told him 
that he knew 'things were not quite as you say, but I praise your 
civic attitudes and I ask you to convey to Admiral Heck my tranquil 
reaction. You will not be bothered. ,130 
Before the Jacarepagua incident was dampened, five more individuals 
were involved: Cecil Borer, the former head of the Department of 
Social and Political Order of Guanabara; his brother, police officer 
Charles Borer; Colonel Gustavo Borges, secretary of security of 
the state of Guanabara; and Inspector Jose Pereira de Vasconcellos. 
Cecil Borer was supplied by and collaborated with entrepreneur 
Alberto Pereira da Silva, linked to Lacerda~and with IPES leader 
Alberto Byngton, who jointly with Colonel Vernon Walters was involved 
in the supply of weapons.l)l Deputies Sandra Cavalcanti and Nina 
Ribeiro were also implicated by the investigations carried out by 
the Federal Service of Information and Counter Information - SFICI. l )2 
Furthermore, it Has alleged at the time that IPES leader Joao Baptista 
Ieopoldo Figueiredo's shipping company, Leopoldo Figueiredo Navegacao, 
headquartered in NeH York, was the carrier of equipment for the 
plotters. Some of the equipment found in the Rio arms cache had 
the All_iance for Progress symbol on it. The cache included sub-
machine guns, amunition, tear gas, communications equipment and 
containers. The weapons were of US American make. The walkie-
talkies were identified as coming from a stock which had been 
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earmarked for the Rio police by late 1963.133 
The weapons and equipment were not only for the use of the 
military. The arms were also intended for the use of entrepreneurs. 
Following the public exhortation of IPES leader Jorge Behring de 
Mattos that entrepreneurs in general 'should arm one another, because 
we are already armed', activists linked to Admiral Heck distributed 
weapons in the states of Rio de Janeiro, Espiri to Santo and lunas 
Gerais, vrhile units led by Marshal Denys armed the landowners in 
the south of country.134 Some of these weapons were obtained 
. through the mediation of Sao Paulo Governor Adhemar de Barros, 
Julio de Mesquita Filho and IPES leader Alberto Byngton. 135 
The ci vilian-mili tary section headed by General Henna Barreto 
carried out two other very important operations in the field of 
psychological preparation of the masses. His section was responsible 
for engaging the party-political directorates of the state of Sao 
Paulo and the directorates of social, cultural and sporting clubs. 
At the close of regular meetings in the first half of 1963 
of the Brazilian-American Relations Committee of the American Cham-
bers of Commerce, its Vice-President B. M. Lobo Rosa analyzed the 
political conjuncture. A report from the CIA station in Rio picked 
up his accounts of the activities of an action unit of entrepreneurs 
and military officers in which he was involved. According to Lobo 
Rosa the action unit had been formed to programme and put into 
effect a plan which involved arms, military forces and funds to 
support activities for a coup. Lobo Rosa commented that the group 
which had initially been formed in Rio de Janeiro had now a strong 
nucleus functioning in Sao Paulo as well, enjoying the support of 
governors Carlos lac erda and Adhemar de Barros. (When asked if 
General Pery Bevilacqua had given his support to the action group, 
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lobo Rosa declined to answer.)136 Lobo Rosa explained that the group 
was divided into many departments, each having responsibility for 
particular fields of action. Lobo Rosa himself was involved with 
a unit responsible for what was called the civilian command. 
Among others, this unit aimed at the formation of 'neighbourhood 
control units' sub-divided into bloc control units, in the mould 
of the ones already existing in Rio. Each sub-unit contacted approx-
imately five individuals in each block of his neighbourhood with 
whom they could count to support general action against the govern-
ment. In Rio, these groups had already been trained in the use of 
small firearms and the handling of plastic bombs, and were far 
ahead of those in Sao Paulo. They were important as 'relay units' 
for anti-government propaganda campaigns and provided most of the 
so-called 'popular' demonstrations against Goulart's executive. 
~obo Rosa's action unit was interested in receiving assurance that 
the leaders of the American business community and the US government 
officials were informed of what action was planned and for what 
reasons. He thought it vital for the American government to recog-
nize a provisional government which would follow in the case of 
successful action against the federal government, although the 
question of timing of this action was still indefinite at that 
stage. The head of the civilian movement to Hhich B. H. ~obo Rosa's 
uni t was a part was General Dalisio i1enna Barreto. 137 
General Menna Barreto's conspiratorial offices had been estab-
lished in the premises of a real estate company, SELA, sited in 
the centrally located Largo de Sao Bento in Sa"b Paulo. In early 
1963, a meeting took place in these offices between Antenor ~mundo 
Horta, Eldino Brancante, Colonel Jose ea;avo Filho, a former com-
mander of the Sao Paulo Public Police Force, Jose Freire da Silva 
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and a number of other entrepreneurs who had been at the meeting pre-
viously mentioned where General Mourao had met prominent civilian 
d 'l't l' t 138 an m~_~ ary pau ~s as. 
In this meeting the entrepreneurs advanced the proposal, which was 
accepted, that in order to achieve wide and efficient mobilization, 
and efficient psychological preparation of the masses, the civilian-
mi1itary staff had to approach not only party directorates139 but 
also any institution already in existence, social and sporting club~ 
class associations and private enterprises, where IPES had been 
developing intense activities since early 1962. The advantages of 
integrating these organizations in the civilian-military movement, 
it was argued, was that they had organized files of members, and 
numerous associates, affiliates and partners. They provided materi~ 
financial and human resources for the action of the organic elite, 
and could become very useful centres for the mobilization of the 
right-wing forces. Given their widespread location throughout S~o 
Paulo, the clubs and associations could also become points for meet-
ing, concentration and depositing material as well as improvised 
headquarters of their middle and upper class neighbourhoods. The 
directorates of parties, acting through their neighbourhoods' commit-
tees cou1_d become useful means of mobilization and rapidly cl.'eate 
the necessary climate, even more so since those directorates had 
good speakers, at ease in political campaigns, who could convince 
their fellow party members and followers that to counter the imminent 
'threat' posed by the Executive and the national-reformist forces 
a civilian-military movement against the government was necessary. 
In the same form, the directors of social clubs, cultural and sport-
" ing associations had the capacity and authority to expound th3 prob-
lems and regiment personnel for the different tasks required by the 
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civilian-military staff. Furthermore, these elite clubs and as so-
ciations, very conveniently, united the paulista dominant and upper-
middle classes, who were then easily co-ordinated and mobilized. 140 
The civilian-military staff expected that, by acting through the 
cupu1_as (l.eadership) of the political parties, social clubs and 
associations, the bases of the middle classes would be easily and 
surely reached in such a way that their involvement in the campaign 
against the Executive would be secured in a fastmd steady way. 
Among those particularly active in the mobiliztion of the middle 
classes were Eldino Brancante, Colonel Canavo, Benedito H. i.,obo Rosa, 
Antonio Vicente de Azevedo, Antenor Edmundo Horta and Jose Freire 
da Silva, who co-ordinated the inVOlvement of the Freemasons of 
,.. J41 Sao Paulo. 
The involvement of the social clubs in the IPES net .. rork of 
politica1-military action was relatively easy, as many of the IPES 
leaders Here a1_so directors or prominent members of these elite 
social, cultural. and sporting institutions. However, the IPh.S net-
work also involved those sporting clubs whose membership was strongly 
middle class, and with a large mass of popuiar followers, although 
their leadership was still elitist. Among these sporting institu-
tions were the professional football clubs Portuguesa de Desportos, 
Palmeiras, Sao Paulo and the most popuiar of them all, tsporte Clube 
Corinthians, whose president, Fadi Helou, had been contacted by 
Joao da Silva Azevedo and taken by Carlos Brancante to General Henna 
142 Barreto. 
Vicente de Azevedo secured the participation in the IPES-led campaign 
of Paulo Yazbek, director of the Sanatorio Avicena de Analises 
Cl1.nicas and president of- the AssociaQao 'Atletica de Sao Paulo and 
of the Clube de Regatas Ponte Grande. 
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Yazbek became a key figure in the sector of Radio Communications of 
the civilian-military movement. Being the founder and permanent 
councillor of the Brazilian Amateur League of Radio Emission -
LABRE, he was able to provide General Dalisio Henna Barreto's staff 
and other participants of the civilian-military movement with a 
powerful network of communication, which side-stepped both commer-
cial and the regular means of communication of the Armed Forces. 
(Colonel Cid Camargo Osorio, on the military side, took the lead 
in developing a system of coded radio communications with the groups 
operating in other states.) 
Yazbek was also to be a central figure in the campaign of middle 
c1_ass mobilization, because he was the president of the Association 
of Sporting Clubs of the State of Sao Paulo - ACLE~SP, which united 
36 amateur sporting clubs. 143 Furthermore, it was Yazbek 
who introduced to the plotters, both Hichel Nahas and Alberto Badra, 
respectively presidents of Clube Atletico Honte LrbanO_ and Clube 
Sirio. 
General Menna Barreto's section also obtained the support of Joao 
Batista Silva Azevedo, city councillor of Sao Paulo and leader of 
the J,iberator Party. He was in charge of articulating the movement 
within the Clube de Regatas Tiete. 
Another contact was at the Banco SuI Americano S.A., where they 
sought its vice-president, IPES leader Hanoel de Carvalho, who was 
also vice-president of the Sao Paulo Football Club. The meeting 
was attended by IPES leader Herman de l10rais Barros, himself a 
director of the Clube AtlAtico PauUstano. Afterwards, they estab-
lished contact with J oao do Amaral, president of the Clube Pauiistano 
and with another director, Pedro Padilha~ both of whom were introduced 
in person to General Dalisio Henna Barreto. 
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Pushing the 'red scare' campaign to extremes, the club directors 
were made to feel that there was a real necessity for the creation 
of underground shooting galleries in their social clubs, for the 
training of associates. 
Action groups of club directors and selected associates were estab-
lished to undergo more specialized drills. Brancante's unit would 
provide the instructor who would secretly train the heads of the 
various groups in neighbouring Sao Paulo farms in the use of firearms 
and guerilla war techniques. l44 
other influential club directors who were linked to the incipient 
network and taken to the civilian-military staff for instructions 
were Luiz Nardy (Qlube de Golfe Sao Fernando); Ferreira da Rosa 
(Clube de Campo); Angelo Deditis and Delfino Facchina (Sociedade 
Esportiva Palmeiras); Jayme Loureiro Filho and Milton Nascimento 
fSociedade Hfpica Paulistana). Contact was also kept with Adhemar 
de Campos, president of the Sociedade Harmonia de Tenis, to which 
Milton 'Tascimento also belonged and where IPES administered courses 
to entrepreneurs, professionals and militants. Many members from 
many organizations who had gone through the Curso de Prepara9aNo 
Ipreparation Course) of the Superior ',·iar College Here also linked 
to the unit headed by Brancante and Lobo Rosa, among them entre-
preneur Lito Coutinho .~ Hho was leader of an action unit) and B'ran-
cisco de Barros Campos, director of Sociedade Harmonia de Ten~. 
Furthermore, the following club directors were integrated in the 
civilian-military movement: Honorino Gasparini, president of Esporte 
Clube Finheiros fa club Hhich became an important centre for co-
ordination of manoeuvres during the coup itself); Antonio Colussi, 
-president of the F'.oresta Clube; Doug::"as l-ticha lany, director of the 
~ 
y,pES Cr ube de VPa ~'1ariana; and the Sao Pau::'o Country Clube, through 
its president, IPES leader Julio Cruz Lima and PUnio Honteiro 
145 Garcia. -
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In the second half of April 1963 the civilian-militaryetaff 
in Sao Paulo issued an invitation to significant figures involved 
in the civilian-military movement against the Executive in the 
Pacaembu Football Stadium in Sao Paulo. It was a 'public' role-
call. About [tOO persons were involved in this show of commitment. 
The organizers and convenors of this action Here General Dalisio 
Mena Barreto and General Agostinho Cortes. Several bank presidents 
belonging to IPES and relatives of Herbert Levy were present, and 
among the crowd stood out well-known entrepreneurs, retired army 
officers and professionals connected 10ri th IPES. 1'+6 
After the Pacaembu show, another meeting took place, with a 
smaller number of people, this time in the apartment of Julio de 
Mesquita Filho. Present were General Mourao, General Ramiro Gorreta 
and General Ivanhoe Martinsl~7 with a representative from General 
Cordeiro de Farias, to co-ordinate the acti vi tie s of the Sao Paulo 
civilian-military group with the military centre in Rio. In that 
meeting it was recided that Julio de r·resqui ta Filho would be in charge 
of the group which would take care of political matters and ideolo-
gical orientations. As head of an important press complex and with 
the logistica,- Slpport of the Public Opinion Group of IPES, I1esquita 
Fi1ho was to maintain support through the media for the coup acti-
. t 14;:\ v~s s. 
Following the Pacaembu meeting in April 1963, the civilian-
military general staff held another one in June.l~9 As the activi-
ties of IPSS were largely covert and participants were secretive 
about their activities, the meeting served to acquaint those present 
with one another and re-inforce their disposition to act. A collection 
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of IPES entrepreneurs, social club directors, professionals and 
other members of the civilian-military staff gathered at the meeting. 
Among some of the influential figures present at the Pacaembu meeting 
in June, for the face-to-face encounter of supporters and partici-
pants of the civilian-military movement were: IPES leaders Herman 
de Moraes Barros, Manoel de Carvalho, Paulo Reis l1agalhaes, Sergio 
Barbosa Ferraz, Roberto Levy, Salvio de Almeida Prado; IPES activists 
Eduardo Levy and his brothers, who worked in General Agostinho Cortes' 
unit: Carlos D'Alamo Lousada and 1uiz Alberto Attilio, who were the 
link-up with Admiral Heck's unit; sporting and social club directors 
belonging to the sections of 'mobilization and psychological prepara-
tion of the masses' of General Menna Barreto's staff, such as Guil-
herme de Almeida, of Clube Piratininga; Celso Correa Dias, of ~­
dade H:tpica and of the Insti tuto Historico de GUaruja e Bertiogaj 
Milton Nascimento, Paulo Yazbek, Antonio Colussi, Adhemar de Campos 
and Pedro Padilha. Furthermore, the following influential entre-
preneurs were also at the meeting: Christian Heins and Lito Coutinho, 
of l;!yllis; Mario Savelli, of Light and Power S.A. and a member of 
the Instituto de Engenharia: Pericles Senna, of I~terial Ferroviario 
S.A - HAFERSAi financier Jose Roberto de Oliveira, a relative of 
Roberto Campos: Herculano de Almeida Pires, of Banco de America; 
Caio de Paula Machado,and Fabio Fasano, director of~e prestigious 
Restaurant Fasano. Noreover, the following members of the !1ovimento 
Ci viI de Defesa Nacional ( Civilian T>!ovement for National Defence), 
a paralle] movement to IPES, operating in the field of public opinion 
and mass mobilization, were also at the Pacaembu meeting: Jose de 
Oliveira Pinho, Darcy d'Alvear, procurator of the Tribunal de A19ada: 
Jose Pedro Galvao de Souza, Evaristo Veiga dos Santos, RUy de Arruda 
Camargo. celso Guimaraes and Plinio Costa Cesar, as wel-~_ as Luiz 
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Fe}ipe de Souza Queiroz and Eduardo Souza Queiroz, state leaders of 
the UDN. Finally, the following activists and supporters of the 
civiHan-military movement were also at the meeting in Pacaembu: 
Aureliano leite, president of the Instituto Historico GeograJ'ico de 
ScC'o Paul.o; federal deputy Juvenal Saya"b, Nemesio Baila"'o, Benedito 
lobo Bizarro, Herman Fickel, Carlos Brancante, Pa~o Cardoso de 
Mello, Haria Aparecida Cardoso de ~1ello, Paulo Cardoso de Hello 
Filho, Nelson Abdo, Lygia Aguiar Fasano, Sergio Lemos Torres, 
Rubens and Esther Guagliemetti, Aziz Calfat, Demetrio Calfat, Ruy 
Buller Souto, Cosmo Guarnieri and a number of student activists and 
t t ' f 1" 't' 150 represen a lves 0 re 1910US aSSOCla lons. 
The several 'public gatherings' of these influential members of the 
S~o Paulo elite served to encourage military activists of the lInd 
Army to go ahead with their preparations for a coup against Goulart; 
they were reassured and felt -strengthened by the oommitment 
of the civilians. 
TOvTards the end of June, a rally was organized by the ci vilian-
mi~itary staff, known as the Convenqao de Pacaembu, which took place 
on the 22nd of the month. The convention was ostensibly led by 
the IPES-sponsored Syndical Democratic i·1ovement and the Student 
Democratic Novement. It was an attempt by the organic elite to 
oounterpose their own right-wing student-worker bloc against the 
growing rapport between the national-reformist student organizations 
and working class trade unions. Representatives from the states of 
Guanabara, Paraiba, Ceara, Bahia, Amazonas, Rio Grande do Sul, Rio 
Grande do Norte, Parana, Para, Santa Catarina and Sao Paulo were 
brought to the Pacaembu stadium, in an 4,000 peopLe, Governors 
Lacerda, Adhemar de Barros, federal. deputies Armando Falcao, Herbert 
Jevy. Ju l io de Nesqui ta Filho. IPSS leader I'liguel Reale, Ivette de 
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Carvalho, Alexandre Husne, Luiz Carlos Batista; NSD leader Antonio 
Pereira Magaldi; Christian Workers' leader Frei Celso, and Francisco 
Ramalho chaired the event. 151 The convention was a significant 
landmark in the campaign of lPES/IBAD against Goulart, the nation-
alistic and reformist proposals and the labour left. It benefited 
from the vast network of media relay organized by IPES and had a 
profound effect on the military, who besides the support received 
from the elites, saw themselves also as openly supported by a wide 
worker-student-middle class bloc. 
By mid '_963, the same pattern of civilians and military, inter-
acting against the Executive and being organized to overthrow the 
national government which had developed in the state of Sa~ Paulo, 
was common to the states of Guanabara, Minas Gerais, Parana, santa 
Catarina and Rio Grande do Sul. 152 In each of these states the 
civilian-military movement was based upon the regional network of 
IPES/IBAD, A Ithough General Mourao believed that they were largely 
due to his effort~ as he had attempted to stir up opposition to the 
regime in t he neighbouring states. General l"ourao I s contacts with 
the southern states were made partly through UDN state leader .i..;uiz 
Fe~ipe de Souza Queiroz, and Aurelio Stievani. J-53 In Sao Paulo, 
Genera1_ ~10uraO was the ostensible organizer of the military sector 
1 SiJ. 
of the movement I' , whil_e General i1enna Barreto Has the chief co-
ordinator of the civiJ_ian elements. l55 The movement had the full 
support of Sao Paulo Governor Adhemar de Barros. In Parana, the 
chief military organizer was General Ernesto Geisel, who had com-
manded the 5th Division of the IIIrd Army. The civilian aspect of 
the movement Has headed by Jose Hanoel .Linhares de Lacerda, co-
ordinating units consisting primarily o"f big landowners~ Hi th the 
IPES leaders of the Commercial Association of Parana and Paulo da Rocha 
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Chueri, who provided an important link with the public police force 
of the state. Colonel Nei Braga, the governor of Parana' quietly 
favoured the plan, but preferred not to give open support. 156 
In Rio Grande do SuI, two-thirds of the officers of the IIIrd Army 
could be counted on, as well as the civil police and the For9a 
PUblica, (Public Force). Colonel Barcellos was extremely active 
in the subversion of the police forces of Rio Grande do SuI. Reserve 
General Armand Cattani was in charge of the organization of the 
landowners in the rural areas into para-military units which would 
act as a co-ordinated body at the time of the coup. The plan had 
the full support of lIdo Menghetti, the governor of Rio Grande do 
SuI, who was connected "lith FARSUI. and IP!I:SUL. In Santa Catarina 
the landowners were being organized to assist military elements in 
favour of the plan for the coup. IBAD/IPES General Pedro Paulo 
Vieira da Rosa was extremely active in the mobilization of military 
personnel. 
In Guanabara, the Navy completely supported the plan, as did some 
key elements of the 1st Army.157 The civilian organization, which 
had the full weight of the IPES structure supporting it, was, as 
assessed by the CIA, further advanced than that in Sao Pallio. The 
movement had the full support of IP~S-backed Carlos Lacerda, the 
l5~ governor of Guanabara state. d 
In Minas Gerais, General Carlos Luis Guedes headed the military 
sector and General Braganqa headed the civilian one, supported by 
the IPES sponsored MobilizaQa'o Democr,Hica Hineira. 159 
The entrepreneurs, professionals and military comprising Hhat General 
Guedes described as the atuante grupo revoluciomirio (activist revo-
l.utionary group), Hhich in his view pl.aced itseU at the vanguard . 
I ..... ·',' I"_·J·~ • ~---:;2.J~r/ 
of public opinion in r.linas Gerais, were leaders and activists of IPES Belo 
CJ+5 
Horizonte. Through their contacts and connections with military of 
Minas and other 'states, the IPES leaders and activists 
'propi~ated the indispensaOLe psychological amd material condi~ions 
for the eclosion of the movement of.3lst .t1arch, judged necessary to justify 
the military actiont~ Among the IPES leaders mentioned by General 
Guedes were: entrepreneur Alusio Aragao Villar; Josafa Macedo, a 
big landowner and banker and president of the Federation of Rural 
Associations of the state of Hinas Gerais - F~, and a medical doctor, 
member of the influential medical association cf Hinas Gerais (so 
vocal in their opposition to the Goulart government); banker and 
industrialist Ruy de Castro l1agalhaes; Angelo Scavazza (director of 
Sul America Cia. de Seguros), General Elcino Lopes Braganca, General 
lopes Bragan9a 'commander of the 4th ID), and Gabriel Bernardes 
Fi l_ho ~~andowner and director of Cia. Forqa e :'uz de rTinas Gerais). 
Other inf"J.uential_ and wel_l-known entrepreneurs, military and profes-
sionals who be'l_onged to the civilian-military pLot were: 
General Antonio Joaquim Correa da Costa, Augusto de Lima Neto (direc-
tor of Cia. Telefonica de Minas Gerais (Bond and Share), Braulio 
Carsalade Villela 'director of Cia. Siderurgica Belgo-Mineira and 
of its subsidiary, Cia. Imobiliaria Santo 8pi ), Bento Romeiro 
(lawyer), Celio Andrade:directox of Hospital Felicio Roxo), Delzio 
Bicalho (medical doctor), Denio Horeira :journalist), Colonel :ii;milio 
I1ontenegro Filho, Evaristo Soares de Paulo ~landowner and prefect 
of Cuxvelo, Hhere he founded the Liga Anti Comunista /Anti-Communist 
:.eague) which organized the landowners), Francisco Floriano de Paula 
(1awyer and lecturer of the Facu;"dade de Direi to de r,rinas Ger~is), 
Geral_do Jacinto Vel.Oso 'fiscaJ_ agent of the Imposto Aduaneiro of 
Belo Horizont~, Heitox Picchini (stock-b~oker of Fundos Publicos), 
nelio Pentagna Guimaraes 'director of Hagnesita S.A.,Cia. Siderurgica 
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Belgo-Mineira and Industria de Calcinaqao Ltda. - ICAL), lay priest 
Joao B otelho ~ director of 110vimento para Um r1undo Helhor and one of 
the organizers of the female middle-class Narcha do TerQo), General 
JOM Manoel Faria, General Joao Torres Pereira, Joao Romeirojudge 
of the ~rilitary Justice of ~1inas Gerais), Jesuit p:riest Jose Candido 
de Castro, JOS3 Resende de Andrade ~lawyer and Police Officer), Jose 
~uiz Andrade 'stock-broker of Fundo Crescino), Colonel Jose Meira 
Junior '!1il.i tary Po' ice), Jose Naria Alkmim ~ PSD deputy), Colonel 
Jose' OS'\oTa Ldo Campos do Amaral i Hili tary Police), ::. uiz Gonzaga Fortini 
'medical doctor a.l1d 13cturer at the Faculdade de l1edicina of the Federa-t 
Universi ty of ~linas Gerais - UFMG and president of ~aminaQao de Ferro 
S . A. - :::CAFERSA), T~ uiz Pinto Coelho : archi tect and executive of the 
Rotary Club). General Haurilio Augusto Fleury Curado Junior, General 
Nelson Felicio dos Santos, General Olavo Amaro da Silveira, Orlando 
Vaz Filho (stUdent leader of the UDN Estudiantil), Paulo de Souza 
:Gima (landowner), Raimundo Silva de Assis (Cia. F'ia9ao e Tecelagem 
de Pa r a de Minas~ Rubio Ferreira de Souza 'lawyer and titular of 
a Cartorio), Vicente T10ura I journalist), and Alberto Deodato Haia 
Barreto 'lawyer, journalist and J_ecturer of "the Faculdade de Dire~to 
1/0 
of the UFHG).- 0 
}fany of the entrepreneurs in the above mentioned list were aJso linked 
to IPES1 eaders in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo through their common 
executive posts in the direction of the regional~encies of the same 
corporation. 
~'1edical doctors, lawyers and architects were important because of 
their participationm niddle class mobiliztion, in such activities 
as the release by professional associations of public manifestos 
against the government, organizaing and ~ndorsing public rallies, 
. . -.. . 161 _ 
and appealJ.ng for mJ.lJ. tary J.nterventJ.on. Hany -Lawyers ,'Tere 
tA7 
important, beside their professional prestige, for their role as 
directors of enterprises whose support was necessary for the movement. 
By mid 1963, General Hourao was satisfied with the activities 
of 'his' civilian-military staff which were run in effect by General 
Menna Barreto. General Henna Barreto's staff (as rart of the general 
staff co-ordinated by General Agostinho Cortes, which drew upon the 
resources of the IPES network of action groups) had been successful 
in its operations of disruption in every sector of public opinion 
and in particu1.ar in the mobilization of the middle classes. The 
growing number of activists present$ the Pacaembu 'public' gather-
ings convened to gauge support bore witness to the success of General 
Henna Barreto 1 s civilian-military staff.. HO'll'ever, this did not deta-
General Mourao from condemning the rather 'academic' attitude of 
IPES, some of whose representatives he had met, and who did not 
seem to him to be involved in any concrete action. The naivety of 
General Hourao and his superficial grasp of events were remarkable 
in that he was allegedly unaware that not only the periphery of 
'his movement', but even the core of 'his' civilian-military staff 
was made up of IPES leaders and activists. 
j'lToreover, Ivrourao did not accomplish much in the purely mili-
tary sector, i.e., in the co-ordination and preparation of a subver-
sive movement within the Armed Forces. General Hourao himself 
acknowl.edged his dissatisfaction with his military staff, which he 
found inefficient, if not downright incapable. Little did he 
know that the inefficiency of his staff was the outcome of a de~i­
berate slow-down and braking action on the part of his collaborators. 
As seen previously, many of the personnel in the miljtary structure 
he haQ established were young officers linked to the IPES/IBAD net-
work. The leadership of the organic elite had shown itself not to 
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be particularly keen on General Hourao going ahead with what seemed 
to them to be his eccentric political views and traditional socio-
economic ideas. The IPES/E3G compound had to close in on 110urao 
to check his bid for leadership and constrain his activities among 
the military. The overall leadership of events had to remain with 
the Informal General Staff in Rio de Janeiro, where General Golbery, 
head of the group in IPES in charge of strategic preparation, was 
already operating, and in Sab Paulo with General Agostinho Cortes, 
head of the IPES group operating in the sector of Armed Forces and 
Intel '_igence. 
One of the first moves by th~ IPES leadership was to withdraw 
the support General Hourao was receiving from the activists of Sao 
Paul_o by 'Hay of free airline tickets, thus curtailing the effective-
ness of his military~iculations, which required a great degree of 
mobility as well as monetary support. 162 The withdrawal of free 
airline tickets was a great blow if one considers the enormous geo-
graphic distances between Porto Alegre, Curitiba, Sao Paulo, Belo 
Horizonte and Rio de Janeiro, an area almost comparable in size to 
western and central Europe. 
General. ;·!ourao began to feel the crunch. J1iajor Figueiredo and 
Colonel Ramiro Tavares, two appointees to his 'genera:L staff' recom-
mended by IPSS/ESG people, were singled out by GeneraJ. Hourao as 
the cause for the inefficiency of his generaL staff. General Hourao 
felt that 'they were out to destroy him' without real.ly knowing who 
was blocking his military efforts. By June 1963, General Houra""6 
complained bitterly that even Julio de r18squita Filho,who had paid 
so much a ttention to him in the past, began to cool down their 
relationship. Only later did he come to know that this was the 
work of IF~S Lieut. Col. Resteel, who as military adviser of Julio 
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de r,~esquita Filho's action unit and as the lnilitary articulator for 
IP~S among the middle rank officers in the lInd Army, was destroying 
Genera 1, r'~ourao' s prestige as a mili tary conspirator among his fellow 
officers and entrepreneurs. Thus, another source of monetary support 
to General Mourao for his military articuiations was hampered, even 
closed, as the committee which had pumped money into his activities 
was headed by Hesq ui ta Filho. 163 
The following incident illustrates the form in which IPES 
sought the control of parallel movements or factional conspiracies 
and pre-empted General r,fourao' s own a ction within the lInd Army. 
Genc;raJ, Mourao had been attempting to subvert the younger officers, 
many of them in command of troops, of the lInd Army. In this endea-
vour he re"1,ied on the work of Hajor Her A. Pereira and Hajor A. 
Nakashima. The former was General Hourcib's man and his link with 
Colonel Jose CanavQ Filho, who as r~jor Ner Pereira's neighbour 
maintained his home as one of the secret headquarters of the civilian 
staff where police, navy and air force officers met. Major Pereira 
and Major Nakashima established a Hide network of support among the 
lower rank officers. fileetings were held at Juvenal Sayab's house. 
The core of the group amounted to approximately 70 officers. l64 
Parallel to this action, lPES General Agostinho Cortes, as head of 
the military staff of General Dalisio Menna Barreto and co-ordinator 
of the miJ..i tary action of IPES in Sao Paulo, was also promoting sub-
version within the younger officers of the lInd Army. A key element 
in this action was Lieut. Col. Resteel,165 who headed an action unit 
composed of Col,one l , Cid Osorio, Ueut. Col. Buitrom, I..ieut. Co:,. 
Ayrton Carta:<o, f,!ajor Ismae;, Armond, i1ajor Geraldo Franco, Hajor 
Ruy r,1achado, Captain Rubens Franco, Captain Herbes Franco, Lieut. 
Ruy Arruda and .Lieut. Queiroz. Lieut. Col. Resteel's unit received 
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the support of a unit of civilians led by IPES activist Eduardo 
I,evy and IPES entrepreneur Jose Carlos da Costa i1arques (a director 
of Vyllis and member of the Paulo Quartim action unit).166 
Major Pereira was contacted by Najor Geraldo Franco, of Lieut. 
Col. Resteel' s unit. Hajor Franco suggested to Hajor Pereira that 
Lieut. Col. Resteel and his group join the conspiratorial~tion of 
General i1oura""o' s men. Lieut. Col. Resteel had already been suggested 
as link-man to the members of the civilian staff by the IPES leaders 
Antonio Carlos Pacheco e Silva and Octavio Marcondes Ferraz, on 
account of his performance as a link-man l'1i th IPl:,;S leader Roberto 
Levy's unit and also with Julio de ~resqui ta Filho and Herbert Levy. 
1,ri th Lieut. Col. Resteel becoming :part of the group, the weekly 
Friday night meetings which were he~d at Sayao's home soon began 
to take place at the home of E~dino Brancante instead, where the 
plotters met together with members of the Pub~ic Force of Sao Paulo. 
Tieut. Col. Restee1_ brought into the group new ideas about leadership 
and forms of action, as ,fell as his ONn men. He opposed the formatim 
of a CouncE, Commission or a Junta, ideas which Here floated by 
Najor Ner Pereira, and supported by General Hourao,and favoured 
instead the establishment of a Central Command. Instead of impul-
sive attitudes, he st.:.pported methodical planning and the insertion 
of their activities, co-ordinated in Sao F'aulo.as:part of a general 
strategic plan co-ordinated in Rio, of which ~ieut. Col. Resteel 
became the link. After patient work by iieut. Col. Resteel and his 
uni t, their view won over the officers and ~·!ajor Ner Pereira I·ras 
ousted from ihe ,_eadership, withdravring from the group into isolated 
. '6'7 
consplracy. 
By August 1963, Genera:, Hourao was 'left with no effective 
command in the midd :.e a.nd i.ower echelons of t he officer corps. 
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The military in the lInd Army headed by Genera~ Kruel163 were 
involved instead in the movement articulated by Lieut. Col Resteel, 
General Cordeiro de Farias and General Nelson de Hello. This 
movement was co-ordinated by General Agostinho Cortes, leader of 
the IPES Sao Paulo based action~oup operating in the sector of 
Armed Forces and Ihtelligence, and the head of the information and 
inte11ig:mce section of the paulista civilian-military staff formed 
after the a1.ready mentioned November 1961 meeting in Rio. General 
Agostinho Cortes' home was a centre of information and intelligence 
supported by the IP~S/IBAD network of military and civilians. Through 
him were co-ordinated the efforts and activities of IBAD Harshal 
Ignacio Rol.imj Colonel Antonio Carlos de Andrade Serpa and Colonel 
Cid Augusto Osorio (both link-men with Colonel Jayme Portella), 
General Aldevio Barbosa de Lemos, General Reynaldo Saldanha da Garna, 
Lieut. Col. Resteel, General Ivanhoe' Gonqalves Hartins (who was by 
then acting as the permanent representative of General Cordeiro de 
Farias) and that of Colone] Lauro Rocca Diegues, head of the Intel-
ligence Section of the lInd Army.169 
In spite of alJ his effort~ General Nourao remained isolated in his 
military conspiracy, while the civilian-military staff under General 
Menna Barreto thrived. 
At the end of August 1.96), General Moura'o was unexpectedly 
displaced to the command of the 4th Hilitary Region ald 4th Division 
of Infantry of the 1st Army, headquartered in Juiz de Fora, state 
of Minas Gerais. 170 This transfer was a blow for the plotters in 
Sao Paulo and other parts of the country, including Minas Gerais, 
on iwo accounts. Firstly, General Hourao had long been in the sight 
of the Executive as a rather conspicuous·, though ineffective, con-
spiratorial candidate. Thus, the attention drawn to his personality 
652 
and activities allowed for other figures, such as General Agostinho 
Cortes and Lieut. Col. Resteel to develop and continue their quiet 
and effective action in Sao Paulo, largely unmolested and far away 
from the counter-intelligence of Goulart. On the other hand, his 
transfer to an army unit stationed at half the distance from Rio 
than that of his former Sao Paulo base and with,~ore troops under 
his command was of great concern to IPES/IBAD. An impulsive march 
onihe former capital by General Mourao could create serious problems 
for the attempts by IPES/ESG to control events and carry out a suc-
cessfu'_ coup.l n The consequences of such an impulsive action could 
prove disastrous, by disrupting the carefully evolved IPES/BSG 
strategy. Furthermore, in Juiz de Fora, General Houra'o was within 
the sphere of influence not only of the governor of Minas Gerais, 
Jose de Magalhaes Pinto, who as potentiai presidential candidate 
for 1965 was thus suddenly presented with a circumstantial ally 
and trum~ card to wield in the regional power game, but also ~thin 
easy reach of officers who responded to General Costa e Silva, a 
leading trou~ier officer,172 who did not share the IPES/SSG values. 
Horeover f the move of General r.lourao to Hinas Gerais could also 
spoil the carefully elaborated connections that activists of IPES 
Belo Horizonte had established with other military in i,rinas Gerais, 
- '73 esp,~cial",--y General BraganGa, and General Carlos Luis Guedes, i, "liho, 
besides his direct connections Hith the leaders of IPBS Belo Hori-
zonte, was also linked to the IPES Sa~ Paulo staff through the 
mediation of Andre Telles de 11attos, a member of General Agostinho 
Cortes' group, as well as through Nemesio Bailao and Carlos iliuaroo 
1"'1 D' Alamo ;cousada. (!+ 
Arriving in Uinas Gerais, and immediately after taking over 
his new command, General Hourao made contact Hi th General Guedes, 
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to whom he confided his operations in Sao Paulo. In September 
~ 963, General Guedes a nd General Hourao had a meeting with Governor 
Magalhaes Pinto, where the formation of a 'revolutionary General 
Staff' was discussed. Subsequently, General Hourao and Guedes 
established operational links with Colonel Jose Grealdo de Oliveira, 
commander of the Military Police of Hinas Gerais ani with Colonel 
Afonso Barsante dos Santos, head of the General Staff of the Hili-
tary Po:.ice. 
Soon after his arrival, General i1ourao had a meeting with Colonel 
Antonio Carlos de Andrade Serpa, recommended to the former by 
Co'one1 Portella, who belonged to General Costa e Silva's group. 
When General Hourao asked his advice on whom to involve in his 
new staff, Colonel Serpa indicated Lieut. Col. Everaldo Jose da 
Silva, a~so linked to Colonel. Portella. Days later, Lieut. Col. 
Evera l.do provided General Hourao with the names of eight officers 
who became the latter's general staff. J.75 General i'1ourao was 
suddenly being propped up by General Costa e Silva's group, who 
attempted to co-opt him. However, in General Mourao'sstaffwasaMajor 
Jose Ramos de Alencar. r1ajor Alencar was linked with IPES leader 
Augusto Frederico Schmidt, who took it upon himself to destroy 
General Mourao's prestige with the young officers,l76 A similar 
pattern to that of Sao Paulo was estabUshed with IP:2:SjESG elements 
attempting to sap away at Genera: Mourao's authority - which in the 
end proved to no avail - as we~l as attempting to incorporate him 
in ihe plotting of the civi lian-mili tary movement of Hinas Gerais. 
As seen previously, the civilian-military movement had been organized 
by the IPES-Belo Horizonte and connected to General Carlos Luis 
Guedes. Naively, General f1oura"'o believed he had been responsible 
for the formation cf -the civilian-military movement in Ninas Gerais. 
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In January 1964 General Mourio went on Holiday, while General 
Guedes took over the command of the 4th IUlitary Region staying in 
Juiz de Fora and overseeing the development of the plotting. Towards 
the end of January General Guedes attended what became a crucial 
meeting of representatives of the 'conservative classes' (sic) which 
took place at the Edificio Acaiaca, the most important office complex 
in the centre of Belo Horizonte and which housed the headquarters of IPES.177 
Among the representatives of the entrepreneurs and professionals present 
at this meeting was the entire executive leadership of IPES, and a number 
of activists, part of the 'atuante grupo revolucion€trio' mentioned earlier 
on, namely: Jonas Barcellos Correa, Josafa Macedo, liui de Castro Magalhaes, 
Aluisio Aragao Villar, Laercio Garcia Nogueira, and the entire directorship 
of Cia. Sidertirgica Belgo-Mineira and its subsidiaries, namely: Joseph Rein 
Francisco Pinto de Souza, Elmo Alves Nogueira, Henrigue Guatimozim, Geraldo 
g. 
Parreiras, Antonio Chagas Diniz (also a director of Cia. Fia9ao Tecidos 
Santa Rosa, Comercial Santa Rita ~ A, Fundicao Santa Fe and Maquinas Agri-
colas Al ti vo siN and Antonio Mourao GUimaraes. Q-iho was also director of 
Banco de Minas Gerais S.A. and Banco Nercantil da Guanabara).178 Further-
more, the following influential entrepreneurs were also present: Jose 
Neto de Oliveira (:Banco Comercio e Industria de 11inas Gerais S .A.), 
Edwin May (Cia. Sideru.rgica Hannessman, Cia. Siderurgica Sao Caetano, 
?vJannex do Brasil S .A. , Mannessmann }linera9ao S .A.), Caetano Nascimento 
Mascarenhas(Cedro e Cachoeira Texteis, Cia. Industrial de Estamparia), 
Antonio Mascarenhas Barbosa, Alexandre Diniz ftlascarenhas(Cia. Industrial 
de Estamparia), Decio Nagalhaes l1ascarenhas (Cia. Industrial Belo Horizonte), 
Jocro Ren6 Moreira (Cooperativa Central dos Produtore.s Rurais de lunas 
Gerais Ltda., MetalgrcU'ica Mineira S .A.), Avelino I!\enezes (Frigorifico 
SIPA S .A.), Francisco Menezes Filho,(Frigorifico SIPA S.A.), Americo R. 
Giannetti and Murillo Giannetti (Fabrica de Papel Cruzeiro S.A., Imobiliaria 
Mineira S.A., Celulose e Papel Minas Gerais S.A.), Oswaldo Pierrucetti 
6.5.5 
(Banco de Credito Real de Minas Gerais S.A. and a close political 
associate of Governor Magalha~s Pinto), Dario Gon9alves de Souza 
(Cia. Industrial Itaunense), Romualdo Canc;ado Neto (Casa Comercial 
Romualdo Can9ado sIA, Commercial Association of Minas Gerais), 
Nansen de Araujo (Cia. Brasileira de Instrumentos Cient:lficos, Commercial 
Association of Minas Gerais), Paulo Sousa Lima (construction business), 
Rui Lage (Sociedade Corretora de T:f. tulos), lawyers Bento Romeiro and 
Jo.3:o Romeiro, Padre Jose Candido de Castro, General Elcino Bragan98, 
Gabriel Bernardes Filho (Cia. Forca e Luz de Minas Gerais), lawyer Rubio 
Ferreira de Souza, and JoseLuiz Andrade (Fundo Crescinco) "!-79 The meetizg 
was chaired by IPES leader A1 uisio Aragao Villar, who, according to General 
Guedes, stimulated extra-legal action and called for military intervention. 
At the Acaiaca meeting (as it came to be known), General Guedes 
had been insistently canvassed by the entrepreneurs and the profes-
sionals of IPES, so that the commanding officer and the military 
in Minas Gerais would commit themselves firmly and actively to an 
offensive operation against the government. General Guedes wasaso 
shown proof of the firm support of the entrepreneurs by their very 
presence at the meeting and their outspoken attitudes. General Guedes' 
answer was that the entrepreneurs should 'take over the streets 
from Jango'. General Guedes stressed that once public opinion had 
been mobilized by the entrepreneurs against the government, 'we, 
the military, as part of the people, though armed, would simply use 
our weapons for what we were created, the defence of '~nternal 
security'" threatened by the left.180 This was a similar scheme 
to that elaborated in November 1961 in Rio and equal to the one put 
into practice in Sao Paulo. The IPES leadership, through their 
civilian command and in conjunction with the media in Minas Gerais, 
in particular the Diarios Associados,18l and a number of middle 
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c1.ass organizations of female activists, especially the i.iga de 
Hu1.heres Democraticas, the 11ovimento Familiar Cristao , with the 
entrepreneurial associations FAREM andihe Federation of Industries, 
wi th t he Anti-Communist League, student organizations and para-mili ta,:r:y 
groups such as the UDN Estudiantil and GAP, carried out similar opera-
tions to those developed in Rio and Sao Paulo and de.scribed earlier 
on. Th8 propaganda campaign which sponsored manifestos in the 
press by professional c:ssociations - e specially lawyers and medical 
doctors~TV and radio programmes, public rallies and marches organ-
ized by IP}~S-Be10 Horizonte and its parallal associations culminated 
in February 1964 in the Prayer of the Terqo, organized by Padre 
Peyton .and the lay priest Joa~ Botelho and by the various female 
. t. '82 organlza lons. 
The march, which pub~.icly condemned Leonel Brizzola as an 'anti-
Christ', a1.so condemned the Gou~.art government and appealed for 
mil.i tary intervention. The appeal of the ;'larcha do Ter90 was re-
inforc.ed by the launching in I·iarch 196'+ of the '[.larch with God, 
for the Family and for :L:iberty', in a similar operation to thOSe 
carried out in Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. Significantly, among 
thos3 military heading the march were General Jose ~opes Bragan9a,1~J 
Gen'.'ral Guedes himsslf, Colonel Jose' Garaldo de Oliveira, Colonel 
.. :"\;1 
Disocoro Val~.e and J_ieut. Col. Joaquim Clemente • .L''T' Th.; political 
climate in j'Iinas Gerais had been mad~~ ready for the launching of 
a mil i tary movem :mt against the c ~ntral government. 
It 1-<aS from Juiz de Fora that G'meral Hourao launched and 
pr(~cipi tat"d the coup of Earch J~, 196,.(., by leaving :his headquarters 
on 1'rhat appeared to be a sudden ehange. of mind supported by G~nera-,-
Guedes, inq:lite of the careful monitoring to which he had been 
subject. !.,' 5 Th" worst L-ars of the Informal General staff of Rio 
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de Janeiro had been confirmed and thus a neatly and carefully elabor-
ated campaign of the IP~S/~SG compound, set to take power in an 
orderly and complete manner, Has hampered as unexpected politicai 
actors wer9 cast into central ro~es in the scramble for power which 
~ . ill 6 followed General Hourao' s hasty departure from JU1Z de Fora. The 
Informal Gen-'ral Staff in Rio was promptly informed of General Hourcto's. 
departure and quickly Cbcided to support the move, in order to avert 
the military intervention of the central governm .. mt crushing the 
incipi~nt insurrection and perhaps making it an excuse to move 
against the IP8S/GSG group as well,lS? Furthermo~e, th~ IP~S!~SG 
Informal. Gcmeral Staff had to mov~] quickly to pre-cmpt undesir0d 
consequences of G,?neral Nourao' s move, namely the projection of 
politicians and military who, while oppos~d to Goulart, did not share 
the values and goals of IPJ:S/~SG, Nevc;rtheless, the damage had b",en 
done, Ths complete dominancs of the ~SG within the Army hierarchy 
had been thHarted, and. troupi:~r General Costa e Silva, supported by 
a host of middJe rank officers and right-:o'l'Iing extremists, became 
J'Tinister of Nar, a post for which General Jurandir B, Namede had 
1 ;1 ,:; 
been groomed ." ll. Genera~. Costa e Silva' s take-over of the Hinistry 
of r,Tar b8came a nost important pol.i tical fact against both IPES and 
1 "9 -~SG ,'" How"'ver, in spite of this setback, the IP!;S/IBAD organic 
ei_i te Has ab-!.e toestab,_ish itself at the helm of the state and 
occupy the k8Y posts of the civilian bureaucracy and the techno-
cratic administration, While th9 JSG was slo,'rly but surely able to 
out-manoeuvre most of its opponents and in the long run to contro~ 
most of the military commissions in key mEitary posts, as Hell as 
gaining an ascenda~t position in the schooling and indoctrination 
of the Armed Forces. In any case, as IP.iS propagandist i'ilson 
Figueiredo, the editor of Jornal do Brasi~~, wrote: • the sH,c;ets are 
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not for him who makes them, but for him who eats them' ,190 and 
al though Gen,"ral Mourao had launched the coup, it "as undoubtedly 
the IPES/IBAD organic elite which reaped th, fruits of victory, cs 
thee fol_lowing chapter attempts to indicate. 
Conclusion 
I have attempted to describe in this chapter the wide-spread 
network of support which lYES/lBAD had gained within the Armed 
Forces and also from retired military. Some of the most influential 
officers were 'lpesianos' and 'lbadianos' and they played a signi-
ficant part infue preparation and implementation offue civilian-
military movement which toppled Goulart. 
Furthermore, I have attempted to describe the participation 
of lPES/lBAD civilians and military officers in the civilian-military 
movement which removed President Goulart from office and marked 
the end of the populist regime. The articula9a~ of so many dis-
parate actors and factions, such as the ESG hard-liners, the right-
wing extremists and the 'traditionalists' made aware of their common 
interests by IPES activists, was accomplished, so it seems, without 
even the different participating groups' full awareness and under-
standing of the wider national implications and the full political 
and economic significance which the role of lPES/lBAD impressed 
upon events. 
lPES/lBAD were at the centre of events as link-men and as organizers 
, of~e civilian-military movement, as material supporters and preparing 
the appropriate climate for military intervention, and here lies 
the l_ast point I have attempted to empha9ize, namely, that wr.at 
occurred on Harch 31, 196+ was not a military coup. It was, as 
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mentioned earlier oh, a civilian-military movement. I have~gued 
and attempted to.. shm.. in the . p~evious chapters as well. as in 
this one what General Cordeiro de Farias himself acknowledged, 
namely, that the successful move~ent of 1964 was 'highly political 
and civilian in formation and execution. 19l The organic elite had 
throughout Goulart's presidency helped tO$eer the Erazilian state 
towards a situation in which a proto-Bonapartist intervention by 
\ 
the Armed Forces could be envisaged by a large number of ihe military 
as a suitable resolution ofihe contradictions of Brazilian society 
and government. IPES/IBAD and their fellow officers ofihe ESG 
organized the take-over of the state apparatus and established a 
new re!_ation of political forces in power. 
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Footnotes Chapter VIII 
1 Of an es~ecially secretive nature were the preparatory manoeuvres 
for the coup itself, the plotting between the different and 
numerous officers involved, and above all, their linkages with 
the lPES/IBAD network. These links were denounced from time to 
time in the early 1960s by political opponents and have come to 
light in recent writings. In IPES documents, in most cases mili-
tary officers were individualized by their initials. 
Among the recent memoirs by military officers which provide 
extremely useful information and which will be used extensively 
in this section are: General Olympio Mourao Filho, Memorias: A 
Verdade de um Revolucionarie, edited by Helio Silva (Porto Alegre, 
1&PN, 1978); Carlos .L!uis Guedes, Tinha que Ser Minas (Rio de 
Janeiro, Editora N6va FTonteira, 1979); and Jayme Portella A 
Revolucao e 0 Governo Costa e Silva (Rio de Janeiro, Guavifa-
Edi t6res Ltda., 1979). 
2 Fragmented information about the plotters and some acco~nt of . 
the entrepreneurial-military movements are to be found ~n: Mon~z 
Bandeira, 0 Governo Joao Goulart (Rio de Janeiro, Edit6ra Civil-
izaQao B.rasileira ~977); Mon~z Ba!;d~i:a, Pfe?e~ca 10s Est~o? 
Unidos no Brasil (R~O de Jane~ro, ~d~tora C~v~1~za9ao Bras~le~ra, 
1973); Helio Silva, 196+: Gol e ou Contr 01 e? (R~o.de Janeiro, 
Editora Civiliza9ao Brasileira, 1975 ; Jose Stacch~n~, Marco 64: 
Mobiliza ao da Audacia (Sao Paulo. Compa~ia Sditora Nacional, 
19 5 j Hernani D'.Aguiar, A Re';roluQao por dentro (Rio de Janeiro, 
Artenova, 1976); Alfred Stepan, The r1ili tary in Politics: Chang-
ing Patterns in Erazil (Frinceton, Princeton University Press, 
1971); Phyllis Parker, 1 &r: 0 Pa 81 dos Estados Unidos no Gol 
de Estado de J.l de Harco Rio de Janeiro, ~ditora Civilizacao 
Brasileira, 1977); John 1";. F. Dulles, Unrest in Brazil (Austin, 
University of Texas Press, 1970); John ~'1. F. Dulles, Castello 
Branco; The ~AU{in of a Brazilian President (Austin, University 
of Texas Press, 1973 ; Joaquim Justino Alves Bastos, Encontro 
com 0 Tem~o (Porto Alegre, Editora GIObo, 1965); George W. Bemis, 
From Cris~s to RevolutionlMonthly Case Studies (ios Angeles, 
University of Southern California, 19&+); Hauro Borges, 0 Golpe 
em Goias (Rio de Janeiro, Editora Civilizacao Brasileira, 1965); 
Glauco Carneiro, Historia das Revolu ces Brasileiras Vol II 
(Rio de Janeiro, Edicoes 0 Cruzeiro, 19 5 ; Alberto Dines et 
al., Os Idos de Mar 0 e a Queda em Abril~Rio de Janeiro, Jose 
A~varo Editor, 19; ; Carlos Castello Branco, Introducao a 
Revolu2ao de 1964 Vol I and II (Rio de Janeiro, Editora Artenova 
S.A., 1975); General Ol~pio Mourao Filho, Memorias •••• 0:;:4 cit., Ar~en TavoraJB~asil, 1 de Abril (Rio de Janeiro, Bruno Buccini, 
1964); Araken Tavora, How Brazil st~ped Communism (Rio de 
Janeiro, Grafica Vida Domestica, 19~); Odilio Deny~ 'Jenys 
Con~a Tudo', sepa:ata of Interviel'1' to Fatos e Fotos, ~.ay 2, 
196r: ~dmundo Momz, 0 Golpe de Abril (Rio de Janeiro Editora 
Civiliza9ao Brasileira, 1965); James W: Rowe, The Rev~lution 
and th~ 'System' - American University Fie Id Staff Reports ,~II 
Nos.J,'+,5 - July and August 1966: Philip Siekman, ",!hen Ezecu-
tives Tur~ed Revolutionaries', Fortune, September 196+; Clarence 
S: Hall, The Country that saved itself', Separata of Reader's 
D~gest, USA, 1967, pp.133-15~. 
I have dra~n heavily from these partial accounts, and with the 
added knowledge accruing from documents infue IP8S archives I 
have attempted to reconstruct connections which have hitherto 
conti •••• 
not been established, and which gain an added significance, 
once the participants' affiliation to IPES/IBAD is known. 
Although many of these accounts conflict in the description 
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of events and on some points of understanding of the process 
leading up to the coup, they have one important thing in common. 
They all point to the centrality of IPES/IBAD military officers, 
entrepreneurs and politicians in the campaign that led to~e 
coup. In many cases the focal role of IF~S in particular is 
made explicit, in other cases the Institute is not mentioned 
as such, although the political actors, both military and 
entrepreneurs involved in key operations or highlighted as 
central figures, are IPES/IBAD leaders and activists. 
3 Articula9ao is a word widely used by Brazilians, indicating the 
intimate connections and links established by individuals and 
groups in order to set common directives for their movements 
against a particular common adversary. Articula9ao is an 
essential factor in the plotting and conspiratorial activities 
of any faction, group or movement. For the purpose of this 
chapter, we shall translate articula9ao as co-ordination and 
integration. 
4 The American Embassy also played a part \lin making disparate 
but sympathetic civilian and military groups aware of one 
another and of the government's treachery". (Riordan Roett, 
BraziJ. in the Sixties (Nashville, Vanderbilt University Press, 
1972), pp.90-92). In these operations, stood out Colonel Vernon 
'\falters, the Military Attache of the American Embassy, vlho co-
ordinated intelligence operations in Brazil. A report of 
SFICl, the counter-intelligence servics of the Army, stressed 
Colonel Walters' involvement. In M. Bandeira, 0 G6verno ••• , 
op.cit., p.129 see 14-6 and J. Portella, op.cit.; p.175. 
5 The external connections which the lPES leadership had were 
highlighted by the visit of a US-American Inter Agency Survey 
Team to Brazil, in october 1962, headed by Ambassador Hilliam 
H. Draper. The Survey Team included Hajor General Douglas V. 
Johnson (Department of Defence); Ludwell L. f.lontague (CIA); 
Thomas S~ Naughton (AID); C. Edward Hells (USIA); Henry J. 
Constanzo (Treasury Department) and ~Tilliam B. Connett Jr., 
(Department of State). They visisted Rio, Sao Paulo and the 
Northeast, and were supported in their activities by the US 
envoys in Brazil. 
This team met in Sao Paulo, through a series of stag dinners, 
working lunches and through personal contacts, for the exchange 
of ideas on the political conjuncture. The folloHL1g IPES 
leaders were present: Teodoro Quartim Barbosa, Gastao E. Bueno 
Vidigal, Paulo R. Hagalhaes, Fernando n;. Lee, Vicente de Paula 
Ribeiro, Paulo Ayres Filho and Humberto Honteiro. 
They also met Qurino Ferreira Neto (director-vice president of 
Folha de Sao Paulo and director of Agua Fontalis SJA), Bruce S. 
Galbraith (assistant general manager of Alba S.A./Borden), 
Walter H. Gussenhoven (managing director of General Hotors do 
~rasil), Francis L. Herbert (Cia. Swift do Brasil), Joseph H. 
Jones (director-general manager, Union Carbide do Brasil), John 
S. Richards (president of RCA 0letronica Brasileira and presi-
dent of the American Chamber of Commerce for Brazil-Sao Paulo), 
Francisco de Paula Vicente Azevedo (vice president of Banco 
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Comercial do Estado de Sao Paulo S.A.). Furthermore they saw 
Adhemar de Barros, governor elect of Sao Paulo; General fery 
Bevilacqua, commander of the Brazilian Second Army; and General 
Aurelio de Lyra Tavares, commander of the Brazilian Second I'1ili-
tary Region; I'1aria da Concei<;:ao da Costa Neves, Sao Paulo deputy 
and who would eventually become an ostensible leader of the 'Harch 
of the Family'; Antonio de Barros Ulhoa Cintra, rector of the 
University of Sao Pauloj and Ruy }1esquita, son of Julio de 
Mesqui ta Filho, the editor and mmer of 0 3stado de Sao Paulo 
and himself a director of the newspaper. 'Ambassador' Draper 
was in reality General i'Tilliam H. Draper (reserve) of the U.S.A. 
Army, travelling under diplomatic cover. General Draper kept 
in touch with IPES, visiting its leadership after the coup. 
Airgram to Department of State, from Daniel M. Braddock, American 
Consul General in Sao Paulo - October 19, 1962 - No A-I09 -
NSF in JFK Archive. See also J. Portella, op.cit., pp.174-131. 
6 In one of the meetings held by General Draper's team during 
their fact-finding~ssion to Brazil, John Richards, president 
of the Sao Paulo American Chamber of Commerce expressed his grave 
concern over the political and economic future of Brazil. Richards 
said "that he believed Goulart was an extremely dangerous person 
and suggested that the United States Government should force 
the economic collapse of Brazil oy cutting off all aid to the 
Goulart Administration and thereby bringing about the downfall 
of Goulart himself. At this point the military would hopefully 
step in and 'correct the existing conditions'." Reinforcing his 
argument, Richards added that "he could see little possibility 
that the United States would be able to place advisors in key 
financial institutions in Brazil". - Airgram to Department of 
State, from Daniel H. Braddock, Ar.i.arican Consul General of Sao 
Paulo, October 19, 1~'62 - No A-I09 - NSF, in JFK Archives. 
IP~S leaders were in contact with the American government at 
other levels. Ambassador Lincoln Gordon noted that IPBS leader 
Alberto Byngton (an American-Brazilian of the paulista city of 
Americana; was sent to vlashington, as emissary of the anti-Goulart 
forces, in Harch 19&r. Before he returned to Brazil, on the 
21st of the month, he had asked the US authorities for an emer-
gency and contingency plan to provide logistical support for 
the movement against Goulart. The contingency plan which the 
US government prepared became knm·m as 'Operation Brother Sam'. 
For information on 'Operation Brother Sam', see Marcos Sa Correia, 
1 96' ~: Visto e Comentado J'ela Casa Branca ~ Porto Alegre, 1..':cH!, 
197?) which reproduces a series of important documents available 
at the T,indon Johnson Iibrary iT'. Austin, Te;{asj P. Parker, op.cit.; 
Vernon 'tal ters, Silent t1issions (USA, Doubleday, 197rl); A. J. 
langguth, Hidden Terrors 'New York, Pantheon Books, 197fi); 
Jornal do Brasil, December 1'),-20, 1976 Lincoln Gordon, Interview 
with Roberto Garcia, in '{.::',JA, March 9, 1977. 
7 On 5th February 1962, at a meeting of the Comissao Diretora of 
IPES, Glycon de Paiva and Jose Rubem Fonseca posed the question 
of the 'lethal equation IPES-HAC' and commented on the stress 
their friend A. Nasser, the Hinister of Justice, was undergoing 
once the issue had been made public." Every effort had to be 
made so that the association IPr.,S-HAC was not envisaged by the 
public. Antonio Galloti reminded those present that "i;ach member 
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of IPSS accused of belonging to }~C has to defend himself. But 
in his defence, neither positively nor negatively should he 
make the least reference to IPSS." The matter was again raised 
a week later on 12th February 1962 by Nei Peixoto do Vale, who 
took care of the public image of IPBS as Promotion and Propaganda 
executive. He was worried that General Golbery was publicly 
considered to be a man of the right, lil~ed to those elements. 
See also P1inio; de Abreu Ramos, Como A em os Gru os de Pressao 
(Rio de Janeiro, Editora Civiliza9ao Brasileira, 1963 , pp.43-44. 
q Several other similar groups and organizations came into edstence 
in the early nineteen sixties, such as the Anti-Communist Move-
ment - i1AC; the Brazilian Democratic Novement - HDB; the Vigil-
ante Action of Brazil - AVE; the Patrol of Democracy, the Anti-
Communist Organization of Parana - OPAC; the Democratic Mobili-
zation of I·1inas Gerais - JlIDN; the Crusade of National Democratic 
Leadership - CNLDj the Group of Patriotic Action - GAP; and lID~R. 
The C~~ had as its targets the indoctrination of the 'classes 
dirigentes capi taJ.istas', while at the same time it aimed to 
penetrate the working classes. See signed document of CNLD in 
IPES Archives - Rio de Janeiro. 
The OPAC/IBAD/IPES/r1AC groups held meetings in Curitiba, capital 
of the state of Parana, at the 3dificio ASA (Where Bronislaw 
Roguski of the CnR had his basis), at the headquarters of SZSC/ 
S=:NAC, at the C:lrculo de Estudos Band.eirantes, at SSSI, at the 
headquarters 0:" the PRP and at the Commercial Association of 
Parana. 
See Honiz Bandeira,Presenxa ••• ~ op.cit., .p.~5:~; 0 Semanario 
No.J75, Barch 12-1,', 196'+, p.S; IPES 11inutes Narch 27, 1962; 
IP3S CD 2)th August 1962 and lPES CD, 16th October 1962j Pol:ltica 
e Negocios, August 19, 1963. 
9 On the special training received by military and po~~ce to deal 
Hith civilians, see A • .L.angguth, op.cit., especially Chapters 
II-V; Jan Knippers Black, United states Penetration of BraziJ 
(Manchester, Hanchester Univer3i'::"~: Press, 1977), Chapter L'~j 
'The U.S. P1ilitary ApparatusJNAC.LA handbook, :Derkeley, August 1972. 
10 Permanent contacts between entrepreneurs, friendly journa~ists 
and politicians ,·Ii th the Armed Forces were stimulated by the 
organic elite. Rci Gomes de Almeida, as a leading entrepreneur-
ial figure not publicly associated with IP~S nor with its sub-
versive activities, was a key element in these contacts. From 
one encounter Rui Gomes de Almeida was able to report to the 
IPES leadership that he spoke with General Osvino Ferreira Alves, 
commander of the 1st Army and a reputed nationalist. Almeida 
confided to Osvino that h0 was a man of the 'dynamic not static' 
centre lesouerdisante = leaning towards the left). However, 
AJ.meida·e:nphasized that ''tomorrow (the military) might have to 
choose, but in thsexecutivethey must" admit only men of the centre. 
Almeida add.ed that "if I have to choose between communism and 
dictatorship, I Hill stay with ihe right" - IPES CD Rio, 22nd 
Hay 1')62 and IP3S CD Hh September 1962. 
According to Antonio Carlos do Amaral Osorio, contacts were also 
kept Hith other influential military officers, such as General 
Crisanto and General Jair Dantas Ribeiro. See a:l.so Octavio 
Costa, ~ Revolu9ao que nao tem Dono' in 0 Processo Revolucionario 
Brasileiro (:Rio de Janeiro, AERP, 1969), pp.60-61. 
11 
12 
13 
11+ 
15 
16 
1.7 
II 
19 
20 
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There were a number of factional conspiracies. A report from 
the American Embassy in Rio noted that "Anti-regime plotting 
going on in the Brazilian military includes, but is not limited 
to, the lInd Army or Second military region. Current plotting 
is typically Brazilian in not being unified and in suffering 
from the presence of too many would-be leaders. All groups, 
however, of which we know, recognized a need for any such move-
ment to be country wide." Telegramme from Ambassador Lincoln 
Gordon to Secretary of Department of State - Control 1 )~62, No 
2275 - Hay 22, 1963 - NSF in J:F'K Archives. 
P. Schmitter, Interests, Conflict and Political 
(Stanford, University of California Press, 1971 
IPES CD Rio 26th June 1962. Meeting held by General Golbery 
do Couto e Silva, General Heitor Herrera, Augusto Trajano de 
Azevedo Antunes, Harold Cecil Polland, Jorge Oscar de }1ello 
Flores, Glycon de Paiva, Niguel l,ins, Jose Rubem Fonseca, OS1'faldo 
Tavares Ferreira, Can~ido Guinle de Paula f1achado, Antonio Carlos 
do Amaral Osorio and Dario de Almeida Nagalhaes. 
Host records of the meeting of IPES ,,1ould avoid mentioning the 
participation of military officers and the natur6 of their 
activities. Furthermore, when activities in which military 
officers were involved were mentioned, the presence of the 
military was indicated by initials. Thus, on August 23, 1962, 
a certain General H.G. is mentioned as being at one of the IPZS 
executive meetings to inform on the situation. See also IPSS CD 
Rio 7th August 1962. 
This was made clear from evidence presented to the Parliamentary 
Commission of Inquiry Qf 1963, which investigated IP2S/IBAD. 
!_etter from Colonel Astrogildo Correia to the CPI, presented 
on August 2), 196), in~, August 2'+, 1963. 
IPf':;S CE 20th November 1962 - J.B. Leopolda Figueiredo. 
According to Glycon de Paiva, General Golbery had been hired to 
direct a "variety of operations less academic in nature than 
those usually credited to IP3S". See Elmar Bones, 'Golbery, 
Poder e Silencio' in Gooj.orna:!. (Porto Alegre, September 1973), 
p.20. See also James RotTe et al., Brazilian Election Fact Book 
No.2, September 1965, p.)2. 
Marshal CCilio Denys, in Joao Camillo de Oliveira Torres, Razao 
e destino cla Revolu2ao~Petropo1is, Editora V6zes, 1<;)6+), pp_ 
225-230. 
B. Bones, 
IPES encouraged rapport between military officers and entrepren-
eurs through political courses administered in prestigious social 
and cultural clubs and in other locales, as seen in Chapters V 
and VI. 
The entreprepC'"lrS of IP~;S/I:SAD provided means for ihe military to 
traveJ and provided military officers engaged in the anti-Goulart 
movement with material support and financial Oacking, as shall 
be seen in this chapter. 
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21 The interaction between entrepreneurs and military was so 
intense that even the influential document 'lEE:( - :::ealdade 
ao Exerci to' C-_oyal ty to the Army), a text which intended to 
harmonize the various factions, was mimeographed in the offices 
of Cruzeiro do SuI, one of the national airlines, under the 
initiative of its director, IPES leader Bento Ribeiro Dantas. 
For an appreciation of the contents and the impact of LEEX, see 
J. Stacchini, op.cit., pp.~0-~6. It is interesting tn note 
that the author of this document was General Ulhoa Cintra, and 
that General Cordeiro de Farias went over the draft. General 
Olympio Mourao Filho, op.cit., pp.~11-412. General Castello 
Branco also went over the basic draft and introduced some changes. 
Interview of Marshal Cordeiro de Farias with R. A. Dreifuss, Rio 
de Janeiro, 1976. 
See also M. Bandeira, 0 Governo •••• , op.cit., p.161. 
22 Octavio Marcondes Ferraz - Testimony given in Sao Paulo on 
October 20, 1971. In HACB362/1 - President Castello Branco 
papers - CPDOC. Marcondes Ferraz was compensated for his 
efforts. He became one of the very few members of the organic 
elite of Sao Paulo to actually hold a top ranking office in the 
1964-1967 administration. 
23 Colonel Hernani D'Aguiar, an active participant of the plotting 
against Goulart, as a member of the ECEHE and a member of the 
Permanent Body of the ESG since 19(0 singled outfue following 
civilians 'who participated in the different stages of the 
conspiracy' : Osvaldo Pierucetti, Monteiro de Castro, Jose luiz 
de Hagalhaes Tins, Antonio Neder, Antonio Balbino, Camilo Aschar, 
Jose Maria Alkmim, Irma A.l"la de 1.,ourdes, :.caudo Natel, .Lucas 
Nogueira Garce-s, Julio de Mesquita Filho, Armando Falcao, Roberto 
de Abreu Sodre, Aliomar Baleeiro, ~uiz Carlos de Oliveira, 
Amaral Netto, Paulo Quartim Barbosa, Teodoro Quartim Barbosa, 
Hugo Levy, Robert Isnard, Joa~o de Almeida Prado, Sergio Barbosa 
Ferra~, I,uiz Pinni Neto, Claudio Soares, Flavio Galvavo, Andre 
de Faria Pereira Filho, Eugenio Gudin, Jose Prudente de f'1oraes 
Neto, Jose Zoberan Filho, Sandra Cavalcanti, Padre Calazans, 
Arnaldo Cerdeira, Adauto Cardoso, Dayl de Almeida, Afonso Arinos, 
Jose biduardo Prado Kelly, Hilton Campos, Edmundo Fa.Lcao, Augusto 
de :'ima Neto, Pedro Alei:<o, Assis Chateaubriand, Americo de 
Souza, Herman de Horais Barros, Herbert :.-evy, Rondon Pacheco, 
Ribeiro de Andrade, ~uiz Antonio Gama e Silva, Paulo Ayres 
Filho, Paulo Egydio Hart ins , Alfredo Easser, i!:mival Caiado, 
Coelho de Souza, Octavio r!arcondes Ferraz, _uiz Carlos Prado, 
Carlos Eduardo D'Alamo Lousada, Rodolfo de Freitas Fi1ho, _uiz 
vlerneck, Aristoteles Drummond, Frederic-;· '/iotti, Daniel Krieger, 
Eldino Brancante, Joao Adelino Prado }leto, Humberto Golfi, 
Silvio I uciano de Campos Arruda Camara, Hurilo de £·1e10 Filho, 
Roberto f.1arinho, Ricardo Narinho, Rogerio Harinho, Helio Fernan-
des, Sergio Lacerda, Sebastiao Tacerda, Arnaldo Vieira de 
Carvalho, Sergio Broteiro Junqueira, GUstavo Borghoff, Adalberto 
3ueno Neto, Joao Baptista :eopolclo Figueiredo, Antonio Car.Los 
Pacheco e Silva, Daniel t.1achado de Campos, Pa1L.o Reis Hagalhaes, 
:::duardo levi Fil:10, Jose Ely Coutinho, Vicente f'Iammana Neto, 
:~arcel 0 Garcia, Rafael de Almeida Magalhaes, David Nassey and 
Joao CaJmon. In H. D'Aguiar, op.cit~, p.I07 The presence of 
the IPES leadership is obvious as HeE as that of many activists 
in the sectors of Pub~ic Opinion and Syndical and Student matters. 
('lany of these names have already been mentioned. in the previous 
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chapters. Most of them will be mentioned again in this chapter. 
24 H. Silva, op.cit., p.250. 
25 Colonel Octavio Velho was appointed to the Servico Noticioso of 
the Agencia Nacional (the news service of the National Radio 
Agency). He had been in the Hinistry of Justice, under Janio 
Quadros, was a member of the Comissao Tecnica do Radio and a 
director of Mesbla S.A., the giant retail house in Rio de Janeiro 
which finance& IPES. Colonel Octavio Velho was also a member 
of IPES study groups. 
General Agostinho Cortes was one offue officers who retired 
prematurely and went to head the military-civilian operations 
of lPES Sao Paulo. 
26 Colonel Geraldo Cavagnari i:esbat Filho first called my attention 
to the role of General Mamede and the importance of the ECE¥~ 
in the events that led to April 1, 196~. Interview at ECEME, 
October 1976. Under the command of General Hamede and General 
J oao Bina Machado a t the ECEHE were about 400 officers who , with 
few exceptions, supported the activities against Goulart. Among 
the activists at the ECEME were i:ieut. Col. Joao Baptista 
Figueiredo, Lieut. Col. Octavio Hedeiros, lieut. Col. IvaI ter 
Pires de Carvalho e Albuquerque, Hajor Helio t1endes, Major 
Hernani D' Aguiar ,Najor Venturini, Iieut. r·1ario Silva O'Reilly 
Souza who were figures of prestige among army officers. See 
J. Portella, op.cit., pp.61-'3'-l-, on the significance of the ECEI>1E, 
and chapters IV-Von the role of the ECE1~ during the events 
that led to April I, 196~l-. 
27 J. W. Rowe, op.cit., p.15. 
21 Carlos Castello Branco, 'La Conspiraqao a Revoiu9ao', in A. Dines 
et al., Os Idos •••• , op.cit., pp.237-306. See also J.H. Rowe, 
op.cit., p.1+. 
29 Interview 1-ri th General Albuquerque .Lima - Rio de Janeiro, Nay 
1976. See also J. Portella, op.cit., p.3+. 
30 ESG General Agricola Bethlem was a director of Codinco - Compo 
de Desenvolvimento Industrial e Comercial and of Cia. Atlantica 
de Investimentos, Cifra S.A., Cota S.A., Consorcio Atlantico 
de Investimentos. He was aso a leading member of AD~CIF, the 
class association of the credit, finance and investment corporations. 
31 General Hontagna Has an executive of \>Jillys Overland. 
32 'Orl_ando Geisel, l·10rreu 0 Condestavel do Regime', in ISTO l:~, 
1\0.J21 , June 6, 1979. IFES Rio telephone biEs were invoiced 
to General Henrique Geisel, who by then 1-[as in private business. 
33 General Esmeraldo was the uncle of Vicente Barreto Esmeraldo, 
who became a close friend of Genera::_ t:rnesto Geise~_ rising 
rapidly through the pub1ic administration and becoming a top 
bureaucrat after 197j • 
]1 Brigadier H. FJ.eiuss became director of the financia::" group S.rl.i.I',:tA 
S.A., and of Safron Tbijin Ind. Brasileira de Fibras (Teijin _td./ 
Barubeni Corp./SAFRA S.A.). 
35 Both Brigadier Batista Bastos and Admiral Augusto Silva were 
executives of ESSOBrasileira de Petroleo. 
36 Colonel Vidal iofas a director of COMAQ. 
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37 :,ieut. Col. Nachado Doria was linked to Volta Redonda, Acesita, 
Companhia Siderurgica Nacional and Itabira. 
3':') other officers were Colonel Souza, of Cia. ieste f.!ineira and 
Colonel Valente, of the paratroopers. 
39 J. Knippers Black, op.cit., pp.75-76. 
IfO On September 9, 1963, Colonel Humberto Freire de Andrade, secre-
tary of Public Security of Pernambuco, denounced 70 military 
officers in a letter to the then Minister of War, General Jair 
Dantas Ribeiro. See OESP November :\ 1963. For further informa-
tion on the IPES/IBAD-network among the military, see OESP July 
19, J963; July 20, 1963; July 26, 1963; October 25, 19()J";and 
November 7, 1963. See also Pedro Aleixo, at the CPI on IBAD 
in OESP October 23, 1963. See also Plinio d3 Abreu Ramos, op.cit., 
p.7-r;:-
'+1 After 196+, General Nelson de Nello becr.me a member of t he finan-
cial group SAFRA S.A. and director cfEricsson do Brasil. 
~2 other members of this network were Lieut. Col. Soares de Souza, 
:Lieut. Col. Hudson, Lieut. Col. Varela, :Wieut. Col. Cunha, 
Captain Lamartine (assistant secretary-ADEP-Guanabara), Capt. 
Joaquim Afonso, Capt. Jaime Antunes Lamir, Capt. Heitor ~opes 
Caminta, Capt. Sardenberg (nephew of BSG General Ida:io Sarden-
berg, another active conspirator), Lieut. Jos~ Carlos Amazonas, 
T,ieut. C~odoaldo and :0ieut. Borda. Some of these young lieut-
enants became hard-liners after 196·1-. 
other military officers linked tofue IBAD/ADEP network were 
Marshal Jose Ignacio Verissimo, Colonel Olympio Feraz (of the 
Military Police of Pernambuco) and Lieut. Colonel Reinaldo 
Sa~danha da Gama, who was deeply involved in the traffic of 
weapons for the conspiracy against Goulart. See M. Bandeira, 
o Governo •••• , op.cit., p.12B and Justino Alves Bastos, oP.cit., 
pp.331-J'H. 
'>3 ~, November 9, 1963. 
:4 J.H, Rowe, Vol :(1, op,cit., pp.11-12 and J.I:.F. Dlliles, Castello •••• 
1 
op.cit., p.309. 
45 See Editorial 'A destruiQ~o das For9as Armadas' in A9ao Democra-
tica, March 1962, which set the tone for many similar appea~s. 
~6 Some of the outstanding officers of the Cruzada Democratica 
were General Mamede, General Go1bery, General 'l'avora, General 
Jostf SinvaJ Monte1ro ::.undenberg, General Sardenberg, General 
Sizeno Sarmento, General Ademar de Queiroz, General Castello 
Branco, General Ernesto Geisel and General Orlando Geisel. 
For the names of other members of the Cruz ada Democratica, see 
contI··· . 
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Werneck Sodre, Memorias de urn Soldado (Riore Janeiro, Editora 
CivilizaqaNo Brasileira, 1967), p.336, and J • lit .F. DuLLes, Unrest •••• , 
op.cit., pp.3-+, 31. 
~r7 As early as Harch 1962, Ruy Gomes de Almeida assessed the results 
of the work of IPES in the military sector, drawing a comparison 
between IPES/Military and the Church. Almeida stated that for 
IFillS to carry out a counter-reform to Communism, it needed the 
participation of the Army, which would playa role analogous to 
the 'Company of Jesus', which had two faces, one seeking proselytes 
and the other actually carrying out the 'inquisition'. IPES, 
because of its nature, could only proselitize, but the show of 
the force ('the bonfire') could come only from the military. He 
observed that the military working with lPES were 'more or less 
the same ones as in the beginning', a situation which would 
rapidJ.y change as the work of lPES/IBAD among the military 
began to bear fruits. IPES DC Rio 27th [I!arch 1962. 
The need for making sure of increased support among the military 
was made even more urgent as Goulart was perceived to be 'con-
soUdating:aily his position i'fithin the Armed Forces and the 
trade unions', while public support for ~eonel Brizzola Has 
groHing. IPES CD '1th September 1962, Augusto Trajano de Azevedo 
Antunes. 
In August 1962, the military aspect of the campaign of IPES was 
analyzed. Candido Guiule de Paula Machado referred to 'a new 
fact such a.s the dispositivo militar'. IPES CD 7th August 1962. 
It is interesting to note that General GOlbery, who was not 
present at this meeting, justified his abs'ence because he was 
'busy with the preparations for the crisis of August :>., 1962', 
vrhen the C'l.;"cadacy of Santiago Dantas to the premiership would 
be rejected by the ADP bloc in Congress. Not long after, 
Augusto Trajano de Azevedo Antunes referred himself to the 
, Attitude of the Armed Forces', and to 'the prepared political 
manoeuvres' (jogadas). In IPIIS Hinutes 2nd October 1.962. In 
this session, General Golbery e.dended his observations on the 
preparations of IPES for the elections of October 7, 1962, as 
well as on the coming referendum of January 1963. 
!~J T. Skidmore, op.cit., pp.223-226, 2&}-265, advances the idea 
of a 'network of military conspiracies'. 
See also R. Schneider, op.cit., pp.39-l07, J. Stacchini, on.cit., 
chapters 3 and ~ and especially 13, and H. Silva, cp.cit., part 
III. 
49 Hernani D'Aguiar provides a list of over 330 Army officers, from 
majors to four star genera1s, who Here aotive members in the 
p:otting against Goulart belonging to these three major ten-
dencies. He a~_so provides lists of navy and Air Force officers 
who actively participated in the coup. Hernani D'Aguiar, op.cit.~ 
pp.l_03-106. 
The Army list in particular resembles a 'who's who' of the 
mi li tary officers who occupied the key posts in the Army structure 
after 196..!- and to t~1e present. 
50 Former presidents of AD£SG have been IP~S leaders, such as G.J. 
Borghoff, J. Behring de HB.ttos, ~udes de Souza Leao, Joao 
Nicolau Mader Gon9alves and Glycan de Paiva. 
51 
52 
53 
t).!~ 
55. 
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Partial accounts of the role of the ESG and ESG activists in 
the p"l.ot against Goulart can be found in J. Stacchini, op.cit., 
Chapter 1J, H. Silva, op.cit., Parts III, IV and V. A. stepan, 
o~.cit., especially Chapter 3, who is largely responsible for 
the extraordinary attention paid by pol.itical scientists to 
the ESG, EliezerBizZQ de Oliveira, As For9as Armadas: Pol{tica 
e Ideologia no Brasil (19&~}-1969) :Petr6polis, Editora V6zes, 
1976), Chapter I, and-J.H.F. Dulles, Unrest •.•• , op.cit., pp. 
J03-JJO and J .\.; .F. Dulles, Castello •.•. , op.cit., pp.261-3 l +. 
In the case of J.W.F. Dulles, his accounts ar8 strongly sympa-
thetic to tha individuals and groups which were a part of IPES/ 
ESG who made up most of his interviewees. Nevertheless, his 
writings provide much of the materia~ necessary for a less pas-
sionate consideration of the issues anC;. probi.ams involv8d, as 
he has dra1m heavily on a series of interviews with :Leading 
political~tors in Brazil, mostly involved infue IP~S/IBAD 
network. However, a detailed account of the true role of the 
SSG in the coup of 196+ is still wanting. 
Host of these young officers were also at. the BG.i.!:M::£, a s seen 
earlier. Col. ~epiane, Col. Ayrosa, Col. Andreazza, ~ieut. Col. 
Halter Pires and Lieut. Col. Caracas ~inhares, in particular, 
Here linked with General Nuricy. General Huricy was also linked 
up with General Cordeiro, General Nelson de Hello and General 
Ulhoa Cintra. 
According to Gal. Huricy, the central nucleus of the conspiracy 
comprised General CasteJ.lo Branco, 'Yrho was head of the General 
Staff of the Army, General. Costa e Silva, ·'!>Tho Nas at the Depart-
ment of Production and l}orks, General Cordeiro de Farias md 
Genera 1. Ademar de Queiroz, both in 'Pajama', General Or~and 0 
Geise 1_, who Has in the directorship of -the Department cf ;:;ngineer-
ing ~'!ateria"., a.'1d furthermcreGil. Ernesto GeisG=_, Gal. Augusto 
Cesar de Castro Moniz de Aragao, Ga'-. Namede and Gal. Alfredo 
Souto ~!la'~an. This group Has connected, a ccording to Ga:c.. Huricy, 
Hith 'General Golbery and his group, who at IP~~S Has carrying 
out, Jinked up 'YTi th us, intense work among the entrepreneurs 
of Rio and Sao Paulo' • 
T,Ti th the exception of Genera 1. Costa e SiJ.va, these officers '..rere 
linked to the Informal General Staff headed by Gal. Caste~~o 
Branco. Genera2- A.l1tonio Carlos da Silva Nuricy, '0 Destacamento 
Tiradentes e 0 32- de I·Tarco de 1>6'+', in 0 Globo, Harch 25, 1)17;, 
pp.6-7. 
"A::"l I did was to ask them to refrain from supporting the govern-
ment. They did not have to join us." l1arshal Cordeiro C"3 Farias, 
Intervie1>l' to R .A. Dreifuss, Rio de Janeiro, 1976. 
An account of ho r" General Cas·tello Branco was draHn into the 
'conspiracy' and of the activities of the Informal General staff, 
is to be found in J.H.F. Dulles, Caste::clo .... , op.cit., pp.297-361. 
The assertion that General Castello Fas an IP:=S af'filiate 'Has 
made by IFc=S leader Helio Gomide in a letter to Gen6ra}, Fontoura, 
head of the SNl I on October 2'3, 1965'. In lEES archives, Rio. 
See Appendix S. 
J 'T F D '1" '" C t., 1 . t 3'-"'" 'l'h ID ·'c/.'C'G/IB '" .~'. • 11.. '"',s, as e -_0 •••• , op.c~ ., p. C-:'" e .L,U ,-,0 fuj
group needed a leader above factional and partisan rivalries, 
respected Hithin the Army hierarchy, sufficient].y moderate and 
cont/ ••.• 
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i.egalist to ca l.m civi:'..ian anxiety over Army continuity in power, 
and who could stand, because of his prestige, against the right 
wing and the traditionalists among the military. 
56 J.1,.!.F. Dulles, Castello .... , op.cit., p.JJO. It shouid be noted 
that the centre of conc£ntration and the first General Head-
quarters of this group on April 1, 1964, vIas reported to have 
been in the Rio de,Janeiro appartment of IPB::S activists tdmundo 
Falcao. H. Silva, op.cit., p.J77. 
57 Other officers who joined the General Staff were General Moniz 
de Arag~o, General ~undenberg, Colonel Murilo Ferreira and Lieut •. 
Col. Ivan l1endes. 
58 Among the members of this group were Air Force Colonels Haroldo 
Velloso, Teixeira Pinto, Iebre, ~euzinger, Major iameirao and 
Paulo victor and Army Majors Luiz Bendes and Tarcisio Ferreira. 
H. D'Aguiar, op.cit., p.10J. For a detailed account of the 
activities of the right-wing extremists since 1954 onwards, see 
J. Portella, op.cit., pp.9-174. 
59 J.W.F. Dulles, Unrest •••• , op.cit., p.22J. See also E. Brancante 
in General Mourao ••. , op.cit., p.200. 
60 Roberto de Abreu Sodre, Testimony to iuiz Viana Filho, Sao Paulo, 
August 2~, 1971, in RACE 679/1 - p.19, in CPDOC Archives, Rio 
de Janeiro. 
61 H.D'Aguiar, op.cit., p.lOJ. 
62 H. Silva, op.cit., pp.4l4-4l5. The newspaper itself had been 
founded, according to the police records of Guanabara state, 
with the support of American and Foreign Power (Bond and Share 
Group), where !BAD intellectual Eugenio Gudin was a director, 
and i..istas Telefo'nicas Brasileiras, of IP.:i.S leader Gilberto 
Huber. See R. Rojas, Estados Unidos en Brasil (Chile, Prensa 
:Latino Americana, ~.965), p.120. 
63 For an account of the activities of the 'troupiers', see J. 
Panella, op.cit., pp.5'-173. General Porte:;'la assimilates 
the 'troupiers' to the right-wing e.dremists and gives an account 
of their 'understanding' Hith the ESG. See aJ.so J. Stacchini, 
on.cit., H. D'Aguiar, oD.cit., Gal. J. A. Bastos, 0x.cit., Gal. 
C. ~. Guedes, oD.cit., and General Nourao, .£p.cit. 
64 A. stepan, op.cit., p.22 7 • 
Interview HUh Pau~ 0 Guerra to R. A. Dreifuss, Brasilia, July 1976. 
For an account of General Eastos' role, see General Justino ALves 
Bastos, op. cit. See ai.so J. Page, 'rhF) Revolution that never was 
(NeH York, Grossman Publishers, 1972.), pp.190-lS7. 
65 H. Silva, op.cit., pp.293, 409. 
66 Interview with Paulo Guerra to R.A.Dreifuss, Brasilia, July 1976. 
67 See Gen'.3ral J. A. Bastos, op.cit., P'p.JJ5-j4i. 
6~ 2urilo Du~rte '32 mais 32, igual a 64', in A. Dines, Os Idos •..• , 
of).cit., p.14;>. See also H. l)'Aguiar, or.cit., p.:3..47. 
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69 A. stepan, op.cit., p.227. See a:s~ J. Portella, op.cit., p.129. 
ryo It is interesting to note that Petropolis was one of the key 
centres for the articula9ao of the military side of the campaign. 
A ~arge number of high ranking officers had summer houses in 
that mountainous resort, one hour's journey from Rio, which 
made it a perfect spot for encounters. A central place for these 
encounters was the house of Judge Antonio Neder, where General 
Ne1son re ;-1e,-10, Genera1 Cordeiro de Farias, Admiral Heck, Marshal 
Denys, Admira1 Rademacker, Admiral Vampre, Admiral Hello Baptista, 
Admiral levy· Aarao Reis, Brigadier ~1arcio de Souza e Hello, 
Genera1 Mourao Filho and many others co-ordinated their efforts. 
In the building where Judge Neder had his appartment, the Rdificio 
Centenario, were living r'1arshal Denys, Brigadier Eduardo Gomes 
and the jurist Francisco Campos, who was an active conspirator. 
In the same neighbourhood lived Admiral Heck and Brigadier Grun 
Noss. 
See Stacchini, op.cit., p.191. 
71 Telegramme CIA - Ref. No. 36659 - Sanitized copy - Report No.TDCS 
3/542,606 - 'Plans of Military groups directed by General Amauri 
Kruel, !'Tinister of \:Tar, Marshal Odilio Denys, General Helson de 
Mello and others to discuss plans for an anti-government coup' -
March 15, 1963 - KSF in JFK Archives. Also in this group were 
one admiral and two generals of t he Brazilian Air Force who 
Here not named in me report. 
72 CIA telegramme - TDCS 3/545,753 - April 39, 1963 - Ref. 23.')63 -
NSF in JFK Archives. ~lourao Filho asked Admiral Heck to join 
forces, to which the latter agreed. Heck and Admiral Mario 
Cavalcanti sought a group of captains to join ~10urao. 
Another telegramme notes that 'This is one of several anti-
Gou1art conspiracies which appear to be under way' - telegramme 
to Department of State from Ambassador Gordon - Control lj+62 -
Hay 23, 1963-- No.2275 - NSF in JFK Archives. 
73 t1arshal O. DenJ's, in J. C. de Oliveira Torres, Ope cit., pp. 225-230. 
74 General r-1ourao' s campaign can be reconstructed and the signifi-
cance of his activities assessed by assembling me information 
provided in General Mourao, op.cit., J. Portella, QP.cit., J. 
Stacchini, op.cit., H. Silva, op.cit., Ga~. C.~. Guedes, op.cit •. 
and J .1'T.F. Dulles, Unrest ••.• , op.cit., pp.30l-337. 
75 I have focused on General Mourao's activities for a number of 
reasons. His campaign has been vddely disc~ssed and documented, 
a very important factor in a most difficult area of research. 
General Mourao's campaign, pieced together from a series of 
separate accounts, provides a most valuable insight into the 
oblique way in which IPES/IBAD operated among the r"ili tary. 
Furthermore, General Mourao's campaign provides a cross-section 
of the interaction of civilians and military and, moreover, of 
the '_eading role played by the IPES/IBAD leaJership and activists. 
"6 H. Silva, on.cit., pn.205-206. See also General ;'lourao, oE.cit •. 
PP.30-J1. General Penha BrasiJ had been a member of the Comissao 
:'1ixta Brasil - USA. 
77 
73 
79 
'10 
11 
General Mourao, op.cit., p.116. 
General Mourao, op.cit., pp.30-31. 
General Moura"'o, op • cit., pp .111, 3J5. 
Gene al 71ourao, _~,-cj.j:,~, p. :-1-7. 
E. Bones, QP~cit., p.20. 
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;2 Americo Oswa'_do Campiglia was a director of Cia. SuI Americana 
de Investime ntos, Credi tos e Financiamentos (r~arcos Gasparian) i 
Cia. Naciona'_ de Equipamentos Eletricos-EQTJI2:U; Perfumaria San-
Dar S .A.; Fia<;ao Brasileira de Rayon S .A./Francisco !ilatarazzo/ 
Snia Viscosa-Italy/ren & Co's Bank - Switzerland) i Industria de 
Bebidas Cinzano S.A.; Cimento Santa Rita S.A. (Prince Ai.varo 
Orleans Bourbon e CODurgo/Dolphin Shipping Co. - Panama); and 
Banco Frances e 13rasileiro S .A. He ,.ras also a public figure 
of the UDN. 
'13 H. Silva, op.cit., p.248. 
34 A. stepan, o£.cit., p.97. 
See also IPSS CE :jth June 1962: 'In the hour of crisis what is 
generally missing is the support to the men and the good ideas' -
Harold Polland and Glycon de Paiva. 
)5 H. Silva, op.cit., p.249. 
~6 Paulo 'Sgydio ~artins was a director of Cia. Geral de Ninas 
'Byngton Family-Alberto Torres Fo); Union Carbide; Cia. de Des-
envolvimento de Industrias Minerais-CODD1 (Union Carbide) i Fios 
e Cabos Pla'sticos do Brasil (Anaconda Mining/A:;:COA;; Produtos 
Eletricos Brasileiros S.A.~Byngton Family/Naguib Niziara-Joao 
BcDowell !,ei te de Castro \: Alcominas - Cia. Mineira de Ai.uminio 
(AI uminium Co.): Tiete S/A de Credito Imobiliario, Cia. Federal 
do Comercio, Industria e Engenharia, Cia. Comercial Administra-
dora Ponta da Praia, Cia. Comercio e ParticipaQoes COp&q, Cia. 
ComercRl e Administradora Macuco J INDUSEG (L. D. Villares). 
=i7 Jornal do Brasil, December 22, 1976, p •. ~}. 
l') It was in late 196,_ or early 1962 that Admiral Heck also met 
Ambassador Gordon, a meeting arranged at the Admiral's request. 
Admiral Heck told ~~ba83ador Gordon that 'large numbers of civil-
ians and military were organizing a golpe against Go~art' • 
Admiral. Heck told ~~bassador Gordon that he was not requesting 
American help but that he had wanted the Ambassador to be 
informed. He added 'One of these days we will~t, and I hope 
when that happens, the United states will not be unsympathetic.' 
In P. Parker, op.cit., pp.26-27. See also J.li.F. Dulles, Unrest •••• , 
op.cit., p.32;+. 
39 J. Stacchini, on.cit., p.lS. Mesquita Filho's reply can be found 
in Stacchini, op.cit., pp.16-1C. It"is interesting to note that 
amongihe points made by Mesquita Filho, he suggested that ~ucas 
-:-opes, Senator Hem de Sa, Hilton Campos, Dario de Almeida I··lagalhaes, 
Harcondes Ferraz, General Hacedo Soares, Roberto Campo~ and 
cont/ ••.• 
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Prado Kelly should be considered for the future government. 
1,Jith the exception of Lucas ~opes, director of Hanna ~1ining, 
and Prado Kelly, all these IPES/IBAD linked entrepreneurs and 
techno-entrepreneurs became members of the post-1964 administra-
tion. Mesquita Filho also prepared with Vicente Rao, the lawyer 
linked to the Hanna t1ining Co., the draft of an Institutional 
Act. 
The officers b e h i n d tho s e who went t 0 S ao P aulD 
had prepared .a doc u men t calle d 'R eflection 0 r 
Contribution to orient the strategic conception of an efficient 
repression of the subversive movement which the left are prepar-
ing in Brazil'. In this document, General Ulhoa CiIitra, General 
Cordeiro, Marshal Denys and others outlined in detail the char-
acteristics of a probable subversive movement in 1962 and recom-
mended a general strategy to counteract it. Among the measures 
were: the appointment of an 'energetic chief' to command the 
key 5th Nilitary Region based in Parana. Very conveniently, 
General Ernesto Geisel was appointed to the post. See also J. 
Stacchini, op. cit., pp.lt 3-50 and T. Skidmore, of. cit., 1'1'.224-225. 
SO A. Tavora, l O de Abri1_ •••• , op.cit., 1'.95. 
91 H. Silva, oD.ci~, 1'.251. 
92 H. Sil.va, oJ2..cit., p.252. 
93 General Hourao, op.cit., 1'.1],3. 
94 H. Si~va, op.cit., 1'.250, 267. See also E. Duarte, op.cit., p.~40. 
S'S E. Duarte, op.cit., p.149 
96 H. Silva, op.cit., pp.2l7-2l3; J. Stacchini, op.cit., 1'.29. 
0'1 H. Silva, op.cit., pp.220-22l. 3ee also J. Portella, op.cit., 
p.47 and General C. 1. Guedes, Of.cit., p.-_10. 
QO G 1"" • t 1 ,.., I' / J renera. (',ourao, op. cJ. ." p. _ "-0. 
"'C) Genera'. ;'1ourao, oJ? • cit., pp. ~ 30, 16 .• 
~.OO General >'{ourawo, OD. ci t., p. '-25. 
Lal Ildo ~f,eneghetti 0:-,.':' the Fabrica de Ce'..ulose e Pa:.oe:~. S.A. 
102 J.ll.F. Dul-Les, caste· .. lo .••. , op.cit., 1'.333. 
Co·'.onel Barcellos would eventua~.ly co-ordinate the subversive 
movement within the PoUce Brigade of I.Ldo Heneghetti, who became 
governor of Rio Grande do Sul in LS62. See General. ;·Iourao, 
Ol).cit., p.l64. 
103 Dutra headed the E;.pansul-Cia. de Financiamento e Credito ~ 
Produ9ao, a powerful investment and credit company in Rio Grande 
do Su~. 
10- D. Krieger, Descle as ~'!issoes •.. Saudades, -utas, Esperanyas :Rio 
de Janeiro, J. Olympio, 1976\ p.16,. See also General ~;Iourao, 
op.cit._, p.32 and H. Silva, oD.cit., p.207. 
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105 General Nourao, op.cit., pp.111, 335. 
106 Genera} r1ourao, op.cit., pp.151-152. 
1.0'7 General Mourao, op.cit., p.140 
10~ ~·'hat resu'ted in another diversionist manoeuvre was the projection 
of' the Ci vi Han r1ili tary Fa troi tic Front, l.ed by Admira:!.. Heck 
himse'.f. The Front attempted to involve in the subversive move-
ment. or at least neutra-:"ize, the nationalist elements of the 
Armed Forces. These nationalists were mainly younger officers 
whose views did not coincide with the socio-economic doctrine of 
the ESG, nor did they approve of the 'politicizing' of certain 
officers. The young offic8rs mistrusted the older military 
who had become 'too civilianized', the so-called 'hybrids' or 
'amphibious', with their duality of roLes as military and. as 
politicians or entrepreneurs. It is high~y significant that 
IP~S leader Octavio Marcondes Ferraz joined Admira~ Heck and 
his lieutenant, IBAD Colonel Astrogildo Correia, head of Promo-
tion S.A., at the Airport of Congonhas in Sao Paulo, on August 7. 
196), for the launching of the Front. i'lith Admiral Heck came 
also Admiral Edir Dias de Caxvalho Rocha, Colonel Jose Anchietta 
Paz, a former integralista" and Capt. Carvalho Costa and Lieut. 
Pedro ~eamar. OESP, August ~, 1963. See Oliveiros S. Ferreira, 
Af? For9as Armadase 0 Desafio da Revolu9ao (Rio de Janei::'o, 
GRD, 1(62). Ferreira, a politics professor at the University 
of Sao Paulo and a most prominent columnist of the 0 Estado de 
Sao Paulo, was an cctive member of th8 Patriotic Front. See also 
J. stacchini, EP.cit., pp.20-22 for what the ?atriotic Front 
ca:.'.ed the 'Ten Commandments', the core of their programme. 
109 C. Carneiro, on.cit., p.562. 
"0 G -. 1 'If AI 't l'77 1~7l 
__ .. en~ra __ "ourao, OP.c~ " pp._, - ..• 
111 j,U~Z Claudio Cunha, tJ Diario de Hourao Filho' in .900jo;rnQJ.; 
(Porto ALegre, April 197 1). Genera~ ffourao, on.cit., pp.11l-132. 
, 12 Genera l Nourao, 0:2. ci t " p. L S'S' • 
., 13 G 01 I··f" • t - 72 ~ en~ra. __ l'.ourao, op. c~ " P .1, • 
'l~ ~. Silva, op.cit., p.221. 
i:5 H. Silva, op.cit., pp.252, 373. 
116 p • Schmitter, Interest, Conflict and rO:Li tica.-L Change in Brazil. 
(Stan::ord, Stanford University Fress, i9'71;, p.360. 
11'7 E. Brancante, 'Relatorio do ~-..stado l1aior GivE de Sao Paulo', 
in General ~'~ourao, .2J2..!..~i t., p. 200. For a description of the 
action of the student ~eaders and CathoHc Horkers' le2.ders, 
s-':e Chapti,rs VI and VII. Colone'- Armando de Oliveira Has 
appointed head of security of Sa~o l'au 1.0 by the command in charge 
of the prs~arations of the coup. See Quem e Quem no Brasil 
(Sociedade Brasileira de Expansao Comercial Ltda, Sao Paulo, 
1967), Vol.V~, p.20 
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118 In the area of Sao Paulo, General Barreto had the support of 
Colonel Sebastiao Amaral, Colonel Jose Silva Prado, Colonel 
Octavio, Colonel Arlindo and several other Public Police officers 
who had been ~ommandeered by him. General Menna Barreto also 
secured the support of Sao Paulo state Police director, General 
Joa-o Franco Pontes. E. Brancante, 0t.cit., pp.200-20l. 
See also CIA report, Plans of Genera Olympio Mourao Filho to 
overthrow the Administration of President Goulart - April 29, 
1963 TOCS 3/546,074 - Sanitized Document - NSF in JFK Archives. 
119 E. Brancante, op.cit., pp.205-206 • 
120 E. Brancante, op.cit., p.202. It is interesting to note that 
Persival de Oliveira and Ricardo Valente were involved because 
of 'their specialized knowledge on Communist techni~ues'. 
121 H. Silva, op.cit., p.252. 
Vicente Mamanna No was director of CH1A - Cia. Industrial de 
Ma terial Automobil:lstico. Ser/2'io Barbosa Ferraz \<fas director 
of INDUSVAL S.A. Corretora de Titulos e Valores. Eduardo Levy 
was a director of Editora Gazeta l'1ercantil S.A. and Praias 
Paulistas S.A. Jose Ely Viana Coutinho was a director of Orbita-
gem ~e Pneus t10nicap S .A. 
122 E. Duarte, op.cit., p.129. 
123 E. Brancante, op.cit., p.2l5. The Sao Paulo based Institute of 
Engineering, represented by Andre Telles de Mattos, had another 
function in General Agostinho Cortes' strategy. The engineers 
had the task of manning the public services of Sao Paulo (water 
supply, electricity and gas), taking over from the Goulart admini-
stration once the coup had been unleashed. 
124 J.H.F. Dulles, Unrest ••• , p.258. 
125 '0 Know-Hm-r de (}..j, usado no Chile ern 73', in ISTO i, No.123, May 
2, 1979. 
126 Among the paperbacks which Drummond received from the CIA Here 
China: Communists in Perspective, by A. Doak Barnett, The Politi-
cal \liar; The Arm of International Communis~J by Suzanne Labin, 
illffi: Instrumento de Subversao, all books which IP~S distributed, 
as seen in Appendix L. A.J. Langguth, op.cit., pp.89-90o 
127 H. Silva, op.cit., p.229. 
128 Before the troops reached Sitio Alegre, three trucks full of 
arms escaped under the command of Paulo Galvao. In Jornal do 
Brasil, Caderno Especial, November 6, 1977. 
The chase after arms deposits, and arms smuggling and training 
grounds for civilians in the use of firearms also served to 
divert the attention of the intelligence services ffid the mili-
tary dispositivo of Goulart, while the real threat was corning 
from withinfue Armed Forces themselves. 
l2q H. Bandeira, Presen9a ••• , op.cit., pp.126-l28 
130 H. Silva, op.cit., pp.257-258. 
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1)'. Jean i1arc Von der 'Heid, who later became president of the 
National Union of Students, recalled that in 196+, as a teen-
ager, he had been recruited to serve with one of a number of 
armed groups organized by the management of ~ight S.A., where 
his uncle "ras one of t he directors, to support Laceroa. Jean 
Marc 1-laS stationed at iacerda' s palace on ihe night the coup 
got under way. His group had sub-machine guns, but they were 
vri thout ammunition until a long black limousine arrived. The 
back s"at had been removed and in its place were containers 
that looked likG caskets, full of ammunition. The man who got 
out and began distributing the ammunition Has speaking :=;nglish. 
Interview vrith J. T1. Von d.er Weid byR.A. Dreifuss in Paris, 
September '-97'(. J. Knippers Black, 0ll.cit., pp.61-69. 
"32 H. Bandeira, ° Governo ••.• , 01'. cit., pp. 12;-~2S·. See also O~:;SP 
N ovc,mber 7, 1(.63. A 1_ berto pc;reira da Silva Has vice-president 
of' Cia. de Ci: :'lto Port1 and Barroso, Cia. de Cimento Portland 
:iossoro, Cia. de Cimento Portl.and Paraiso and was ~l.inked to Cia. 
naciona~_ de ~=stamparia and 5mpresa Granja ?araiso. IbS leader 
Pau1.o ~'~ario Fr8iro was a director of th,':)se enterprises. 
233 Te1_egramme to Departm::mt of state from Ambassador Lincoln Gordon -
No AID 511 - rillS, October ~L2, 1963. Se, ai.so t~legramme to 
De-oartm':nt of state from Gordon J.18in - Sanitized version -
September 19, J.963 - hSF, in JFl{ Archives. Gordon !'lein was 
years later killed by gu?rrillas in Guat~ma~a. 
13 1 r1. Bandeira, Pr:;senqa •••• , op.cit., p.16l .. 
"-35 
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'\!. -cndeira, Presen<;a •... , op.cit., pp.12+-:25. See aiso J. 
Knippers B:iack-;-Qjf.Clt., p.qSi J. Page, oD.cit., pp.1.'jO-197. 
In other parts of the country, particularly in the :iortheast, 
entrepr_'Deurs and landmmers mobilized private armies. In 
Ai agoas, under th'.:; supervision of the! Secr·.~tary of Security, 
Col_one-~ Jo8:o i·1endon9a, an army of 10,000 men Has raised, trainc:d 
for sabotage and gU'3rriJJ.a warfare. Similar organizations 
sprung up in th.cO rest of the Northeast and in the centre south 
stat9 of Goias. In Pernambuco, p"lott::rs vrers led by the Fedc;ra-
tion of Industries, Hh·:-;r;"'; IY:S had estab~_ish;d its strongho~_d, 
and \'rhere Cid Sampaio Has particular1y active. Int.1rvieH vIi th 
Pau'o Guerra, ErasiJia, July 1.976. 
According to ?au'_o Schi~ling, G.meral Pery 3evi~acqua was' con 
quer)0. -for th3 clemocratic cause' by IBAD and IP~S. Faulo 
Schi" ling, Como se Co"~a. Direi ta no P_oder : Sao FaU2.o, Gi.oba~;_ 
~ditdra, 197 9), p.2Jl. 
CIA Report, PJ.ans of Sao Paulo Civilian Sector of ~Ilovem~nt to 
Overtnrow ,;oulart Administration - Sanitized copy - TDCS J/5-(),654 -
~lay 2", 1963 - NSF in JFK Archives. See also Jornal. do BrasL, 
Caderno 'Cspecia1, November 6, J..j7r;. 
Brancante, op.ci~~, p.199. 
Colon'.;;:' Jose CanavD Filho, former commander of the For<;a Publica, 
the state mEitia of Sao Paui.o, stated that through the clandes-
tine financing by privat;; industry, the stat", mi:Litia reCeived 
money and technical assistance to ma.1{e its OHn anti-tank vreapons, 
hand-grenades, e"J)losives and some smal2. rockets. In Stepan, 
The ifi l.i tary~ ... , op • cit., p. 200. 
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Sao Paulo's governor, Adhemar de Barros, also the leader of 
the PSP, was, as mentioned earlif?r on, heavily involved in the 
plot. The support of UDN leader, Roberto de Abreu Sodre, had 
al.so beAn sec'lred. He was a close politicaJ. cssociate of both 
UD;~ 1 eaders Carlos !.accrda and Ju:io de jlL~squita Filho, and 
-pr,?sicient of n'." Sao FauJ_o ::tate legislature;. Through Abreu 
Soare's support and that of IFES leadf~r Rafael hoschesc;, Herbert 
;Jevy and other DDN leaders, th) m.:ltropoli tan and district direct-
orates of the lIDN ware co-ordinated with the civiJian-military 
movement. In th:~ particular case of Abreu Sodre, he had b'3en 
involved since D,3cember 1962 in plotting against Goulart. At 
the end of that y::.ar, AbrJu Sodrfhad a s",cret meeting with 
~_face:r:da, in vrhich they began plan,ling the buL.d-up ·)f a movement 
which wouli lead to a military coup against the government. 
According to Abreu Sodre, I1arsha.L Dutra VIas projecLd as a key 
figure in carrying out the coup, VIhich counted with the support 
of Harshal Teixeira lott, the former PSD presidentia~ candidate. 
CIA telegramme 'Possibl-:: intent of conservatives to promote 
militarl coup against President Goulart' - Sanitized copy -
TDCS 3/531,65-}, in JFK Archives - Decemb8r3, 1962. 
The phenomenon of individuals having ties in elite social ciubs, 
and upper class interest and consensus groups, as part of the 
fabric of c}ass hegemony, has been stuc.ied by John Sonquist 
and Tom '{oenig - 'E:mmining Corporate Interconnections through 
Interlocking Directorates' in Power and Control.: Social. Struc-· 
tures and T~~ir Transformation, edited by Tom R. Burns and 
l<al ter ;:luck: ey t Sage Studies in International Socio-~ogy :To. 6, 
lc;'76, p~.5J-13 • 
Erancant?, op.cit., p.202. 
J • H • F. Dulles, Unrest •••. , op. cit., p. 2;3 - IntervieH with IP:=S 
leaders ~_uiz "'erneck and Flavio Galvao, both colUllmists of 0 
Estado de Sao .?au10. 
'!adi He::"ou, like many of the c~ vb directors of Rio, Sao ?acio 
and Belo Horizonte, was an entrepreneur hiT;'."';<:3:'-f. He lias director 
of Chocolates Dizio.~i S.A. 
E. Brancante, op.cit., p.206. 
E. Brancante, op.cit., p.203. 
E. Erancante, oD.cit., up. 204-205. 
Luiz Nardi was a -director of Meyer Chemical Co. do Brasil Ind. 
Farmaceutica. Jayme Loureiro FO was director of Casa Martins 
Costa S/A Tecidos, Banco Comercial do Estado de Sao Paulo and 
Cia. Agricola e l'1ercantil Jayme Loureiro FO. 
'~6 J:'.1". DU1Jes, Unrest .... , op.cit., p.22-. See a2so H. SEva, 
OD. cit., -p. 249 • 
1!p Gen'ra -: Ivanhoe" !~ctrtins was responsible for recruiting other 
office -"5 in the area of Sao Paulo, together 1,11 th Genera::C Ramiro 
Gorreta Jr., command:;r of t he 2nd Artillery ]ivision of Sao 
Pau" o. See 1''1. Band2ira. (l Governo •.•• , :p. L2 1,. 
l4':l a. Silv2" oD.cit •. p.2~O. Hith Julio de i'lesql:.ita Fi~ho were 
operati:lg a nu.rnber of 0 .2:stado de Sa~o Paulo cO~LL1J1nists, among 
conti •••• 
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them mavio Galva:"o, Tuiz "'[erneck, Joao Ade!_ino Prado Neto, 
Gastao Mesquita and O ..... iveiros S. Ferreira, of the Patriotic 
Front. See P. Siekman, op.cit., and J. Stacchini, op.cit., 
p. '_2. 
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General Mourao, op.cit., p.86. H. Silva, oE.cit., pp.235-236 • 
Nelson Abdo was a director of Darca Artigos para Cabeleireiros 
S/ A. Aziz Calfat was direct~r of TextH Gabriel Calfa*- sl A. Deme-
trio Calfat was director of CODECA-Cotonoficio Demetrio Calfat S/ A. 
E. Brancante, o~.cit., pP.207-208. 
CIA report 'Plans of conservative military and civi~ian elements-
to overthroN the Goulart Administration if Congress is forced 
to close' - TDCS 3/51-9,655 - May 24, 1963 - JF'K: Archives. In 
CIA report TDCS 3/546,07'+, of April 29, 1963, Sanitized copy, 
JFK Archives, General Mourao was reported as saying that the 
coup was inevitable because there was no indication that the 
political situation would improve, and even if there was no 
move by Goulart to close down Congress, the planning of the 
coup would continue without any definite timing. 
S. Brancante, 0E.cit., p.200. General f1ourao, 0E.cit., p.190. 
GeneraJ_ ~~ourao 1'l'aS a1so linking up with the Bahia conspirators 
through Colonel. Anchietta Paz, of the Patriotic Front and 
through Joi'o Ravache. As early as April 1963 General I1ourao's 
connections in Parana state -orought him into contact Hi th General 
Ernesto Geise~ and in frequent trips to Rio Hith Gener~ Cordeiro, 
General Nelson de r1ello , Admiral Heck and l·larshal Denys. His 
links with the Rio activists were aJ..so maintained through Car.Los 
Eduardo D' Alamo iousada, who worked as secretary of Admiral 
Reck's grou-p. 
Hilitary.units in the following cities in Sao PauJ..o state sup-
ported the coup to the degree indicated: total support from 
arti~lery units in Jundiai; total officer support except for 
the corrunander from light tank units in Campinas j tota..L SUP:f;ort 
of artillery and anti-aircraft units in Quitauna; totaJ.. support 
from mechanized cavalry units in Pirassunungaj support of the 
one battallion at Lins; support of airforce officers at Cumbica 
airforce base; and support of shore batteries at Santos. The 
Second Army commander, Pery Bevilacqua, had not been asked to 
sup-port the plan. CIA report TDCS 3/5+-3,655 - May 27, 1963 -
JFK Archives. 
In the civilian sector, the fol~owing groups, institutions and 
organizations Here active: 2.ports clubs; :a'·[ and Engineering 
students: contacts in newspapers 0 Lstado de Sao Pau~o, ?o~f:a 
de Sao PauJo and Diario de Sao Fau-,-o; democratic labour groups 
such as the Circui.os Ouerarios Gat6~icos, the Federa9ab das 
Industrias of Sao Paulo, the Associagao ComerciaL of Sao ?auio. 
the ruraJ. association F.A...'BS:F' and the lederaqao das Associayoes 
do Estado de Sao Pau~ o. Noreover, a ham radio nei.:,',wrk was being 
organize rl as ,·:e -_1 as para.-mili tary ci vL.ian units in rura_ 
areas. Furthermore, counter-:.;,'.~.'Qtage measures Here being tal<::en, 
to occupy and :;:>rotect pu'oUc and prj.vate utEities in the event 
of a coup movement being s tart6Q • At the same time, Hithin Sa"t 
Pau~o city, neighbourhooQ recruitments were tmder .... ray, in ar. 
effort to organize city neighbourhood strength. The irarastruc-
ture of IP:iS Sao Patuo was invoived in fu~.L. 
679 
-, 56 T.etter from }1anoel :::'inhares de 1'3.cerda, :2rasi Ha 30th April !.96J., 
asking audience wi th Pr;~sident Caste~~_o Branco - Eox ~"2 P ':., 
'list t::'0.6, Item 2' 65, in J~uiz Viana Filho Archive, Rio de Janeiro • 
., 57 CIA re-port TDCS 3/5'1,655, of r'1ay 24, lS,63, in JFK Archives 
noted that the complete detai=.s of the situation in the 1st 
Army were Lacking, since the organizers in Guanabara were not 
under Sao Pau;o's jurisdiction, as were the other states mentioned 
above. 
""53 Lacerda had been involv9d inih3 IPES-led strategy since the early 
days of electoral campaigning in J.:;;62 and furthermore, through 
his po~itical associates, the IPES/IBAD activists and ieaders 
Guilherme Borghoff, Dario de Almeida Magalhaes, Sandra Cavalcanti, 
Armando Falca"'o and Julio de Mesquita Filho. :acercla was also 
a political associate of Jose Candido l10reira de Souza, his 
former secretary of Agriculture and an old Clube da -"anterna 
fello'H conspirator. Horeira de Souza was, moreover, the brother 
of IPES leader Jose' Luiz Noreira de Souza, whose brother-in-law, 
General Affonso de Albuquerque Lima Has also connected with 
Lacerda 4 since the conspiracy days of the Clube da :::'anterna. 
The PSD leader, Armando Falcao, also an IPES activists, served 
as a link for the right vring of his party with Lacerda, vrho 'Has 
a nationa"" figure of prominence with the urN. Lacerda also 
J inked himse 1_f Hi th Jusce lino Kubitschek and the centre :'_eft 
of the PSD through ~1ario Carneiro. Kubitschek himself had as 
his ~.itl-'k.-men in IPES the entrepreneur and poet Augusto F'rederico 
Schmidt anG. Oswaldo naia Penido, his former head of the Ci viiian 
Staff' Office, as wel_'. as General Ne.son d e ~1e~.lo, ;.rho had been 
his former head of the NLitary Staff Office, and General Cordeiro 
de Farias, who was c '. ose to the PSD himse 'f . 
See a'.so C~.audio Mel.lo e Souza, \J Vizinho do Presidente', in 
A. Dines, Os Idos •••. , op.cit., 12.169. 
:"59 General Moura-o, o-p.cit., pp.2'-,?, 2)]. 
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'
. C. J. Guedes, op.cit., pp •. ;j2-~53. See also IPES ~~ Rio 
l2th June 1.962 and IPSS CE Rio 2nd October .L~62. 
J61 Gal. C. 1,. Guedes, ol2.cit., pp.l1'7--52. 
162. Genoral 110urao, on. ci t. , , ') / 12 . -'- )0. 
, /3 G - 'A' OJ , t - 00 - n-
.'_0 enerai. hourao, op. Cl .. , 1212.1 J -1.;; _. 
~64 S. Brancante, op • cit., 1212.222-223. 
165 ~ieut. Co'. Resteel also linI\:ed up ,dth Abreu Sodre and ~erbert 
Tevy. C'audio ;'1e
'
10 e Souza, on.cit., 12.l6~;, and :Ierbert l.evy 
in 0 G'o'bo, January 1'7, ";''7 7 • 
A :ter the remova' of Genera -:. }C;YY :3evi ~ acq ua from th9 cOlnmanci. of 
the IIn-1 Army and his rep~acement by Genera'~ Amaury lC:r::ue-:", :::. ieut. 
Co'. Restee' Has transferred to Rio de Janeiro) tome cabinet 
of the Genera~. :Jtaff of th(~ Ar:ned Forces. He then became t:1e 
;.ink-man bet\<!een the mi ;"itary articu,,::Ltions in ~1io and 3ao :t-au:""o 
organized. by IY::'S/2SG. 
-66 ~''P t, 't ?23 2r)/ 
. ~. ~rancan e, Op.Cl " pp.~ - ~o. 
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l67 ~.ieut. CoL Resteel' s units, among other tasKs, had to provid.e 
detaHed information to the general military staff on terrain 
and preparatior.s of tha ground for offensive and defensive action. 
They yTere on the lOOK-out for hide-out p_aces and locations 
sui tab:_e for the establishment for secret deposits for ammuni-
tion, uniforms and food. One of these places was the l:oschese 
farm of IP3S Sao Paulo leader Rafael l;oschese. 
See also J. Portella, op.cit., p.72. 
16q "hen the eruption of the coup was finally announced and public~i.y 
supported by Gover"or de Barros of Sao PaulO, he had beside 
him bot h General Cordeiro ani General. He 1son de HeJ.·w, who 
vrere monitoring events c:osely. On Genera1_ Kruel' s invo:i.vement, 
see also J. Porte1.la, op.cH., pp.127-129. 
"69 H. Silva, op.cit •. pp~37~-311. 
"'- 70 CIA tel egramme 'Further Developments in GeneraJ. l<Iourao Filho';:, 
Coup P'.anning' - TDCJ 3/555, 7~+ - Ref. 95136 - AUGust f, 1.;63 -
"SF in JFJ( Archives. 
:71 J. Portella, op.cit., p.129. 
-:. 72 UDIl leader Jose de Hagalhaes Pinto had been connected with the 
conspiracy since the early stages, and a.l though he vTas the owner 
of Banco Nacional de }linas Gerais, he did not belong to the 
industria:-financial core Hhich led n'E;S. ifJagalhaes Pinto had 
personal political ambitions which made him distasteful to many 
IFES leaders. However, he was such an influential political 
figure, as governor of a strategic state with an ~j,OOO strong 
sta te miHtia, thaT. he had to be brought into the fold. of the 
organic elite. IFiS leader Jonas Barcelos Correia, himself a 
banker, had been in J. 962 the intermediary for ;1agalhaes Pinto 
in his contacts ,,!ith General Pery Bevilacqua, while Jose l'10nteiro 
de Castro, a former head of th~ Civilian Staff Office of Presi-
dent Cafe' Fi 1 ho, yras the intermediary for i'lagaihaes Pinto with 
General Cordeiro de Farias and G:meral lIei.son de .. :t;llo. Jose 
i'ionteiro de Castro Has He}::' connected. Under Prasident Cafe 
Fi"_ho he paired i'Tith Genera·~. J. Tavora, as head of the r1Eitary 
Staff Off'ice, who had as his :second in command Co~onel Grnesto 
Geise~_. r1agalha-es Pinto kept, besides these mediated contacts, 
direct 1 inks yd th i'!arsha ,_ Denys and Brigadier Clovis Travassos, 
one of the geo-poUtica'. thinkers of the l;;SG. Pedro Gomes 'Do 
Di'~ogo ao Front', in A. Dines, Os 1d.06 •... , op.cit., pp.67-99, 
1_06- 1.17. 
However, the direct re presenta ti v'::: of ;'1agal.haes Pinto at the 
centre of political affairs was 1P]:!;S e:(ecutive Jose _~uiz de 
;'~aga~haes ~ ins, his nephew and right-hand man, who Has a~Lso 
the son-in-._aw of industrialist Jose Thomaz liabuco, director 
of some corporate contributors of IP~S. The6fiio Azeredo Santos, 
another nephew of ~·1agalhaes Pinto and an ADL::;SG members, was aso 
infJ.uential in the civi~_ian-military movement. 
Jose ~uiz de Magalhaes =-ins played a significant ro-,-e as inteT-
mediary vri th lead::..ng figures of the campaign, such as Genera:.c 
CasteJ.Jo Branco, Harshal Dutra and GeneraJ_ Jose Pinheiro de 
l!' hoa Cintra, l'!arshal Denys, Genera:'. Cordeiro and Ju(l,ge Antonio 
lieder. 
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On the attem~ts to establish General Costa e Silva as the leajer 
of a 'cons~iracy', see J. Portella, Cha~ters II, IV and V. 
General Guedes' mediator and convenor for these encounters as 
well as the person in charge of providing material support for 
the operations was lPES-Belo Horizonte activist, Luis Aragao 
Villar. The information about the role of Aragao Villar was 
confirmed in conversation with Octavio Dulci, November 25, 1977. 
See 8.130 the revinr of General Guedes' memoirs in~, July 29, 
1979. 
E. Brancante, op.cit., ~.217, Gal. c. L. Guedes, op.cit., p.185. 
Gal. C. L. Guedes, op.cit., pp.113-114, also J. Portella, op.cit., 
p.69. General Hourao, op.cit., pp.232, 287. 
Gal. C. L. Guedes, op.cit., pp.126-13l. 
The Cia. Siderurgica Belgo Hineira still belongs to the European 
Consortium ARBE~, whose director in Rio de Janeiro had been 
Octavio Gouveia de Bulhoes. Antonio Chagas Diniz was director 
of Refratarios Isolantes S.A-., Nagnesita S.A. and Industria de 
CalcinaQao ICAL. Jose~h Hein was director of Cia. Industrial e 
Hercantil de Artefatos de Ferro CII1AF, Artefatos de Aco S .A. 
AASA, Cia. Ferro Brasileiro S.A., 8.A. ~1ineracao da Trindade 
(Brazil l!Tarrant), Cia. Siderurgica Belgo ~lineira, Central de 
Administra90Nes e Participa~oes, Cia. Agro-Pastoril Rio Doce 
S.A., and Serraria Santa Helena S.A. 
Francisco Pinto de Souza was a director of Hagnesita S.A., S.A. 
MineraQao da Trindade. Elmo Alves Nogueira was director of S.A. 
Minera9ao da Trindade. HenriQue Guatimozim was director of S.A. 
MineraQao da Trindade. Antonio Hourao Guimaraes was director 
of I~agnestia S.A., and Ind. de Calcinacao ICAL. Geraldo Parreiras 
was director of Cia. Imobiliaria Santo Eloi, Siderurgica Itatiaia 
and Cia. SiderUrgica Belgo Hineira. 
Horeover, the following were present at the meeting: vialdir 
Soeiro Emerich (Cia. Siderurgica i'iannesmann, Cia. Siderurgica 
Sao Caetano), Faulo Gois, Antonio Padua Clementino (Mascarenhas 
Barbosa-Roscoe S/A Engenharia e Comercio), Caetano Nascimento, 
Luiz Antonio Gonzaga (Paraopeba Industrial SA), Cesar Rodrigues 
(Netalurgica Triangulo S/A) , Raimundo Fontenelle de Araujo, 
Lucas Gonzaga (Ind. e Com. Sao Lucas), Exaltino ;Ilarques de 
Andrade (Tecidos Euclides Ar\drade S/A) , Ar:lstides H.R. Ferreira, 
(Banco Comercio e Industria de Minas Gerais), Christiano F.T. 
Guimara""es (Cia. Textil Cachoeira de f1acacos), A:nerico de Souza, 
A. G. de Souza (Cia. filercantil de AdministraQa-o), Celio Karez, 
Fabio C:outinhoBrandao, Anselmo Vasconcellos Filho, Carlos . 
Patricio de A. Cardoso, Ildeu de Castro, Jacy Vieira do Prado 
(EBC-Smpreendimentos Brasileiros de Cimento S/ A), Licinio !"Iartins., 
Fernando Pessoa Junio~, Angelo Scavazza, Paulo Rotzen de Hello, 
Jose Augusto de F. Branco, Jose i1endo, Misael de Sousa, Joaquim 
Silveira, Clovis Goncalves de Sousa,.Celio Andrade (Cia. Tele-
fdnica 019 Passos, Sociedade de Veiculos, 11aquinas e Representa-
c;oes Somevar), Roberto de Conti, Luis Pinto Coelho and lase Palma 
Tenuta. . 
Genera':l C. L. Guedes, op.cit., pp.126-127. 
Gal. C. L. Guedes, op.cit., pp.127-131. 
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1)1 Tbis was relatively simple, considering that the most pOWer1ll.L 
media in !1inas Gerais belonged to the Assis Chateaub:;:-iand compie,,-.. 
of radio, TV and neHspapers, which in sere, Paulo was headed by 
IPES leader Sdmundo Honteiro. Jose :uiz de Hagalhaes I.ins was 
involved in the IFES-~ed Public Opinion action, stimulating 
the directors of Minas Gerais newspapers and suggesting the 
treatment of themes tuned to the guidelines of the civiHan-
military campaign. 
P. Gomes. op.cit •. pp.9l-99. 
'12 Ga'. C. L. Guedee, on.cit., pp.1J2-~5~. 
1 "'1 
.. ./ 
1}J. 
. J. r:: 
1. 'J 
General Braganc;a, in his testimony to ih3 ~staclo de ;linas repro-
duced in Jornal i.o Brasil of 9th January :"~77 stressed that if 
Gaul_art had not been deposed he would have been the victim of 
an attempt on his Ufe in the month of April, during his planned 
visit to i1inas Gerais. ~Gen'3ral. Bragan<;a had been posted at 
the Centre of Information cf the Army - CLX.;, In Raul. Ryff, 0 
Fazend3iro Jango na Presidencia' Rio, Avenir .:.:odi tora, ~97;'),-p. 29. 
Gal. C. L Guedes, op.cit., pp.l.(7-2:.4. 
The ,coup had been set for April 2 ty the Informa~ General Staff, 
and not for April 1 st, which Nas deemed unsuitable, as it 'liaS 
April Fools' Day in Brazil. Ga1. Guedes, being a superstitious 
incH vidual, supported Gal. Nourao' s i;npulsi ve decision because 
h8 though the 'stars "ere auspicious during the Jist'. Gal. C.~. 
Gue~es, op.cit., pp.202, 2:1, 2l~. See ~lso Gal. J. Portel~a, 
OD • cit., p. - 0 7 • 
The officer Hho had been expacted to taIu over the 1'1inas Gerais 
operation, according to the Informal Gen,:;raJ Com.i'na.nd, Has ESG 
General. j,1uricy. 
~ (: 6 It is hard to know at this stage Hh,;ther GenGral _ Moura~o was 
fina" 'y push-,d into action by Governor Haga 'hass Pinto in an 
unorthoclox bid for the presidency, or if he Has ne -.d jed into 
action 'by other [i"OUpS. or Hhether it Fas his 01m aCld persona ~ 
cl~cision. This is a matter for further res8arch. 
- ''7 Once Gen~ra~_ i·lourao precipitat..;d events there Ylas no other optim 
for the Informal Genera~ Staff of General Go,-bery, G..;neral 
Castello 3ranco, General Lrnesto Geise -L anci. General Ademar de 
Queiroz but to Sl.:}port him, or face a r8actio'1 from ihe govern-
ment. See J. ': . F. Dull,;s, C.§l-stello •.. , op. cit., Chapter .,1. 
" -:- ~ There "ias an unsuccessful attemft, by General. i.rnesto Geise.;_, to 
make Genera'. :{umb:~rto Castello Branco the f,jinister of " .. ar. 5(.:)8 
Gal. J. Portella, 0';) • cit., pp .1,-)- }JtL~. 
lOr; On Gen corDJ Costa e SiJ.va' s successful attempt to take command 
of the; ;·iinistry of Par, see J. Port,,:,lla, QP' ci t '.' especia:~ly 
pp.~2J-=-25. 
190 '0 bom bocado nao e para que~ 0 faz ~ sim para quem 0 come' -
'Ti'son Figueirt~do, 'A margem ',sqw;rda' in A. Dines, Os I(los •••. , 
op. ci t. t p. ~ 93. 
~ ~I A. stepan, on. cit. , p.-p 
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IntroductioE.. 
This chapter attempts to qua~ify accepted and unquestioned 
assumptions about the shape of the post-1964 regime, assumptions 
which overestimate the mili tar~r aspect of the regim~, while under-
emphasizing the poli tical role of industrialists and bankers. 
In spite of the post-1964 administration being labelled as 'military' 
b? many students of Brazilian politics, the continuous predominance 
of civilians, the so-called tecnicoB' in Hhat traditionally have been 
non--mi l.i tar,r ministries and administrative agencies is quite notable. 1 
However, an immecliate point to be mads is that to fficribe the label 
of technocrats to those ne\~ occupants of the leci of pO"l'rer'is a 
misnomdr', as this chapter attempts to show. A closer examination 
of these civi-iians indicates that the overwhelming majority of the 
leading tecnicos in bureaucratic positions shoQd (because of their 
strong industrial and banking connections) more accurately be called 
entrepreneurs, or at most techno-entrepreneurs. 2 
Moreover, this chapter aims to provide evidence that the entrepreneurs 
and techno-entrepreneurs Nho had taken over the key agencies in the; 
state administration and the cabinet ministries Herd either IPES/IJ3AD 
activists or 'fiere industrial.ists and bankers who had shared the goals 
of the former and '\>Tho had contributed to the IP:SS-1ed efforts to 
oust Goulart. In many cases business associates and emplo~rees of 
IP~3 lea~~ers were cppoint,;d to administrative agencies and cabinet 
mil1istries. 
This chapter is a:'so concerned vii th highlighting the congrudnce 
of the post-1964 administrative, economic and po~_itical reforms Nith . 
the reform proposals advancsd by the study and Doctrine groups of 
IPES. The _atter provided the policies and the guidance for the 
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structural reforms and organizational changes of the post-~s~ admini-
stration, and many of these policies had been developed by the entre-
preneurial organic elite during their successful campaign from 1961 
to 196~.3 The techno-entrepreneurs and entrepreneurs were able to 
ensure through their public offices the charting of the Brazilian 
state along a capita '.istic path, serving the general interests of 
mU'.tinational and associated industrialists and bankers. 
Finally, the chapter also att~mpts to describe some of the new 
roles assumed by lPES after the ousting of Goulart, in view of the 
key positio,1s in cabinet and administration occupied by so man~/ of 
its members. 
The traditional anal-rsis and interpretations of the 196,-~ coup 
8mphasize the presence of the Armed Forces in the state administration 
and government, and emphasize the influence of the Sup'crior Har 
College in the aconomic pO'.icies imp'_emented by the post-1964 mid-
tary- government. Some authors ~ven speak of a 'changing pattern' 
of militarr political and ideologica'.. behaviour vlhich favoured mili-
tary intervention in !.964 and ",hich 8quipped the military for govern-
~1 
ment.' Others >'Tho have examined the military administration since 
19&+, in looking at the type of :personnel recruited for the admini-
strati on assume that th2 principal groups contributing to the Brazilian 
political elite since 1964 were l) the officers corps from the three 
Armect 'Forces; 2) the technocrats: and 3) the civilian politicians.5 
Such analyses even concLude that 'there is little question that 
high level officers of the Army, Navy and Air Force (in terms of 
re'..ative pOHer, probab~e in that rough order) have commanded the 
'.ion's share of DOHer in the Brazilian political system sinc~ 
1 :6'1' •6 
68.5 
i'espite such a widespread belief, evidence seems to suggest other-
wise in the period He are about to discuss. The notion of the 
Armed Forces acting as a Poder Moderador has been over-emphasized, 
while the role played by entrepreneurs and techno-entrepreneurs 
has been strongly underplayed. A close look at the occupants of 
the loci of' pOHer makes it apparent that the entrepreneurs and 
techno-entrepreneurs of IPES "ere the ones Hho controlled the levers 
of policy-formation and decision-making both within th9 cabinet 
and in the state administration. 
It is not our intention to deny the influence of ESG affiliates, 
even more so since many of their members were incorporated in IPES/ 
IBAD. Moreover, af'ter 1964, the ESG managed to indoctrinate increas-
ing numbers of middle and top ranking officers of the Army, and the 
ideology of National S3curity permeated both the Armed Forces and 
government,? shaping their attitudes tOvT~rds the working classes. 
However, it "rould be useful to place in perspective the presence 
in government of the ESC officers in particular and of the military 
in general. Considering the civilian and military personnel who 
were recruited to the key civilian poets of th~ government and of 
the administration, it becomes clear that while policy formation 
and deci~ion-making were in the hands of IP5S/IEAD civilians -
mostly big entrepreneurs - the steering of national policies vras 
partly in the hands of the politically-minded ESG military graduates. 
These officers, together "ith politicians belonging to the ADP, 
were supported by a second administrative echelon, increasingly 
influenced by the Ex Alumni Associations of IPES and ~SG, respect-
.., 
. . , 
~vel~T called ADIPES and AD;-<:SG.· The techno-entrepreneurs and entre-
preneurs of IPES saw in the military the source of political support 
and authori t:, "rhich the former couLd not possibJ. ~T gain through 
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political appeal to the population at large, in view of their 
decidedly unpopular modernizing-conservative programme of govern-
ment. 
Moreover, the attempt to enhance the prestige of the ESG propping 
up its image as the cradle of the movement that ousted Goulart and 
as the source of policies implemented by the government served 
other purposes as well. For one it served to counter military fac-
tion~ rival to the ESG, who by 1964 had secured important positions 
within the hierarchy of the Armed Forces, mainly by recruiting 
troupiers and right-wing extremists. It also served to neutralize 
competing entrepreneurial interests who were reduced to a subaltern 
position' vis-a-vis those represented in IPES/IBAD, for the latter 
were the only entrepreneurial group to have organic connections with 
a sizeable and influential military dispositivo. 9 Furthermore, the 
projection of ESG/ADESG elements served to legitimate the 'neutrality' 
of the regime, serving to emphasize its 'technocratic' character 
by the 'natural' interaction of the so-called tecnicos and the mili-
tary, and reinforcing the feelingfuat the approach to Brazil's prob-
lems and the nature of the policies implemented by the government 
were 'scientific' and 'national' as opposed to being political. A 
side-effect of such a scheme was to keep at bay nationalist demands 
arising from middle rank officers, overruled by Army hierarchy and 
swamped by the ideology emanating from the ESG. Indeed, the ESG 
was to serve as an ideological and political filter for advancement 
in the Army hierarchy and administrative posts within the state, 
as well as an instrument of co-option and indoctrination of new 
civilian and military recruits who were already occupying positions 
within the state apparatus. 
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After April 1964, the loci of power 1-Tere occupied by a large 
number of lPES/IBAD affiliates, and supporters who had linked their 
political fortunes to the organic elite during the period of 1961-
1961+, and Nho h ad participated in the campaign led by lPES/IBAD to 
oust Goulart and to contain the labour left. The organic elite 
of the multinational and associated industrial and banking interests 
were able to secure economic and administrative power, objectively 
making the state~paratus a component part of the monopolistic 
interests in control of the economv,lO The multinational and 
associated interests were able to control the po~itical life of 
the state and to shape its machinery according to the needs of 
monopoly capital, by occupying the central positions of power and 
by determining its goals, procedures and means. The class power 
of the mUltinational and associated interests was expressed after 
April 1964 in the hegemony they established within the state appara-
tus, in the direct control of the policy formation and decision-
making agencies, and in the personal presence of representatives 
of these economic interests in the administration at large. II 
Direct control of the state apparatus and, through it of the 
other sectors of the oominant classes of the subordinate classes 
of society, was, if not ths most complete form of advancing the 
interests of big capital, at least the most efficient and secure 
which Has available to the multinational and associated industrial 
and banking interests. 12 In brief, in post-1964, direct state 
power became the highest expression of the economic power of the 
financial and industrial multinationai and associated bourgeoisie. 
As IPES leader Antonio Carlos do Amaral Osorio pointed out, 'one 
of the big achievements of the revolution of 1 S,6+ was, without 
doubt, that of strengthening a nevI conception of the relations 
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behleen the state and the entrepreneurial classes' .13 
The Take-over of the state - The political dominance of multinational 
and associated industrial and banking interests. 
On April- 2 1964, the bourgeoisie celebrated the removal from 
office of President Goulart with a gigantic 'March of the Family 
Hith God for Liberty', through the streets of Rio de Janeiro, an 
event which the organizers had been lookingfo~1ard to for more than 
a week. Bj the time the Marcha da Familia, com Deus, pela Liberdade 
was scheduled to begin, the centrally located Avenida Rio Branco con-
tained a sea of anti-Communist placards carried by an estimated 
crowd of over eight hundred thousand. While the throngs were walk-
ing in Avenida Rio Branco, the presidential succession was being 
extensively discussed. Entrepreneurs in the office of IPES, in 
Rio, which overlooked the March, 'pleased with the cheers in the 
streets be low and highl'r satisfied with the result of their anti-
Communist work' spoke with General Heitor Herrera, one of their 
key link-men 11ith the ESG officers, 'about the qualifications that 
they wanted to see in the next president of Brazil' .14 The IP3S 
entrepreneurs decided that he should be a man not associated with 
any of the three leading (civilian) governors (~acerda. ~~alhaes 
P:i:nto and Adhemar de Barros) and they objected to Harshal Dutra's 
connections. The IPES entrepreneurs favoured General Castello 
Branco, head of the Informal General Staff, and actively sponsordd 
his candidature. 15 The intensive media campaign and middle class 
mobi~izatio~ ~hich, following this meeting, was unleashed throughout 
the l.ength and breadth of the country to" stimulate the candidature 
of General. Castello, had the unmistakable mark of IPES public opinion 
t ' 16 ac lon. 
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The next day, a joint meeting of the Rio-Sao Paulo leadership 
of IPES took place 'Hith the participation of Harold C. Polland, 
Joao Baptista Leopoldo Figueiredo, Jose Rubem Fonseca, Paulo AjTeS 
Filho, Paulo Reis Magalhaes, Jose Roberto Whitaker Penteado, Gilbert 
Huber Jr., General Heitor Herrera, Jose Duvivier Goulart, General 
Golbery do Couto e Silva, Gly~on de Paiva, General Joao Jose Batista 
Tubino, Joviano Jardim, General Liberato da Cunha Friedrich, Helio 
Gomide, OSl'Taldo Tavares, Augusto Trajano de Azevedo Antunes, Denio 
Nogueira and Jose Garrido Torres. The president of the session, 
Polland, congratulated 'the military of IPES for the victory' and 
warned about the problems which lay ahead, by drawing a parallel 
with the unstable period in Argentina, following the ousting of 
Peron. Polland urged the lPES leadership to reappraise its role 
and adjust itself to the new situation, keeping. the organization in 
functioning order. Polland stressed that 'Our 'Hork has to be 
ahrays that of a General Staff' .. 17 Leopoldo Figueiredo, who had 
come to the meeting with the three lPES leaders from Sa-o Paulo 
"Tho had -participated in the movement from the very beginning in 
co-ordination with IPES in Rio, congratulated those present for 
t~e successful outcome of the campaign. However, l,eopoldo Figueiredo 
and also Paulo Ayres FO warned that IPl~S was 'sti:Ll far awaj from 
victory' and that the 'road ahead could still present them Vlith 
difficulties'. This was becoming apparent in vieH of the stances 
being ta.ken by certain economic groups, basically in Sao Paulo, 
who, a~though opposed to Goulart and his government and having 
supnorted his r~moval from office, did not share the goals of IPES. 
Furthermore, military who did not share the goals of ESG had a tta:ined 
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positions of influence in the scramble for power which ensued after 
General Nourao' s hasty departure from I'linas. Leopo1do Figueiredo 
added that every·thing demanded the continuous dedication and con-
tribution of lEES, because now, perhaps, was to come 'the most 
important and difficult part', namely, the take-over of the admini-
stration and the containment of dissident and recalcitrant economic 
groups and military and political factions. Paulo Ayres FO also 
observed that 'without measures of security and immediate coverage 
(cobertura), the Armed Forces would rapid1.? lose grip of the situa-
tion', casting more than a shade of doubt on the abilit} and the 
readiness of the military to control the polity and to run the 
adminis~ration. This situation was especially critical since those 
military most akin to IPES entrepreneurs, the ESG officers, Here 
still far from having an effective hold on the Armed Forces, while 
the troupiers and right-wing extremists found an appropriate channel 
of expression through the Minister of War, General costa e Silva, 
and through the Navy Minister, Admiral Rademaker, both prominent 
members of the Hilitary Junta in command of events after th2- coup. 
Harold Pol_land remarked t~hat after their central meeting on April 
2nd, 196~~, at their headquarters in Rio, some IPES activists had 
already started to Hork on the economic-financial and political 
situation. A commission was formed, Nhich comprised Glycon de 
Paiva, Joao Baptista Leopoldo Figueiredo, Genera~ Golbexy, Jose 
Garrido 'l'orres and ~'!hi taker Penteado, in order to prepare a 'p_lan 
of action for the next 30 dalS I "Thich ;.ras to be decisive in shaping 
the regime and staffing the new government. The final decision 
Has for IPES to remain in its traditional ro1e as a General Staff. 13 
IF3S leaners perceived thair organization as 'the appropriate 
body for the entrepreneurs ••• tai<:ing well guided and opportun(~ 
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decisions of a political character'. Furthermore, th~ IPSS leaders 
perceived themselves as being the 'private government' (sic)lY who 
should sup~ort the 'public government', which they themselves would 
staff and inspire. 20 Moreover, the type of political activities 
which the entrepreneurs were required - to canY out demanded that 
they shoQld keep a lovI profile and IPES remained a convenient cover 
and channel to express their demands and exert their action. Leaders 
of IPES took upon themselves the formulation of the basic guidelines 
of the new government, . as well as the coneideration about which 
individuals should occupy the key posts in the new administration. 
General Golbery, General Ademar de Queiroz and General Ernesto Geisel 
Here at General Castello Branco's residence every day, preserving 
de facto the functioning of the leadership of the Informal General 
staff,2l and keeping the future president under close supervision. 
General Golbery and General Geisel, who Has also a personal friend 
of another IPES military leader, General Herrera, also served as 
channels for the selection of IPES leaders, affiliates and co11a-
22 borators to the key governmental posts. General Castello, who 
had been appointed president by Jongress on April 11, was seeking 
a competent team to form his government and administration. Being 
a professional soldier; he was not familiar with the entrepreneurial 
and techno-entrepreneurial ~,orld, and very much in need of advice 
on '-Thom to choose a..11.d appoint. Ver'j conveniently, he ~!as intro-
duced to and got to know potential candidates approved by IP3S/ESG 
activists who surrounded him. 23 
The organic e1_ite in the state 
"That could be regarded as a 1<.ey innovation introduced by the 
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post-1964 administration was the creation of the Serviyo Nacional 
de Informayoes. The SNI combined both the functions of a central 
intelligence agency with those of an advisory council for national 
policy-making~4 The founder and first national head of the SNI was 
none other than lPES General Go1bery do Couto e Silva, who for a 
while remained in the active service of both organizations, as well 
as in private business in his native state of Rio Grande do Sul. 25 
General Golbery formally discharged himself from his commission in 
lEES in July 1964, without severing his ties with the organization, 
where he remained as a member of the Conse1ho Orientador. It is 
highly significant that General Golbery, when thanked for his past 
work and congratulated by Glycon de Paiva, in the name of lEES, 
for his new commission as head of the SNI, remarked that in his 
new job he would continue to carry out the same type of activities 
he had developed until then in lPES, although now greatly 'expanded 
. d' 26 ~n resources an means • 
The complete intelligence archives of lEES, assembled by the Grupo 
de Levantamento da Conjuntura which General Golbery had headed, and 
where information about 400,000 Brazilians had been compiled, were 
taken by General Golbery to Brasilia as the basis for the SNI network. 27 
General Golbery took with him to the SNI not only the archives of 
lPES, but also his close associates and collaborators in the mili-
tary and intelligence network, which lEES had set up from 1961 to 
1964 under the name of Grupo de Levantamento da Con,juntura, and who 
became part of the new intelligence structure. 
Among the cluster·of officers who were engaged with General Golbery 
in the creation of the SNI were General Ernesto Geisel, Lieut. Col. 
Danilo Venturini, Colonel Joao Baptista Figueiredo, Lieut. Col. 
Octavio de Aguiar Medeiros, Colonel Ivan Vieira Perdigao and Captain 
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Heitor de Aquino Ferreira. 28 Other officers recruited by the incip-
ient SNI were General Emilio Garrastazu Medici and General Carlos 
Alberto da Fontoura. 
Lieut. Col. Joao Baptista Figueiredo became the head of the Rio de 
Janeiro SNI centre, second in importance to that of Brasilia, and 
whose headquarters ~ere located at the Ministry of Finance. Lieut. 
Col. Figueiredo also became the secretary-general of the National 
Security Council, a post General Golbery himself had occupied under 
Quadros.29 Captain Heitor de Aquino Ferreira became General Golbery's 
personal secretary in the SNI. 30 General Riograndino Kruel, brother 
of General Amaury, became the chief of the Federal Department of 
Public Security, co-operating closely with the new intelligence 
service headed by General Golbery.3l 
The SNI set out to become - and became - a most influential 
centre in forming policy in every area of Brazilian social, political 
and military life. It established a network of intelligence within 
the ministries, autarchies and administrative agencies of the govern-
ment, as well as in the military, the working class movement, the 
student movement and other selected segments of the population, 
transforming itself into a 'super-ministry' untouched and untouchable 
by the legislative and the judiciary and not answerable to the 
Armed Forces. In immediate terms, the creation of the SNI served 
to pre-empt some of the functions of the Federal Service of Informa-
tion which had functioned until then as a surrogate for a central 
intelligence agency. The need for an institution able to side-step 
the Federal Service was made acute not only because the htter was 
a product of the previous regime, but more so because troupier 
General Costa e Silva, as the new Minister of War, had appointed 
one of his own men, Colonel Portella, to the secretariat of the 
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National Security Council overseeing the Federal Service, in an 
attempt to make it his stronghold. In the medium and long term, a 
central intelligence agency was called for by the military as it 
would have to playa key role in the implementation of the doctrine 
of National Security disseminated by the ESG. Moreover, the commu-
nity of intelligence could provide the regime with some political 
attributes which the Armed Forces, with their natural rigidity did 
not possess. Institutional behaviour, hierarchy and corporate norms 
did not bequeath the Armed Forces with the required level of flexi-
bility to involve itself in politics. Furthermore, direct involve-
ment of the Armed Forces in the political life of the nation, when 
attempted, reinforced the positions of hard-line right-wing extremists, 
because ~ficient action by the Armed Forces in non-military affairs 
required the maintenance or further transformation of the war-like 
aspects of the polity. The intelligence system could overcome the 
rigidity of the Armed Forces, withQ~:t.~esorting to extreme action, 
without strengthening right-wing extremism and, perhaps, even more 
important in the long run, without allowing dissident nationalistic 
factions among the Armed Forces to establish a foothold in running 
the polity and the economy. 
Finally, the SNI could function even after the Armed Forces 
were returned to the barracks, and parallel to regular party-political 
life, even keep politics going in the absence of parties. The SNI, 
in fact, could perform as a political party, perhaps the only mili-
tary agency capable of doing so, functioning as a focus of support 
and information of the regime, as well as an agent to manipulate the 
polity. 
The links of IPES with the SNI remained so close and strong 
that Colonel Ivan Perdigao, who was General Golbery's successor as 
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head of the Grupo de Levantamento da Conjuntura, felt the need to 
reconsider the ways in which certain action groups in IPES would 
function, once the SNI had been established. In the field of 
intelligence, IPES remained as a source of independent information 
for the SNI, and its immediate link with the entrepreneurial 
community. IPES, in turn, was fed back information for action by 
the SNI.32 
IPES activists involved themselves in a variety of intelligence 
operations, functioning as a clearing centre of anti-communist 
information and propaganda. 
IPES Sao Paulo, in conjunction with the SNI, was responsible for the 
initiative to create the Instituto de Estudos Cient!ficos sobre 
Comunismo (Institute for the Scientific Study of Communism),]) which 
was to be headed by Estanislau Fischlowitz, of the Study and Doctrine 
Group of lPES Rio. 
Eventually, in view of the political fragility of the parties created 
by presidential decree after 1964 to replace those born during the 
populist regime~IPES was responsible for the attempts to create 
a poder Polftico based on the entrepreneurs themselves and not on 
party-politicians. 35 This 'Political Power' was expected to become 
the 'basic structure of the Nation', in association with the 
'Poder Mil i tar , based on the intelligence structure. To attain 
such a goal, Helio Gomide recommended to General Fontoura the 
'approximation of the Poder Militar, representing the Political 
Leadership and Public Administration of the country with certain 
entrepreneurial groups', of which IPES was considered to be the 
most appropriate because of its past experience, the quality of 
its organization and the individuals it comprised. 
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Having acted as a clearing house of anti-communist information 
for other groups, the Armed Forces and entrepreneurs, IPES was in 
a position to channel information into the Ingueritos Policiais 
Militares (Police-Military Investigations - rPM) installed after 
the coup in order to investigate alleged subversive activities 
within the new political-military framework of 'national security'. 
Lieut. Col. L. G. Andrade Serpa, in charge of the rPM on the National 
Confederation of Industrial Workers, was sent material by Harold 
Polland, in the hope that it would serve as a 'contribution to the 
work which the Army is involved with in order to investigate, with 
justice, those truly responsible for the calamitous state of aff~rs 
which occurred in the past regime,.J6 
Another IPES activist, Colonel Rubens Resteel, was appointed head 
of the Police-Military Investigations in the area of the lInd Army, 
which included the industrial belt of Sao Paulo, and was given the 
responsibility of investigating the activities of left-wing indivi-
duals and groups,J? while General Dalisio Mena Barreto was in charge 
of the IPM on corruption in Sao Paulo, which hit hard at politicians 
and the bureaucracy. 
IPES remained in operation, among others, as an intelligence 
gathering unit (which had been one of its previous functions anyhow), 
preparing regular reports on the 'communist pressure' for entrepren-
eurial, military and technocratic circles. These reports justified 
the hard-line attitude which IPES leaders claimed, had to be adopted 
by entrepreneurs and military against the 'subversion' of the country. 
As a by-product, these reports also justified the continual fund-
raising for IPES.J8 
Eventually, some lPES leaders also "involved themselves in the 
seamier side of intelligence operations. IPES leader and entrepreneur 
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Henning Boilessen was among those responsible for the consolidation 
of a scheme of financial support for the repressive apparatus of 
the police and the Armed Forces. Boilessen was responsible for 
gathering a group of entrepreneurs who contributed financially and 
provided equipment forihe security organizations.39 This support 
provided another dimension of co-ordination between entrepreneurs 
and military. 
Furthermore, IPES leaders eventually exported the expertise 
they had acquired in the campaign to overthrow Goulart, to neigh-
bouring countries, and they were involved in international operations 
of de-stabilization of their regimes. The coup that brought the 
IPES leadership to power in Brazil appears to have been used as a 
model for ihe Chilean military coup. In 1970, senator Salvador 
Allende was elected to the Chilean presidency! heading a socialist 
oriented front of popular unity. Members of Brazil's IPES worked 
closely with Chilean entrepreneurial and professional associations 
and provided them with financial support and advice on middle class 
mobilization and action on different sectors of public opinion. 
Among the IPES ~aders involved in these activities and in advising 
Chilean businessmen on how to prepare the ground for the military 
intervention and overthrow of President Allende were Gilbert Huber 
and Glycon de Paiva. As Glycon de Paiva remarked afterihe success-
ful coup took place, 'The recipe exists, and you can bake the cake 
any time. We saw how it worked in Brazil, and now again in Chile. ,40 
In addition, Brazil's right-wing para-military group, the Anti-
Communist Movement - MAC, provided weapons and money for similar 
groups in Chile. Faustino Porto, a militant of MAC, and AXistbteles 
Drummond, head of the Grupo de AC~o Patriotica - GAP, one of the 
off-shoots of IPES, and an activists of MAC himself, served as 
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couriers from Brazil to Chile, taking money for political actions. 
Arms were delivered tofue right-wing extremist organization Patria 
y Libertad (Fatherland and Freedom) and to PROTECO, the right-wing 
neighbourhood committees. The Chileans who received support from 
lPES and MAC were critical to' the success of the de-stabilization 
tactics that brought down the socialist government of Allende.4l 
lPES leaders were also active in the preparation of the cam-
paign which toppled President Juan Torres of Bolivia, in 1971. When 
General Juan Torres became president in 1970, a group of Brazilian 
and Bolivian entrepreneurs and military created in Sao Paulo a 
'Centre of Latin American Studies', following the familiar pattern 
established by IPES. Among the participants of the Centre, located 
in the neighbourhood of Pacaembu, were Oscar Barrientos, a lawyer 
and cousin of the former Bolivian president, General Rene Barrientos 
Oriuno; IPES leader Henning Boilessen; Mario Busch, a former officer 
of the Wehrmacht and ex-agent of the Bolivian Servicio de Control 
Polftico; General Hugo Bethlem, a former military attache in Bolivia 
and eventually ambassador to La Paz; and a series of Bolivian mili-
tary officers and big entrepreneurs. Boilessen, together with 
Bolivian entrepreneur Uguarte, were the financiers of the Centre, 
while Barrientos was in charge of keeping contacts with the lInd 
Army of Brazil (which, headquartered in Sao Paulo, was in charge 
of territories on the frontier with Bolivia) and with the SNI. In 
August 1971, General Hugo Banzer took ove~ and many offue Bolivians 
involved infue Centre became members of the new government.42 
The SNI had a close connection with another 'super-ministry' 
created by therew government, the Ministry of Planning and Economic 
Co-ordination. The quest for governmental planning, nurtured for 
so long by the organic elite, had finally been realized. 
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On March 31st 1964, the very day when the coup was launched, 
a group of directors of large banks and industries created in Sao 
Paulo the National Association for Economic and Social Planning -
ANPES, as part of a scheme to make lPES affiliate and techno-
entrepreneur, Roberto de Oliveira Campos, the Minister of Planning 
of the new government. Roberto Campos, a central figure of CONSULTEC,· 
lecturer at the Superior War College and former ambassador to the 
USA, was made secretary general of ANPES.43 Banker Teodoro Quartim 
Barbosa was the president of ANPES, and one of its most active mem-
bers was IPES leader Le1io Toledo Piza, also a banker. Another 
central figure in ANPES was Antonio De1fim Netto, of the Doctrine 
and Study group of IPES-Sao Paulo, who became secretary-general 
after Campos became Minister of P1anning.44 
The Ministry of Planning became the key civilian ministry of 
the first administration cfter the coup of 1964, with a say in ihe 
affairs of all the other ministries, except the SNI, with whom it 
co-ordinated efforts. Campos, the Minister for Planning, was the 
prominent civilian figure of the cabinet, and as the most favoured 
minister of the president, a central figure in the formation of 
the 'economic' thought of the Castello Branco administration.45 
The Minister of Planning gathered around himself an advisory 
team, almost completely from IPES, which reflected the hegemony 
gained by the organic elite. Campos' team also expressed the great 
weight that CONSULTEC/APEC members had in the Study and Doctrine 
Group of IPES-Rio de Janeiro, as most of his collaborators belonged 
to both organizations. 
It was the IPES/CONSULTEC team of Roberto Campos who devised the 
Plan for Economic Action~ the Government - PAEG, a programme of co-
ordinated government activity in the economic sphere, which became 
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the master-plan for the economic and social reforms implemented from 
1964 to 1967. It should be noted that despite its name, the PAEG 
had more to do with diagnosis and statements of general policy than 
with the actual detailed realization of a plan of action. 
However, the implementation of PAEG had one particularly important 
effect. It allowed multinational corporations making use of their 
subsidiaries in Brazil to buy at rock-bottom prices Brazilian busi-
nesses strangled by the credit restrictions which it imposed, lead-
ing to the phenomenon known as denationalization.46 
Campos' team included the following core of IPES/CONSULTEC/APEC 
affiliates! techno-entrepreneurs and entrepreneurs Eudes de Souza 
Leao, Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, Carlos de Assis Ribeiro, Frederico 
Maragliano Cardoso, Edgard Teixeira Leite, Denio Nogueira, Jose 
Garrido Torres, Wanderbilt Duarte de Barros, Eduardo da Silveira 
Gomes, Josl Piquet Carneiro, Alexandre Kafka, Og Leme, Estanislau 
Fischlowitz, Mario Henrique Simonsen, Luiz Bulhoes Pedreira, Oswaldo 
Trigueiro, Antonio Casimiro Ribeiro, Walter Lorch, Harold Cecil 
Polland, Claudio Cecil Polland, Carlos Moacyr Gomes de Almeida, 
Glycon de Paiva, Luiz Gonzaga Nascimento Silva (who became the 
juridical advisor of the Ministry) and Gilberto Ulhoa Canto. 
Sebastiao Sant'Anna e Silva, a director of USIMINAS, the giant 
joint Japanese-Brazilian steel consortium, and a person who enjoyed 
the personal~st of Campos, was appointed secretary-general of 
the Kinistry. Edmar de Souza, of the Study and Doctrine group of 
IPES and a team-mate of Campos at CONSULTEC, became administrative 
director of the Ministry. 
A Consultive Council for Planning - CONSPLAN, was established 
in 1965, with Roberto Campos as executive' secretary, which became 
a major centre for policy formation and a forum designed to 'gather 
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suggestions, listen to~iticisms and produce contributions from those 
in national economic life,.47 Again, this central body, designed 
to ensure private participation in the planning process, was com-
posed mostly of IPES affiliates and collaborators. 
Strictly speaking, the CONSPLAN was not a representative body. All 
its members were appointed by the president either on his own ini-
tiative or from lists submitted by sectors concerned. 
From the entrepreneurial and techno-entrepreneurial sectors the 
following were involved in CONSPLAN: industrialist and banker General 
Edmundo Macedo Soares, Saturnino de Brito Filho, Joao de Pietro 
(Banco do Estado de Sao Paulo), Padre Fernando Bastos D'Avila (ADCE), 
Lindolfo Martins Ferreira (ADESG), Antonio Deifim Netto, Antonio 
Dias Leite (a militant Catholic who turned out to be a discordant 
voice in CONSPLAN favouring different entrepreneurial policies), 
Mauro Ramos, Frederico Heller (CONSULTEC, who was in charge of the 
Sector of Promotion), Glycon de Paiva, and his stand-in Harold Cecil 
Polland. From the Regional Agencies were appointed Vitor Gradin 
(SUDENE), Paulo Camillo de Oliveira Penna (Banco de Desenvolvimento 
de Minas Gerais) and Karlos Rieschbieter, from CODEPAR, the Companhia 
de Desenvolvimento do Parana, a nominee of Nei Braga and of banker 
Leonidas Borio. From the 'pelego' structure of the trade unions 
were chosen Ary Campista, Jos~ Rotta, Paulo Cabral and Odilo Nasci-
mento Gama. IPES activist Mario Leao Ludolf represented the entre-
preneurial class associations. 
A Special Commission of CONSPLAN was created, which functioned as 
an agency for assessing government projects. Its members were 
Lindolfo Martins Ferreira (president), Jose Rotta, Nylton Velloso 
(an entrepreneur and executive offue Commercial Associations of 
Minas Gerais), Padre Fernando Bastos D'Avila, Armando de Oliveira 
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Assis, Joao Paulo dos Reis Velloso, Oswaldo Iorio, Paulo de Assis 
Ribeiro and Eudes de Souza Leao.48 
Helio Beltrao, another leading techno-entrepreneur and IPES 
affiliate, was responsible, with the support of Roberto Campos and 
in conjunction with an IPES/CONSULTEC team, for the drafting of 
the Law No.200, which encapsulated the wide and far-reaching Federal 
Administrative Reform carried out during General Castello Branco's 
presidenCy.49 Directly linked to the Minister of Planning was Jose 
Nazare Teixeira Dias, who was the executive secretary of the Special 
Commission for the Study of Administrative Reform.50 
Planning "Wa.s made an absolute rule of the administration and all acti-
vity thenceforth had to fit into a programme extending over several 
years, which covered the nationaU, regional and sector plans. A 
General Inspectorate of Finances was set up to monitor expenditure 
and Brigadier Roberto Brandini, an active militant in the civilian-
military staff of Sao Paulo, was appointed director. 
As co-ordinators of the Sectoral Groups of the Ministry of 
Planning, Campos appointed fellow IPES/CONSULTEC affiliates and col-
laborators, namely techno-entrepreneurs and entrepreneurs Henrique 
Capper Alves de Souza, Jesus Bello Galvao, Jo~o Batista de Carvalho 
Athayde, Milciades Mario Sa Freire de Souza, Walter Lorch and Harry 
James Cole. As co-ordinator of the influential Committee for Co-
ordination of the Alliance for Progress - COCAP, which was attached 
to the Ministry of Planning, Campos appointed Francisco de Assis 
Griecco. 51 
EPEA, the state Agency for Economic and Social Planning, where 
Victor da Silva Alves Filho was appointed secretary-general and 
where IPES/CONSULTEC activists Mircea Buescu and Colonel Luiz Victor 
D'Arinos Silva worked, was transformed, under the supervision of 
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Mario Henrique Simonsen into the Applied Economic and Social Planning 
Institute - IPEA, and IPES collaborator Mauricio Villela was assigned 
to it. 
IPE:A was established to put in hand studies, research and analysis 
in the economic and social spheres, required by the Ministry of 
Planning. 
DATAMEC, a state agency for the processing of data was created, to 
which was assigned IPES-linked General Adauto Esmeraldo. 
IPES affiliates and activists became in effect the core of 
the Ministry of Planning. Besides their affiliation to IPES, the 
members of Roberto Campos' team also showed an extraordinary over-
lapping .with their CONSULTEC/APEC membership in particular and with 
techno-entrepreneurial agencies in general, thus reflecting the 
former composition of the Study and Doctrine Groups of lPES-Rio and 
lPES-Sao Paulo. 
But above all, what should be emphasized is that against established 
belief, most of the members of the Ministry of Planning were not 
tecnicos, but techno-entrepreneurs, if not outright industrialists 
and bankers. 
The Ministry of Planning had effective support from two key 
agencies which operated in direct connection with the presidency 
and which performed for General Castello Branco the functions of 
filtering political information from both the civilian and military 
areas, as well as serving as foci of communication. 
These agencies were the Civilian and Military Staff Offices. 
The Staff Offices were eminently political bodies, rather 
than administrative ones. Th~y took care of procedural aspects of 
executive decision-making, examining and advising on the pertinence 
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and adequacy of decisions taken or about to be taken by the presi-
dent and the various ministries. The Staff Offices also examined 
the range of implications which decisions taken or about to be taken 
by the different ministers had on other individual ministries and 
administrative agencies and on the cabinet as a whole. In this 
respect, the Staff Offices controlled policies and provided valuable 
information to the Ministry of Planning and to the president affect-
ing national policies. The functions of the Staff Offices have 
varied throughout the different administrations, each president 
attempting to shape them to his needs and those of his government.52 
As head of the very sensitive Civilian Staff Office was 
appointed IPES affiliate Luiz Viana Filho, a. writer and politician 
of the Liberator Party, of Bahia and a member of the ADP, and as 
head of the powerful ~filitary Staff Office was appointed General 
Ernesto Geisel. 
Under General castello Branco, the Civilian Staff Office 
functioned largely as a political ante-chamber of the president, absorb-
ing partisan political pressures as well as from other quarters. 
Most of the attempts by the. executive to manipulate party politics 
were carr1ed out through the Civilian Staff Office, which was 
crucial in the protracted negotiations and longdrawn manoeuvres 
of the government aimed at carrying out the sweeping reform of 
party-political life engineered by the axecutive. Through the 
party-political reform, the government attempted a recomposition 
of political life, aimed at neutralizing regional and clientelistic 
pressures which obstructed efficient planning, by means of the 
creation of an official government party, ARENA, which was based 
on the alignment of force which had been operating under the aegis 
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of the Democratic Parliamentary Action - ADP. By taking an active 
part in party reform, the Civilian Staff Office shielded the public 
image of the president, allowing him to intervene decisively in 
selected and critical moments, backed by the authority of his office 
and the power of the military. 
The Civilian Staff Office also served as a channel of communi-
cation of the president with public opinion in general and with the 
academic media and cultural environment in particular, for it was 
in charge~ the preservation of the public image of the government 
as well as having a say in the preparation of the daily agenda of 
the president. 
Moreover, the Civilian Staff Office took care of a wide array of 
individual demands, performing as an informal lobbying centre for 
economic groups and absorbing business press~es raised against 
the government which did not have proper channels of communication 
to the key administrative agencies or efficient representation 
before the ministries, thus being excluded from interest articula-
tion at the top.53 
During the government of Castello Branco, the Military Staff 
Office was strongly supported by the lPES/ESG group and designed 
to become a counter-force to the Ministry of War, where Costa e 
Silva held control. Through the Military Staff Office, the IPES/ESG 
communicated with the military area, attempting to absorb the pres-
sures arising from the various sectors of opinion within the Armed 
Forces and defusing military-political crises directed against the 
government. There was also an attempt to build up the image of 
the Military Staff Office as being the 'Ministry for the Military', 
a sort of lobbying agency to which the military could appeal for 
the resolution of their institutional problems in the wider context 
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of national politics, an exercise aimed at creating much needed 
support for the government among the Armed Forces. In this way, 
and under the aegis of IPES/ESG activists, it was expected to pre-
empt or at least diminish the chances of the Ministry of War from 
acting as a power-broker. 
The Military Staff Office did not succeed in'one of its tasks, which 
proved to be critical, namely, in defusing the build-up of the candi-
dature of General Costa e Silva supported by an alignment of forces 
which comprised the troupiers, the right-wing extremists and a number 
of dissidents from within the ESG cluster. This alignment finally 
carried him to the presidency, very much to the despair of IPES/ESG 
activists. 
Although informed by the strategic thinking of the executive, 
both the Ci vUian and the Military Staff Off~ces were ruled by 
expediency and by the constraints imposed by immediate requirements 
and contingent pressures. In a way, the heads of the Staff Offices 
performed as trouble-shooters of the president. In subsequent 
administration, though, the role of the Staff Offices varied enor-
mously. They increasingly acquired a strategic quality and developed 
the function of executive policy-control mechanisms, under the pre-
sidencies of General Medici and of General Ernesto Geisel, and in 
particular under the current president, General Joao Baptista 
Figueiredo, whose present heads of the Civilian and Military 
staff Offices are respectively General Golbery himself and General 
Danilo Venturini.54 The IPES/ESG group, and especially the SNI 
had gone full circle. 
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By far the most important development in economic matters 
was that IPES affiliates~d collaborators established their hege-
mony within the financial network of the state, thus controlling 
the allocation ~ the vast resources at their disposal. Moreover, 
the IPES activists controlled the key agencies for financial policy-
making~d all the levers of decision-making, thus in effect shaping 
the economy. Law 4595 of 1964 restructured the. financial system, 
which by 1966 comprised the following bodies 
The National Financial S,stem 
Ministry of " Ministry of 
Planning - - - -A Finance (Fazenda) 
)1 Na tional National I 
,-- Economic Monetary ~ 
I Council - CNE Council - CMN I I 
fl' cent~al I 
,.-------+1-1- Bank 
II (ex-SUMOC) 
Bank of 
Brazil 
.-
I 
-, 
.f. 
Financial Institutions 
Public 
-Federal and state Savings Banks 
-Federal and state Credit Banks 
-Regional Development Banks 
-National Housing Bank 
-Autarchies and Mixed Economy 
Corporations 
-Official State Banks 
-National Bank for Cooperative 
Credit 
Advisory Committee 
Banking, Capital 
Markets, Rural Credits 
Industrial Credits 
1 
f I 
BNDE 
I 
Private 
-Commercial Banks 
-Industrial Banks 
-Credit, Finance and 
Investment Corporations 
-Real Estate Credit Corp. 
-Savings and Loans Corp. 
-Insurance and Capitali-
zation Corporations 
-Stock Exchanges 
-Credit Funds 
-Selected Pe~sons and 
Corporations operating 
in the Capital Market 
The key positions in this structure were occupied by former 
members and activists of the Study and Doctrine groups of IPES. They 
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were mostly entrepreneurs and techno-entrepreneurs and many of them 
had dealt, at IPES, with position papers, reform proposals and pro-
grammes for government related to their subsequent functions and 
positions in the administration of castello Branco. 
As Minister of Finance was retained IPES affiliate Octavio 
Gouveia de Bulhoes who had been appointed, immediately after April 
1st 1964, by the commanding junta of the self-appointed ministers 
of the Armed Forces. Gouveia de Bulhoe~s became, together with 
Roberto Campos, the shapers of the new Brazilian economy.55 
Alvaro Carvalho Cesario Al vim was made Procurator of the Ministry, 
and Mader Gon9alves was .:ppointed advisor to the administration. 
Ernane Gllveas, an IPES collaborator and a friend of Delfim Netto, 
was appointed assistant to Gouveia de Bulhoes. 
The Superintendency of Currency and Credit - SUMOC,comprised, 
by 1965, the following entrepreneurs and techno-entrepreneurs, all 
affiliates and collaborators of IPES: Octavio Gouveia de Bulhoes 
(president\ Luiz de Moraes Barros (vice-president), and a council 
composed of Denio Nogueira, Luiz Biolchini (Carteira de Cambio), 
AIdo Franco (CACEX), Casimiro Antonio Ribeiro (Carteira de Redes-
contos do Banco do Brasil), Daniel Faraco (Ministry of Industry 
and Commerce), Roberto de Oliveira Campos (Ministry of Planning), 
Joa-o Gonyalves de Souza (SUDENE) and Jose Garrido Torres (BNDE). 
The director of Foreign Affairs of SUMOC was also its general direc-
tor, lEES leader Denio Nogueira. Fabio Antonio da Silva Reis was 
appointed head of the Division for International Affairs. The 
secretary general of SUMOC and head of the Inspetoria Geral de 
Bancos was entrepreneur Helio Marques Vianna, a member of the think-
tank of the Federation of Industries of GUanabara and a collaborator 
of IPES as well as a relative of General Castello Branco. 
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The Economic Department of the SUMOC was headed by Eduardo da Silveira 
Gomes Jr. and the Division a Financial and Monetary Appraisals 
(Estudos) was headed by Basilio Martins. As advisors to Silveira 
Gomes Jr. were appointed Jose Luiz Silveira Miranda and Ernane 
, 
Galveas. 
SUMOC was eTentually superseded by the establishment of the 
lPES-recommended Central Bank - a bank for the government, a bank 
for the banks and a bank of emission - and by a newly created National 
Monetary Council which was in charge of economic-monetary policy-
making. A long standing proposal of lEES, that of the creation of 
a Central Bank, as an agency responsible for the administration of 
banking and credit policies and in charge of the control of foreign 
capital, was finally implemented. Its first president and founder 
was Denio Nogueira, who had been responsible ~or the lEES-sponsored 
project at the Study and Doctrine Group in Rio. As directors of 
the Central Bank were appointed techno-entrepreneurs Casimiro Anton1o 
Ribeiro, Luiz Biolchini and AIdo Franco.56 Jose Luiz Bulhoes 
Pedreira was appointed consultant to the Bank, while as head of the 
Economic Department was appointed Eduardo da Silveira Gomes Jr. 
Denio Nogueira was succeeaed as president of the Central Bank by 
techno-entrepreneur Ruy Aguiar da Silva Leme, the Doctrine and 
Study Group leader of lEES-Sao Paulo. 
The National Bank for Economic Development - BNDE, with its 
enormous resources, which in 1966 allocated 200 billion cruzeiros 
to industry and its function of long-term financing of fixed capital 
in basic sectors, became another lEES preserve. IPES leader and 
techno-entrepreneur Jose Garrido Torres was appointed president. 57 
Techno-entrepreneur and lEES collaborator Jayme Magnassi de Sa was 
appointed director.58 Other influential figures in the BNDE structure 
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were the economists and IPES affiliates and collaborators Jorge 
Duprat de Brito Pereira, Jesse Montello, Raul Fontes Cotia, Joao 
Batista Pinheiro, Alvaro Americano and Alberto Lelio Moreira, who 
occupied administrative posts. As director of the Administrative 
Council of the BNDE was appointed IPES affiliate Edmundo Falclo da 
Silva, who also became the Bank's representative in the administra-
tive council of the Fund for Financing and Acquisition of Machinery 
and Industrial Equipment - FINAME, a new and key state agency in 
the process of industrializations. FINAME used resources of the 
Alliance for Progress, the Interamerican Bank for Development - BID, 
and the German Fund for Development. 
The overlap and interchange of personnel was so intense that Garrido 
Torres, in view of the heavy load imposed on IPES, even suggested 
that BNDE economists should help the IPES Study and Doctrine Grou~9 
which continued to prepare recommendations for economic moderniza-
tion after April 1964 and remained a body which assessed the 
government's performance on financial and industrial policy. 
The Banco do Brasil lost many of its attributions to the 
newly created Banco Central, but still remained the financial agent 
of the treasury, in charge of collecting federal revenues. The 
Banco do Brasil combined the operations of a commercial bank with 
those of an agricultural bank, entering even into some lines of 
investment banking. Its control gave the IPES entrepreneurs a 
strong card in the allocation of resources to agriculture. IPES 
leader and banker Luiz de Moraes Barros was appointed president of 
the Banco do Brasil,60 substituting entrepreneur Arnaldo Blank, who 
had been appointed by the Military Junta. Luiz Biolchini was 
appointed head of the Bank's Foreign Exchange Department. The 
Foreign Trade Department - CACEK (formerly CEXIM) was headed by 
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techno-entrepreneur Aldo Franco, and Ernane G{lveas was appointed 
director in 1966. The Carte ira de Redescontos was headed by techno-
entrepreneur Casimiro Antonio Ribeiro. The head of the Carteira 
Agricola was ADCE executive Severo Gomes, himself an industrialist 
and landowner. Herculano Borges da Fonseca was the lawyer of both 
the Banco do Brasil and of CAGEX. 
Affiliates and collaborators of IPES soon controlled the 
National Economic Council, which for a while remained an assorted 
composition~ entrepreneurial interests. By 1965, the CNE had as 
counsellors the entrepreneurs and techno-entrepreneurs Harold Polland, 
Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, Glycon de Paiva and Humberto Bastos. They 
joined nationalistic entrepreneur Fernando Gasparian, and Jose; 
Augusto Bezerra de Medeiros, Pereira Diniz, and Paulo Fender, a 
former senator for Santa Catarina, all of whom were members of the 
CNE in the previous government. The president of the CNE was Antonio 
H • P' d' 'd t G . 61 orac~o ere~ra an v~ce-pres~ en was aspar~an. 
By March 1966, the IPES leadership had succeeded in removing 
the thorn represented by the nationalistic aspirations of Gasparian 
and reconstituted the CNE. The president of the CNE was Harold 
Cecil Polland. As councillors were listed Glycon de Paiva, Antonio 
Delfim Netto, Obregon de Carvalho, Jose Bonifacio Coutinho Nogueira, 
Humberto Bastos, Paulo Fender, Antonio Horacio Pereira, Antonio 
Carlos Carneiro Leao (secretary). IPES affiliates Ruy Aguiar da 
Silva Leme, of the Doctrine and Study Group of Sao Paulo, joined 
the Council, as did Helio Beltrao, who went to the Planning Commission. 
As head of the Section~ Exchange and Divulgation of the CNE was 
appointed IPES affiliate Maragliano Cardoso. 
In late 1965 a National Monetary CoUncil - CMN was created, 
in charge of formulating financial policy, thus crowning the newly 
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trimmed Financial System with an IPES team of entrepreneurs and 
techno-entrepreneurs. The CMN comprised the Minister of Finance, 
Gouveia de Bulhoes (president), Roberto Campos (Planning), Denio 
Nogueira (Central Bank), Luiz de Moraes Barros (Banco do Brasil), 
Garrido Torres (BNDE) , Casimiro Antonio Ribeiro (director of the 
Central Bank), Luiz Biolchini (director of the Central Bank) ,. Aldo 
Franco (director of the Central Bank), and Daniel Faraco (Minister 
of Industry and Commerce). IPES leaders and bankers Gastao Eduardo 
de Bueno Vidigal and Rui de Castro Magalhaes were included as repre-
sentatives of the private banking institutions, thus giving them 
direct access to policy-making. IPES affiliate and entrepreneur 
Jose Maria de Araujo Costa was made director of the influential 
Consultive Commission for Industrial Credit of the Crill, 
control of the allocation of resources for industry~2 
which had 
IPES affiliate Jose Luiz Bulhoes Pedreira, a leading entrepreneur 
himself, during his passage through the Ministry of Finance and 
that of Planning was :responsible together with an IPES/CONSlL'lEC 
team for the major part of the financial legislation of the period, 
and in particular, for the Capital 11arkets Law. This law, promul-
gated as No.4728 in 1965 regulated the financial market, laying the 
groundwork for protecting security-buying public and minority stock-
holders, and attempting to provide adequate disclosure of corporate 
financial structure and other information necessary to the potential 
investor. The law also established principles for the reformulation 
of the stock exchanges, which were led by IPES related financial 
figures, and established new bases for mutual funds and investment 
banks. Several sections of the Law were aimed at the 'Democratization 
of Capital', i.e., increasing participation in the ownership of the 
sociedades anonimas, an important battle-horse of IPES previous to 
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1964. Finally, the law gave to the Monetary Council and to the 
Banco Central functions comparable to the Securities Exchange Com-
mission in the United states~3 
It has already been shown that IPES affiliates and collaborators, 
in the majority bankers and industrialists - not tecnicos - held the 
key posts of the CNE, the CMN, the Banco do Brasil, the Central 
Bank, the Ministries of Planning and Finance and of the BNDE. However, 
the law that reformed the financial system also involved a most 
important decision, i.e. the inclusion of the private banks and 
financial institutions, as formal components of the National Finan-
cial System. It is interesting to note that IPES affiliates and 
collaborators were strongly represented in the private and public 
banks? and in financial institutions,64 which were part of the 
National Financial System (as can be seen from APpendix W). 
IPES affiliates and collaborators, themselves industrialists 
and bankers, were also prominent in the administration of the biggest 
public state banks, which controlled enormous resources available 
for regional projects to private entrepreneurs. Among them it is 
worth mentioning: Banco do Estado do Parana (Andre Arantes), Banco 
do Estado da Guanabara (Joab Augusto Maia Penido, Dario de Almeida 
Magalhaes), Banco do Estado de Santa Catarina (Irineu Bornhausen), 
Banco do Estado de Sao Paulo (Lelio Toledo Piza Almeida Filho, Paulo 
e 
Almeida Barbosa, Henrique Bastos' Thompson, G. E. Bueno Vidigal, Ruy 
Aguiar da Silva Leme (director of the Carteira de Expansao Economica), 
.. 
Teodoro Quartim Barbosa, Paulo Reis Magalhaes), ]lanco do Estado do 
~ (Milciades Mario Sa Freire de Souza, Cesar Gmnle, Francisco 
de Assis Monerat, Carlos Alberto Melloni), Banco do Amazones (Nelson 
Ribeiro), Banco do Estado de Minas Gerais (Jose Alcino Bicalho, 
-
Geraldo Ildefonso Mascarenhas, Celso Lage, Jose Pereira de Faria), 
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Banco do Sstado da Bahia (Edmar de Souza). 
Furthermore, IPES affiliates and collaborators were placed in 
key positions in the class associations and the private agencies 
related to the financial sector. 
Jos6 Luiz Moreira de Souza became president of ADECIF, the Associa-
tion of Credit, Investment and Finance Enterprises. A. Oswaldo 
Campiglia became president of ACREFI, the Association of Investment, 
Credit and Finance Enterprises. 
Luiz Cabral de Menezes was made president of the Stock Market of 
Rio de Janeiro (Bolsa de Valores do Rio de Janeiro). Ernesto Barbosa 
Tomanik was appointed president of the Stock Market of Sao Paulo. 
Tomanik.was also responsible for the modernization of the Stock 
Market, for which 'project he had peen responsible at the time of 
the IPES-sponsored Congress on'Basic Reforms. The 'democratization 
of capital', one of the ideological tenets of IPES involving the 
development of the National Stock Market while securing the invest-
ment of middle-class and white-collar working-class savings, and 
the expansion of the number of 'Blue-Chip' corporations, i.e. enter-
prises which placed their shares in the market, was being implemented 
under the supervision of IPES activists. 65 
Finally, IPES activists took over key positions in the ]ending 
banks of the state. The former IPES treasurer and banker, Joviano 
Rodrigues Moraes Jardim, was appointed president of the ~ 
Econ6mica Federal - CEF, in Rio de Janeiro, a government low-lending 
bank which operated with considerable resources. Moreover, Antonio 
Viana de Souza was also appointed to the CEF-Rio. Arnaldo Blank 
became president of CEF-Guanabara. To the directorship of the 
Carteira de Consigna90es of the C~F was appointed Humberto Esmeraldo 
Barreto, nephew of General Adauto Esmeraldo. 66 To the Superior 
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Council of the Caixas Economicas Federais went Minas Gerais banker 
Oswaldo Pierrucetti, as president~ and lBAD Marshal A. Magessi 
Pereira as director. Jose Carlos de Assis Ribeiro became juridical 
consultant of the CEF of Rio de Janeiro. Arnaldo Blank became 
president of the Caixa Economica of Guanabara. Paulo Salim Maluf, 
an associate of lPES leader Fuad Lutfalla's economic group and 
director of Eucatex a/A, became the head of the CEF in Sao Paulo 
in 1967. 
The accumulation of key posts within the financial system 
by the lPES affiliates and collaborators was truly remarkable, 
emphasizing, against accepted beliefs, the extraordinarily high 
degree of direct participation in politics of bank owners and 
directors of private banks. Another important observation to be 
made is the relatively small number of lPES ~ctivists holding so 
many key positions, due to their extraordinary overlap of functions. 
Moreover, what is particularly important to stress is that these 
lPES affiliates were not only owners and directors of financial 
institutions, but were shareholders and directors of a very large 
concentration of industrial corporations, both local and multi-
national. Many of the banks were themselves connected by share-
holding or joint venture association with large industrial corpora-
tions, expressing the advanced stage of integration and concentration 
of banking and industrial interests. These connections can be 
seen in Appendices B, E and I. 
Besides the reform of the financial system and the occupation 
of its key positions, which lPES considered necessary and which 
was implemented under the supervision of its leaders and affiliates~7 
there was another politically and ideologically important issue 
which had a serious effect on the Brazilian economy and polity. 
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This issue was the emotionally charged Law of Agrarian Reform. 
Agrarian Reform, as seen earlier, had been a subject of detailed 
study at lPES/IBAD. The guidelines for the basic Law of Agrarian 
Reform, which became known as the Estatuto da Terra, were based on 
the recommendations made by IPES. These proposals on reform, 
relying on complex progressive taxation to force large landowners 
to adopt modernization techniques or sell their land, were made 
public in a book released in 1964 by lPES and called The Agrarian 
Reform: Problems, Bases, Solutions. The study had been coordinated 
by Paulo de Assis R~beiro, under the supervision of IPES leaders 
Glycon de Paiva, General Golbery, General Heitor Herrera and Harold 
Polland.> The IPES/IBAD team which worked on the study included Jose 
Garrido Torres, Jose Arthur Rios, Denio Nogueira, Carlos Jose de 
Assis Ribeiro, Edgard Teixeira Leite, Julian Chacel, Luis Carlos 
Mancini, J. Irineu Cabral, Wanderbilt D. de Barros and Nilo Bernardes. 
(others who parthipated in the original study have been listed in 
Chapter VI.) Basically the same entrepreneurs and techno-entrepreneurs 
participated .in the formulation and implementation of the Estatuto 
da Terra which was finally implemented. 68 
Paulo de Assis Ribeiro's team received the help of the Ministry of 
Planning through a team made up basically of IPES affiliates and 
collaborators. 69 
The hegemony of IPES was also visible in the composition of the 
various task-teams which had a say in the technical preparation of 
the Estatuto da Terra. The individuals who headed the various task-
teams of professionals and bureaucrats from SUPRA and DATE-Sao Paulo 
(a technical and consultantship agency) were: 70 Denio Nogueira (SUMaC), 
Mario Henrique Simonsen (Ministry of Planning), Julian M. Chacel (FGV) 
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and, rather surprisingly, Maria da ConceiQao Tavares (SUPRA), all 
of whom dealt with Economic Problems; Wanderbilt Duarte de Barros, 
of the Ministry of Planning (Agronomic Problems); Andre Martins 
Andrade (Fiscal Problems}; Jose Arthur Rios and Luis Carlos Mancini 
(Sociological Problems); Nilo Bernardes (Geographical Problems); 
Jose Tocantins (Banco Nacional de Credito Cooperativo) and Jose 
Pires de Almeida (Banco Nacional de Credito Cooperativo) (Coopera-
tivist Problems); and General Golbery (SNI) , Candido Guinle de Paula 
Machado, Harold Cecil Polland (CNE) , Jose Rotta (Federation of Rural 
Workers of the State of Sao Paulo), and Glycon de Paiva (CNE), with 
no specified assignments, dealing with Diverse Problems. 
From the Brazilian Rural Confederation - CBR, the following 
rural entrepreneurs had access to the bill of law on agrarian reform 
and were able to propose amendments to the core group which dealt 
with the Estatuto da Terra: Iris Meinberg, Edgard Teixeira Leite, 
Jose Rezende Peres, Durval Garcia Menezes, Lingard Miller Paiva, 
Al Neto, Batista Luzardo and Josafa ~~cedo. 
From the Banco do Brasil were consulted entrepreneurs Severo Gomes 
and Claudio Pacheco. The absence of representatives of the tradi-
tional agrarian interests was noticeable, although party political 
figures were consulted on their opinions about the bill of law (only 
after it had been drafted). It was clear that the weight behind the 
formulation of the bill lay with those mentioned above, all affiliates 
and collaborators of IPES/IBAD. 
Techno-entrepreneur Jose Gomes da Silva was appointed super-
intendent of SUPRA, the Superintendency for Agrarian Reform. Jose 
Gomes da Silva was also a member of IBRA, the Institute for Agrarian 
Reform, which eventually superseded SUPRA. 
For. the implementation of the Estatuto da Terra, or Statute of 
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the Land and the reform of landholdings, IBRA, the Institute for 
Agrarian Reform, was established. IBRA, which had been accorded 
status of a Super-ministry, enjoying priority among cabinet depart-
ments, served to side-step in terms of policy-making the Ministry 
of Agriculture where the traditional agrarian interests st~ll had 
a foothold. IBRA was functional in pre-empting the control the oli-
garchy and the coffee bourgeoisie had over agrarian policies, by 
shifting the locus of policy-making in this vital area to another 
agency, staffed by techno-entrepreneurs and entrepreneurs who pushed 
forward policies which attempted to integrate the agrarian sector 
within the wider plans of deveiopment of big industrial modernization. 7l 
The nub .of the analysis of the Statute of the Land was the ineffi-
ciency that was found in the man/land relationship both in the 
traditional latifundia and in the large quantity of minifundia. 
Existing bottlenecks in agriculture had to be overcome by a better 
distribution of the factors of production, modifying archaic patterns 
of land ownership. Emphasis was placed on increasing agricultural 
resources, mechanization, and on developing distribution networks 
suitable for the products involved, which as a side-effect involved 
the Ministry of Transport in a policy of road-building, and the big 
industrial concerns into mechanizing farming and providing transport 
facilities to the rural markets. 
Again, IBRA was mostly staffed by IPES/IBAD activists. The 
president of IBRA, the agency charged with the administration of 
the Agrari~ Reform and the government's effective policies in the 
rural sector was Paulo de Assis Ribeiro. The directors of IBRA 
were Wanderbilt D. de Barros, Cesar Cantanhede (Assis Ribeiro's team-
mate at CBP), Helio de Almeida Brum (ADESG) and IP0S General JaUl 
Pires de Castro. 72 
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The Technical Council of IBRA comprised Claudio Cecil Polland, Julian 
Magalhaes Chacel, Edgard Teixeira Leite, Jos~ Agostinho Trigo Drum-
mond Gon9alves, Joao Quintiliano de Avelar Marques (representative 
of Rural Machinery Industry of Minas Gerais), Glauco Olinger (repre-
sentative of ABCAR-Santa Catarina, the Brazilian Rural Credit and 
Technical Assistance Association), entrepreneur Flavio da Costa 
Britto (representing the cooperativista movement) and Edvaldo de 
Oliveira Flores.?J 
The head of the work-team on the Specific Programme of Sugar 
Co-operatives of the Ministry of Planning and co-ordinated by !BRA, 
was Jose Garrido Torres. 
Together with !BRA was created another agency, INDA, the 
National Institute for Agrarian Development, which was to deal with 
'colonization' and agricultural development in the country. 
As president of INDA was appointed IPES activist and rural entrepre-
neur Eudes de Souza Leao. He was also advisor to the Ministry of 
Planning on Agrarian Matters. In this capacity, EUdes de Souza 
Leao became the co-ordinator for the Planning of National Agriculture, 
for Which, very conveniently, INDA was responsible. 
Paulo de Assis Ribeiro was also to become subsequently the co-
ordinator for the bill of law of the General Plan of Statistics of 
INCRA, the National Institute for Colonization and Agrarian Reform 
which superseded IBRA and INDA. As consultants to INCRA were appointed 
vIanderbilt Duarte de Barros, Julian Chacel and Jose Arthur Rios, all 
IPES affiliates and activists. 
As mentioned earlier, the Ministry of Agriculture remained at a 
secondary level of importance throughout the administration, over-
" 
shadowed by IBRA. This was reflected not only in the appointments 
made to the Ministry but in its diminished functions.?4 
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Initially, the Minister of Agriculture was a representative of the 
traditional~arian interests and the Ministry served to absorb 
pressures coming from such quarters. The new Minister was Oscar 
Thompson Filho, who had been Secretary of Agriculture of the State 
of Sao Paulo under Adhemar de Barros and had been a participant 
in the political mobilization of middle-class women organized by 
IPES. Soon Oscar Thompson resigned, on~count of his incompatibi-
lity with the new policies being implemented by the Castello admini-
stration through IBRA and the ineffectiveness of his efforts. His 
place was taken by Hugo Leme, also of Sao Paulo. Besides being an 
agronomist and professor at the Esco1a Superior de Agricultura of 
Piracicaba, Hugo Leme was also the business associate of IPES 
leader and entrepreneur Nivaldo Coimbra de Ulhoa Cintra, who became 
top advisor of the Ministry of Agriculture, together with Edgar 
Teixeira Leite. 
Hugo Leme was succeeded by Nei Braga, a former governor of Parana, 
who was close to General Geisel and President Castello Branco. 
Braga was also a Klabin place man, for the K1abin group had exten-
sive interests in Parana. 75 Nei Braga had succeeded in securing 
the appointment of his po1iticalresociate, banker Leonidas Borio, 
a former director of CODEPAR, to the presidency of the Brazilian 
Coffee Institute - IBC, the agency in charge of government policies 
in the coffee sector. Borio took with him Karlos Rischbieter from 
CODEPAR. 
When Nei Braga resigned his post, his place was taken over by Severo 
Gomes as a stop-gap Minister. 
The Ministry of Agriculture played a subdued role after 1964, doing 
nothing dramatic. Even credits to agriculture were outside its 
sphere of influence, for they were handled and allocated by the 
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Banco do Brasil, under the supervision of its president, IPES leader 
Luiz de Moraes Barros, and through the services of rural entrepreneur 
Severo Gomes, as head of the Carte ira Agricola e Industrial. 
Besides the key ministries directly involved in economic policy-
making mentioned above, IPES affiliates occupied the central posts 
of a host of other ministries and administrative agencies of the 
post-1964 government. In many cases these ministries and administra-
tive agencies remained with their pre-1964 functions, only they were 
taken over by the IPES/IBAD activists who thus secured homogeneity 
in policy-making. For these ministries and agencies were implement-
ing policies which to a large extent had already been developed as 
a programme for government by the Study and Doctrine Groups of IPES 
and co-ordinated by the Ministry of Planning. Most of the reforms 
implemented by IPES ministers and administrators had already been 
introduced to parliament, unsuccessfully though in many cases, as 
bills of law still under Goulart. Other policy proposals had been 
presented to the public at large, by these very same current mini-
sters and administrators and by some of the individuals who were 
part of the new government, as reform proposals at the IPES-sponsored 
Congress on Basic Reforms, in 1963. 76 
The Ministry of Industry and Commerce remained with its pre-
1964 functions, and it was occupied by a number of IPES affiliates 
and collaborators. Daniel Faraco, the ADP deputy, who had played 
an important role in the strategy of the Parliamentary Action Group 
of IPES in the Chamber of Deputies, was appointed Minister for 
Industry and Commerce. He was eventually substituted by industrial-
ist and banker Paulo Egydio Martins, who had been a participant 
of the Sao Paulo based civilian-military staff led by IPES. Indus-
trialist and banker Helio Beltra~ was appointed director of the 
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influential Advisory Committee on Industrial and Commercial Policy 
of the Ministry. Other IPES collaborators and entrepreneurs were 
appointed to agencies which functioned under the aegis of the Mini-
stry for Industry and Commerce. Among them were Sylvio Froes Abreu 
(National Institute of Technology), Paulo Accioly de Sa (National 
Institute for Weights and Measures), and Joaquim Xavier da Silveira, 
who went to EMBRATUR, a newly created agency which was to co-ordinate 
government policy in the area of tourism.?? 
To the National Superintendency of Supplies - SUNAB, established by 
the previous regime to control the prices and the supply of basic 
commodities, was appointed IPES leader Guilherme Borghoff, and 
Colonel. Mauricio Cibulares, who had previously been with COFAP, the 
predecessor of SUNAB. The National Supply Agency was subsequently 
replaced by a new agency, the Brazilian Company of Food - COBAL, to 
which was appointed IPES General Carlos de Castro Torres. COBAL's 
emphasis was more on orderly supply of goods to the market rather 
than on fiscalization of prices and supply of non lucrative basic 
commodities and services. 
Another ministry which did not undergo drastic changes in its 
structure, but which expanded its role was that of Justice. This 
ministry was, and is, within the Brazilian political system, a key 
political ministry and not just the administrative structure of 
the judicial power. It is a ministry whose head is generally 
present in the most important political~cisions taken by the 
government, absorbing together with the Civilian Staff Office pres-
sures coming from the party-political area, the media and academic 
quarters. as well as dealing with political and intellectual oppo-
sition to the incumbent government. The Ministry of Justice has 
also served as a channel for the expression of hard-line pressures 
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coming from the military in their opposition to civilian corruption 
and to the left. 
Initially IPES leader Luiz Antonio Gama e Silva was appointed 
Minister of Justice, immediately after April 1st 1964, by the com-
manding Junta of the self-appointed Ministers offue Armed Forces. 
With General Castello Branco's accession to power, Gama e Silva 
stepped down and another jurist, UDN politician Milton Campos, the 
unsuccessful former slate companion of Janio Quadros in the elections 
of 196~ succeeded him~ Campos, who belonged to the 'more legalist' 
trend within the UDN, and was in this, akin to General Castello 
Branc~ was soon replaced by ADPjESG General Juracy Magalhaes for an 
interim. period until IPES/ADP Senator Mem de Sa, of the Liberator 
Party, who had played such a. significant role in the strategy of 
IPES/IBAD in Congress, took over. 78 
Although it kept its previous functions,' the Ministry of 
Justice played a very active role because of the authoritarian 
nature of the regime imposed after 1964, performing a supportive 
role in the executive in the latter's legislative flurry which pre-
empted Congress. The Ministry of Justice did not only rubber stamp 
political decisions against opponents of the opposition with 'juri-
dical authority', but it also exerted judicial intervention with a 
clear political character, of which many of the over 6,000 decrees, 
700 laws, )12 law-decrees, 2 Institutional Actsmd 17 Complementary 
Acts promulgated and enacted by the Castello Branco administration 
bore witness. 
The extraordinarily great amount of legislation by the executive 
was eventually encapsulated into a new Constitution. The commission 
of prominent jurists in charge of the project for the Reform of the 
Constitution which they drafted and which was implemented in 1967 
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comprised four IPES affiliates and collaborators, namely Them!stocles 
Cavalcanti, Seabra Fagundes, Orozimbo Nonato and Levi carneiro. 
Besides the direction of the Ministry of Justice and the responsibi-
lity for the reform of the Constitution (for which Carlos de Assis 
Ribeiro had before 1964 prepared a basic draft plan and line of 
argument), the IPES activists also secured a host of key positions 
within the judicial structure. 79 
A ministry which clearly changed its role was that of Labour. 
Through the Ministry of Labour, the past administrations had secured 
the limited mobilization offue urban working classes and attempted to 
manipulate the trade unions. Under the new government, popular mobili-
zation wa~ halted, although the Ministry of Labour remained with its 
function of labour control. 
IPES political actors were influential in the Ministry of Labour. 
Immediately after the coup the Junta appointed Arnaldo Lopes Sussekind, 
who retained his function with President Castello Branco. Sussekind 
had helped to draft the long-standing direct and indirect corporativist 
controls established in the COnsolidation of Labour Laws - CLT, which 
were the cornerstone of the Estado NOvo's labour policies. Sussekind 
was sUbstituted by Walter Peracci Barcellos, the ADP deputy of Rio 
Grande do Sul. Barcellos was substituted in mid 1966 by lawyer and 
~trepreneur Luiz Gonzaga do Nascimento Silva, a lecturer at IPES, 
when the former decided to become a candidate for the governatorial 
seat of Rio Grande do SuI, which he eventually won. BO As lawyer to 
the Ministry of Labour was appointed Juarez do Nascimento Fernandes 
T~vora, son of ESG co-founder Marshal Juarez Tavora and Minister of 
Transport of the new government. As member of the Superior Labour 
Tribunal was appointedarch-pelego and AIFLD/ORIT-linked Ary Campista, 
while Romulo Marinho, a ICT/AIFLD graduate, became director of the 
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Departamento Naciona1 do Trabalho under President Medici's term. 
The Study and Doctrine Groups of IPES, in co-operation with 
members who had been active in the Syndical Sector of Action of IPES, 
had prepared a series of reforms intended to contain the working-
class movement, as well as to break the populist hold which tradi-
tiona11y had been EStablished through the Ministry of Labour. These 
reforms were incorporated into the Ministry of Labour, thus shaping 
the form of events for years to come, refining and supplementing the 
techniques of the Estado Novo. The government's new labour legis-
1ation served three main purposes. It tightened direct control of 
the trade unions, preventing them from providing an organizational 
base for. working-class attacks on specific government policies, on 
the new political system and against the social conditions the system 
came to preserve. 
The new labour legislation also sought to strengthen the corporative 
aspects of the syndicalist structure for their role in nation bui1d-
ing and social cohesion. Finally, under the guise of inflation 
control, it attempted toiransfer resources to industry by subjecting 
the working class to several types of forced saving programmes. 81 
Government intervened in 67 per cent of the confederations of . 
trade unions and in 42 per cent of the federation~ seeking to purge 
them ideologically and politically. Bank and transport workers' 
organizations figured prominently in the po1itical$rikes between 
1960 and 1964 and they were hit hardest in proportion to other 
sectors. General Liberato was appointed delegate to the Instituto 
de Aposentadoria e Previdencia dos Bancarios (Social Security Insti-
tute for Banking Employees - IAPB) of Guanabara, thus providing the 
system with a powerful instrument of pressure on banking employees. 
General Moacyr Gaya became De1egado Regional do Trabalho in the 
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troublesome area of Sao Paulo and was also appointed to~e commission 
in charge of the reform of the Labour Ministry in the same area. 
Large unions suffered more than the small ones. The Ministry inter-
vened in 70 per cent of those trade unions with 5000 or more members, 
in 38 per cent of those with 1000 to 5000 members and in only 19 per 
cent of those with fewer than 100.0 members. They simply destroyed 
the radical labour movement. 
Government legislation expressly prohibited political and 
solidarity strikes and made even economic strikes extremely difficult. 
The government also fundamentally restructured the social security 
system in order to prevent labour activists from using its' immense 
resources against the establishment. In 1966, a new law combined 
nearly all the Institutos de AposentadOria e Previdencia into one 
single National Social Welfare Institute - INPS, which was eventu-
ally placed under the responsibility of a Ministry spawned by the 
Ministry of Labour, the newly created Ministry ~ Social Welfare, 
thus ensuring 'apolitical' control over social security activities. 
Luiz Gonzaga do Nascimento e Silva was appointed Minister and IPES 
activist Estanislau Fischlowitz was appointed advisor to the Ministry. 
IPES affiliates were also instrumental in the establishment 
of the Fundo de Garantia de Trabalho Social - FGTS. One of the 
most highly prized benefits for Brazilian Jabour prior to the over-
throw of Goulart had bee~ job stability or tenure, i.e., protection 
against being fired once a worker had reached ten years of service 
with an employer, except in duly proven cases of serious misbehaviour, 
Foreign investors strongly objected to the stability law,82 and the 
new administration reeded these objections. In 1966 a bill was sub-
mi tted by the president which abolished the previous form of job 
stability and replaced it with a severance pay fund, the FGTS. The 
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law establishing the FGTS required that employers establish a bank 
account in the name of each of their employees and that they deposit 
therein each month the equivalent of 8 per cent of the employee's 
wages - the Creditopor Tempo de Servi90. Employees may withdraw 
this money only in the event of their dismissal, retirement or 
under other specified extraordinary circumstances. The bill of law 
instituting the Credito por Tempo de Servi20 was prepared by an 
all out IPES team which comprised entrepreneurs Joao Baylongue, 
Jos~ Duvivier Goulart and Jose Marques, General Heitor Herrera and 
Frederico Cesar Cardoso Maragliano. 83 The legislation establishing 
the FGTS also terminated several employer-funded programmes designed 
to assi~t workers and it eliminated employers' statutory contribution 
to others, thus reducing services previously available to the working 
class and further lowering the workers' standard of living. The 
FGTS had a marked impact onihe workers' lives, by heightening their 
personal economic insecurity, stimulating a high turnover rate of 
the labour force in the industrial~eas of Brazil (by 1970, 35.5 
per cent of the work force in Sao Paulo had put in ]ess than one 
year in the job, 55.6 per cent had not yet reached two years, and 
74.2 per cent had not reached three years). 
The lack of stability offered them also made workers hesitant to 
complain against their employers in the labour court-system, while 
the high turnover of workers employed by anyone enterprise favoured 
lower wages compared to those employees who stayed with the same 
company over a long run, as the workers were always hired anew at 
the minimum wage. 
The FGTS was established by a task-force of techno-entrepreneurs 
led by Roberto Campos, Luiz Gonzaga do Nascimento Silva and Mario 
Trindade, a friend of the Minister of Planning. The task-force 
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involved in the project comprised Mario Henrique Simonsen, Jose 
Americo Leon de Sa (a statistician of the Bozzano-Simonsen Bank, 
pertaining to Mario H. Simonsen), IPES affiliate and entrepreneur 
Moacyr Gomes de Almeida, Jayme da Silva Menezes (a bureaucrat of 
the Instituto de Resseguros do Brasil), lawyer Sergio Coelho and 
Joao Jos~ de Souza Mendes, the actuary. 
Finally, the Brazilian administration would resort to an 
important mechanism for financing economic growth in post-1964: 
the absolute reduction of wages. As the new Minister of Planning, 
Roberto campos woUld acknowledge, 'The wage discipline of Brazil ' 
seemed socially cruel, but it was the price to pay inaner to restore 
the capacity for investments, both in the public and entrepreneurial 
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sectors' • 
As seen in previous chapters, IPES activists had played a 
significant part in the disruption of the political organization of 
rural labour. They now intervened in the legislation which aimed 
to presoribe the political status of the rural workers and to pre-
empt their mobilization. The committee set up by the Ministry~ 
Planning and appointed to study the project for a Statute for Rural 
Workers (Estatuto do Trabalhador Rural), a sort of code of political 
and labour behaviour, was comprised of Paulo de Assis Ribeiro (presi-
dent), Eudes de Souza Leao, Armando de Oliveira Assis, General Adyr 
Maia and Carlos Ferreira de Souza. The choice of these individuals 
was not difficult, since the special commission of CONSPLAN which 
selected these members was composed of a number of IPES activists 
and collaborators, namely: Lindolfo Martins Ferreira, Jose Rotta, 
Nylton Velloso, Padre Fernando Bastos D'Avila, Armando de Oliveira 
Assis, Joao Paulo dos Reis Velloso, Oswaldo Iorio, Paulo de Assis 
Ribeiro, Eudes de Souza Leao, General Adyr Maia and Carlos Alberto 
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Ferreira de Souza. 85 
Among the peasantry, Padre Melo, the IPES/IBAD activist of the 
Northeast, became after the coup an 'unofficial dictator, directing 
the Army and the police to intervene in virtually alltbe rural 
syndicates and naming- new directors to replace the leaders he had 
removed,.86 Four AIFLD graduates were appointed to intervene within 
the trade unions in order to purge them of labour-left influence,87 
while as president of the Confederation of Agricultural Workers was 
elected IPES-sponsored Jose Rotta. 
Itamaraty, the Foreign Ministry, was purged. IPES leaders 
General Liberato and Them!stocles Cavalcanti, together with Ambassador 
Camilo de Oliveira, composed the Comissao de InvestigaOQes de Alto 
Nivel (High Level Commission for Investigations) responsible for 
implementing Institutional Act No.1 within the Itamaraty. They 
were, thus, effectively in command of the purge of the foreign 
service. 
Retained 'as Foreign Minister'was ESG graduate and IPES-linked Vasco 
Leitac, da Cunha, who had been appointed by the military Junta, and 
whose wife had. been involved in the IPES-led campaign of middle-
class mobilization. He soon retired, going into private business 
and was substituted by ESG graduate and ADP deputy Juracy Magalhae~s, 
also a successful entrepreneur who had been the post-1964 ambassador 
to the United states. Magalhaes was followed as ambassador to the 
United states by Joao Batista Pinheiro, of the CONSULTEC team. 88 
The Foreign Ministry underwent drastic changes in its orientation, 
abandoning its neutralist and Third World policies for one of auto-
matic alignment with the United states. The change in foreign 
policy was expressed by Foreign Minister Leitao da Cunha's state-
ment on Ire-situating Brazil in the framework of priority relations 
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with the Western World', and on Brazil's readiness to defend 'the 
security of the continent against subversion and oppression from 
without or within' and on the 'consolidation of ties of all sorts 
with the United states of America,.89 
The change in foreign policy was also emphasized Oy Foreign Minister 
Juracy Magalha~s' assertion that 'what is good for the United states 
is good for Brazil', paraphrasing the dictum about General Motors 
and the USA. 
The principle of national sovereignty shared the fate of the 
industrial and mercantile interests not involved in the internationali-
zation of the market. As President Castello Branco stated in a 
speech given in Itamaraty as early as August 1964, ' ••• the political 
expression of independence has been disfigured and has lost its des-
criptive utility •••• The concept of independence is operational 
only under certain practical conditions •••• In the economic sphere, 
the recognition of interdependence is inevitable, not just in trade, 
but especially in matters bf investment •••• Brazilian foreign policy 
has frequently reflected irresolution as the result of the doubtful 
nature of certain dilemmas: nationalism vs. interdependence; uni-
lateral vs. multilateral negotiations; socialism vs. free enterprise •••• 
More recently, nationalism was distorted so as to appear favourable 
to socialist systems, whose possibilities for trade with us and 
capacity for investment in Latin America were overestimated •••• 
Brazil seeks to follow a policy of free enterprise and of orderly 
receipt of foreign capital. ,90 A year later, the Foreign Minister 
summarized these same ideas as follows: 'From the operational stand-
point of foreign policy, independence and nationalism must give way 
to international interdependence, be it in the military, the political, 
the economic or the cultural spheres. ,91 
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The change in policy was epitomized by a heavily criticized agreement, 
signed in early 1965 and conceding special guarantees to North 
American investment in Brazi+,- while any restrictions imposed by 
previous governments on the remittance of capital and regular and 
extraordinary profits were lifted. 
From the moment the premises of dependent development in the economic 
sphere and of unquestioned US hegemony in the political sphere were 
accepted by Itamaraty and the government, it became possible to 
implement a foreign policy which some authors have characterized as 
b " • 1" 92 su -J.mperJ.a J.sm. 
This foreign policy which aimed to secure the collective security 
of the Americas from without and from within, involved a division 
of functions (economic, political, ideological and military) between 
the United states and Brazil as favoured ally in the context of the 
inter-American system. But in order to implement the new interna-
tional division of functions, which the official ideology presented 
as if it were a plan rooted in some supranational vision, it required, 
if not the wholesale sacrifice of the classic principles of self-
determination and non-intervention, at least their being tactically 
put aside in certain circumstances. It was 'in the name of collecthe 
security' that Brazil intervened militarily in the Dominican Republic 
in 1965, siding with the United States in the guise of an Inter-
american Peace Force. 93 
An area in which lEES took a special interest and in which its 
affiliates and collaborators also occupied key posts was that of 
Education and Culture. 94 The new administration reformed the educa-
tional system and established new goals. 95 Educational planning 
became an integral part of 'global' (economic) planning, and approp-
riately, the reform was co-ordinated by the Ministry of Planning, 
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within the framework of PAEG. The team which studied these reforms 
was headed by Luiz victor D'Arinos Silva and Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, 
both members of the Study and Doctrine Group of IPES-Rio. 96 
The new educational policy became the expression of the 're-
ordering of the forms of social and political control', functional 
to the requirements of the economic interests which made necessary 
the reformulation of the polity ~d the economy in the first place. 
Higher education was relatively favoured against popular education, 
revealing the preoccupation with the qualification of the labour 
force for the higher echelons of the administration and of industry. 
Private schooling was strengthened by the Constitution of 1967 
against government-owned, and free, universities. 
IPES affiliate, Victor D'Arinos, headed the Commission of the 
Plan for the Improvement and Expansion of Hig~er Teaching (Comissao 
do Plano para Melhoramento e Expansa~ do Ensino Superior). General 
Heitor Herrera, one of the leaders of IPES, was appointed to the 
Ministry of Education and made director of the programme responsible 
for the Co-ordination and Improvement of Higher Level Personnel -
CAPES, and which was presided over by Suzana Gon~alves. The agency 
was responsible for funding students who wished to continue higher 
studies. 
The tendency of educational planning ·to relatively favour 
higher learning against other levels, has to be seen in the context 
of the specificity of the Brazilian economy. The latter is endowed 
with a small and highly productive nucleus which functions on the 
base of imported sophisticated technology and produces durable con-
sumption goods for a minority of the population. This sector of the 
economy requires specialized and qualified human resources, but in 
small quantities. The universities became the factories of this 
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refined product, while educational planning was the mechanism through 
which the output of the educational system was adjusted to the input 
of the necessities of the labour market, regulated by the law of 
supply and demand. 97 
Higher education was seen as an economic input for industrial growth, 
and as such was conceptualized in the Ten Year Plan prepared by 
the Ministry of Planning in 1967. Brazilian education had 'to con-
solidate human capital in the country, so as to accelerate the pro-
cess of economic development'. Even the jargon in the preliminary 
diagnosis and in the Ten Year Plan itself was 'economic' in nature. 
Both the diagnosis and the plan speak of techniques of production, 
factors -of production, costs of production, regional and international 
comparative studies of production, and they all refer to the 'produc-
tion' of lecturers and students and the struc~ure of production of 
the educational system. 
Subsequent plans even speak of 'teaching productivity', expansion 
or contraction of supply and demand of higher learning, and of turn-
ing the population into a 'factor of production through the effects 
of schooling on the production of resources'. 
The concept of education changes SUbstantially. It becomes human 
capital, which duly invested can produce social and individual 
profit. However, education is investment only when:lt prepares 
individuals for labour. Education js not any more a process of trans-
mission of general culture of humanity, of universal knowledge. 
Education is instrumentalized for work, so that the individual becomes 
more productive in the enterprise which hires him. 98 
The Ten Year Plan prescribed for the educational system the amount 
of professionals it would have to produce in each year, envisaging 
current and projected production. Moreover, prognosis of human 
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resources needed until 1976 led to the formulation of four specific 
sectoral plans, namel~ for the formation of industrial labour force, 
the formation of rural labour force, the formation of professionals 
in medical sciences, and the formation and training of primary 
school teachers. These sectoral plans were important in that ihey 
showed the preoccupation with basic and primary education and health, 
in order to prepare a literate and semi-skilled and skilled labour 
force. 
For private enterprises to expand or shrink their production on the 
basis of the law of supply and demand and the maximization of profit, 
they needed to have a reservoir from which to draw and to which 
could be returned the superfluous labour force. The state, already 
the mediator of private enterprise in the process of internationali-
zation of the economy, took on the onus of the cost of the formation 
of such a reservoir of labour force and thus contributed directly 
to the formation of an industrial reserve army, both of qualified 
executive and professional personnel and skilled factory labour, 
through the institutions of higher learning and through MOBRAL, 
the Brazilian Movement for Literacy. 
Paulo Freire's creative experiment and the Movement for Basic 
Education were terminated. Instead, for a while, the Cruzada ABC, 
directed by a North American protestant minister and carefully 
planned to check expectations and to restrict the formation of a 
critical perspective, was implemented, mainly in the Northeast. 99 
In the meantime, a different type of literacy campaign was designed, 
made public as a government project towards the end of Castello 
I 
Branco's administration and subsequently implemented by the name of 
MOBRAL - Movimento Brasileiro de Alfabetiza9ao. MOBRAL was estab-
lished under the aegis of Mario H. Simonsen and Arlindo Lopes Correa, 
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who had devised one of the plans for middle-class mobilization 
employed by IPES in order to create the propitious political and 
emotional atmosphere for the coup of April 1964 became its head. 
MOBRAL was intended to co-opt and contain the urban worker, aiming 
at the 15-35 age group. Through MOBRAL civil and moral attitudes 
were inculcated at the political level as education and common 
sense. The government imposed a literacy campaign of explicitly 
ideological character, designed to instil in the urban working 
classes the values ~ authoritarian capitalism. What is interesting 
to note is that MOBRAL used the techniques of alphabetization of 
Paulo Freire, although extracting them from their philosophical and 
political context. lOO 
FUrthermore, civic indoctrination through the school system was an 
endeavour where the IPES-sponsored League of National Defence and 
the Campaign for Civic Education and the Superior "Tar College were 
collaborating in the planning of the new programme. lOl 
Finally, the National Union of Students, which had its head-
quarters taken over by the police and the military, was thereafter 
severely restricted in its activities by law 4,464, mown as 'Lei 
S)lplicy de Lacerda' t the name of the Education Minister. The UNE 
was finally banned outright under Costa e Silva's presidency.102 
Turning to a lesser ministry, that of Public Health, the 
pattern of IPES collaborators occupying key positions and of IPES 
policies being implemented was the same. I03 
Plans for the nationalization of the pharmaceutical corporations, 
so many of which were IPES contributors, and the socialization of 
medicine were halted and investigations intofueir techno-scientific 
and economic practices and the quality of their products was dis-
continued. Government budgets were allocated minimal resources 
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for public health. l04 
The working group which prepared the programme of government in 
the area of Public Health in the framework of PAEG was headed by 
Paulo de Assis Ribeiro. 
Changes were also carried out in the Ministry of Transportation 
and Public Works, which was placed under the responsibility of ESG 
General Juarez Tavora, the former lBAD-supported politician of the 
the PDC and one-time presidential candidate. 
Over the eight years from 1955 to 1963, there had been a 
noticeable increase in the use of motor vehicles. Of the 93 billion 
of tons/kilometer transported in 1963, highway transportation 
increas~d its share to 66,% of the total (from 5Y~ in 1955) while 
maritime transport decreased to l~& (from 26% in 1955). A projection 
of the growth of demand in each means of transportation carried out 
by the Ministry in order to decide on a policy of investment for 
the national system~ transportation estimated that by 1970, motor 
vehicle transportation of goods (and passengers) would represent 
78.1% of the total, while maritime transport would decrease to 12.7% 
and railway transport would carry a mere 8.n~.105 
The strategy of development of the Brazilian model after 1964 with 
the extraordinary expansion'ofthe multinational automobile and 
truck industry reinforced the trend towards motor transportation. 
Nothing was done to counteract the prognosis of the decline of rail-
way and maritime transportation, while almost 3~ of the Gross 
National Product was applied in 1965 in an ambitious programme to 
expand the motorway network. Furthermore, having a large population 
unable to acquire individual means of transport, the scant attention 
paid to the development of the railway system, which was the cheapest 
means of public transportation, said much about the social priorities 
of the new regime. 
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Measures of austerity were imposed on the railway syste~~ 
The emphasis was placed on running as efficiently as possible exist-
ing services, many of which were vital for the transport of ore from 
private mining enterprises and joint ventures, keeping up the supply 
"'-
of spare parts and weeding out dysfunctional lines rather than on 
the development of the railway system, which required in-depth 
measures comparable to those with which the automobile industry had 
been favoured along the years. Even so, IPES affiliates and colla-
borators occupied key positionsm the railway system.106 
Under the aegis of the Ministry of Transportation a wide-ranging 
programme of de-nationalization of the merchant shipping fleet was 
carried out. To the Merchant Navy Commission, an influential part 
in the decision-making which led.the process ofre-nationalization, 
were appointed a series of IPES affiliates anq directors of multi-
t ' 1 h' . t' 107 na 10na s 1pp1ng corpora 10ns. IPES affiliates and collaborators 
also took over other influential positions in the public management 
of the navigable waterways and services.108 
When EMBRAER, the government enterprise in charge of develop-
ing a national technology for the construction of aeroplanes for 
civilian and military use, was finally launched in 1969, a number 
of IPES entrepreneurs and techno-entrepreneurs took control. IPES 
affiliates and collaborators also maintained influential positions 
in other air transport companies. 109 
A new Ministry for Regional Co-ordination, MECOR, was created 
to which ESG General Cordeiro de Farias was appointed. The new 
ministry had the function of co-ordinating regional development 
agencies. MECOR paid special attention to SUDENE, the Superintend-
ency for Development of the Northeast and to SUDAM, the Superintend-
ency for Development of Amazonia. MECOR provided the central 
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government with an effective instrument to by-pass the state gover-
nors and implement its policies, as well as to side-step local 
pressures. It also became an~fective channel for entrepreneurial 
interests based in Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro to invest in the 
north and northeast of Brazil and to benefit from resources ear-
marked for development which were allocated to the regional state 
banks or to the regional agencies of development. 
SUDENE, the agency in charge of the development of the Northeastern 
region, was headed by Jo~o Gon9alves de Souza, an agronomist and 
rural sociologist. Gon9alves de Souza was also one of the organizers 
of the Brazilian Association of Credit and Rural Assistance - ABCAR, 
set up by Rockefeller interests in agriculture and which was headed 
by IPES affiliate J. Irineu Cabral, a main force behind the IPESjIBAD 
project of agrarian reform. 
Entrepreneur Arthur Amorim was given the job of reorganizing the 
Superintendency of the Amazonia SUDAM and the Bank of the Amazonia, 
headed by entrepreneur Nelson Ribeiro. Amorim became the head of 
the Executive Group for the development of the Amazonia, which 
included entrepreneurs Harry James Cole and Nelson Ribeiro, Com-
mander Geraldo Maia and Luis Carlos Andrade. The Executive Group 
designed a policy which aimed at attracting multinational investment 
in agriculture, mining and industries. Amorim was also a key figure 
in the establishment of the Free Trading Zone of Manaus, on the 
Amazon River., functional to the import of parts for assembly lines 
of multinational industries and the cheap import of machinery and 
equipment. In its operations, Amorim's team had the full endorse-
ment of the executive, through Colonel Gustavo 110raes Rego, of the 
Military Staff Office of the presidency and through General Mamede, 
commander of the Military Region of the Amazonia, both former members 
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of the Informal General Staff. 
General Cordeiro de Farias resigned his post once the candidacy 
of General Costa e Silva, which he bitterly opposed, was consolidated 
among important segments of the rank and file of the Armed Forces. 
After his resignation, the Ministry for Regional Co-ordination was 
taken over, as a stop-gap measure, 'by Joao Goncalves de Souza, who 
shared this new function with his directorship of SUDENE. 
The Ministry for Regional Co-ordination was replaced under Marshal 
Costa e Silva's term as president by the newly created Ministry of 
the Interior, which was to be occupied by ESG General Albuquerque 
Lima, the brother-in-law of IPES leader Jose Luiz Moreira de Souza. 
The post-1964 administration did not substantially modify the 
structure or function of the Ministry of Mines and Energy, but it 
reversed the nationalistic orientation of its policies which went 
back as far as Vargas. At the end of 1964, the government issued 
a call to the private sector, basically multinational, inviting 
it to take an interest in the intensive exploitation~ Brazil's 
subterranean riches. The Ministry also gave foreigners the right 
to acquire shares in Brazilian companies operating in this sector. 
Initially, General Costa e Silva, as a member of the military 
Junta which took over on April 1st, 1964, appointed himself to the 
Ministry of Mines and Energy. He was replaced by ~~rio Thibau, 
who was linked to the CONSULTEC team. 110 It was Thibau, with the 
collaboration of Roberto Campos and Octavio Gouveia de Bulhoes, 
who was to lead the attack on the public monopoly for the exploita-
tion of petro-chemicals, thus opening the doors for private, and 
mainly multinational, participation in this vital sector of the 
economy. 
A commission of the National Oil Council was established to study 
the particular case of the petro-chemical industry, which decided 
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in favour of private enterprise participation side by side with 
public enterprises in the development of the petro-chemical industry. 
The commission was formed by entrepreneurs Paulo Figueiredo, Kurt 
Politzer and Ivo de Souza Ribeiro, Jose Batista Pereira and Paulo 
Ribeiro. lll Marshal Juarez T.{vora, the Minister of Transportation, 
led the vote of the Security Council against the nationalization of 
oil refineries, reversing the process initiated but not concluded 
by Goulart. 
An inter-ministerial commission, formed by ministers Mario Thibau, 
Gouveia de Bulhoes (Finance), Roberto Campos (Planning), Daniel 
Faraco (Industry and Commerce), Marshal Juarez Tavora (Transport), 
and Ernesto Geisel (Military Staff Office), pushed for legislation 
which held as a tenet that mineral reserves were valuable only if 
exploited. They led to the effective revision of the 'Codigo de 
Minas', limiting the state to a supplementary role and opening the 
gates to multinational and associated private exploitation of the 
natural resources. Under the second military presidency, that of 
General Costa e Silva, the controversial decree of Gabriel Passos, 
which had suspended the concessions to Hanna Mining Co., was 
annulled.112 
As described above, lPES affiliates and collaborators, mostly 
entrepreneurs, were placed in key positions in the cabinet ministries. 
However, IPES/IBAD did not limit itself to holding key positions 
in the cabinet. To ensure the continuity of the organic elite, a 
plan was drawn up at lPES to place ES members and collaborators on 
a permanent basis in certain public enterprises. ll) 
IPES affiliates and collaborators took~er positions of command also 
within the autarchies and administrative agencies, some of Hhich were 
even created on the basis of IPES nspired or prepared proposals. 
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One of the most important state agencies created infue wake of 
lPES inspired policies was the National Housing Bank - BNH, a 'build-
ing bank' which was to play an essential part in the building industry. 
The BNH was in charge of implementing government policies on housing 
and regulating and refinancing housing credit. 
The BNH was important because of the enormous financial resources 
at its disposal, a great part of which came Irom the Fundo de Garantia 
de Tempo de Servi90. Being a source of savings and determinant of 
investment, the Bank in its early stages was central for ~s contri-
bution to financing the federal cash deficit by purchase of govern-
ment bonds. The BNH's importance also lay in the social implications 
of its policies, for although it had been created with the purported 
aim of providing housing facilities and credit for the large homeless 
and poorly housed population, it ended up as an instrument for finan-
cing middle-class residential construction which responded handsomely 
to the resources offered. The BNH also played a significant role 
in fostering the constructionmdustry, where so many lPES affiliates 
and contributors had a stake. Finally, the BNH also became an 
influential source of political patronage. 
Together with the BNH were instituted the Federal Service of Housing 
and Urbanization - SERFHAU, and the National Housing Plan, all of 
which were based on previously elaborated IPES projects. 114 
Very fittingly, IPES lecturer Sandra Cavalcanti, who had been 
attached to the IPES study unit on Housing Reform ('Economic and 
Legal Study on Popular Housing') and having first-hand knowledge of 
the matter as she herself was in the construction business, became 
the first head of the BNH. 
Entrepreneur Harry J. Cole went to SERFHAU, and in charge of the 
Housing Cooperative Scheme of Guanabara state, a pilot project 
developed by the BNH to tackle the housing shortage by giving an 
active role to private enterprise in the building of dwellings, 
instead of the government, was placed lPES affiliate Carlos Moacyr 
Gomes de Almeida, himself the head of a giant construction enter-
. 115 pr~se. 
742 
After a short period, Sandra Cavalcanti left the BNH, at a time when 
her close political associate Carlos Lacerda fell out with the 
government. Although Harold Polland and Glycon de Paiva were con-
sidered as candidates for the post, the job eventually went to IPES 
collaborator Mario Trindade, and he was subsequently succeeded by 
Luiz Gonzaga do Nascimento e Silva. The latter, who was working 
at the ~inistry of Planning, had played, together with IPES leader 
Mario Leao Ludolf, a significant part in the discussion and subse-
quent measures which the government took in relation to the Rent 
Acts and related legislation which regulated the rights of tenants 
and owners and which indexed rents, while at the same time laying 
down differential correction criteria so as to enable the lag in 
prices of old rental agreements to be gradually made up.116 
As members of the Administrative COuncil of the BNH were appointed 
entrepreneurs Mario Henrique Simonsen, Fernando Machado Portela and 
Helio Beltrao. As superintendent of the BNH was appointed entre-
preneur Arnaldo ~lalter Blank, while General Liberato da Cunha 
Friedrich, by then an executive in the construction business, 
became its director. 
lPES activists and collaborators, mostly industrialists, but 
also bankers - and not tecnicos - took command of the entire steel-
miningl17 and petro-chemicall18 industrial structure of the state. 
They also secured key posts in the public' companies providing hydro-
electric energy for the big private electricity utility corporations -
belonging to IPES leaders - and which supplied electricity for 
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domestic and industrial consumption.119 
The IPES industrialists and entrepreneurs were thereafter in the 
most favourable positions to implement policies set out by the 
Ministries of Planning, Finance, Mines and Energy, and Industry 
and Commerce, to which the big entrepreneurs and bankers had privi-
leged access. The overlap of their private interests with the 
'particular role playero by the entrepreneurs in the public admini-
stration was most remarkable. 
It was against this background that the announcement that the 
government was going to buy back the largest public utility company 
under multinational ownership, AMFORP (American and Foreign Power 
utility .Company) set up a heated political controversy. The admini-
strati on was attacked, even from the right under the banner of Carlos 
Lacerda, for its purchase of AMFORP by what was considered an exorbi-
tant price for outdated equipment. Such opposition had aroused 
undisguised irritation in the United States, and AMFORP had been 
one of the main bones of contention between the United States and 
Brazil. The Brazilian government, anxious not to disturb the feelings 
of prospective investors, went ahead with the purchase at the stipu-
lated price, and AMFORP became the nucleus of a new nationalized 
company, ELETROBRAS, a state agency which, although founded in 
1962, only now came into being.120 
However, not arerything seemed to go the way the IPES entrepreneurs 
wanted. In the first days of April 1964, the issue of the telephones 
in the area of CTB - Brazilian Telephone Company operations, i.e. 
Minas Gerais, Guanabara, Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Esp1rito 
Santo - was debated by a group of entrepreneurs and federal authorities. 
The entrepreneurs argued that private business had to take over the 
CTB which was owned by IPES leader Antonio Gallotti's Brazilian 
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Traction, the Canadian group interested in selling the company. 
The entrepreneurs wanted the support of the state to raise the funds 
for the transaction which was estimated at a basic 100 million 
dollars. The group of entrepreneurs comprised IPES leaders Augusto 
Azevedo Trajano Antune~ Gilberto Huber, Harold C. Polland, Eurico 
Castanheira, Ernesto Pereira Carneiro and Mauricio Libanio Villela, 
who had obtained the support of the National Confederation of Commerce, 
the National Confederation of Industries and the Brazilian Rural 
Confederation. A meeting was held to discuss the matter in June 
1965, with the Ministers Octavio Gouveia de Bulhoes and Roberto 
Campos. By then the group of entrepreneurs also comprised o. Marcon-
des Ferraz, Leopoldo Figueiredo, Mello Flores and Paulo Ayres 
Filho.121 
In spite of the pressure by-the IPES leaders, the CTB was taken over 
by the state, under the aegis of EMBRATEL, a state agency in charge 
of telecommunications. The entrepreneurs were opposed in their 
demands by pressures stemming from within the Armed Forces, a con-
flict of views which was not to be the last the IPES-led organic 
elite would have with the military.122 
Although the IPES leaders were not able to clinch the CTB business 
deal, one of their number, Octavio Marcondes Ferraz, became the head 
of ELETROBRAS, which was constituted as a holding enterprise, function-
ing as the executive body in charge of guiding and implementing the 
energy policy of the government. ELETROBRAS was both the effective 
co-ordinating agency of the Electric Enterprises owned by the federal 
government and which were staffed by IPES directors, and the finan-
cial source for those enterprises owned by the federal states and 
district authorities. 
IPES leaders Antonio Gallotti and Lucas Nogueira Garcez, both directors 
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of enterprises involved in energy supply, were appointed as directors 
to ELETROBRAS. 
Finally, lPES activi$ Admiral Jos~ Claudio Beltr~o Frederico was 
made president of CONTEL, the state agency for telephone communi-
cations and was succeeded by Commander Euclides Quandt de Oliveira.123 
As seen in the previous pages, affiliates and collaborators 
of IPES not only took~er key positions infue cabinet but in the 
administration as 'well. Meanwhile, lPES affiliates and collabora-
tors who took over the organization from those who went into public 
office developed after 1964 a range of new functions for IPES. These 
functions involved the development of a series of channels and ways 
of securing easy communication between the entrepreneurs at large 
represented Qy IPES, those entrepreneurs in IPES, and the public 
administration. Of course the lPES entrepreneurs took advantage of 
the informal and very close relationship they had with the occupants 
of public positions. But lPES also developed an intricate network 
of interpenetration between the state and the dominant sectors of 
civil society, but whose locus was outside the state and within 
lPES, thus developing an exclusive neo-corporatist structure of 
interest articulation. This was another level in which the objective 
interpenetration~ the state and the oligopolistic structure of modern 
industrial and banking capitalism took place, mutually guaranteeing 
the predictability of their future behaviour.124 
The consolidation of these linkages outside the state, not institu-
tionalized, and thus less visible, did not provide the only mechanisms 
of entrepreneurial control ~ the state. The most significant 
mechanisms were obviously ingrained within the state because of the 
lPES presence in the apparatus of the state. 
746 
After April 1964, IPES was shaped into an~fective 'inter-
mediary body' for policy-making. lPES operated as a mediator bet-
ween the state, where it had its place-men in key positions, and 
the big private interests. IPES performed as a forum for the 
discussions of entrepreneurs, ministers and top bureaucrats, with 
the explicit function of 'promoting intimate contact' between them.125 . 
Furthermore, IPES acted as a forum for the lobbying of class asso-
ciations and representatives of varied industrial sectors. Entre-
preneurs of lPES, as well as outsiders, were stimulated to list ,their 
problems and demands which were then brought to committees of lPES 
who, acting as a clearing house, would translate them into feasibility 
and operational studies and into recommendations which were to be 
forwarded to IPES-linked decision-makers in the state administration. 126 
Cabinet ministers and heads of governmental agencies and autarchies 
were also invited to arranged meetingsof selected entrepreneurs. 
The meetings took place at IPES headquarters generally, and in some 
cases, at the headquarters of entrepreneurial class associations. 
To these meetings, a number of entrepreneurs, whose activities were 
related to the Minister's area of concern, were invited. The selec~ 
group of entrepreneurs always included a majority of IPES affiliates 
and collaborators, thus underlining and shaping the exclusive charac-
ter of interest articulation. The Minister wo,uld explain his view-
point on a previously determined issue or policy. The entrepreneurs 
then raised their doubts, queries and demands, which had been pre-
pared beforehand and studied by the advisors of the Ministers in 
question, as well as by the Study and Doctrine Group of IPES. After 
these questions had been dealt with, a period of free debate ensued. 
Among the participants in these debates which provided first-
hand knowledge to selected entrepreneurs, were cabinet ministers 
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such as Octavio Gouveia de Bulhoes, Paulo Egydio Martins, Roberto 
Campos. Daniel Faraco, Luiz Gonzaga do Nascimento e Silva, Marshal 
Juarez Tavora, Mario Thibau, and many top administrators and heads 
of autarchies or government commissions, such as Jose Garrido Torres, 
Denio Nogueira, Commander Saldanha da Garna, John Cotrim, Sergio 
Paulo Rouanet (of the Foreign Ministry), Arthur Cezar Ferreira Reis 
(in charge of development policies for the Amazonia), General Edmundo 
Macedo Soares, .Helio Beltrao and Mario Henrique Simonsen. 
The structure of the debates was designed by General Golbery. By 
1967, all those ministers and top bureaucrats in key policy and 
decision-making agencies of the post-1964 administration had parti-
cipated in these encounters. 127 
Moreover, IPES organized seminars and courses for the ideolo-
gical preparation not only of entrepreneurs and top bureaucrats 
but also of military opinion-shapers and decision-makers. These 
courses were organized through its Institute for Democratic Educa-
tion - lED, which was run as a foundation, 'separate' from IPES.128 
lPES also maintained its Cursos de Atualidades Brasileiras - CAB, 
and other superior courses launched before 1964, which were organized 
by the Study and Doctrine Group.129 However, IPES added to these 
courses a new version of Work and Study Groups, which actually 
delved into policy-research. lPES leader Duvivier Goulart went 
even further and suggested that lPES should launch a service asking 
the entrepreneurs about their specific needs and problems which 
would then be brought to the Institute 'for discussion and analysis, 
transforming entrepreneurial preoccupations and demands into policy 
studies. The scheme, which was taken up, would serve to transmit 
to lPES affiliates and collaborators in governmental posts the 
problems and demands not only of those close to IPES, but of wider 
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entrepreneurial sectors, allowing for broader action. lJO 
IPES maintained its role as debating centre for reforms, as 
well as providing basic guidelines for the post-1964 administration, 
not only because of the obvious overlap of members described above, 
and the adoption by the administration of the reform programme 
envisaged by IPES at the Congress for Basic Reforms, but also on 
account of explicit efforts to elaborate policy recommendations and 
bills of law.lJl 
IPES also acted as a reservoir of ideas and a structure of 
advice upon which IPES affiliates and collaborators in government 
posts could fall back upon, in order to receive help with specific 
matters. In this capacity, IPES acted as an informal and multi-
purpose think-tank, able to provide advice, take initiatives in 
policy-making and rally the entrepreneurs to the side of the Min~er 
in question, as well as mobilizing public opinion. lJ2 
That IPES was itself a core organization of the dominant class is 
in no doubt. Harold Polland, in a letter to Jesse Pinto, president 
of the National Confederation of Commerce, stressed that lPES "con-
sidered it of fundamental importance and of immediate interest, to 
provide, whenever possible, contact for the class we represent ~ 
classe que congregamos) with representatives of government. Such 
contact not only would allow for a better understanding of the prob-
lems that burden the entrepreneurial environment, but would also 
help the government to sound out the viewpoints and the yearnings 
of this laborious class~lJJ This sentiment was not confined to 
lPES personnel: the leaders of entrepreneurial class associations, 
themselves affiliates of IPES in so many cases, recognized in IPES 
the effective intermediary agency between themselves and the govern-
ment. 
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After 1964 IPES continued to shape the outlook of the entre-
preneurial sectors on economic matters and on political Esues. In 
addition to its campaign to assert its views among the entrepreneurs, 
IPES strove to shape the attitudes and feelings of the public at 
large. This was done through the activity of those professionals 
who were linked to IPES and were involved with economic issues 
throughout the media. These IPES activists and collaborators were 
in charge of the economic pages of 0 Globa, Jomal do Brasil and Q 
Estado de Sao Paulo as well as of the publications of the Fundacao 
Getulio Vargas, EPEA and IBRE, all of them influential opinion-
134 shapers. 
To shape the outlook of the entrepreneurs on economic matters 
and their political attitudes as well, IPES organized seminars 
with the explicit intention of 'filling the ~ap on economic informa-
tion' which the entrepreneurs were assumed to have. One such seminar 
was the one to discuss 'Government and Private Enterprise in the 
Process of Development,.135 The theses which were presented and 
the debates which ensued were intended to 'esclarecer (throw light 
on) the true role of the state vis-a-vis development needs of the 
country and the state's role in the creation~ conditions and 
stimulus for private initiative, so that private enterprise could 
transform itself into the creative and enlivening force (fo;9a 
vivificadora) of the Brazilian~onomy,.136 One of the important 
points which IPES hoped to put across was that the state should have 
a supplementary and regulating role vis-a-vis private enterprise 
(papel supletivo) instead of the 'paternalistic' role it assumed 
during the populist period. IPES also encouraged local firms to 
associate themselves with multinational concerns, on the grounds 
that capital and the need for technological improvement of local 
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enterprises was recognized. With the economic role of the state 
greatly reduced, there were few options left to the local firms but 
to associate with multinational concerns, in order to survive fierce 
competition.137 
Another form of overcoming what IPES perceived as 'economic 
illiteracy' among entrepreneurs and professionals was to administer 
technical and managerial courses which aimed fundamentally to 
rationalize procedures, simplify operations, reduce costs and elimi-
nate inefficiency in private enterprises; so as to 'accelerate the 
process of capitalization' of the country, and to bring about methods 
and goals of rationalization and modernization to the individual 
enterprise. vTithin such a context, IPES and Gilbert Huber's group, 
Listas Telefonicas Brasileiras, created in 1967 the Curso Superior 
de Estudos Financeiros - CURSEF (Superior Cou~se of Financial Studies). 
The CURSEF had as its goal the formation and the improvement of 
personnel with university background and of executive level, through 
courses of post-graduation, capacitating them for the exercise of 
specialized functions in the administrative and financial sectors 
of the big enterprises. IPES achieved a significant success when 
the CURSEF was eventually institutionalized as a regular course at 
the Funda2ao Getulio Vargas, in Rio de Janeiro.138 
Furthermore, in its efforts to introduce ever widening sectors 
of the entrepreneurial classes to notions of economic rationality, 
IPES launched the Course for the Global Planning of the Enterprises, 
which aimed at highlighting the advantages of planning for private 
enterprise. The course, under the responsibility of IPES activists 
Brigadier Ortegal, General Montagna, and Admiral Leoncio r~rtins, 
was to be implemented under the joint auspices of IPES and the 
Pontificia Universidade Cat61ica. The financial responsibility 
of the investment was assigned to PUC, with financial support of 
the BNDE and the Ministry of Educationmd Culture.139 
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Finally, IPES also attempted to continue the political indoc-
trination of entrepreneurs and managers. To do so, besides keeFing 
its traditional courses functioning, IPES launched, in association 
with the Centro de Estudos of the Boletim Cambial led by Jose 
Alberto Leite Barbosa, the Curso de Forma9ao Pol!tica e Atualiza9ao, 
which was led by IPES affiliate Them{stocles Cavalcanti, a professor 
of politics at the Funda9ao Getulio Vargas. 140 
Another new role developed by IPES was that of becoming the 
'voice of the revolution' both nationally and at international levels. 
Nationally, it perceived its task as being that of orienting public 
opinion, through the audio-visual media and through publications, 
and thus shape the public's reaction to government measures. 14l To 
do so, IPES had to assume the role of an independent agency, conceal-
ing its connections with the administration from the public eye. 142 
IPES decided to behave as a watch-dog for the democratic profile of 
the government, which also involved attempts to curb military dissent 
and the expansion of the role of the state in the economy. IPES 
involved itself in the image-building of the administration and the 
promotion cf individuals therein,11+3 as well as attempting to defuse 
criticism of the government coming from social, economic and political 
quarters which were left out from the new pOl'ler structure. 
At another level, IPES supported the making of short propaganda films 
to be screened to TV, commercial cinema circuits, factories, and 
schools, thus performing as a private informal agency for public 
relations for the government. l44 
On the international scene, IPES established itself as an 
agency of apologetics for the. regime, both at private and public 
752 
levels. A significant exercise in public .relations and a key step 
taken by IPES leaders towards the consolidation of international 
links between various multinational corporations and organizations 
similar to lPES occurred in 1964. Soon after the coup a delegation 
of IPES leaders travelled to the United States 'so as to enter into 
negotiations with the entrepreneurs of the country and explain .to 
them as well as to American public opinion what was in reality the 
Brazilian Revolution,.145 
The lPES leaders established contacts with the directors of corpora-
tions belonging to the Committee for Economic Development - CED, 
who in most cases were executives of the matrices of companies 
operating in Brazil, who had been the very financial contributors 
to IPES and whose directors were lPES affiliates and collaborators.146 
However, lPES leaders went beyond merely public relations activities. 
lPES leaders tookm active part in the development of economic and 
political links between multinational corporations operating in 
Latin America, the entrepreneurial class associations of the Latin 
American countries and of the United States, many of whom were its 
official counterparts, and the national governments of Latin 
American countries. IPES, in conjunction with its American counter-
part, the CED (Committee for Economic Development) and with other 
organizations, engaged in economic-political research on Brazil in 
particular and Latin America in general. 147 
lPES made serious efforts to bring about the integration of trade 
among the Latin American countries and endeavoured to stimulate the 
consolidation of the Latin American Free Trade Association - ALALC. 148 
Furthermore, IPES leaders participated in negotiations at government 
level between Brazil and the United States149 
Moreover, IPES-linked personalities were chosen to deal with foreign 
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creditors. Ambassador sette Camara, who had participated in the 
activities of the Public Opinion group of IPES, headed the delega-
tion to-the negotiations with the 'Hague Club'. Antonio Azeredo 
Coutinho, Vilar de Queiroz and Mata Machado went as members of the 
delegation. 
To deal with American creditors, Gouveia de Bulho~s chose IPES 
affiliate end entrepreneur Trajano Puppo Neto, who had been advisor 
to the Ministry of Industry and Commerce. The strategy to deal with 
creditors was established at a meeting held at the Ministry of 
Finance, in the presence of Denio Nogueira, Roberto Campos, Gouveia 
de Bulhoes, sette Camara, Puppo Neto, Casimiro Antonio Ribeiro, 
Antonio Azeredo Coutinho, Vilar de Queiroz and Mata Machado.150 
A measure of the international recognition of IPES was the 
invitation to join the annual meetings of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development - IBRD, and of the International 
Monetary Fund for 1966, together with the international counterparts 
of lPES. Behind the procee.dings to involve IPES in these meetings 
151 
was the CED. 
IPES also acted as a bridge between civilians and the ESG 
military, thus continuing the successful co-operation which had 
been developed with these officers in achieving the change of regime 
on April 1st, 1964. IPES also kept up its function as a bridge 
between civilians and the Armed Forces in order to engage wider 
circles of military officers outside the sphere of direct influence 
of the ESG and with whom IPES had no firm or steady links. IPES 
invited selected officers in command of troops and in administrative 
posts to its courses, seminars and conferences, and continued its 
policy of co-opting military personnel. 
IPES also organized lectures and debates on~sues of specific 
interest to the military, especially issues of development policy 
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which could be justified in terms of national security or for which 
a connection could be found, such as transportation, mining, petro-
chemicals, and the industrialization of the country in order to 
develop its potential and turn Brazil into a super-power. In these 
lectures and debates, the military were putm contact with a mixed 
audience of entrepreneurs and techno-entrepreneurs.152 Thus, indus-
trialists and bankers reinforced their privileged position by getting 
across their views onrevelopment and by prescribing their solution 
to socio-economic and political problems. 
Perhaps the most successful relationship was the one IPES 
leaders were able to develop with the Armed Forces through the 
establi~hment of the Brazilian military-industrial complex, which 
eventually became a key element in the economy of the country and 
an influential political factor. 153 
A significant element in the constitution ~ the military-industrial 
complex was the Grupo permanente de Mobilizagao Industrial (Permanent 
Group for Industrial Mobilization). The GPMI, whose structure and 
aims had beenreveloped by entrepreneurs of IPES with military of 
the Superior War College, was a significant aspect in the evolution 
of the ties between political and economic power, on t.he one hand, 
and military power on the other hand. IPES leader Rafael Noschese, 
speaking at the inauguration of the GPMI, stressed that the estab-
lishment of the Permanent Group for Industrial Mobilization represented 
'the continuation of the collaboration seen over the years between 
the producing classes and the armed forces, whether in periods of 
mili tary action 0 r in the normal life of our country'. IPES leader 
Victorio Ferraz, president of the GPMI, added the remarks that 'the 
vivid experience of the first days' (when the troops moved in to 
overthrow Goulart) 'showed the imperative necessity of industries· 
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to recognize the minimum requirements of the military and the latter 
to know whom they can rely upon in industry'. It was essential 
to Ferraz to create a civil and military group of a permanent 
character that would do what the entrepreneurs sought, (and be able) 
to act in times of danger. According to Ferraz, the Pernament 
Group for Industrial Mobilization 'will try to achieve the inter-
linking of industrial standards with the needs of the armed forces. 
It will give the incentive to industrial research in the military 
field. It will reconcile industry to the manufacture of equipment, 
machines, and accessories for the armed forces. It will designate 
the firms that are best adapted to execute the service or manufacture 
of military equipment. It will advise and recommend the adoption 
of standards for items which could be used in an emergency to bene-
fit national security, giving the armed forces the answer to the 
principal equation of modern warfare: Where to obtain material? 
When to obtain material? How to receive the necessary material?,I54 
The authoritarian style of politics supported by IPES reduced 
the significance of the traditional politicians.155 The articula-
tion of interests was~complished through the techno-entrepreneurs 
and entrepreneurs in the key positions of power, to which the big 
industrial and financial interests had easy access. Congress lost 
much of its value as a policy-making locus, and its importance as 
a political forum for the aggregation~ popular pressures and 
demands was greatly diminished. In such a political picture resided 
the 'technocratic' features of the regime. 156 
Nevertheless, IPES attempted to gain the upper hand in the political 
system as well, perhaps with the main intention of controlling it so 
as to neutralize its possible interference with the 'technocratic' 
policy-making process. Congress was purged. The 'Ibadianos' were 
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left with greater~rength even than when they had blocked Goulart's 
legislative efforts. Most of the ADP members became affiliated with 
the newly created Revolutionary Parliamentary Bloc - BPR, which 
was formed in March 1965 by 206 members of the Chamber of Deputies 
and consolidated after conversations between Gal. Go1ber,y, Gal. 
Cordeiro and Nilo Coelho of the PSD. The BPR was led by Adauto 
Cardoso and the Chamber of Deputies president, Bi1ac Pinto, The 
BPR was formed by deputies of the PSD (48), of the PTE (23) and 90 
odd members of the UDN.157 
These deputies became the bulwark of ARENA - National Renovat-
ing Alliance, which was made the official government party after 
the dissp1ution of all the existing traditional parties.158 Among 
the National Directorate of ARENA were included, besides the tradi-
tional right-wing politicians who had co-operated with IPES/IBAD: 
General Edmundo Macedo Soares, Brasi1io Machado Neto, General Punaro 
B1ey, Brigadier Antonio Barbosa, A. C. Pacheco e Silva, Raque1 de 
Queiroz, Paulo Almeida Barbosa, He1io Be1trao, Luiz Gonzaga Nasci-
mento e Silva, General Go1bery do Couto e Silva and many others. 
Raimundo Padi1ha became the ARENA leader in the Chamber of Deputies. 159 
The total exclusion of the working classes and the peripheral 
position in which the socio-economic interests not represented in 
IPES were placed, made it difficult for the organic elite to rule 
by consensus and consent. Because of these objective difficulties, 
the preoccupation with the institutionalization and legitimation 
of the new polity was a central one. 
In a series of debates organized by IPES to examine the possibilities 
and the means to institutionalize the regime, journalist Luiz Alberto 
Bahia urged the leadership to 'examine those forms at our disposal 
and those we can (Teate, in the sense of ensuring the continuity of 
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the cycle of democratic authority, controlled authority, without 
risks of deceiving (ourselves, and) without risking the degradation 
or degeneration (of sliding) into a regime of an authoritarian and 
uncontrolled character. (The continuity of democratic and controlled 
authority will) only be possible by means of the elaboration of 
new political contracts, which will ensure that the system of 
authority functions democratically, controlled by intermediate 
"bodies such as IPES, where politics is made with the sense of auto-
nomous and independent participation and intervention. ,160 
In spite of these well-meant warnings, the Brazilian system slid 
into open dictatorship, consolidated by the Institutional Act No.5 
of 1968., Al though the Act was drafted and implemented by IPES leader 
and Minister of Justice, Luiz Antonio Gama e Silva, this was General 
Costa e Silva's presidency, and IPES, while still part of the admini-
strati on , seemed to have lost its hegemonic position. However, 
IPES/IBAD activists did re-establish their predominance under 
President Geisel, and by 1979, of the 400 key posts of the federal 
administration umbilically linked to the executive, at least JOO 
were occupied by individuals who had the personal confianca (trust) 
161 
of General Golbery. 
It is to say the least ironic that IPES, which in196J underwent a 
Parliamentary Investigation for alleged criminal~tivities, was, 
on November 7 1966, declared an organ of 'public utility' by 
'd t'a1 d 162 preS2 en 2 ecree. 
Conclusion 
IPES was able to round up its complex and carefully elaborated 
campaign to oust Goulart with a successful occupation of the key 
posts of government and the administration, achieving the complete 
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overhaul of the regime. 
However, contrary to received wisdom, these key positions were not 
occupied by tecnicos, but by industrialists and bankers in most 
cases. Instead of disinterested and non-partisan policy-makers, 
the most striking feature of the new administration was the accumu-
lation of various posts by place-men of the big industrial and 
banking concerns and of multinational interests. 
Another aspect worth underlining was that most of the entrepreneurs 
occupyingkeyppsitions were involved in private business activities 
closely related to their public roles. Moreover, the extraordinary 
accumulation by a relatively small number of individuals of a series 
of administrative positions, and the fact that each of these entre-
preneurs and techno-entrepreneurs also accumulated various posts 
in the direction 0 f big enterprise~ pointed t? the increasing degree 
of concentration of economic and political power. 
IPES activists controlled the process of policy formation and 
were the central figures in decision-making. The fact that IPES 
supported a structure of policy-consultation and provided appropriate 
channels for exhaustive lobbying only highlights the predominance 
of big entrepreneurial interests in the orientation of the new 
administration. The alliance of mutual dependence between the state 
and private enterprise was not only rooted in the deepening of the 
capitalist process, but in very concrete terms in the presence of 
these interests in the state, thus ensuring the indispensable poli ti-
cal guarantees for the re-organization and control of society and 
163 economy. 
IPES affiliates and collaborators shaped the financial system, 
and controlled the cabinet ministries and the main agencies of the 
public administration, remaining throughout the Castello Branco 
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government in privileged positions exercising power brokerage. 
Although their programme emerged from the right of the political 
and social spectrum, the lPES activists imposed a modernization of 
the socio-economic structure which benefited, broadly speaking, the 
entrepreneurial classes and the middle sectors of society, to the 
detriment of the mass of the population. The programme of IPES, 
beyond the coup d'etat of ~~rch 31st 1964, implied a capitalist 
revolution thereafter. l64 
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Colonel Joao Baptista Figueiredo, 0 Servi90 Nacional de Informa-
90eS ESG Document Cl - 69 - 65, and Lieut. Col. Mario D. Andreazza, QlServiyo Nacional de InformaQoes - Cl - 60 - ~. 
25 Brazil - Election Factbook, ed. by Charles Daugherty, James 
Rowe and Ronald Schneider - No.2, September 1965 - Institute for 
the Comparative Study of Political Systems, YTashington D.C., 
p.32 
In 1967, with the end of General Castello Branco's government in 
sight, and the impending takeover by General Costa e Si1~a and 
the military-civilian coalition which supported him, General 
Golbery returned to active service within IPES, where he was to 
remain until the early 1970s, working for the consolidation of 
General Geisel's bid for the presidency. In fact, most of the 
original IPES activists supported the manoeuvre to make General 
Geisel president in 1974. 
See also Letter from Joao Goncalves de Souza to Luiz Viana Filho 
on September 29, 1972 - from the site of the Organization of 
American States, in Washington D.C. - In RACB Archive, at CPDOC, 
Rio de Janeiro. 
26 lPES CE June 23, 1964. 
27 ISTO E, May 2, 1979. 
28 0 Misterioso Reitor, in VEJA August 8, 1979. 
29 Colonel Joao Baptista Figueiredo became the director of the 
National Information Service in the presidency of General Emilio 
Garrastazu :V-Iedici, from 1969 to 1974 (himself the head of the 
SNI under President Costa e Silva, from 1967 to 1969), while 
General Carlos Alberto da Fontoura (author of the 'Communist 
Infiltration' document which had contributed to the 'red scare' 
campaign) was made head of the SNI. Colonel Figueiredo became 
head of the SNI under General Ernesto Geisel's presidency, from 
1974 to 1978, when he was promoted to General, while General 
Fontoura was appointed ambassador to Portugal. In 1979, General 
Joao Baptista Figueiredo became the fifth military president 
of Brazil since April 19&t. General Golbery, who had been the 
head of the Civilian Staff Office of the presidency under General 
Geisel, remained in his post with the new president, General 
Joao Baptista Figueiredo. As head of the SNI was appointed 
General Octavio de Medeiros, and as head of the Nilitary Staff 
Office General Danilo Venturini. One should point out that the 
last three military presidents of Brazil have all come from the 
'Community of Intelligence' and that of the nine military 
officers holding formal 'cabinet posts in the present administra-
tion, at least seven have sprung from the 'Community of Intel-
ligence', which has become the political fulcrum of the Armed 
Forces. 
30 During the period inbetween the presidencies of General Castello 
Branco (1967) and General Geisel (1974), Captain Reitor de 
conti· ••• 
7(}+ 
Aquino Ferreira and IPES General Joao Baptista Tubino were 
employed as part of the general staff of multi-millionaire Emil 
Ludwig in his gigantic agro-industrial and mining empire in 
the north of Brazil, along with Colonel Jorge Aragao and Admiral 
Jose Luis da Silva. 
For a case study of the activities of the NBC, the multinational 
corporation owned by Ludwig, see Marcos Arruda,' Case Study No.2' 
Daniel Keith Ludwig: in Multinationals and Brazil: The Impact 
of Multinational Co orations in Contempora Brazil, ed.by 
Marcos Arruda, Herbet de Souza and Carlos Affonso Toronto, 
LARU, 1975), pp.130-207. 
Captain Aquino became personal assistant of President Geisel 
and remained in that function with President Joao Baptista 
Figueiredo. 
31 Brazil - Election Factbook, op.cit., p.33. 
32 IPES CD July 7, 19(}+. 
Gilbert Huber also concluded at a meeting of the IPES leadership 
that in view of the situation it was necessary to 'review the 
role of IPES' (rever 0 papel do IPES) - IPES CD Rio, April 14, 
19(}+. 
33 See Appendix T. 
34 IPES leader Jose Luiz Moreira de Souza headed a task team of 
IPES for the preparation~ a study on electoral reform, which 
was submitted to the Study and Doctrine Group. Among their 
proposals was the establishment of the cedula linica. The Study 
and Doctrine Group elaborated a proposal of its own, which 
attempted to integrate the recommendations of the various task 
teams which had dealt with electoral reform, so as to submit 
it toibe government. IPES CD August 4, 19(}+. 
35 See Appendix S. The attempts to create a Poder Politico based 
on entrepreneurs and not on party-politicians coincided with 
the dissemination at the ESGand other centres of ideological 
debate, even in Congress itself, of the notions of the 'exhaus-
tion of liberal democracy', of the 'inefficiency of parliament'. 
36 Letter from Harold Cecil Polland to Lieut. Col. L. G. Andrade 
Serpa - SEC 65/0736 - Secret IPES Document - October 28, 1965, 
Rio de Janeiro, See also Secret Correspondence of October 8, 
1965, Oficio Secreto No.377, october 18 1965. and Oficio Secreto 
of October 22, 1965, No.420. IPES Archives, Rio de Janeiro. 
37 ISTO i, May 9, 1979, p.13. 
38 Two samples of these reports, seen in Appendix U, were the 
'Monthly letter of IPES-Sao Paulo' prepared in September 1968, 
denouncing the 'subversive escalation in Brazil' and the paper 
on 'Communist actionm the Press as a base for the counter-
revolution to be launched in 1974'. 
39 For more information on the activities carried out by the entre-
preneurs in general and Boilessen's direct involvement in parti-
cular, see 'Descendo aos Poroes', in VEJA, 21 February 1979, 
cont/ •..• 
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pp.60-64. Also 'Urn Poder na Sombra', in VEJA, 21 February 
1979, pp.65-68. ----
The suspicion that IPES leader Boilessen was also a 'CIA agent 
grew when he began soliciting money for a new organization to 
be called OperaQao Bandeirantes - OB~~ •••• Boilessen and his 
cohorts put heavy pressure on fellow businessmen for money to 
support OBAN'.- in A. J. Langguth, Hidden Terrors (New York, 
Pantheon Books, 1978, pp.123-l60. General J. Canavarro Pereira 
was the ostensible creator of OBAN. See ISTO E No.92, September 
27, 1978, p.32. 
General Menna Barreto was, allegedly, the creator of CODI-DOl, 
the Centro de Operaqoes de Defesa Interna - Departamento de 
Operacoes de Informa90es, which in 1970 replaced OBAN. 
40 Quoted by Marlise Simons, Whose Coup?', in Brazilian Information 
Bulletin No .12, 1.rinter 1974 (Berkeley), pp. 7-9. 
It is important to note that some of the 'red scare' tactics 
employed to prepare a favourable atmosphere for military inter-
vention a..gainst Allende had already been employed in 1964, at the 
time of the Chilean presidential elections, when he was defeated 
by Eduardo Frei. According to Edward Korry, one-time American 
Ambassador to Chile, there was, 'concealed from public scrutiny 
a ne.twork of under-the-table deals', concerning acti vi ties of 
the American government and multinational corporations first 
to defeat Allende in 1964 and then to de-stabilize the Allende 
regime in 1970, and bring about its downfall in 1973, which 
'would make watergate look like a bedtime story'. According to 
Korry, 'swept under the rug' was the complicity of ITT, its 
president, Geenen, the Rockefellers and such Chileans as publi-
sher Edwards of El Mercurio, with Presidents Kennedy, Johnson 
and Nixon, many American senators and the CIA. No mention had 
been permitted of how Edl'lards and another Chilean had attended 
an anti-Allende strategy session~ top multinational executives 
in David Rockefeller's office at 410 Park Avenue, in New York. 
The meeting was convoked by Lyndon Johnson's man for Latin 
America, Assistant Secretary of State, Thomas ~ann. He told 
the gathering how important the defeat of Allende was to the 
White House. The CIA officials in attendance took it from there. 
In follo1-l-up huddles they suggested how the multinationals might 
do 'their part' for the national interests by chipping in cash, 
material and influence to elect Frei and not a rightist, as 
they preferred. 
According to Korry, Mann came to Rockefeller's office on the 
heels of his most important 'success', On ~arch 31 Brazil's 
generals had cverthrown the government of J oao Goulart. Korry 
stressed that the 'toppling of the leftist Goulart - he was very 
much like Allende, and his removal reads like a step-by-step 
rehearsal for the Chilean's ouster six years later - involved the 
CIA, key multinational members of the Rockefeller group, and the 
Pentagon. The secretary of defence was Robert McNamara (now 
head of the World Bank), and his deputy was Cyrus Vance, when 
the Pentagon ordered au. S. naval task force with paratroopers to 
sail for Rio to put down any resistance to Goulart's dismissal. 
John McCone headed the CIA then, with'" Helms as his deputy. When 
McCone resigned in 1965, he joined ITT's board of directors. He 
also remained a paid consultant to Helms.' - Edward Korry, 'The 
Sell-out of Chile and the American T~{ Payer', in Penthouse, 
11arch 1978 (USA), pp.90-1l4. 
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41 Soon after Allende's election in 1970, a Chilean entrepreneur 
Luiz Fuenzalida came to Brazil and joined IPES leader Gilbert 
Huber in his business affairs. At the same time Fuenzalida was 
trained in the IPES techniques. Following in the footsteps of 
IPES, the Chilean entrepreneurs, professionals, landowners and 
military set up their Centre for Public Opinion Studies, with 
an Intelligence Action group modelled on that of IPES, which 
became one of the principal laboratories for campaigns such as 
the mobilization of the middle classes - the women in particu-
lar -, crippling anti-government strikes, especially by lorry 
drivers, the vicious and slanted press campaigns, the spreading 
of rumours and even the use of shock troops during street demotl-
strations. Both the Centre and the Intelligence Action group 
were also actively engaged in canvassing the support of military 
officers against Allende. 
Large quanti ties of money were used to topple Allende,' and 
Brazilian entrepreneurs and executives of large corporations 
provided financial support. 
The Centre worked alongside the Corporationfur Social, Economic 
and Cultural Studies - CODESEC, which was also involved in 
middle-class mobilization; and in other anti-Allende campaigns. 
CODESEC was financed by local contributions and it also made use 
of funds from the German and Italian Christian Democratic Parties. 
The most successful fund raiser among the Chilean conservatives 
seemed to be Orlando Saenz, at that time president of the powerful 
Chilean Association of Manufacturers - SOFOFA. After ine coup 
Saenz became economic adviser of the new military government. 
Another important fund raiser was Senator Pedro Ibanez, of the 
the National Party. 
The American government and the CIA were also heavily involved. 
McCone, the former head of the CIA and lIT executive, approached 
Richard Helms, at that time the CIA director on Chile, on behalf 
of the ITT president, Harold Geened, in the spring of 1970. 
This was only a few weeks cfter Korry, the American anbassador 
to Chile, had vetoed the Council of the Americas' secret propo-
sal for a joint CIA-big business programme of de-stabilization. 
Wi thin days, the ITT launched an intensive campaign at the vlhi te 
House to override Korry's decision. This lobbying was co-ordinated 
with the activities of the Chilean entrepreneurs themselves, 
Edwards among others, close to the Council and to the CIA. Two 
ITT 'public relations' men, Robert Berellez and Harold Hendrix, 
worked closely in Santiago with Edwards' agents, who in turn 
vras in daily contact with the CIA, just as he had been from 1963 
to 1964. 
See l1arlise Simons, op.cit., p.9; Edward Korry, 0]2. cit. , p.114 i 
Samuel' Bailey, The United States and the Develo ment of South 
America, 1<"45-197 5 New York, Nev1 Viewpoints, 1976), pp.157-158 
and '0 KnOw-How de 64 usado no Chile em 73', in ISTO E, Nay 2, 
197Q, PP.J6-?7. See also Anthony Sampson, The soverei~n State: 
The secret hlstOry of ITT (London, Coronet Books, lY74 , Chapter 
11. Sampson asserts that Enno Hobbing, the former CED director 
and current Council forLatin America director, who had worked 
closely with IPES and Has no", involved b the campaign against 
Allende, had also been a CIA man - p.247. 
42 For further information on the Centre and the activities of this 
group, as well as the removal of President Torres, see Alberto 
Dines, 'Brasil, Banzer e Bush', in Folha de Sao Paulo, 11, Novem-
ber 1979. See also YEJA, September 12, 1979. 
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43 'Retrato de um Super-Homem sem Principios', in Movimento, Feb-
ruary 12-18, 1979, p.17. 
44 Campos' successor was another techno-entrepreneur, the IPES 
lecturer Helio Beltrao. Beltrao was succeeded in 1968 by Joao 
Paulo dos Reis Velloso, for a period of 10 years. In 1974, the 
Ministry became a secretariat directly linked to the presidency. 
In 1979, Mario H. Simonsen became Minister of Planning, with 
the ministry fully restored to its previous rank. He was suc-
ceeded by Antonio Delfim Neto after a short spell. 
l}5 Edgard Teixeira Leite in Letter to Iris Meinberg - Rio de Janeiro, 
August 19&+, IPES Archives. See Appendix V. 
46 On the centrality and significance of the PAEG for the Castello 
Branco administration, see George-Andre Fiechter, op.cit., Chap-
ters 10, 11 and 15. 
H. S. Ellis (ed.), The Economy of Brazil (Berkeley, University of 
California Press, 1969). This book is particularly interesting 
as most of the individuals who contributed were IPES affiliates. 
Celso L. Nartone, 'Analise do Plano de A9ao Economica do Governo 
PAEG (1964-1966)', in Betty Mindlin Lafer (ed), Planejamento no 
Brasil (Sao Paulo, Editora Perspectiva, 1970), pp.69-90. 
It should be mentioned that Hario H. Simonsen, a member of the 
Study and Doctrine Group of IPES-Rio, drafted the chapter on 
Redistribution of Income of the PAEG. 
47 Luiz Viana Filho, 0 Governo Castello Branco (Rio de Janeiro, 
Editora Jose Olympio, 1975), p.218. 
Viana Filho's book provides an insider's account of the Castello 
Branco administration. It is important to note that the majority 
of the political rotors named by Viana Filho were IPES affiliates 
and collaborators. 
See also Roberto Campos, ~ Retrospect over Brazilian Development 
Plan~ in The Economy of Brazil, ed. by Howard S. Ellis, op.cit., 
Chapter 11, especially pp.336-337. 
48 Nylton Velloso was director of Demisa-Deutz Minas Gerais S/A 
Fabrica de Tratores (DE~ITG - Desenvolvimento de Minas Gerais/ 
Kloeckner Humboldt Deutz AG), Economia S/A Credito, Financia-
mento e Investimentos. 
49 See L. Viana Filho, oE.cit., pp.480-)+81. 
The text of Law No.200 which has seventeen chapters and 215 
articles constituted a fundamental recasting offue procedures 
of the body politic in Brazil. See George -Andre Fiechter, 
op.cit., pp.117-118. 
See also discussion over reform of federal administration in IPES 
11inutes October 20th, 196+. 
3D L. Viana Filho, op.cit., p.131. 
51 J. B. de Carvalho Athayde was a director of Investcred S.A.-
Credito,Financiamento e Investimento, Banco de Investimento e 
Desenvolvimento Industrial S.A., Inve"stbancoand Investbanco-
Banco de Investimentos e Desenvolvimento Industrial. 
Harry Cole was a director of Luxor Moteis Turismo S.A. 
52 
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For further information on the role of the Staff Offices and 
particularly well informed insights into the workings of the 
administrations, see Walder de Goes, 0 Brasil do General Geisel 
(Rio de Janeiro, Editora ~ova Fronteira, 1978), pp.17-32. 
53 The Archive of Luiz Viana Filho in Rio de Janeiro is extremely 
useful in the study of this phenomenon because it contains 
thousands of letters and notes sent to the president or to the 
head of the Civilian Military Staff, asking for personal. business 
and professional favours and raising all kinds of demands. The archive 
also. contains many of the answersgi ven by.the government to these demands. 
54 With General Costa e Silva, the heads of the Staff Offices were 
Colonel Jayme Portela (Military) and Rondon Pacheco (Civilian). 
Under President f4edfci, the Military Staff Office was headed 
by Colonel Joao Baptista Figueiredo and Leitao de Abreu, brother-
in-law of General Lyra Tavares, headed the 'Civilian Staff 
Office. Colonel Figueiredo, together with GeneraL Orlando 
Geisel,as Minister of War, were key figures within the Medici 
government in the consolidation of the 'candidature' of General 
Ernesto Geisel to the presidency. General Geisel took General 
Golbery as his head of the Civilian Staff Office and General 
Hugo de Abreu as head of the l'Iili tary Office. General Hugo de 
Abreu was succeeded by General Belfort Bethlem, a 'Geisel man', 
after his resignation over the crisis which ~eveloped in the 
course of the successful attempts by theIPES/ESG groups to 
engineer the presidential 'candidature' of the then Colonel 
Joao Baptista Figueiredo. 
55 Gouveia de Bulhoes was succeeded by IPES affiliate Antonio 
Delfim Netto, who became the key figure in economic matters 
under President General Costa e Silva and President General 
Garrastazu Medici, spanning eight years of economic policy and 
overhaul of the state apparatus. Delfim Netto also became the 
president of the powerful Commission for Investment of the 
Finance Ministry. With Delfim Netto in the Finance Ministry 
came his personal team of collaborators and Joaquim Ferreira 
Mangia who was appointed head of the CPA, the Council for 
Customhouse Policy. The CPA became an important agency under 
Delfim Netto in the wake of his strongly stimulated export drive. 
As representative of the 'national' industry in the CPA, appointed 
by the Minister of Finance, was Julio Saurbron de Toledo, direc-
tor of the Rhodia group, to which Octavio Marcondes Ferraz and 
Paulo Reis de Magalhaes belonged. 
Delfim Netto's successor as Minister of Finance from 1974 to 
1979 was none other than IPES leader Mario Henrique Simonsen. 
The IPES team had gone full circle. 
56 Ernane Galveas was appointed head of the Central Bank in 1968, 
a post to which he returned in 1979, only to become subsequently 
the Minister of Finance. By then he was the director of Aracruz 
Celulose. 
Helio Marques Vianna and Ary Burger were appointed directors of 
the Central Bank. Eduardo da Silveira Gomes was kept as head 
of~e Economic Department. 
Of the other Central Bank directors, Antonio Ribeiro was direc-
tor of Banco Brasileiro de Desenvolvimento S.A., FINASA and 
ARNO S.A. Industria e Comercio belonging to IPES leader Felipe 
conti •••. 
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58 
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Arno; Aldo Franco was director and shareholder of Metal Leve 
S.A. Industria e Comercio, belonging to~e Lafer/Klabin/Mlndlin 
group; and Luiz Biolchini was a director of Cia. Industrias de 
Papel Pirahy and Cia. de Docas de Santos, belonging to IPES 
leader Candido Guir~e de Paulo Machado. 
Garrido Torres was succeeded in 1967 as head of the BNDE by 
techno-entrepreneur Jayme Magrassi de Sa, a lecturer~d parti-
cipant in the debate panels organized by IPES. As director of 
the BNDE was appointed IPES affiliate Helio Schlittler Silva. 
The Bank's Administrative Council by then included IPES leaders 
and affiliates Alvaro Americano, Raul Fontes Cotta and Antonio 
Bastos. To the Department of Economic Studies went IPES affiliates 
Luiz de Magalhaes Botelho. ~agrassi de Sa was substituted in 
1974 by techno-entrepreneur Marcos Pereira Viana, who had been 
a director of A90S Anhanguera S.A. (ICOMI, CAEMI, Bethlehem 
Steel Corp. and AKT Swenska Kullager Fabriken). ICOMI and CAEIlI 
were jointly owned by IPES leader Augusto Trajano de Azevedo 
Antunes and the Bethlehem Steel Corp. 
Jayme Magrassi de Sa, an ESG graduate of 1955, had been a former 
member of the CNE, the BNDE, SUMOC, COFAP, the Foreign Ministry 
and the Mixed Commission Brazil-USA. He has been linked to 
Ericsson, the electronics complex, Cia. Nacional de Alcalis, 
Argo Distribuidora,Tecidos Bangu, and has been director of Banco 
da Bahia, an important IPES financial contributor. After 1964 
he occupied key posts in the National Monetary Council, the 
Ministry of Finance, FINAME, FUNDECE and ALALC. 
IPES CD July 7th, 1964 - J. G. Torres. 
Moraes Barros was succeeded by Nestor Jost, a participant in the 
debate pannels of IPES and a lecturer and who has been director 
of Corretora Cocentro and of the Grupo Denasa. 
61 Fernando Gasparian and Jose Augusto Bezerra de Medeiros were 
directors of Cia. America Fabril. 
Pereira Diniz was director of Pereira Diniz Comercio e Industria 
S.A. 
For an insight into Gasparian's economic views, see Fernando 
Gasparian, Em Defesa da Economia Nacional (Rio de Janeiro, 
Editora SAGA, 1966) and Capital Estrangeiro e Desenvolvimento 
da America Latina (Rio de Janeiro, Civiliza9~o Brasileira, 1973). 
62 The CMN became the key focus for economic policy making in the 
subsequent administration. 
Under the presidency of General Costa e Silva, the National 
r10netary Council was composed of Delfim Netto, General Edmundo 
de Macedo Soares, Helio Beltrao, Ernane Galveas, Nestor Jost, 
Jayme ~!agrassi de Sa, Ary Burger, Helio l1arques Vianna, Germano 
de Brito Lyra, Gastao Eduardo de Bueno Vidigal and Rui de Castro 
Magalhaes. lPES still had a hold on financial policy, although 
the ESG members of lFES had lost control of the miRitary and of 
the political situation. 
On the Capital Markets Law, see H. g'. Ellis 'Corrective Inf1~­
tion in Brazil, 1964-1966, in H. S. Ellis, op.cit., pp209-211. 
770 
63 The endorsement of the concept of 'democratization of capital' 
by the government was concretized through the creation of the 
Fund for the Democratization of Capital of the Enterprises -
FUNDECE. Jayme Magrassi de Sa was assigned to FUNDECE. 
64 Appendices Band W make it clear that affiliates of IPES/IBAD 
were fully represented within the entrepreneurial community of 
private, financial, credit and investment interests. Appendices 
Band W.also help to show the very high degree of financial con-
centration and interlocking directorates of which IPES/IBAD 
activists were members. Furthermore, they provide information 
on the high level of industrial and banking integration through 
interlocking directorates, joint venture associations and 
shareholding. 
65 By 1964 the'Blue Chip corporations numbered 78, the majority of 
which were financial contributors of IPES and whose directors 
were IPES affiliates. 
See Anuario Banas S.A - Bancos, Investimentos e Balsas (Sao' 
Paulq 1964)pp.112-l44; Anuario Banas, Bancos, Bolsas e Investi-
mentos., (Sa"b Paulo, 1966), Chapter IV. 
66 During this period, Humberto Barreto e:;tablished a very close 
personal relationship with the head of the Nilitary Staff Office 
of the President, General Ernesto Geisel, who was an intimate 
friend of his uncle. Humberto Barreto became vice- president 
of the Superior Council of the Caixas Economicas Federais and, 
as General Geisel's protege, the president of CEF in 197~. 
67 The changes infue structure of the ministry and of the financial 
system have been~mined. There were several changes in policy 
prepared at IPES and implemented after 196+. One such change 
was the Agreement on Guarantees for Foreign Investment and the 
bill of law on Profit Remittance (IPES CD August 4th, 1964 -
Jose Luiz Moreira de Souza, Harold Cecil Polland, Glycon de 
Paiva and Augusto Trajano Azevedo Antunes)- IPES continued to 
prepare policy papers. Gilbert Huber, with a team of advisers, 
among whom was Humberto Gogliati, prepared a paper on Qreditos 
e Prazos Comerciais. The papers suggested a new system of short 
loan terms with the creation of Obrigacoes Reajust~veis e Con-
verslveis, fixing a maximum of 60 days for duplicata~ (a credit 
instrument specially created by Brazilian commercial legislation 
corresponding to fue sale of goods on time). The study was taken 
to the government as a suggestion fora new financial policy 
and tofue Banco Central to be studied in its operational aspects 
(IPES CO October 25th, 1966 and IPES CO November 8th, 1966). 
~or an explanation about the state of the commercial banks and 
the short term credit market and the significance of the changes 
implemented, see Mario Henrique Simonsen, 'Inflation and the 
Money and Capital Markets of Brazil', in Howard. S. Ellis, OPe ci t. , 
pp.l*O-l~j-5.) On readjustable obligations, see N. H. Simonsen, 
idem, p.156 and H. S. Ellis, in H.S. Ellis, ibid., p.207. 
Gilbert Huber's team also prepared the bill of law on T!tulos 
de Credito, which was accepted by the government. IPES CO Decem-
ber 19th, 1964. Moreover, Huber prePared with his advisers 
Paulo Roberto de Norais, Eduardo SChoueri and Per Laurentzius 
., 
a policy paper on the Stabilization of Prices for the National 
cont/ •.•. 
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Council for the Stabilization of Prices - CONEP, which was 
directed by Jose Lobo Fernandes Braga, a director of Gavea S.A. 
Maquinas e Ve1culos and of Luiz F. Braga ComeTcio e Industria. 
The paper focussed on Portaria 71. IPES CO September 20th, 1966. 
See also H.S. Ellis, op.cit., pp.20Q-Z04. 
The bill of law on Reavalia9ao de Ativos was oriented also by 
IPES. IPES CD August L}th, 19&+ - Jorge Oscar de Mello Flores, 
Augusto Trajano de Azevedo Antunes, Glycon de Paiva and Harold 
Cecil Polland. IPES collaborated with the government in the 
'lan9amento' of readjustable obligations of the national treasury. 
IPES CD December 15th, 1964. 
Furthermore, under the administration of President Geisel the law 
regulating the Sociedades Anonimas was implemented. Among its 
architects were Jose Luiz Bulhoes Pedreira and A. Lamy Fo. 
68 Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, Draft of Letter to Luiz Viana Filho, 
for the preparation of the latter's book on the Castello Branco 
administration - PAR Archives w/d. 
In a letter from Paulo de Assis Ribeiro to General Golbery of 
October 1964, the former gave additional information on those 
who collaborated in the general preparation of the Estatuto da 
Terra, which became the cornerstone of Castello Branco's agrar-
ian policy. They were: Jose'Garrido Torres, Denio Nogueira, 
Carlos Jose de Assis Ribeiro, Hario H.Simonse:p., J,9se.Arthtlr'Rios, 
General'Golbery, Harold Cecil Polland, Jose Rotta, Glycon de 
Paiva, Iris Meinberg (president of the Brazilian Rural Confedera-
tion - CBR), Edgard Teixeira Leite (vice-president of the CBR), 
Candido Guinle de Paula Machado, Padre Mello (of SORPE-Pernambuco), 
Al Neto (representing the modern farming interests of Santa 
Catarina), Hario Lacerda de Mello (secretary of agriculture of 
pernambUCO), Assis Brasil Correa (president of the Association 
of Cattle Breeders of the south of Matto Grosso), Salvador Diniz, 
Paulo Ignacio de Almeida (representing the Ministry of Agricul-
ttITe) and Joao Calmon(of the Assis Chateaubriand group). Again, 
the IPES/IBAD team had the hegemony. The names of these enter-
preneurs and techno-entrepreneurs obviously overlapped with 
those activists who had participated in the IPES sponsored pro-
ject of agrarian reform. Letter from Paulo de Assis Ribeiro to 
General Golbery - October 1964, PAR Archives. 
69 The team of the Ministry of Planning included entrepreneurs 
Luiz Gonzaga do Nascimento Silva, Jose Garrido Torres, Mario H. 
Simonsen, Eudes de Souza Leao, Jose Gomes da Silva, Jose Trigo 
Drummond, Carlos Jose de Assis Ribeiro, Frederico Naragliano 
Cardoso and Julio Cesar Belisario Vianna. The hegemony of IPES 
was evident. 
In a memo to the cabinet, the Grupo de Trabalh~ which partici-
pated in the elaboration of the Estatuto da Terra, was officially 
acknowledged by the Ninistry of Planning as having been composed 
of: Roberto Campos (Ninistry of Planning), Hugo de Almeida Leme 
(Ministry of Agriculture), Paulo de Assis Ribeiro (Ministry of 
Planning), Jose Gomes da Silva (SUPRA), Jos~ A. Trigo Drummond 
Gon9alves (Ministry of Planning), Jose Garrido Torres (BNDE), 
Carlos Jose de Assis Ribeiro (r-linistry of Planning), Luiz Gonzaga 
do Nascimento e Silva (Hinistry of Planning), Julio Cesar 
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Belisario Viana (Ministry of Planning), Frederico Maragliano 
(Ministry of Planning), Copernico de Arruda Cordeiro (Mini~try 
of Agriculture), Eudes de Souza Leao (Ministry of Planning), 
Messias Junqueira (SUPRA), Fernando Pereira Sodero (SUPRA) and 
Carlos Lorena (SUPRA). Ministry of Planning - Memo for Cabinet 
Meeting - September lOth, 1964 - PAR Archive. 
Despite the different accounts of who had been 'responsible' for 
the agrarian reform plan, it was evident that IPES affiliates 
were predominant i~ each group 
70 Ministry of Planning - Memo for Cabinet - September lOth, 1969 -
PAR Archive, Rio de Janeiro. 
The task teams wereaded by professionals from SUPRA and from 
DATE Sao Paulo, a technical and consultantship agency. Among 
them were Paulo F. Cidade (DATE). Pedro Morais (DATE), Mario 
Borgonovi (Instituto Agronomico de Campinas), Jorge Souza e 
Mello de Oliveira (SUPRA), Mario Nogueira da Silva (SUPRA). 
Dryden de Castro Arezzo (SUPRA), Jose Carlos Costa Martins 
(SUPRA), Fernando Antonio Genshow (SUPRA), Manoel de Souza 
Barros (SUPRA). Lytton Leite Guimaraes (SUPRA). Angelo Moraes 
Neves (SUPRA). Paulo Aguiar Godoy (SUPRA). Mario Lacerda de 
Mello (secretary of agriculture of Pernambuco), Nelson Coutinho 
(FGV). 
71 M. Cehelski, op.cit., pp.205-235. See also Julian Chacel, 'The 
Principal Characteristics of the Agrarian Structure and Agricul-
tural Production in Brazil', in Howard S. Ellis, op.cit .• pp. 
103-129. 
72 Report of the Ministry of Planning - May 15th, 1965 - PAR Archive. 
73 Flavio de Almeida Brito was director of Cia. de Seguros Concordia. 
Eventually, Sylvio Wanick Ribeiro, assistant of Julian Chacel. 
was appointed director. The Technical Council was composed of 
Edgar Teixeira Leite, Manuel Diegues Junior, Jose Agostinho 
Trigo Drummond Goncalves (Sao Paulo), Jose Nazare Teixeira Dias 
(MF), Pedro Luiz Pecoe (vice-rector of PUC), I1ilciades de Sa 
Freire (MG), Jose de Souza Soares (RGS). Renato Gonqalves Martins 
(Bahia) or Jo~o Gonyalves (Sudene) (Ceara). Joao da Costa Porto 
(pernambuc~ and Fabio Yassuda. Other individuals considered in 
the short list were Padre Gregory, representing the Church, Joao 
Napolea'O of Hinas Gerais, and Candido Guinle de Paula Machado. 
ABCAR was a semi-private extension organization, modelled on the 
Farmers' Home Associations of the United States. Beginning with 
Minas Gerais,in 1948, it had been$tablished jointly by the 
American International Association. a Rockefeller organization. 
in conjunction with several state governments. In 1966, the 
ABCAR became the main instrument of eytension in 16 out of Brazil's 
23 states at the federal level, sh01-dng significant effects on 
the rate of adoption of new techniques and on productivity. In 
1965 almost 127,000 persons participated in the meetings of 
ABCAR and there were over 53,000 members of its various organi-
zations. See Gordon S. Smith, 'Brazilian Agricultural Policy, 
1950-15$7, in Howard S. Ellis, op.cit,., Chapter 8, especially 
pp.217-218. 
74 Luiz Viana Filho, the former head of the Civilian Staff Office, 
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candidly admitted that channels to policy formation on:agricul-
tural matters were left open for Salvio de Almeida Prado of 
the SRB, Luiz Emanuel Bianchi of FARESP, Paulo Ayres Filho, and 
Amador Aguiar, president of BRADESCO, which became the biggest 
discount bank of Brazil. 
It was also common for Gouveia de Bulhoes, Roberto Campos, Hugo 
Leme, Severo Gomes, G. Borghoff, Denio Nogueira and Luiz de 
Morais Barros, all linked to IPES, to travel periodically to 
Sao Paulo for the discussion of agrarian matters and to iron 
out differences with representatives of traditional interests. 
See L. Viana Filho, op.cit., pp.263-264. 
75 See Testimony of Senator Siegfrido Pacheco in Jornal do Brasil, 
January 16th, 1977. On the same occasion, he named Octavio 
Gouveia de Bulho~s as a place-man for Siderurgica Belgo ~uneira. 
76 See Chapters VI and VII of this thesis. 
77 Furthermore, engineer Mario da Silva Cunha, who had worked for 
General Electric, Acesita and Ferro e Apo de Vit6ria until 1964, 
was appointed to the Ministry as a 'technocrat', and in 1965 was 
also appointed to the Ministry of Planning, where Carlos de 
Assis Ribeiro, director of General Electric, was also posted. 
As successor to Paulo Egydio inihe Costa e Silva administration 
went General Edmundo Macedo Soares, a director of Mercedes Benz, 
Volkswagen, Banco Mercantil de Sao Paulo,- Light Rio S.A., Mesbla 
S.A. and A90S Anhanguera S.A. General Macedo Soares was also 
president of the CNI and executive of CIESP, FIESP and the Forum 
Roberto Simonsen and had been director of Volta Redonda and 
governor of the state of Rio de Janeiro. 
78 The successor of Senator Mem de Sa, in the Costa e Silva presi-
dency was IPES leader Luiz Antonio Gama e Silva. He took with 
him to the Ministry of Justice, as advisors, a series of indi-
viduals belonging to the Comando de Ca9a aos Comunistas - CCC, 
a para-military group which incorporated MAC and GAP elements. 
See 'Urn Poder na Sombra' in VEJA, 21, February, 1979. 
Gama e Silva was substituted under President Medici by Alfredo' 
Buzaid, a business associate, in his legal capacity. of IPES 
leader Fuad Lutfalla. President Geisel's Minister of Justice 
was Armando Falcao, who, like his predecessor Hem de Sa, had 
played an important part in the strategy of IPES/IBAD in Con-
gress and through the media, against Goulart. 
79 The four jurists had been recommended by Hem de Sa. They were 
eventually substituted in their functions by Carlos Medeiros 
Silva. 
As Procurador da Republica was appointed entrepreneur Oswaldo 
Trigueiro. Antonio Neder, in whose house in Petropolis military 
officers of the various factions withinihe Armed Forces co-
ordinated their efforts to conspire against Goulart, was appoin-
ted Judge of the Supreme Federal Tribunal. Deputv Joao Nendes
i head of the ADP was appointed to the SuperiorMili ta'ry Tribuna , 
together with Eraldo Gueiros, a relative of IPES activist J. 
Gueiros, and formerly attorney' general of Military Justice 
(Procuradorda Justi9a Militar), with General Pery Bevilacqua, 
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the former commander of Sao Paulo, and General Olympio Mourao 
Filho. General Golbery, after his spell as head of the SNI 
was appointed to the Tribunal de Contas da Uniao. Alvaro Ameri-
cano had already been. appointed to the Tribunal de Contas as 
well as having become secretary of administration of the state 
of Guanabara. 
As director of the Demographic, Moral and Political Service of 
Statistics, which functioned under the aegis of the Ministry of 
Justice was appointed Rubens D'Almada.Horta Porto, a member 
of the CBP team which IPES activist Paulo de Assis Ribeiro 
directed. Another IPES leader, former integralista Miguel 
Reale became secretary of Justice for the key state of Sao 
Paulo. 
80 Luiz Gonzaga do Nascimento e Silva has been director of Cia. 
Fiayao e Tecidos !1inas Gerais (Aluisio Aragao Villar - Adm. e 
Empreendimentos Lugona S/A), Administraqao e Empreendimentos 
Lugona S/A, Standard Electric (Fernando jvlachado Portella, 
International Standard Electric Corp.), I.T.T., Cia. Ferro 
Brasileiro (Joseph Hein, Luiz Lodi - SiderUrgica Belgo-Hineira). 
Cia. B~asileira de Usinas Metalurgicas - CBll4 (Cecil Hime, 
Mervyn Hime, Francis Hime, Francisco de Paula Pinto), FIAT-
Alfa Romeo, Hime Comereio e Industria (Cecil Hime, r1ervyn Hime, 
Francis Hime), Cia. de Administraqao e Comercio Rio Grande 
S.A./Acompar - Administra9ao, Comercio e Participayoes S.A./ 
Cia. Brasileira de Participa90es e Comercio/Carangola Adm. e 
Com. S/A/Patrol Adm. e Com. S/A/Ribeiro Pinto Adm. e Com. S/A. 
He had also been an executive of the BNDE before 1964. 
81 IPES embarked an a giant effort to provide the ~enets of a new 
labour legislation. In order to provide the government with 
the necessary background information, they set themselves the 
task of assembling information on the labour laws of the dif-
ferent countries of Latin America with the co-operation of the 
different Brazilian anbassadors in those countries. Letter from 
Harold Cecil Polland to Ambassador in Uruguay, Hanoel Pio 
Correia - Rio de Janeiro September 9th, 1965 - IPES Archives. 
For an analysis of the labour reforms and a view of the rela-
tions between state and labour after 1964, see Kenneth P. 
Erickson, The Brazilian Co orative State and Worki -Class 
Politics Berkeley, University of California Press, 1977), 
Chapters VIII and IX. 
82 See K. Erickson, oE.cit., pp.165-167. 
83 IPES CE Rio February 16th, 1966. See also Draft 192, of the 
National Council of Economy - CNE - Rio de Janeiro 1966 in 
IPES Archives. 
For further information on the FGTS, see the very useful study 
by Alexandre de Souza Barros and Argelina Haria Cheibub Figuei-
redo, The Creation of Two Social Programs: The FGTS and the 
PIS (Himeo - Rio de Janeiro, 1975). 
84 R. Campos, 'A Geografia Louca', in OESP, December 1st, 1971 
(my translation - RAD). 
85 See Letter from Lindolfo Martins Ferreira, councillor and presi-
dent of the Special Commission of CONSPLAN, to Paulo de Assis 
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Ribeiro - August 23rd, 1966 - PAR Archives. 
See also Memo CONSPLAN - August 1966 - annex to Letter, in PAR 
Archives. 
86 Padre Melo, the only leader the IVth Army trusted, was given 
de facto control of the rural labour movement. With the help 
of the Army and the police he replaced the leadership of virtu-
ally all of the rural unions. See Jan Knippers Black, United 
States Penetration of Brazil (Nanchester, Manchester University 
Press, 1977), p.136. 
87 Eugene Hethvin, 'Labor's New yleapon for Democracy', in Reader's 
Digest, October 1966, p.28. 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
°3 
04 
Vasco Leitao da Cunha went into private business as a director 
of Standard Electric - ITT, where he joined IPES leader Fernando 
Machado Portela and Luiz Gonzaga do Nascimento e Silva. Leitao 
da Cunha also became a director of Banco filercantil de Sao Paulo, 
owned by IPES leader Gastao Bueno Vidigal. 
A number of IPES and CONSULTEC activists and collaborators occu-
pied diplomatic posts after 1964. Among t hem were Raimundo 
Meirelles Padilha, a right-wing Catholic intellectual and son of 
ADP/ADEP Congre.ssman Rarmundo Padilha, appointed to Rome; Carlos 
D'Alamo Lousada appointed to Paris; Luiz.de Almeida Nogueira 
Porto was appointed to.S::>fia j Bilac Pint?, a umy ADP Congressman, became 
ambassador to France. Among his successors have been General 
Lyra Tavares, Antonio Delfini Netto and Luiz Gonzaga do Nasci-
mento e Silva. Roberto Campos became ambassador to G. Britain. 
OESP, July 4th, 1964 and OESP Editorial August 15th, 1964. 
See also Juracy Magalhaes, Minha Experiencia Diplomatica (Rio 
de Janeiro, Livraria Jose Olympio Editora, 1971), especially 
his speech to the Conference of Business Managers at John 
Hopkins University, USA, on January 22nd, 1965 - pp.130-136. 
OESP, August 1st, 1964, quoted .in Carlos Estevam r~rtins, 'Brazil 
and the United States from the 1960s tothe1970s', in Latin 
America and the United States: The Chan in Political Realities 
ed. by Julio Cotler and Richard R. Fagen Stanford, Stanford 
Universi ty Press, 1974), pp.277-278. 
Visao, October 1965, as quoted by Carlos Estevam Hart ins , idem. 
Ruy Mauro Marini, 'Brazilian Sub-Imperialism', in Monthly Review, 
February 1072. 
See Juracy Magalhaes, oD.cit., Speech to the Organization of 
American States - September 15th, 1966 - pp.64-68. 
Initially, Luiz Antonio de Gama e Silva had been appointed by 
the r·lilitary Junta as ~!Iinister of Education and Culture, combin-
ing this function with that of Minister of Justice. vii th 
Castello Branco fn the presidency, Gama e Silva was substituted 
by Flavio Suplicy de Lacerda, rector of the University of 
Parana and a relative of Hanoel de Linhares de Lacerda, the 
IPES activist of the civilian-military staff of Parana. 
Suplicy de Lacerda was soon replaced by the UDN/ADP politician 
and entrepreneur, Pedro Aleixo, after an interim period in 
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which IPES collaborator Raymundo Moniz de Aragao held the 
post, as stop-gap minister. Pedro Aleixo, a leader of the 
UDN of Minas Gerais and linked to the Assis Chateaubriand 
media complex, finally left the post of Minister of Education 
to become vice-president to General Costa e Silva. Raymundo 
Muniz de Aragao took over for the remainder of the administra-
tion's period. 
Entrepreneur and ADP politician Tarso Dutra was appointed 
Minister of Education in Costa e Silva's administration, suc-
ceeded by Jarbas Passarinho, who in turn was succeeded by Nei 
Braga. In Joao Baptista Figueiredo's administration, Eduardo 
Portela, editor of Cadernos Brasileiros, became Minister of 
Education. 
95 Guidelines for the change in educational policy were also fL~ed 
by President Castello Branco in mid-1964, when he communicated 
to the secretaries of education of all the states of the federa-
tion that the aim of his government would be to 're-establish 
order and tranquility among students, workers, and military' -
OESP, June lOth, 196L}. See also Barbara Freitag, Escola, 
~do e Sociedade (Sao Paulo, EDART Sao Paulo Livraria e 
Editora, 197'1), pp.67-71. For Freitag, the new educational 
legislation envisaged de facto the creation of instruments of 
control over students and workers. 
By 1965, a commission of five Americans and two Brazilian 
specialists constituted in the framework of a H8S-USAID agree-
ment, produced an in-depth report on educational policy. This 
report inspired the wide-reaching educational Law of University 
Reform of 1968, produced by a task-team of ten members, which 
consolidated the technocratic features of higher education. 
J. A. Poerner, a Poder Jovem (Rio de Janeiro, Civiliza9ao Brasil-
eira, lQ68). 
06 The team also comprised Raymundo ivloniz de Aragao, Carlos Pas-
coali, Candido Paim, Joaquim Faria Goes Filho and Pery Porto. 
By November 1964, the following team of IPES activists and col-
laborators had been gathered to debate the problems of educa-
tional reform: Augusto Frederico Schmidt, General Edmundo 
Macedo Soares e Silva, Jayme Abreu, Jose Arthur Rios, Lucas 
Lopes, Padre Laercio Dias Houra, Mario Henrique Simonsen, 
Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, Raymundo Honiz de Aragao, Wanderbilt 
Duarte de Barros, Antonio Couceiro, Ana Amelia Carneiro de 
MendonQa, Belarmino Austregesilo de Athayde, Carlos Chagas 
Filho, Jorge Kafuri, Ernesto Luiz de Oliveira Junior, Carlos 
Otavio Flexa Ribeiro (director of Promotora de ~ducaQao S/A), 
Luis Cintra do Prado (director of Luferreira S/A Comercial, 
Agr1cola e Administradora) and Suzana GonQalves. IFLS Boletim 
Mensal - NO.26/27, sept./Oct. 1964, Rio. 
IP~S was finally to present its ideas in a publication called 
'The Education which is convenient for us'. The ideas con-
tained in the study were introduced as representing 'the stance 
('tomada de posiQao') taken in a certain historical moment by 
strategic entrepreneurial sectors and those of the Brazilian 
organic intellectuals ('intellectualidade organica 4 ) (sic)'. 
'A EducaQao que nos convem' - IPES (Rio de Janeiro, APEC 
Edi tara, 1969). 
I 
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97 On the functionality of the educational reform for the big cor-
porations in general and multinational enterprises in particul~, 
see Luiz Antonio Rodrfgues da Cunha, Educayao e Desenvolvimento 
Social no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, Livraria Francisco Alves 
Editora S.A., 1975). 
See also B. Freitag, op.cit., pp.95-97. 
98 B. Freitag, op.cit., pp.67-82 , 92-93, 98-99, 120-121. 
99 Thomas G. Sanders, the Paulo Freire Method: Literacy Trainin~ 
and Conscientizayao, West Coast South America Series, Vol. XV, 
June 1968, p.14 - American Universities Field Staff. 
See also Philippe C. Schmitter, The Portugalization of Brazil 
in Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies and Future, ed. by 
Alfred Stepan (New Haven,Yale University Press, 1973), pp.2l5-2l9. 
100 Gilberta Martino Jannuzzi, Confronto Pedagogico: Paulo Freire e 
MOBRAL~ (Sao Paulo, Cortez e Morae s, 1979), Chapter IV, especially 
pp.78-79. .-
B. Freitag, o~.cit.,pp.83-89. 
See also Soletre MOBRAL e Leia Brasil: Sete Anos de Luta pela 
Alfabetiza9~q (Rio de Janeiro, Guavira Editores) MOBRAL Report 
1977 - Ministry of Education and Culture. 
101 P. Schmitter. Interests Conflict and Political Chan e in Brazil 
(Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1971 , p.+18. 
After the coup, a unit of OPUS DEI was established in Sao Paulo 
and by lCI66 it had three university centres functioning - Jornal 
do Brasil, July 27th, 1966. 
As Glycon de Paiva remarked, it 'is one thing to make a revolu-
tion. but quite another to sustain it. The danger now is that 
we who initiated this revolt might relax.' To avoid such a 
danger, IPES continued to sponsor courses and train activists, 
especially from the middle classes and the trade unions, as 
well as continuing its indoctrination of the entrepreneurs 
themselves. See Clarence S. Hall, 'The Nation that Saved 
Itself', supplement of Reader's Digest November 1964, p.158. 
With the approval of Brazilian Federal authorities, Jean NcKee 
and Arthur Renander, both New York pollsters and political 
scientists, lectured on public opinion surveying and citizen 
participation in politics, to the Centro Industrial in Rio de 
Janeiro, the Public Opinion Secretariat of the National Confer-
ence of Bishops, the Centro dos Engenheiros Democraticos in 
Sao Paulo and the Liga da 11ulher Democra,tic~ in Belo Horizonte. 
The Council for Latin America arranged. supervised and paid for 
the lecture tour. The purpose of the tour was to 'help Brazil-
ians to broaden the basis of their democracy'. Support was 
given to a programme of high school scholarships for the child-
ren of members of the Christian I·lorkers Federation in Ric. 
The; selection board consisted of Horkers, employers and members 
of CAtm=::. The purpose of this activity was to 'give prestige 
to democratic unionists and to improve understanding betHeen 
labour, management and civic minded Homen' . 
Arrangements Here also made for a donation by the American 
Society of Rio to the building of a communi t~l centre for voca-
tional and c ivie education in the 'Favela da Rocinha', Rio I s 
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largest urban slum. The purpose of this activity was to 'demon-
strate US business support for the middle class of the future'. 
See Council for Latin American report - Chicago Meeting~October 
8th, 1965. 
102 Flexa Ribeiro, a politicalresociate of Carlos Lacerda and who 
had collaborated with IPES, became secretary for Education of 
the politically troublesome state of Guanabara, where the U~ 
had been headquartered. Flexa Ribeiro was eventually to become 
president of the Commission for Culture and Education of the 
Chamber of Deputies. 
Ie) Members of the working group were Manoel Jose Ferreira, Ernani 
Braga, Walter Ribeiro Sanchez, Eduardo Secades and Carlos 
Leopoldo Philipowski. 
Immediately after the coup of 196'+ Arnaldo Sussekind, the Mini-
ster of Labour, was also made Minister of Public Health. Under 
Castello Branco's presidency, he was replaced by ADP politician, 
Raymundo de Brito. His successor, Leonel Tavares t1iranda, was 
one of' the main shareholders of Banco Mercantil de Sao Paulo, 
of IPES leader Gastaode Bueno Vidiga1, -and of Banco Economico 
do .Rio de Janeiro, whose president was Marcos Rabello, of 
Construtora Rabello, the IPES contributor, Miranda was also 
owner of one of the biggest private clinics in the country, 
the Hospital e Casa deSaude Dr. Eiras, which by 1969 was the 
211th biggest 'sociedade anonima' according to the FGV - see 
Conjuntura Economica Vol.24, No.9, 1970.-
104 See Unirio Machado, A Industria Farmaceutica no Brasil: 'Des-
nacionalizakao' Preoo, Similares, Fraudes (Rio de Janeiro, 196J). 
See also CPI sobre a Desnacionalizacao da Industria Farmac8utica 
no Brasil - 1961, IPES Archives Himeo; L. Viana Filho, op.cit., 
pp.426-427i and t10niz Bandeira, Carteis e Desnacionalizar;ao 
(Rio de Janeiro, Civiliza9aO Brasileira, 1975), Chapter III. 
105 Banas, Investindo para 0 Brasil (Sao Paulo, Banas, 1966), pp. 
137-11.~3 • 
106 Ernani Mazza Wetternick became director of Planning of the 
National Department of Railways - DNEF. General Ramiro Gorreta 
Jr., of the Civilian Military Staff of Sao Paulo, was appointed 
director of the Estrada de Ferro Noroeste do Brasil. Jo~o Soares 
do Amaral Netto became director of the Cia. Paulista de Estradas 
de Ferro, to which Colonel Walfrido de Carvalho was subsequently 
appointed. 
107 To the Merchant Navy Commission went Commander Francisco Frota, 
Commander Jos~ Cruz Santos and Admiral Aniceto Cruz Santos, 
while Admiral Saldanha da Gama became its president. 
Commander Frota was a partner of Frota Oceanica Brasileira 
(Delta Line, New Orleans) and so was Leonidas Castelo, who 
became president of Loide Brasileiro, the state shipping company. 
Admiral Aniceto Cruz Santos, a CONSULTEC member, was director 
of Ishikawajima, the Japanese shipping consortium, and director 
of Ishi bras. 
Jose Cruz Santos was a member of CONSULTEC 
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779 
Admiral Saldanha da Gama was a director of Verolme Estaleiros, 
the lPES contributor. 
Joao Eduardo MagalhaBs Motta, an IPES affiliate, was~pointed 
to the_Loide in 1972. 
See Maur~ioBacelar, Transportes Marftimos, pp.227-232 j Admiral 
Jose Cruz Santos, ~ Cabotagem, pp.233-242j Walter Lorch, Trans-
portes em 1965, pp.243-252; and Jose Gon9alves Pontes, ~itua9~0 
dos Portos Brasileiros', pp.253-260, in Estudos Econ6micos 
Brasileiros - Sele~oes APEC no.l, 1965, Rio de Janeiro. 
108 To DOCENAVE, the shipping company of the state-owned Cia. Vale 
do Rio Doce went Oscar de Oliveira. The General Direction of 
the National Dep~ment of Ports and Vias Navegaveis (Navigable 
waterways) was placed under the responsibility of Fernando 
Viriato Miranda Carvalho, while Admiral Leoncio Martins became 
director of the Companhia Brasileira de Dragagem, in charge of 
dredging operations. 
109 Techno-entrepreneur Aldo Franco was ~pointed president. 
As superintendent of ErmRAFR was appointed Luiz Cassiodos Santos 
Werneck, and as directors the entrepreneurs and techno-entre-
preneurs Vitorio Ferraz, Jose Luiz de Almeida Bello, of COTEC -
Consultoria Tecnica S.A. (who became executive secretary of 
the Council for Industrial Development, a key policy-making 
agency of the government in the late 1960s) and Antonio Augusto 
Reis Velloso (APEC). 
Entrepreneur Luiz R. Rossi was eventually~pointed director of 
Via9ao Aerea Sao Paulo - VASP, the commercial airline owned by 
the state of Sao Paulo. VARIG, the joint private-Rio Grande 
do SuI state enterprise remained under the direction of IPES 
collaborator Rubem Berta until his death. 
110 Besides being a member of CONSULTEC, Thibau has been director 
of SELTEC (Sanders & Porter), USIMINAS, Vidraria Industrias 
Figueiras Olivera S.A. - VIFOSA (Cie. Saint Gobain) and lately 
Petroquimica Unicib. 
As advisor to the Ministry was appointed Antonio Carlos Ferreira 
de Queiroz, an economist was was part of the Study and Doctrine 
Group of IPES-Rio. 
III L. Viana Filho, op.cit., p.160. See also ResoluQao No.5165, of 
the National Oil Council - Brazil, 1965 - in lPES ArQhives. 
See also M. Bandeira, Carteis •.. , op.cit., Chapter ~I. 
To ~EIQUIl1 - Executive Group for the Chemical IndustI"J - were 
appointed Paulo Ribeiro, Juvenal Osorio Gomes, Paulo Bellotti 
and Francisco Melo Franco. 
Paulo Figueiredo has been a director of Union Carbide do Brasil. 
Kurt Politzer has been a director of Guanabara Chimica Indus-
trial S.A. and Industrias QUlmicas Taubate S.A. 
Ivo de Souza Ribeiro and Jose Batista Pereira have been direc-
tors of Petrobras. 
112 However, Hanna r-lining Co. considered it to be wise to associate 
itself with CAEMI, an enterprise owned by ICOMI, of IPES leader 
Augusto Trajano de Azevedo Antunes, who was associated with 
Bethlehem Steel. From the merger was born the gigantic Minera9&es 
Brasileiras Reunidas - NBR. The nationalistic campaigns against 
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Hanna stopped and 11BR controlled a most substantial parcel of 
the mining market. 
See L. Viana Filho, op.cit., p.170. For a detailed view of 
the links of MER see Guia Interinvest19 : 0 Brasil e 0 Ca ital 
Internacional - research by Jean Barnet Rio de Janeiro, Inter-
invest Editora, 1973), pp.l54, 160 and 477. 
113 IPES CD July 7th, 1964. J. R. Moraes Jardim. 
114 In July 1964, after Mario Henrique Simonsen and Jose Luiz Bulhoes 
Pedreira, whose help had been requested by Roberto Calmpos, had 
finished their draft on the Banco Nacional da Habita9ao and 
the housing plan, Congress was presented with the project which 
created the BNH, SERFHAU and the National Housing Plan. Stress-
ing the importance attached to the housing programme, Paulo de 
Assis Ribeiro himself was made responsible for defending the 
Housing Reform in Congress. See G.-Andre Fiechter, op.cit~, 
p.60 •. 
115 Sandra Cavalcanti had previously been the secretary for Social 
Services of Carlos Lacerda Ca post which now went to Jose 
Arthur Rios) and had been involved in the experience of the 
Housing Company of Guanabara State - COHAB. Durir~. Cavalcanti's 
period as head of the BNH, her team of young advisers closely 
resembled a nepotist network, for she was aided by lawyer Carlos 
Eduardo Paladini Cardoso, son of ADP member and UDN leader 
Adauto Cardoso; Dr. Sussekind, cousin of Minister of Labour 
Arnaldo Sussekind; Dr. Bulhoes, nephew of-Octavio Gouveia de 
Bulhoes, the Finance Minister; Dr. Jorge Tedesco, son-in-law 
of Health Minister Raymundo de Brito; lawyer Jo~o Claudio 
Dantas Campos, son of Minister of Justice Milton Campos; and 
by Henrique Capper Alves de Souza, a CONSULTEC associate. 
The trend of appointing IPES linked entrepreneurs to key posts 
continued under President Geisel. IPES~ader Gilberto Waack 
Bueno was appointed director of the Companhia de Construy~s 
Escolares do Estado de S~o Paulo - CONESP, while Mauro Ribeiro 
Viegas was made director of the Companhia de HabitaGa~ Popular 
do Estado da Guanabara - COHAB. 
116 See Harry J. Cole, 'Uma Pol!tica de Desenvolvimento Urbano', 
in Estudos Economicos Brasileiro~ (RiO, APEC, 1965), pp.38-43. 
Banas, Investindo para 0 Brasil Cop.cit., pp.120-123j. 
See G. A. Fiechter, op.cit., p.60. 
117 IPES leader Oscar de Oliveira was made the overlord of both the 
state-owned and the mixed steel enterprises. He was the presi-
dent of the Cia. Vale do Rio Doce, a joint venture responsible 
for the extraction and transportation of iron ore out of 11inas 
Gerais. Oscar de Oliveira was seconded by ESG General Jose 
Sinval Monteiro Lundenberg and Jose Hugo de Carvalho, also a 
director of Floresta Rio Doce. Oscar de Oliveira also became 
the president of Cia. Siderurgica VATU, and director of the 
Cia. de Ferro e Ayo de Vitoria, together with entrepreneur 
Baron Vollrat von Fatzdorf. The latter was also director of 
Intergrafica S!A Ha6uinas Impresora~ and of Ferrostael do Brasil. 
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Amaro Lanari, IPES financial contributor and an associate of 
Lucas Lopes, the general director of Hanna I'lining, was appointed 
president of USIMINAS, the private/state joint venture. In 
USIHINAS participated Nippon Kabishiki Kaisha, Yamata Iron and 
Steel Co., Fuji Iron and Steel Co. and Ishikawajima. 
IbererGilson was made president of Cia. Siderurgica Paulista -
COSIPA, the steel complex of Sao Paulo, while industrialists 
and bankers Luiz Dumont Villares, Francisco de Paula Vicente 
Azevedo, Plinio Reis Cantanhede and Helio Cassio Huniz de Souza 
were appointed directors. (Cantanhede was also appointed direc-
tor of the National Steel Corporation.) Eventually entrepreneur 
Oscar Augusto de Camargo was also made director of COSIPA. 
Lieut. Col. Antonino Machado Doria, a commercial director of 
CONSUL and former director of Volta Redonda, ACESITA and Com-
panhia Siderurgica Nacional, was~pointed to the directorship 
of Usina Siderlirgica da Bahia - USIBA. He was also appointed 
head of the Department of Promotion and Sales of the National 
Steel Corporation. Entrepreneurs Fernando J1achado Portela, 
Helio Beltrao, Edmundo Falcao da Silva and Fabio Garcia Bastos 
were appointed directors of COSIGUA, the steel complex of 
Guanabara, of which Brigadier Antonio Guedes Muniz became 
president. Brigadier Guedes Muniz was also made president of 
the 'National Steel Corporation. Jose Ermirio de Moraes was 
appointed member of its Conselho Consultivo., while Joao de 
Castro Moreira was appointed financial director. 
General Cordeiro de Farias, after his spell as Ninister for 
Regional CO-Ordination, became director of Acos Especiais 
Itabira - ACESITA. . 
118 Marshal Ademar de Queiroz remained head of Petrobras, to which he 
had been appointed by the military Junta, and Silvio de Froes 
Abreu and entrepreneur Manoel da Costa Santos (of A.S.E.A. and 
ARNO S/A) were eventually appointed councillors. After his 
spell at Petrobras, Marshal Queiroz took up private entrepren-
eurial activities, heading Bakol S.A. (Cevekol S.A.) in asso-
ciation with Ralph Rosenberg, the biggest individual shareholder 
of Petrobras. To the National Oil Council was appointed Plinio 
Reis Cantanhede. The direct~r of the Instituto Brasileiro do 
petr61eowas entrepreneur Jose Marques. 
General Geisel became head of Petrobras under General Medici and 
took with him a number of close collaborators, namely Captain 
Heitor de Aquino Ferreira, Colonel Gustavo Horaes Rego, Humberto 
Barreto and Shigeaki Ueki, director of Industrias de Lampadas 
Sadokin S/A, who was attached to Ralph Rosenberg. The first 
three were subsequently part of General Geisel's team at the 
'Largo de Misericordia' site in Rio de Janeiro of the meeting 
place and headquarters of the IPES/ESG team in charge of draw-
ing up and impl~mehting the strategy which made Geisel president 
in 1974. Shigeaki Ueki became Minister of Mines and Energy 
under President Geisel and'head of petrobras under President 
General Joao Baptista Figueiredo. 
llq Ruy de Castro Magalhaes was appointed head of CEI~G, the Elec-
trical Power Complex of Minas Gerais". John Cotrim was the 
director of FURNAS, the Electric Power Complex of Guanabara. 
John Cotrim also took part in the government-level conversa-
tions which were held with the Paraguaian authorities preparing 
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the ground for the joint venture to use hydroelectric power 
to be obtained from falls on the Parana River through the con-
struction of a giant dam •. The electricity generated by the 
Itaipu Dam would serve the area of Sao Paulo and the south of 
Brazil •. The Itaipu Dam would eventually be constructed by 
a binational corporation headed by reserve colonel, costa 
Caval cant i, who became Minister of Mines and Energy and of 
the Interior under General Costa e Silva and under President 
General Garrastazu Medici. Lucas Nogueira Garcez was appointed 
director of the Centrais Electricas de Sao Paulo. Apolonio 
Salles, president of Banco America do Sul S!A and di~ector of 
Cia. Electricidade Cariri - CELCA, became head of the Companhia 
Hidroeletrica do Sao Francisco - CHESF. 
120 On the background to the 'AMFORP case', see Moniz Bandeira, 
~ Presenpa ••• , op.cit., pp.423-434; Moniz Bandeira, 0 Governo ••• , 
op.cit., pp.49-53. See also Airgram No.7l0 of American Embassy 
.in Rio de Janeiro to Department of State - Minutes of Conver-
sation between President Joao Goulart and Attorney General 
Robert Kennedy - December 17th, 1962, dated December 19th, 1962. 
Declassifi3d state Dep l~K 76-93; Telegramme from Ralph Dungan, 
special assistant to President Kennedy, to Harold S. Geneen, 
president of ITT, Narch 3, 1962; l1emorandum for Mr. }lcGeorge 
Bundy from L. D. Battle, executive secretary of Department of 
State on Reply to Telegram to the President concerning Exprop-
riation of ITT Properties in Brazil - February 28th, 1962, 
enclosing Gene.en's telegramme of February 17th, 1962 to Presi-
dent Kennedy, Secretary Rusk's reply of February 22nd, 1962 
to Geneen's telegramme of February 17th, 1962 to Secretary 
Rusk and Embassy Rio de Janeiro's telegrammes of February 23rd 
and 25th, 1962; Telegramme from Department of State to Ambas-
sador Gordon, Rio de Janeiro, f1arch 7th, 1962 - No. 24j4. All 
these documents are in the National Security Files, in the 
JFK Archives, Boston, Mass. 
121 Joao Calmon, 0 Livro Negro da Invasao Branca (Rio de Janeiro, 
Edi90es 0 Cruzeiro, 1966), especially pp.37-38. 
On the business holdings of Gallotti's Light s.A./BRASCAN, see 
f1arcos Arruda, 'Case Study No.1 - BRAS CAN', in Hultinationals 
and Brazil: The impact of multinational corporations in con-
temnorary Braz il, ed. by Marcos Arruda. Herbet _ de Souza and 
Carlos Affonso (Toronto, LARU, 1975), pp.9l-l29. 
122 See letter from Paulo Ayres Filho of August 5th, 1965 to 
'Dear Niso' and enclosed telegrammes from Paulo Ayres Filho and 
Antonio Gallotti (in the name of the GLASSCO president) to 
Roberto Campos lobbying for private nationalization against 
state take-over of the CTB, in Luiz Viana Filho Archive, Rio 
de Janeiro. 
123 One of the reforms introduced by the Castello Branco administra-
tion but only implemented in the subsequent government of General 
Costa e Silva was the setting up of a new ministry to oversee 
.the different acti vi ties and agencies" in the ar:3a of communica-
tions. The first r1inister of Communications was Carlos Furtado 
de Simas, a former director of the Telephone Company of Bahia 
and an associate of Juracy Hagalha"'es, the director of .B;ricsson 
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do Brasil. Simas had also been linked to IPES. 
Commander Euclides Quandt de Oliveira succeeded Simas as Mini-
ster of Communications, keeping his post until the end of 
President Geisel's term. By then he had been for years a 
director of Siemens do Brasil, which Vias presided by Ambas-
sador Manoel Pio Correia, the former secretary-general of the 
Itamaraty under Juracy Hagalhaes. 
124 The notions about the neo-corporativist structure of interest 
articulation draw heavily on Guillermo O'Donn~l, 'Corporatism 
and the Question of the State', in Authoritarianism and Cor ora-
tism in Latin America, ed. by James H. Malloy Pittsburg, Uni-
versity of Pittsburg Press, 1977); Guillermo O'Donnel~ ~puntes 
para una teorla del Estado - Documento CEDES/G.E. CLASSO, No.9 
Buenos Aires, November 1977 - Mimeoj Philippe C. Schmitter, 
'The "Portugalization" of Brazil?', in Alfred Stepan (ed.), 
Authoritarian Brazil - Origins! Policies and Future (Nevi Haven, 
Yale University Press, 1973), pp.179-232: and Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso, La Cuestion del Estado en Brasil - Mimeo, 1974 
125 IPES CO Rio December 19th, 1966 - Helio Gomide. 
126 . IPES CD Rio April 28th, 1964. 
127 The complete and extensive list of lecturers and participants 
from the administration and from the entrepreneurial sector, 
as Viell as the themes they discussed, the questions raised, 
and the answers given are to be found in the lPES Archives, 
Rio de Janeiro. This large amount of documentation is excel-
lent material for anyone attempting to do research on economic 
and social policy formation and decision making during this 
period. 
128 lPES CD June 16th, 1964 and IPES CD June 23rd, 196+. 
129 An idea of the ensemble of personalities, political functions 
and social roles brought together by the CAB is provided by 
the list of participants of the 4th course of IPES-Rio in 1965. 
From a total of 36 participants, 18 were entrepreneurs: Benjamm 
Robert Fye, diretor of Comercio e Ind. Stik S.A.j Carlos da 
Silva, president of ENGENFUSA: Celso de Almeida Campos, direc-
tor of Cia. de Laticinios Alberto Boeke S.A.; Eder Accorsi, 
executive of S.A. Marvin: Elie Laurencel, director of Esso; 
Francisco Correia Bordale Garcia, executive MESBLA S.A.; Geraldo 
Gayoso Neves , executive of ENGEN" USA: Gual ter Hano, execu ti ve 
of Nestle: Homero Luiz Santos, executive of ICOMI: Israe~ 
Hirsch Coslovsky, executive of ICm!I; Leonardo Musafir, direc-
tor of L. Nusafir Arquitetura e Constru90esj Luiz de Hiranda 
Figueiredo, executive of Esso; Luis f·1elone Junior, executive 
of Brafor S.A.: Osmar Gomes da Silva, executive of Norbrasa; 
Osvaldo Cezani, executive of Lloyd Brasileiro, otto Frensel, 
president of Associayao Brasileira de Laticinistas; Vicente 
Alves de Carvalho, president of Banco Nacional do Esplrito, 
Santo: Vinicius Costa, executive of Cia. Casimiras Aurora. 
Other participants were: entrepreneur Alberto 1elio i'joreira" , , 
Diogenes Vieira Silva, l:i!SG officer; Eduardo de Almeida Martins, 
sociologist and head of Division of INDA; Epitacio Elliot 
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Martins Medeiros, head of Property Administration of the 
Caixa Economica; Francisco de Assis Gon9alves, Army officer; 
Gilberto Comforto, planning adviser to the Secretaria de Economia 
of Guanabara; Hans Alfred Rappel, agronomic engineer of INDA; 
Jorge de Oliveira Castro, officer of the Her chant Navy; Nair 
Sodre Gomes, nurse: Jairo Araujo Regis, economic editor of 
Diario Carioca; Paulo Cezar Xavier Aguiar, security inspector 
of Petrobris: Paulo Emilio da Camara Ortegal, Air Force briga-
dier: Paulo Leite Ribeiro, director of the Planning Division 
of the Comissci'o de Marinha rvIercante: Paulo Roberto Tavares 
Azevedo, migration official; Pedro Jacinto de Mallet Joubim, 
Army officer: Sonia Lucia Abud, student: Waldir Gon9alves de 
Carvalho, assistant of Corregedoria of Justice; and Zenildo 
Costa de Araujo, lawyer. 
130 IPES CD April 28th, 1964. 
131 IPES Meeting June 9th, 1964, with Glycon de Paiva, Augusto 
Trajano de Azevedo Antunes, General Heitor Herrera, Jorge Oscar 
de Mello Flores, JPO, Jose Duvivier Goulart. General Liberato 
and General Golbery. 
At this meeting strategic guidelines Here discussed on what 
they considered was the appropriate concept of government for 
Brazil, focussing on whether it should be a unitarian or 
federative republic. Moreover, they discussed what would be 
the minimal conceptualization of democracy ('which one is our 
democracy') and concluded that a democrat is not he who 'does 
not admit private property'. Furthermore they focussed on 
the issue of liberty, problems of sociali~ation of profit and 
on free enterprise, both national and foreign. 
132 Guilherme Borghoff, who became head of SVNAB, appealed to the 
IPES executive for help in the preparation of a policy paper 
on prices. propaganda and guidelines to take to the government, 
in view of the difficulties he was encountering in his new job. 
IPES CD December 1st, 1964. 
Before Borghoff, it was the turn of Hario Thibau, {·linister of 
Hines and Energy, to discuss his problems with the IPES leader-
ship. IPES meeting September 9th, 19@+. 
133 Letter from Harold C. Polland to Jesse Pinto Freire - Rio de 
Janeiro, Harch 14th, 1966. Such contacts were Obviously not 
difficult, considering the tight grip that IPBS/IBAD affiliates 
and militants held over the reins of government. See Letter 
from Colonel Yeddo Blaut to IPES Rio - IPESUL f1ay 8th, 1969; 
Letter from J. I. Caldeira Versiani to IPES Rio January 5th, 
1966: and Letter from Helio Gomide to Glycon de Paiva November 
17th, 1966. See Appendix X. 
134 IPES also exercised its influence through APEC, the expertise 
agency spaNned by CONSULTEC. 
APEC pUblications "Tere distributed by IPES to its affiliates 
and selected sectors of the public and opinion shapers. Until 
1970 the 'APEC team was to organize aDd write up the annual 
edition of the Revista Econo'mica (Economic Review) of Jornal 
do Brasil and was also to write up Pano:rama Economico and the 
Cadernos Economicos of 0 Globo from 1970 onwards. Frederico 
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135 
785 
Heller continued in charge of the Economic Section of 0 Estado 
de Sao Paulo. IPES affiliates controlled both the key posts 
inihe Fundacao Getulio Vargas, which was directed by IPES 
leader Julian Chacel, and its key publications, such as Con-
juntura Economica. The government's data centres also came 
under the influence of IPES affiliates and collaborators. 
(In 1979, IPES collaborator Jesse Montello became head of the 
Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica - IBGE.) 
The significance of the seminar lay in the sponsors as well as 
in the participants and theses discussed. This international 
gathering was organized by IPES in Sao Paulo between the 2)rd 
and 27th of November 1964, and took place at the Forum Roberto 
Simonsen. The gathering was sponsored by the University of 
Sao Paulo and co-sponsored by the Commercial Association of 
Sao Paulo - ACSP, the National Association for Economic and 
Social Programming, the Bolsa de rIercadorias of Sa"'o Paulo 
(Commodity Stock Market), the Bolsa Oficial de Valores (Stock 
Ivtarket), the Federation of Rural Associations of the State of 
Sao Paulo - F~~SP, the Federation of Commerce of the State 
of Sao Paulo - FCESP, the Federation of Industries of the 
State of Sao Paulo - FIESP, the Order of the Economists of 
Sao Paulo, the Secretariat for Economy and Planning of the 
State of Sao Paulo, the Syndicate of the Banks of the State 
of Sa~ Paulo and the Brazilian Rural Society - SRB. 
The main discussions centTed round papers onihe role of the 
government and private enterprise in developed countries, the 
role of the government and private enterprise in developing 
countries, the need for a theory of the form and limits of 
state intervention in developing countries, the problems of 
the state enterprises and mixed-economy enterprises (sociedades 
de economia mista) and the obstacles to private enterprise. 
The relationship of private enterprise and foreign competition, 
as well as private foreign co-operation were also discussed. 
Participation in the Congress was restricted to economists, 
university professors, liberal professionals, entrepreneurs 
and directors and representatives of public and private entities. 
The lecturers at the Congress were Antonio Delfim Netto, Eugenio 
Gudin, Glycon de Paiva, Geraldo Dannemann, Jose Pinto Antunes, 
Laerte Almeida de Horaes, Hem de Sa' and Roberto Campos, for 
Brazil. Ettore Lolli (Italy), Ingvar Svennilson (Sweden), 
Mario R. Hicele (Argentina) and Pierre-Bernard Couste (France) 
were the international guests. 
The organizers of the conference were: Antonio Carlos Pacheco 
e Silva, Brasilio M~chado Neto, David Beatty III, Ernesto 
Barbosa Tomanik, Fernand Edward Lee, Gastao Eduardo Bueno 
Vidigal. Harold Cecil Polland, Humberto Hartins, Humberto Reis 
Costa, Joao Baptista Leopoldo Figueiredo, Jose' Adolfo da Silva 
Gordo, Jose Ulpiano de Almeida Prado, Luiz Antonio da Gama e 
Silva, Luis Cassio dos Santos Werneck, Luiz ~mmanuel Bianchi, 
r1odesto Scagliusi, Paul Albright, Paulo Ayres Filho, Paulo de 
Almeida Barbosa, Paulo Reis Magalhaes, Rafael de Souza Noschese, 
Salvio Pacheco de Almeida Prado, Roberto Pinto de Souza and 
Jose'Roberto Fhitaker Penteado. "'lith the exception of IPLS 
Rio leader, Harold Polland, these members of the various class 
and sectoral$sociations mentionedroove were part of the leader-
ship of IPES Sao Paulo. 
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IPES Report - 0 Governo e a Em resa Privada no Processo de Des-
envolvimento, Sao Paulo 23 27 November, 1964. 
IPES Report, idem, p.3. See also Roberto Campos, Speech at 
the Federation of Commerce of the State of Sao Paulo, January 
29th,196S. 
On denationalization, see Rubem Medina, Desnacionalizayao: 
Crime contra 0 Brasil? (Rio de Janeiro, Editora Saga, 1970); 
Osny Duarte Pereira, Multinacionais no Brasil: Aspectos Sociais 
e Politicos (Rio de Janeiro, Civiliza9~o Brasileira, 1975); Fer-
nando Henrique Cardoso, 'As Tradi26"es do Desenvol vimento Associadd, in 
Estudos CEBRAP No.8, April-June 1974 (Sao Paulo, Ediyoes CEBRAPI 
Editora Brasileira de Ciencias,h~da.), pp.41-76; Fernando 
Gasparian, op.cit.j Peter Evans, op.cit.: Guia Interinvest, op.cit. 
, and Silvio Heck, op.ci t. 
The director of the CURSEF was Colonel Luiz Victor D'Arinos 
Silva~and appointed as 'teaching director was Pierre Louis 
Laporte, from France. The teaching S:.aff was composed of: 
Americo Cury, Antonio Veiga de Freitas, Agrlcola de Souza 
_Bethlem, Aurelio Chaves, Bellini Cunha, Carlos Henrique Froes, 
Clertan Arantes, Condorcet Pereira de Rezende, Fernando Strach-
mann, Henrique Flanzer, Herculano Borges da Fonseca, Gary S. 
Schieneman, Gustavo Watsted, Ian Benedict, IsaacSirostky, 
Isaac Kerstenetsky, J. Brito Alves, James do Souza, Joao 
Batista de Athayde, JOM Eduardo Nagalha"es Notta, Joseph A. 
Caltagirone, Luiz. Zottmann, Lywall Salles~ Natalino Agostinho 
Pereira de Souza, Og j'rancisco Leme, Oliveira Penna, Orlandy 
Rubem Correa, Ricardo Cesar Pereira Lira, Ruy Flaks Schneider, 
Victor da Silva Alves Filho, Victor H. Russomano, Waldyr Santos 
and Hilliam Barcellos. 
See Report of Activities - IPES GE, 1968 - Introduction, in 
IPES Archives Rio de Janeiro. 
IPES CO Rio December 12th, 1966 -General r1ontagna, Admiral 
Martins. 
IPES maintained its own Group of Education, which received sup-
port from the tv!inistry of Education and Culture, through its 
programme of the Industrial Department. In lS67, IPES realized 
28 courses, Hith a total of 841 participants. Sixty-five per 
. cent of the participants ,·:ere university students. IPES also 
provided the PERT - Project Cost Analysis Course, for private 
enterprises. In 1967 there were 200 participants, mostly profes-
sionals and university stUdents. 
IPES Report of Activities - 1967 - pp.lS-17, in IPES Archives, 
Rio de Janeiro. 
J ornal do Brasil, f:ay 19th, 1966. 
IPES CD November 3rd, 196+ - Helio Gomide. 
IPES CD May 26th, 1964. 
When Philip Siekman published his article about the role of 
the entrepreneurs in bringing down the government of Goulart, 
the IY~S Rio leadership considered the article a 'most serious 
matter' and 'prejudicial to IPES and to some of its members' and 
sent a telegramme to IPES Sao Paulo ';There they ::tressed that 'He 
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have been unpleasantly surprised (by the) article (in) 'Fortune' 
over (the) Revolution, embarrassingly ~(comprometedoramente) 
commented by Tribuna da Imprensa and Ultima Hora'. Telegra~ 
to Joao Baptista Leopoldo Figueiredo, from Harold C. Polland 
(annex to IPES CD September 21st, 196+). See also Philip 
Siekman, "~hen Executives Turned Revolutionaries, A story 
hitherto untold: How Sao Paulo business men conspired to over-
throw Brazil's Communist infested government, in Fortune, No.J, 
1964, pp.147-149, 210-221. 
IPES CD July 21st, 1964 and IPES CD December 1st, 196+. 
IPES CD November Jrd, 1964. 
The .delegation was comprised of Harold Polland, Jose Luiz 
Bulhoes Pedreira, Luiz Dumo.nt Villares, J oao Reginaldo Cotrim, 
Paulo Ayres Filho and Israel Klabin. 
IPES Bulletin - Brazil-USA: Encontro de Empresarios, April/ 
May 1964, pp.24-25. . 
Immediately after the coup, IPES had appealed to entrepreneurs 
for an offer of financial help to the new government. IPES 
CD April 6th, 1964. It was widely believed that one billion 
doliars had been pledged. 
146 Among those contacted by the IPES leaders were: Hubert Aldrich 
(vice-president of Chemical Bank New York Trust Co.); Richard 
Aldrich (vice-president of International Basic Economy Corp.); 
William Barlow (president of Vision Inc.); Henry Borden (presi-
dent of Light and Power Co.); John W. Buford (vice-president of 
Hanna Mining Company): Norman Carignan (vice-president of the 
Latin American Group, W. R. Grace Co.); Sam Carpenter (general 
manager of the International Department of E.I. du Pont de 
Nemours & Co.); Robert Christopher (chief editor of Newsweek 
Magazine Internacional); John T. Connor (president of Merck 
& Co.); Harry Canover (assistant executive of the president 
of CICYP); Alphonse de Rosso (Latin American co-ordinator of 
Standard Oil Co.); Richard Fenton (president of Pfizer Inter-
national); Leo Fernandes (vice-president of Merck & Co.); James 
R. Greene (vice-president of Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.); 
Francis Grimes (vice-president of Chase Marbattan Bank); 
Clarence Hall (chief editor of the Reader's Digest Association); 
Philip H?lmann (pr~sident of ~ohnson & Johnson International); 
Edgar Kalser (presldent of Kalser Industries); Donald Kendall 
(president of Pepsi-Cola Co.); Francis Mason (vice-president of 
Chase Manhattan Bank): S. Maurice McAshan Jr. (president of 
Anderson Clayton-ACCO); McCullough (president of General Electric 
of Brazil), Georges Moore (president of the First National City 
Bank) and David Rockefeller. 
147 In September 196}, at a meeting of the leadership of IPES, 
in w h i c 11 Mario H. Simonsen pa r tic ip ate d the leaders 
of IPES considered the material~d human resources at their 
disposal for the studies to be developed in~reement with the 
CED. Paulo re Assis Ribeiro md I'lario JI. Simonsen were appointed 
directors of the programme. IPES CD September 8th, 1964. One 
of the outcomes of these encounters was the decision to produce 
a study on Inflation in Brazil, cssigned to Simonsen. I1oreover, 
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it was decided that Paulo de Assis Ribeiro and Simonsen should 
study the positive and negative factors in the various histori-
cal cycles of the Brazilian economy. IPES CD September 16th, 
196'-l-. 
148 Leocadio Almeida Antunes was appointed to ALALC as was Jayme 
Magrassi de Sa after his spell as president of the BNDE. 
In August 196+, Gilbert Huber reported. on his conversations 
in the United States with Alfred C. Neal of the CED. On that 
occasion, the agenda of a future discussion between IPES, the 
Ford Foundation and the CED members was established. The 
priority objectives aimed at eliminating the obstacles counter-
posed tofue internal commerce between Latin American countries. 
To operationalize this proposal, two aims were discussed: the 
investigation of the potential of intra-South American commerce, 
even to the point of complementing the economies of the differ-
ent countries; and the development of road links between the 
different national transportation systems offue various South 
American countries, seen as a key incentive to commerce and 
tourism. IPES was also behind the projection of CICYP, the 
Interamerican Council for Commerce and Production, which oper-
ated as a counterpart of the Institute and to which the corpora-
tions that made up the CED and later the CLA belonged, including 
_ the above' :nentioned concerns. 
It is interesting to rote that after his term as Minister of 
Planning, Roberto Campos was appointed to the CICYP. General 
Pedro de Almeida became secretary of the CICYP in 1968. 
Furthermore, it was to be with CED directors A. C. Neal and 
Frank Brandenburg that IPES executives Harold Polland and 
Gilbert Huber would discuss how to 'eliminate the obstacles 
placed before the internal commerce between South American 
Countries'. 
IPES CE August 21st, 1964, IPES CD August 21st, 196~~, IPES CD 
August 18th, 196~;. and IPES Ninutes August 2!.J.th, 1964. See 
also Appendix Y. 
140 In October 10 64, Gilbert Huber gave an account of another trip 
and his contacts in the United states. He proposed a solution 
to the problem of the relations at government level between 
Brazil and the United States, in geo-economic terms. Huber 
suggested a group of men to deal with the matter in the United 
states, with the 15 advisors of President Johnson. Huber 
stressed the fact that there should be a personal representative 
of President Castello to President Johnson (urn homen que seja 
o emissario pessoal). An individual whose presence in such 
a mission was considered to be essential was Alberto Byngton. 
As a result of the meeting, it was decided that IPES would con-
centrate its efforts in the preparation of its team of advisors, 
in order to 'approach the ~rob1em with the government'. 
IPES CD October 6th, 196+. (see also Appendix Y.) 
150 Luiz Viana Filho, op.cit., pp.lJ2-1JJ. 
151 Letter from Alfred C. Neal, of the cED, to General Gomes de 
Abreu, secretary of IPES - August 22nd, 1066. 
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152 Among these lectures sto'od out one on 'Planning and Projects 
of National Interest', prepared by the Funda<;ao Delmiro Gouveia, 
an ipstitution which, although bearing the name of the fa~ous 
assassinated nationalist entrepreneur, collaborated with Ifl;S 
General Olympio Sa Tavares, Colonel Newton Cipriano Leitao (of 
the Ninistry of Finance) and General Joao Bina Nachado, comman-
der of the General Staff and Command School of the Army ~CbM£, 
were invited. See Letter from General Octavio Gomes de Abreu 
to General Olympio Sa Tavares - Rio de Janeiro, August 16th, 
1966 - IPES 66/0228 and letters to Colonel Cipriano Leitao and 
General Bina Machado of the same date. IPES Archives, Rio de 
Janeiro. 
IPES also co-operated with the Fundayao Coimbra Bueno, led by 
General Humberto Peregrino, in the preliminary Norks envisaging 
the creation of an Interamerican System of Civilian Security, 
as a watchdog over political and socio-economic development in 
the rest of Latin America. General Heitor Heitor Herrera was 
designated by IPES to participate in the corresponding work-team. 
Letter from Harold C. Polland to General Humberto Peregrino, 
Rio de Janeiro, August 3rd, 1966 - IPES 66/0104. IP~S Archives 
Rio de Janeiro. 
153 The military industrial complex has a two-fold meaning. It 
involves both the association of entrepreneurs and officers 
and institutions of the Armed Forces for the production a 
milita~J equipment and other ventures, as well as the large 
and growing number of military officers ih executive positions 
of private enterprises. For the sake of clarity, the first 
case shall be referred to as milita~J-industrial complex and 
the second case as entrepreneurial-military complex. 
In i'lay 1968, a critical period in Brazil of social and poli ti-
cal unrest, Rui Gomes de Almeida organized a meeting of entre-
preneurs, at which. J. A. Leite Barbosa read out the' Nanifesto 
of the Military and Industrial Complex', attacking students, 
the Church and other 'subversive' elements and appealing to 
the joint action a military and entrepreneurs in order to 
rescue the country. TONards the end of t he year, Congress had 
been closed; some of the most influential politicians had their 
mandates and political rights suspended, students, workers and 
intellectuals Here driven into fringe militant guerrilla 
organizations, and a junta of the three services ruled the 
country, backed by Institutional Act No.5. 
The !lIanifesto loT as elaborated by 'encomenda' of the Chamber of 
Commerce. See Movimento, February 12-18, 1979, p.l? 
154 O. Ianni, Crisis in Brazi1 (New York, Columbia University 
Press, 1970), pp.187-188. 
155 Moreover, IPES stimulated an extra-awareness of the 'dangers' 
existing in political mobilization. At the time of the enact-
ment of Institutional Act No.5, IPES was busy stirring up the 
fear of political mobilization by bringing to the 'personal know-
ledge' of company directors and csking them to keep in their archives a 
'Summa~J of the present political conjuncture of communist 
pressure among us', produced by IPES. The letters, signed 
cont;' ... 
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by Glycon de Paiva, were sent to, among others, Lojas Americanas, 
Centro Industria de Fosforos de Madeira de Seguranqa, Antonio 
Ga110tti-Light S. A., Gil berto Huber - Listas Telefonicas Brasil-
eiras, Jorge Geyer - Masson, Coca-Cola, Antonio Sanches Ga1deano-
Cia. Estan:lfera do Brasil, Augusto Trajano de Azevedo Antunes-
ICOMI, Artes Graficas Gomes de Souza, Paulo Geyer - Refinaria 
Explora<;:ao Petroleo Uniao, Candido Guin1e de Paula Machado - Cia. 
Docas de Santos, Meta10n S.A. 
IPES Archives, Rio de Janeiro. 
156 As K. Erickson remarked, the Institutional Act 'left no doubt 
about either the low esteem in which the victorious officers 
held the nation's elected representatives or the relationship 
which they intended to maintain with Congress'. K. Erickson, 
on.cit., 1'.153 
157 J. Knippers Black, op.cit., 1'1'.76-77: Brazil: Election Factbook, 
op.cit., 1'.37. 
158 The governatures of the states remained a focus of traditional 
power. Nevertheless, IPES affiliates made inroads into this 
area as well, while central government, by eventually establish-
ing.a centralized federative republic which substituted the 
preceding federal system, took the sting out of the governors, 
at least for a while. 
159 
160 
161 
See also Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos, Dovernadores-Po1iticos, 
Governadores-Tecnicos, Governadores-Militares', in DADOS No.8 -
Instituto Universitario de Pesquisas do Rio de Janeiro, 1971, 
1'1'.123-128. 
IPES members also masterminded the scheme to turn the states of 
Rio de Janeiro and Guanabara into a 'super-state', by the fusion 
of their administrations. A Work Group 'Rio de Janeiro-Guanabara' 
Has created at IPES. lPES had the 'pleasure of seeing its 
studies and preliminary work utilized as a contribution tofue 
basic planning of the government goals of the Administration 
Raymundo Padilh~, of the state of Rio de Janeiro. 
The 1'!ork Group and its head, Joao Duvivier Goulart, were put at 
the disposal of municipal, regional and state authorities for 
their respective projects. The Work Group Has to remain an 
'auxiliary tecnical assistantship' to the governor of Rio de 
Janeiro. 
Letter from J. Duvivier Goulart to Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, Rio 
de Janeiro, i,lay 3rd, 1971 - PAR Archive, Rio de Janeiro. 
As co-ordinator of the planning of the Plan for Development of 
Governor Padilha was cppointed Paulo de Assis Ribeiro, who Has 
also in charge of the planning of the administration, supported 
by a task team of IPSS. See '10 Bncontro Governo Padilha -
Em1'resas' in IPES Archives Rio de Janeiro. 
Luiz Alberto Bahia, 'Contexto PolItico e Modelos Economicos' , 
Lecture - IPES Archives. 
E. Bones, 'Golbery Poder e Silencio', in Coojornal Porto Alegre, 
September 1978. 
162 IPES CO November 8th, 1966 - General Herrera. 
163 O'Donnell, Corporatism ..• , op.cit., pp.61-62 
164 O'Donnell, Corporatism •.• , op.cit., pp.57-60 • 
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There are several conclusions to be drawn from the empirical 
evidence presented in this thesis, and some methodological, theore-
tical and political implications, which are worth briefly mentioning. 
It is important to stress at the outset that these observations 
are concerned primarily with the change of the Brazilian regime in 
1964 and the imposition of a new state in its aftermath, and not 
with so-called 'bureaucratic-authoritarian states' in general. l 
Generalizations about these states .reqliire comparative research. 2 
Among the immediately striking observations to be made are 
two which have a bearing on the recent historiography of Brazil. 
The first observation refers to the political involvement of the 
entrepreneurs and the ~ua1ity of their organization and action, 
which was by any standards very high. 
The second observation centres on the take-over of the state admini-
stration and the policy-making apparatus by the entrepreneurs and 
techno-entrepreneurs of IPES. 
A mistaken CBsumption which has permeated the politico-historical 
literature on Brazil for at least the last 20 years is that of the 
traditional lack of political interest of the entrepreneursJ and 
their conformity to the designs of professional politicians and 
civil servants. This, in turn, was thought of as being one of the 
characteristics of the 'independent' populist state. Received 
wisdom had it that entrepreneurs did not occupy the posts within 
government, although their interests were nevertheless expected to 
be accommodated. The class power of the industrialists and bankers 
was$sumed to be mediated mainly through the political action of 
politicians and bureaucrats, and transposed into civil authority 
by proxy. Consequently, the focus of pol'itical and academic atten-
tion was on -the politicians, at the expense of the study of the direct 
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~olitical involvement by the entrepreneurs. This lack of attention. 
on the political praxis of the entrepreneurs has in turn reinforced 
the prevailing myth that industrialists and bankers had a 'natural' 
horror of involvement in political matters. 
Such a view is in need of severe qualifications. The politicians 
were certainly the mediators of power between society and state in 
the political system previous to 1964. However, despite the obvious 
role played by the politicians in the quasi-pluralist populist 
polity, there are several points which have been consistenly over-
looked. For one, many of the most influential politicans, party 
leaders and state governors were entrepreneurs themselves, entre-
preneurial influence being one of the main springboards for their 
becoming politicians at all. 
Another qualification which has to be made is that although both 
professional politicians and politically active entrepreneurs loomed 
large in the populist period, the inner circles of the various admini-
strations from Vargas onwards were predominantly composed of indus-
trialists and bankers.4 
Furthermore, one could even argue from the empirical evidence that 
entrepreneurs have regularly occupied the key economic policy and 
decision-making centres and agencies of the State, and that this 
tendency was strongly enhanced by the creation of the 'parallel 
administration' during the Kubitschek government and the existence 
of bureaucratic-entrepreneurial rings. Meanwhile, the private indus-
trial production and managerial affairs of the entrepreneurs have 
been run by administrative and technical experts, who were the 
executives of Brazilian capitalism. For the Brazilian entrepreneurs, 
politics has been intrinsically part of their business.5 
Traditional analyses of the peri'~ which the thesis has 
?rj+ 
focused upon rave stressed the 'exhaustion' of the 'easy' stages 
of 'import-substitution', the 'political decay' of the system and 
the disintegration of public consensus in order to explain the 
crisis of the early 1960s. 6 
The emergence of a modernizing cluster of officers at the ESG and 
Goulart's ' violation' of hi s role as an arbiter by becoming identi-
fied with the avantgarde of a section of the population, with the 
remainder of the social body 'feeling itself tobethreatened' have 
been considered to be contributing factors of instability.? 
Such analyses have interpreted the military intervention of April 
1964 as a response to the impasse created by structural crisis and 
political decay, an intervention which was spurred by the Armed 
Forces I adoption of the d.octrine of National Security and Development 
of the ESG and their disenchantment with pop~ist politics. 
What has been neglected is the role of the entrepreneurs and techno-
entrepreneurs in the political2adership of events, in the defini-
tion of the policies and tactics employed to face the crisis of 
insubordination described in Chapter IV, and the desire of the 
industrialists and bankers of the multinational and associated 
power bloc to control the state. 
This thesis has attempted to outline the establishment in 
Brazil of a new multinational and~sociated power bloc,8 stressing 
the transformations which occurred in the sphere of economic produc-
tion. It has been argued throughout the thesis that their influence 
on Brazilian society and the state was not a mere reflection of the 
economic supremacy they enjoyed by the early 1960s, as seen in 
Chapter II, but the result of a political struggle waged by the 
vanguard of these new interests. In effect, the new power bloc gave 
rise to an organic elite, and Chapters III and V have sought to 
795 
describe the different stages of their organization for action and 
their efforts to shape both the economy and the polity so as to 
foster their interests and consolidate their expansion. 
Emphasis has been focused upon the early attempts by the new 
interests to free themselves of the control hitherto exercised by 
the populist polity and to press claims of a limited character, 
through the formation of techno-entrepreneurial agencies and a 
parallel administration. The thesis has also ~cused upon those new 
organizations such as CONCLAP and lBAD which~serted the autonomy 
of the newly formed multinational and associated bloc, though still 
wi thin the old populist framework. 
These organizations were superseded in their political significance 
by the formation~ lPES, a class organization whiCh encompassed 
the organic elite of the new power bloc, and which expressed the 
integral philosophy behind the multinational and aS30ciated industrial 
and banking interests. 9 
Finally, the thesis has been concerned with the action through which 
the organic elite of the new power bloc disrupted the established 
regime and the form in which it took over the state. In other 
words, the thesis has been an attempt to show the organization for 
action and the political praxis of (what proved itself to be) the 
leading power bloc of the dominant classes. The capacity for leader-
ship of the multinational and associated interests was shown by 
their ability to stimulate a wide assortment of sectors against the 
regime and the subordinate classes, both under cover and in an open 
manner. Through lPES the new power bloc mobilized the dominant 
classes for action and served as the nexus for the various military-
civilian conspiracies against Gouart. Their action&fferentiates 
the class movement which led to April 1st from a mere military coup. 
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The political involvement of the multinational and associated 
entrepreneurs was exemplified by their success in engaging the 
support of those economically subaltern fractions which made up 
the populist industrial-oligarchic bloc. The need of the multi-
national and associated interests to encompass the industrial-
oligarchic bloc was urgent on two basic counts. First, the industrial-
oligarchic bloc was$ill politically predominant, through their 
influence in the national and regional parties, the media and the 
state governments. Politicians and state governors were extremely 
useful not only in containing the mobilization of the working 
classes attempted by the Executive and the labour-left but also in 
the counter-mobilization of the middle classes and segments of the 
working classes, as seen in Chapter VII. 
Furthermore, political parties and state governors were efficient 
in blocking the Executive's policies through Congress and the state 
legislatures, as seen in Chapter VII. Finally, politicians and 
state governors were also influential for their contact with the 
rank and file members of the military opposition to Goulart who 
were outside the influence of the ESG. 
A reason for engaging the participation of subaltern economic 
interests was to dilute what would otherwise have been an over-
obvious presence of multinational interests in the campaign opposing 
Goulart and his national-reformist government. Such a situation 
would have made them extremely vulnerable to attack from the left. 
With the insertion a multinational and associated demands within a 
broader modernizing-conservative framework, which included the widest 
spectrum possible of the dominant classes, and with some 'popular' 
backing furnished by the mobilized middle classes, mainly through 
female organizations and such tame labour groups as the MSD, the 
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labour-left lost its clearly defined object of opposition. It meant 
that military intervention could then be legitimated in the name 
of the 'people'. 
The most important form of political action, however, exer-
cised by the entrepreneurs and techno-entrepreneurs and which has 
consistently been underemphasized in past studies of the political 
conjuncture of the early::J;/60s, was the campaign directed by IPES 
against the Executive and the labour-left. The organic elite, 
under the cover of IPES, confronted the Executive in constant poli-
tical battles, harassing it and succeeding in narrowing the scope 
of the government's political space for manoeuvre, while preparing 
a strategic military strike at the heart of the regime. Both state 
and society were transformed into a battleground. The policies 
and techniques used in the campaign to disrupt Goulart's regime and 
bringroout military intervention resembled closely those which 
became known after the experience of Chile in 1973, by a memorable 
euphemism: 'destabilization,.lO 
The dominant classes, under the leadership of the multinational 
and associated bloc, fought, as seen in Chapters VI, VII and VIII, 
an ideological and politico-military campaign on many different 
fronts, through a series of class institutions and organizations, 
many of which were part and parcel of the populist polity. Some 
of these institutions and organizations were exclusively controlled 
and occupied by the dominant classes, such as the entrepreneurial 
class associations. others, however, were agencies and institutions 
through which the dominant classes sought to assure their hegemony, 
although they did not have total control over them. Among these 
institutionsmd agencies of 'civil society', where dominant class 
power was exercised and also contested by other classes, were the 
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educational system, the cultural, social and sport clubs, the 
Catholic Church, the professional$sociations and the trade unions. 
lPES also made significant inroads into large sections of the 
state ~paratus, such as the middle and senior ranking officers of 
the Armed Forces, military police, influential individuals and the 
bureaucratic-entrepreneurial rings within the state administration 
which Goulart had inherited from the previous governments. lPES 
also managed to exert its influence with members of the political 
bureaucracies of the state, such as the pelegos. lPES actually 
kindled the political struggle of the dominant classes and raised 
the level of class struggle to the point of military confrontation, 
for which the working classes and their allies were not prepared 
at all. lPES called the bluff of the government's military dispositivo, 
of Brizzola's Gr~os de Onze Companheiros and of the purported 
political muscle of the Frente de Hobilizacao Popular by clever 
instrumentalization of the Armed Forces. 
The harm created by~e 'alarm and despondency' campaign instigated 
by lPES coupled ~dth the help given them by professionals in private 
occupations and in the state apparatus itself slowed down the running 
of the regime and resulted in a vast collective enterprise to pro-
duce disruption, which was crucial in allowing military interventors 
to act as restorers of order. 
Finally, IPES served as a focus for the intervention of private 
multinational corporations, both as individual companies and through 
their class associations outside and inside Brazil. lPES also 
served as a 'linkage group' for foreign governments, in particular 
that of the United States.ll The pressures of multinational corpora-
tions and those exerted by the US government, together with the 
accumulated effects of external conservative intervention such as 
the joint Brazilian-American teams to programme development had 
a devastating effect on the Brazilian government. 
799 
The political autonomy and initiative shown by the entrepren-
eurs described in this thesis shows that they were not blind traeger 
(bearers) of the process of domination, but were politically aware 
forces who made the conquest of state power the aim of their politi-
cal planni~ and action.12 It should be noted that the unprecedented 
efforts of the entrepreneurs were carried out primarily through the 
exercise of their class power,lJ although class action was 
ultimately realized and sanctioned by the force of the coer-
cive state apparatus.14 The idea of an 'amorphous' dominant class, 
without consciousness of its own interests, which therefore had 
to be 'led'by the state in the critical conjuncture of the early 
1960s, or the vision of an 'underdeveloped' entrepreneurial class, 
who in the absence of an enlightened ruling class had to be 
directed by a technically prepared military force or by an effi-
cient techno-bureaucratic 'elite' grafted onto the dominant 
class, does not stand the evidence of a close study of entrepren-
eurial political action. 
The dominant classes were led by a vanguard basically composed 
of their own kind, the organic elite operating through IPES. They 
were the organized leadership of the class, those who made 'the 
perfecting of the illusions of the class about itself' a central 
activity, together with providing the dominant power bloc with a 
strategy and tactics for action. They were an integral, organic 
part of the emerging power bloc, not least because 'they themselves 
belonged economically to the dominant classes; they were intellec-
tuals and political organizers and at the same time heads of 
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enterprises, big landowners or administrators of big estates, com-
mercial entrepreneurs and industrialists,.15 
This true elite of the dominant classes took charge of the 
most general affaires d'etat. They preserved the state's capitalist 
nature, a task which involved severe restrictions in the autonomous 
organization of the working classes, and the consolidation~ a 
pattern of growth which has been called profundizacion,16 Le., the 
deepening of a type of late, dependent, uneven, but also extensively 
industrialized capitalism, with an~onomy mainly directed towards 
a high degree of concentration of ownership::in industry, and integra-
tion with banking.17 
The double-pronged aim of lPES to ensure profundizacion and to 
restrain the labour force, was coupled with another objective which 
was both a requisite for the development of multinational and asso-
ciated interests and the exclusion of the industrial-oligarchic 
populist bloc. This objective was the overhaul of the bureaucratic 
structure of the state and the imposition of specific restrictions 
on political life in general. 
Once in power, the multinational and associated industrial and 
banking power bloc, in seeking a redefinition of the criteria of 
inclusion/exclusion in the polity18 did not limit its attention to 
the working classes alone. 19 The multinational and associated power 
bloc imposed a new relationship between the state, the dominant 
classes and itself, which entailed the rejection of the populist 
industrial-oligarchic bloc and of its mechanisms of class represen-
tation and control. The new power bloc rejected the previous poli-
tical order and sought to establish a techno-entrepreneurial polity, 
protected and butressed by the Armed Forces, a polity in which the 
poli ticians were t.O become ancillary and in the process were to lose 
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their central roles. 
The new relationship between the state, the dominant classes 
and the leading multinational and associated power bloc, allowed 
IPES to shape the process of economic modernization. 20 The bureau-
cratic entrepreneurial rings were consolidated. Economic groups 
who did not belong to the multinational and associated industrial 
and banking power bloc were excluded from central policy-making 
21 processes. 
The overlap of industrial and banking personnel occupying 
the key positions of economic policy-making, their common membership 
or close relationship to lPES, and their public roles as cabinet 
ministers and top bureaucrats allowed lPES to perform $ a true 
mediator of power, i.e., as a political and ideological agent which 
was part both of the dominant classes and of the State. 22 
The occupation of the economic policy-making agencies by IPES 
entrepreneurs and techno-entrepreneurs amountedm effect to the 
'privatization' of the state's institutions,2J i.e., it opened up 
institutional areas of the state to the exclusive representation 
of certain organized private interests. This had to be legitimated 
in one way or another, for not even a prepared and powerful~ganici 
elite as that of lPES, with the support of the ESG officers, could 
operate an economic system so openly biased in favour of the multi-
national and associated fractions without presenting a vulnerable 
political and ideological position which could readily be exploitad 
by the discordant voices among the dominant classes and among the 
military. The formula which 2gitimated the control of economic 
policy-making by lPES was that of the 'technocratic' polity, in 
which technically equipped bureaucrats, the so-called tecnicos, were 
responsible for rational decision-making. 
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'Technocratic rationality' in policy-making excluded by defini-
tion political considerations which were equated with petty interests 
and pressures. The 'technocratic' features of the polity, namely 
the absence of open discussion and public responsibility of the 
decision-makers effectively worked against those fractions of the 
dominant classes not related to IPES. Likewise, the 'technocratic' 
nature of state decision-making was congruent with the total exclu-
sion~ the popular sectors. The technocratic ethos befitted the 
image of the two 'rational' elements in poliby-making among civilians 
and military. These were the so-called tecnicos charting economic 
development, with their counterparts in the Armed Forces, i.e., the 
officers of the ESG steering the political helm~ the state and 
providing security. 'National Security and Development', the motto 
of the ESG, became the motto of the new State •. The tecnicos and the 
ESG officers were purportedly united in government onrocount of 
their supposed endowments, their unemotional, apolitical, apartisan 
ideology.24 The 'technocratic' image had the same function of 
legitimation and generalization~ particular demands and interests 
as the idea of 'development' had had during the Kubitschek period. 25 
Both 'development' and 'technocratism' appealed to expectations, 
although both labels served to blur the identification ~ the main 
beneficiaries of the process, in both cases multinational and asso-
ciated interests. The one difference, t~ough, was that the idea 
of 'development' under Kubitschek served to foster hegemonic aspira-
tions of the dominant classes vis-a-vis the subordinate classes, 
i.e., it involved active political life in the quest toatain a 
national goal of development. 'Technocratism', on the other hand, 
referred not to a goal, but to the ways in which decisions were 
taken about sooio-economic objectives rot open to discussion. 26 
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'Technocratism', which was assumed as an ideological veil by the 
new state established in 1964, sanctioned an important aspect of 
reality, i.e., the restrictions imposed on political life by the 
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new rul~ng power bloc. 
Although policy-making was handled by the entrepreneurs and 
techno-entrepreneurs of the organic elite, a body of literature 
has tended to portray the occupants of positions of power in~e 
state as tecnicos, emphasizing~eir lack of economic interests 
and their 'neutrality' inthe process of policy-formation and decision-
making. The analytical dichotomy between entrepreneurs (or techno-
entrepreneurs) and tecnicos seems to have stemmed from a lack of 
simple empirical research into the strong business connections of 
the tecnicos as well as from assumptions which too readily ascribed 
the rather arbitrary degree of 'technocrat' to entrepreneurs on 
account of their specialization in various sectors of business. 28 
The study of the dominant c1asses-for-themse1ves, in action, exercis-
ing their class power, showing their political will and their class 
consciousness has been severely neglected, with noteworthy exceptions.29 
Instead, the Armed Forces and in particular the ESG as its ideological 
centre have been focused upon~ agents of change, while the bureau-
cracy through a core of tecnic~ have been singled out as the agents 
of nation-bui1ding.)0 Moreover, the projection of the state and 
the minimization of the role of~e industrialists and bankers could 
be regarded as one of the outcomes of the emphasis placed on the 
automonous or sub-systemic nature of the Armed Forces and the techno-
bureaucracy.)l 
Furthermore, the Bonapartist intervention of the military has been 
assumed to be the basic model for the interpretation of coups in 
Latin America, and in particular that of Brazi1.)2 The Bonapartist 
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state of exception of post-1964 was perceived as a military-bureau-
cratic apparatus which took power against popular unrest and was 
supported by the fear of the middle classes, rather than acting on 
'behalf' of the peasantry as had been the case of the original 
Bonapartist state.33 What the Brazilian case was assumed to have 
in common with the original Bonapartist state was that the military-
bureaucratic apparatus took power in spite of the dominant classes 
in order to command the state, so that the interests of the whole 
of the dominant classes could rule. The perception of the post-1964 
state as Bonapartist was reinforced by the belief in the 'relative' 
autonomy of the exceptional state, which according to Nicos foulantzas 
needs relative autonomy to 'reorganize hegemony and the power bloc,.34 
As it happened, it was the IPES-led power bloc which reorganized 
the state, and under the control of the organic elite attempted to 
consolidate their position. 
With the dominant classes hypostatized in the state, the latter 
became the object of research instead of what seemed to be 'state 
absentee' industrialists and bankers. state and classes were per-
ceived as paired externalities, 3.5 and . soc ia 1 groups were 
supposed to compete for the favours of the administrative and largely 
'independent' bureaucratic-authoritarian apparatus of state, charted 
by tecnicos and steered by military officers. 36 As Cardoso pointed 
out, social scientists launched themselves 'a la recherche de l'etat 
perdu', a sort of Estado Tecno-burocastrense (military and techno-
bureaucratic state) exercising a supervisionary role over the domin-
ant classes as well as acting for its own sake. 37 
By generally overemphasizing the leading role of the Armed Forces 
and the strategic function of the 'techno-bureaucracy' at the expenre 
of the presence and activity of the entrepreneurs in national politics, 
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several important issues and questions, such as the notion of a 
ruling class or ruling power bloc, were explained away, while~di-
tiona1~fficulties were raised inatempts to understand the problems 
of interest articulation and class representation in the state. 
The state itself'was clad in the clothes of metaphysical 'relative 
autonomy'. Overlooked was the fact that authoritarianism pre-empted 
social responsibilities and ~olitical accountability of the state, 
while the technocratic features of the regime legitimated the control 
of the economic-administrative state apparatus by IPES and ensured 
the exclusion a the industrial-oligarchic bloc. Thus a nonsense 
was made of one of the basic factors for the concealment of class 
instrumentality~ the state, i.e., the state's representation a 
the general interests. 
• 
The state expressed then the supremacy and political unity of the 
IPES-led ruling power bloc.J8 From a structural point of view, 
the Brazilian state was the true 'condensate of relations of power', 
of which Poulantzas speaks, between struggling classes and between 
contending fractions. The level of class struggle in Brazil in 
the particular political conjuncture of the early 1960s accounted for 
the 'technocratic' -a.uthori tarian nature of the' condensate' of relations of 
power and the conflict between the IPES-led power bloc and the 
industrial-oligarchic bloc. In other words, the state then repre-
sented both the relation of force between those excluded from poli-
tical participation tout court-hence its authoritarianism -, and 
the relation of force between those interests excluded from repre-
sentation at the top and the power bloc led by lEES, conditioned 
by the dynamics of the technocratic polity. 
The widespread presence which lEES established infue state 
apparatus, their privileged position in civil society, their control 
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over a predominant part of the means of material production, and 
their repression of opposition, present some food for thought 
vis-a-vis the notion and political reality of a ruling class (or, 
for that matter, of a ruling power bloc or ruling fraction). 
The widespread _p res en c e of IPES entrepreneurs and techno-
entrepreneurs in the state apparatus also helps to qualify the rather 
sceptical views which have been cast upon the possibilities of 
actually ascertaining their existence. 39 
The class bias of the Brazilian state post-1964 has been studied 
both on~count of its fulfilment of political and economic require-
ments for the development· of the capitalist mode of production and 
on~count of the strength and influence which the dominant economic 
interests are able to wield by virtue of their ownership and control 
of material and other resources. 40 
However, as seen in Chapter IX, these multinational and associated 
industrial and banking interests were not obliged to exert pressure 
'from outside' as it were, on the state's actions and policies. 
The process of economic policy-making and of decision-making was 
carried out both inside and outside the state by the IPES-led ruling 
power bloc, who did not require intermediaries, for they were the 
very mediators of power. In other words, the class bias of the 
state was determined not only by the structural constraints, which 
in themselves amounted to an objective and impersonal dimension of 
class instrumentalizaion/~l but by the recruitment of the personnel 
located in the commanding heights of the state. Those individuals 
in the executive, administrative, judicial, legislative, repressive 
and coercive branches of the state apparatus were largely of the 
same class as the entrepreneurs and techno-entrepreneurs who commanded 
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the private sector of the economic life of Brazil.42 
The state was anchored to the designs of IPES activists who took 
care of the problems of policy-cohesion. Although tactical differ-
ences did occur (and one is hard put to find any social group without 
internal differences), they occurred within a specific and fairly 
narrow spectrum, and so allowed IPES to be influential throughout 
the 1970s. There is, however, scope for further research into the 
role of lPES after 1964, into the power distribution:between the 
different fractions and sub-groups comprising the IPES-led power 
bloc. 
Not only did the new state established in 1964 act on behalf 
of the multinational and associated industrial and banking power 
bloc, but it acted at the behest of the ruling power bloc organized 
by IPES. The state of 1964 was indeed a class state and above all 
a state ruled by a power bloc. By the same token of its subjection 
to~e personal control of an IPES-led ruling bloc, the state was 
largely outside the sphere of influence of the dominant classes as 
a whole, while enjoying total autonomy from the subordinate classes, 
thus emphasizing the need to qualify the assertions about the rela-
tive autonomy of the state in Brazil. 
To sum up, lPES represented in organic form the power of multinational 
and associated interests, with a strategic vision which transcended 
narrow interests of individual corporations or coteries and which 
was able to formulate policies 1'lhich benefited the whole bloc. 
It is important to stress that organizational capacities playa 
pivotal role in understanding class struggle and social change, 
for class struggle is a struggle over the very existence of organized 
classes before it is a struggle between organized classes.4J To 
the extent that the dominant classes could achieve the transformation 
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of what Olin Wright calls their 'structural capacities' into organi-
zational capacities, the multinational and associated power bloc 
was capable of containing the pervasive contradictions of the 
Brazilian state and to take it over. 
What happened in Brazil, on April 1st, 1964, revealed that the most 
obvious and perhaps therefore, the most easily overlooked fact 
concerns the notion of class struggle. According to Miliband, 
'assuming one may ignore the view that the class struggle is the 
result of "extremist" propaganda and agitation, there remains the 
fact that the left is rather prone to a perspective according to 
which the class struggle is something waged by the workers and the 
subordinate classes against the dominant ones. It is of course that. But 
class struggle also means, and often ,means first of all, the struggle 
waged by the dominant class, and the state ac~ing on its behalf, 
against the workers and the subordinate classes. By definition, 
struggle is not a one-way process; but it is just as well to empha-
size that it is actively waged by the dominant class or classes, 
and in many ways much more effectively waged by them than the strug~e 
waged by the subordinate classes. ,44 From the evidence provided 
in this thesis, one has to concur with Hiliband in this respect. 
HO''fever, the crucial observation to be made, contrary to another 
generalization offered by Iuliband, is that class struggle was 
waged by the multinational and~sociated bloc led by IPES in 'civil 
society' within a particular strategy, with specific and deliberate 
foci of action and with elaborate lead.ership and organization. 
That military intervention was finally called upon to deal the deci-
sive blow to the Goulart government only highlighted the fact that 
'the dominant class, under the protection of the state, had vast 
resources, immeasurably greater than the resources of the subordinate 
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classes, to bring its own weight to bear on "civil society". ,45 
To conclude, one could say that the political and ideological 'pre-
history' of big industrial and banking multinational and associated 
interests was interwoven with that of the populist historical bloc 
and with its ruling class convergence. The multinational and asso-
ciated power bloc's own history 'began' with April 1st, 1964 when 
the new interests actually 'became state', overhauling the polity 
and reshaping the economy to suit their purposes. In doing this, 
they brought Brazil, and, one might venture to say, by proxy the 
southern cone of Latin America into the world-wide stage of mono-
politistic capitalist development. 
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Footnotes - Chapter X 
1 For generalizations about the bureaucratic-authoritarian state 
see Guillermo O'Donnel, 'Corporatism and the Question a the 
state' in James 11. Halloy, Authoritarianism and Corporatism in 
Latin America (Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh University Press, 1977). 
2 To what extent is the Brazilian~erience relevant for other 
Latin American countries, Are similar patterns of entrepren-
eurial class action found elsewhere? For one, IPES had sister 
organizations and counterparts throughout Latin America and 
even in the United states. Also, as seen earlier on, there 
is some indication that the 'Brazilian model' was employed in 
other countries. The case of Allende's downfall and the climate 
of economic disaster and social convulsion which was stimulated 
during his presidency certainly bear close resemblance to the 
Brazilian experience. Ambassador Kourry, ,-rho served in Chile, 
went as far as asserting that the techniques employed in Brazil 
were used in Chile ten years later with devastating effect. 
Horeover, local and foreign entrepreneurs belonging to the 
Council for Latin America were engaged by 1970 in Uruguay, in 
activities similar to' those carried out in Brazil, namely 
a 'business-suPIl0rted publicity campaign against the extremists:. 
Horeover, ~ntre:preneurs we r e :p art· of 'an Uruguayan-US 
committee of businessmen which acted as volunteer adviser to 
President Pacheco Areco'. Furthermore, ~ year later, IPES 
leaders were involved in the downfall of President Torres of 
Bolivia, while Council for Latin America 'stockholders' were 
involved in ~ublicity' campaigns in Argentina. 
see The Report to Stockholders - The Council for Latin America 
Report Vol.6 No.2, January 1970, New York, page 8. 
3 Most industrialists and bankers were sup:posed to be preoccu:pied 
with or submerged in their immediate business problems, and 
thus, it was assumed, had little intellectual or practical 
inclination to devote themselves to tasks which seemed extran-
eous or possibly harmful to their entre:preneurial goals. The 
belief in the political passivity of the Brazilian entre:preneurs 
has been forwarded in particular by Riordan Roett, Brazil: 
Politics in a Patrimonial Society (Boston, Allyn & Bacon, 1972), 
:p:p.126-130. 
4 The entrepreneurial classes have held through their successive 
organic intellectuals the reins of power with a strong political 
and ideological grip. Hhenever a new configuration of power 
relations pointed to the possible establishment of a relatively 
autonomous state, as in 1945, 1954, or 1964, the entre:preneurial 
order intervened in one form or another to restore its firm srray 
over the political machinery of authority and force. 
Even Joao Goulart did not dispense initially with important 
entrepreneurial figures, such as banker Moreira Salles (purport-
edly im:posed upon Goulart, as part of the compromise of 1961 
when he assumed the presidency); Nei.Galvau, a banker and 
industrialist; Carvalho Pinto, a banker; Santiago Dantas, an 
oil industrialist with Copebras (A.F. Torre~ E. Caio da Silva 
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Prado, Angus C. Littlejohn) - Columbian Carbon Co-USA/Celatino 
S.A. _ Panama/Celanese Corp. of America/Traders Inc.-Panama; 
Jorge Serpa, a director of Manne ssman, the German Steel complex; 
and Renato Costa Lima, representing interests in the coffee 
sector, to mention but a few. 
There is certainly need to research further into the political 
options open to multinational and associated interests, through 
the person of santiago Dantas and the reason for their 'rejection' of him. 
Furthermore, in research carried out by Carlos Hasenbalg and 
Clovis Brigagao, in relation to the political participation of 
the bourgeoisie between 1955 and 1968, it was found that from 
a total of 132 central public offices occupied by entrepreneurs, 
the bankers had 56 posts against L!-6 of industrialists and 27 of 
merchants. Out of a total of 9 Finance Iunisters, 6 were 
bankers. Out of 36 directors of t.he Banco do Brasil 16 were 
bankers, as well as 22 of the 34 executives of SUHOC and officials 
of the Central Bank. In C. Hasenbalg and C. Brigagao, 'Forma9ao 
do Empresario Financeiro no Brasil' in DADOS No.8 1971, pp.79-l 03, 
IUPERJ, Rio de Janeiro. 
There is need for further study of the interplay between entre-
preneurs and political entrepreneurs and between them and pro-
fessional politicians in policy-making prior to 1964. On the 
political role of the entrepreneurs, see Quentin Hoare and 
Geoffrey Nowell-Smith, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of 
Antonio Gramsci (London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1973), p.260. 
See A. stepan, The Hili tary in politics (Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 1971), Chapters 6 and 7; T. Skidmore, Politics 
in Brazil (Oxford, O:;d'ord Uni"ersity Press, 1969), Chapters 
VII and VIII; R. Schneider, The Political System of Brazil 
(New York, Columbia University Press, 1971), Chapter I. 
Geor~es-Andre Fiechter, Brazil since 1964 (London, Hacmillan, 
1975), pp.9, 28-29. 
On the concept of power bloc see N. Poulantzas, Political Power 
and Social Classes (London, l~, 1975), pp.24l-242. 
The argument is based on the methodological criteria of A. Gramsci, 
as presented in Quentin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith, op.cit., 
pp.175-l85; Antonio Gramsci, NaQ,uiavel, A Pol1.tica e 0 Estado 
Moderno(Rio de Janeiro, Civiliza9ao Brasileira, 1968), p.6l. 
See Godfrey Hodgson and Willian Shawcross, 'Destabilisation' in 
The Sunday Times, October 24, 1975, pp.15-l6. 
The notion of 'linkage groups' as employed by Karl Deutsch refers 
to groups within the domestic polity which have particular ties 
with the international environment. See Jan Knippers Black, 
rrnit8d States Penetration of Brazil (Nanchester jy!anchester 
University press, 1977), pp.59-63. ' 
••• a political movement ••• (is) a movement of the class, with 
the object of enforcing its interests~ a general form, in a 
form possessing general, socially coercive forces' - Karl Marx, 
in Letter to Bolte, November 23, 1871, concerning the Gotha 
programme, as quoted by N. poulantzas, Political ••• , op.cit., 
p.l07. 
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For R. Miliband class power is the 'general and pervasive 
power which a dominant class (assuming for the purpose of expo-
sition that there is only one) exercises in order to maintain 
and defend its predominance in 'civil society'. This class 
power is exercised through many institutions and agencies. Some 
of these are primarily designed for ~~e purpose, e.g. political 
parties of the dominant class, interest and pressure groups, etc. 
Others may not be specifically designed for the purpose, yet may 
serve it, e.g. churches, schools, the family. But whether 
designed for the purpose or not, they are the institutions and 
agencies through which the dominant class seeks to assure its 
'hegemony'. R. Miliband, Marxism and Politics (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1979), pp.54-55. 
For N. Poulantzas, in Political ••• , op.cit., pp.l04-l07, power 
is 'the capacity' of a social class to realize its specific 
objective interests'. The notion of power is related to the 
field of 'class' practices, having a particular reference to 
the analysis of class organizations. Its frame of reference 
is the field of class struggle of a society divided into classe's. 
For the notion of 'interests', 'objective interests' and ~lass 
interests', see N. Poulantzas, idem., pp .109-113 and Erik Olin 
Wright, Class Crisis s,nd the state (London, N113, 1978), pp.87-88. 
By such action, the state apparatus performed as a strategic 
and historically prepared class power. For the notion of the 
state as prepared class power (previously deployed and consoli-
dated), see Q. Hoare and G. Nowell-Smith, op.cit., p.217. 
One has to remember, though,that State power 'is the main and 
ultimate, but not the only means whereby class power is assured 
and maintained'. See R. r·1iliband, 'Poulantzas and the Capitalist 
State', ~~R No.82, London, 1973, p.86 and N. Poulantzas, ~he 
Capitalist State: a Reply to !uliband and Lac1au' in 1~ No.95, 
London, 1976, pp.72-76. ---
15 A. Gramsci, Antologia (Hexico, Siglo XXI, 1970), p.71 i A. Gramsci, 
Notas sobre f.1a uiavelo sobre politica sobre el Estado Hoderno 
Buenos Aires, Editor Lautaro, 19 2 , p.325. -
16 G. O'Donnell, op.cit., pp.48, 64. 
17 One of the indicators of the process of integration was that 
from 1962 to 1967 the number of directors of industrial enter-
prises for the whole of Brazil dropped from 48,000 to 40,000, 
while the number of individual enterprises actually grew by 
several thousands. See BANAS, 40.000 no Comando da ~conomia 
Brasileira, Vo1.I, 1968-1969, Introduction. 
18 On 'exclusion politics' see F. Parkin, Harxism and Class Theory 
(London, Tavistock, 1979). 
19 The threat posed to the dominant classes by the mobilization of 
urban and rural working classes resulted inthere-establishment 
after April 1st, 1964 of strong cont~ol links with the popular 
sectors, underlining the authoritarian character of the new 
state, and a further 'penetration' of the State into civil 
society. On the notion of 'penetration' see O'Donnell and his 
notion of the authOritarian-bureaucratic states - in O'Donnell 
, op.cit!, p.48 
~_'V\+ / 
8lJ 
However, the quasi-corporatist relationship of the dominant 
classes with the popular sectors through the new bureaucratic-
authoritarian state entailed not the controlled incorporation 
of the urban working classes, which had been the practice of 
Vargas and his successors, but the political and economic e~­
clusion tout court of the popular sectors. The stifling of 
the corporate and political expression of the industrial and 
rural working classes was the foundation of the 'new order' 
and of 'social peace', and a pre-requisite to 'national security 
and development'. The new power bloc implemented a strategy of 
domination of the subordinate classes in accordance with the 
doctrine of National Security and Development of the Superior 
War College, which had as one of its basic tenets the unavoidable 
recreation of the equation 'elite-masses'. The demands and 
needs of the htter were,in this doctrine, to be interpreted by 
the 'elite', ascribing to the masses a permanent intermediary 
in the form of the State. 
On control of the working class after 1964, see Kenneth S. Mericle, 
'Corporatist Control of the Working Class: Authoritarian Brazil 
since 1964', in Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin 
America, edited by James M. r~loy, op.cit., Pp.JOJ-JJ8. 
20 As seen in Chapter IX, at the centre of the institutionalized 
exclusion of subaltern economic interests was the Ninistry of 
Planning, which was an outright IPES preserve. It was this 
Ministry which was in charge of co-ordinating and overviewing 
the different functions of the State apparatus, setting out 
socio-economic policy guidelines for the post-1964 government. 
It was under the guidance of the Ninistry of Planning that 
the overhaul of the productive and administrative structure of 
the State was carried out. By the nature of the indicative 
planning it carried out, the Ministry of Planning made of the 
State a giant factor of capital accumulation, which benefited 
the multinational and associated bloc. In this respect, the 
Hinistry of Planning was fundamental for its role in the pro-
cess of 'agenda building' and 'mobilization of bias' for the 
policies of modernization, in:D far as the consequences of its 
action have to be evaluated not only in terms of r,hat it openly 
and positively attained and favoured, but also in terms of 
what it prevented from occurring. 
21 Besides the State mechanisms of exclusion, i.e., the institu-
tional means of articulation of interests represented by the 
I1inistries and agencies of government, there were other informal 
links between the entrepreneurs of IPES and the state admini-
stration. IPES itself, which had been created, financed and 
directed by members of the multinational and associated interests 
in order to take over the State, became after 1964 one of the 
major means whereby the members of the ruling power bloc were 
able to carry out research on specific policy-issues and dis-
cussion of general policy, and come to agreement on major socio-
economic and political questions and their solutions. In this 
respect, IPES developed functions which G. William Domhoff has 
called 'consensus-seeking of policy-planning' for the ruling 
power bloc; very similar to such American organizations as the 
Council on Foreign Relations, the Business Council and the Com-
mittee for Economic Development, which, as seen earlier, was 
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actually one of the American counterparts of lEES. 
See G. William Domhoff, 'Social Clubs, Policy-Planning Groups, 
and Corporations: A Network of Ruling Class Cohesiveness' in 
G. William Domhoff, ~d.), 'New Directions in Power StructUre 
Research', The Insurgent SocioJogist, Vol.V No.III, Spring 
1975, p.175. See also Laurence H. Shoup, 'Shaping the Post-
war World: The Council on Foreign Relations and the United 
States vfar Aims during World War Two', in G. William Domhoff, 
(ed.), idem, pp.9-52. 
22 As seen in Chapter IX, lPES was shaped into an effective 'inter-
mediary body' for policy-making, developing a series of channels 
and ways of securing easy communication between the entrepreneurs 
at large, represented by IPES, those entrepreneurs in IPES and 
the public administration. Of course, the lIES entrepreneurs 
took advantage of the informal and very close relationship they 
had with the occupants of public positions. By virtue of both 
their overlapping public roles and their private industrial 
and banking positions~ well as their common background in lEES, 
straightforward informal communication took place between govern-
ment and the leading multinational and associated fraction. 
lPES also developed an intricate network of interaction between 
the 'State and the dominant sectors of civil society, thus 
constituting an exclusive neo-corporatist structure of interest 
articulation, whose locus was not within 'political society' 
as had been the case of the corporatist structures of the 
Estado Novo and of the populist structures of associations 
of interests, but in 'civil society'. Th~s was another level 
in which the objective interpenetration of the state and the 
oligopolistic structure of modern industrial and banking capital-
ism took place, mutually guaranteeing the predictability of 
their future behaviour. In the fulfilment of the functions 
of stabilization and predictability the SNI played a central 
role, by drawing away from naked repression and coercion and 
closer to preventive manipulation and less visible social 
controls. On the role of the SNI, see vlalder de Goes, 0 Brasil 
do General Geisel (Rio de Janeiro, Editora Nova Fronteira, 1978). 
The role of the SNI in policy-mru~ing is an area in need of fur-
ther research. 
See also O'Donnell, Cor~oratism ••• , op.cit., pp.49, 61-64 and 
his notion of 'bi-frontal corporatism'. See also Philippe C. 
Schmitter, 'Still the Century of Corporatism?' in RevieH of 
Politics,36 No.1, January 1974, USA, pp.85-131. 
23 On the notion of 'privatization' of the State, see O'Donnell, 
op.cit., p.i+8. 
24 Flynn, in a recent book vmich repeats the argument of so many 
Brazilianists, reflects this ideological argument about the 
'ESG-tecnico' marriage as the focus of policy-making and the 
lack of political muscle of the businessmen vis-a-vis these 
tecnicos and bureaucrats. See P. Flynn, Brazil: A Political 
Analysis (London, Ernest Benn, 1978), pp.331, 355, 372. 
25 On the idea of development as a source of hegemony, see j,jiriam 
Limoeiro Cardoso, La Ideolog:1.a Dominante (l'le~dco, Siglo ~CCI, 
1975), pp.277-298. 
'" 
26 The exercise of hegemony by a class, power bloc cr fraction 
depends on its capacity to maintain the norms of political 
exclusion, and thus in a certain form to exercise a measure of 
repression. The hegemonic or coercive character of the rule 
of a class is determined by whether such exclusion is imposed 
and recreated by naked force or if it is established - or at 
least recreated - by the ensemble of ideological apparatus of 
state and society. See F. H. Cardoso, Estado e Sociedade no 
Brasil~ F. H. Cardoso (ed.), Autoritarismo e Democratizacao 
(Rio de Janeiro, Paz e Terra, 1975), pp.193-l96. 
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27 The direct imposition of entrepreneurial interests through the 
occupation of the key positions of government and state admini-
stration and the implementation of narrow and exclusive policies 
restrained the space for politics. Moreover, the political 
restrictions imposed upon subordinate classes and subaltern 
socio-economic groups made shambles of the pretense of 'public 
authority' defending general interests, let alone common needs. 
Instead, the authoritarian State with its entrepreneurial bias 
became the true instrument of the dominant classes, totally 
excluding subordinate interests and shaping the character of 
the new class relations, qualifying G.-A. Fiechter's hopes to 
the 'contrary. See G.-A. Fiechter, op.cit., pp.xii-xiii, )4, 212. 
The overwhelming victory which lPES,in particular and the domin-
ant classes as a whole attained against the subordinate classes 
both in State and society also meant that the State was not 
any more the 'arena' of class struggle which it had been during 
the populist period. Instead, the state became the stage where 
conflicting fractions of the dominant classes excluded from the 
ruling bloc adjusted their own differences and their relationship 
with the latter. 
28 See G.-A. Fiechter, op.cit., pp.225, 250; N. Leff, ~conomic 
Policy-Making and Development in Brazil 1947-1964 (London, 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1968), Chapter 11. 
29 Among these exceptions were Eli Diniz, Empre sari 0 , Estado e 
Capitalismo no Brasil: 1930-1964 (Rio de Janeiro, Paz e Terra, 
1978); Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Empresario Industrial e 
Desenvolvimento 3conomico no Brasil (Sao Paulo, DlFEL, 1972); 
F. H. Cardoso, 0 Modelo Pol{tico Brasileiro (Sao Paulo, DlFEL, 
1973); and F. H. Cardoso, Autoritarismo e Democratizacao (Rio 
de Janeiro, Paz e Terra, 1975). 
30 There are various examples of such lines of argument. Alfred 
Stepan in his The Nili tar,y in Politics - Changing Patterns in, 
Brazil searched for the explanation of social change in military 
intervention, the reasons being encapsulated in ideological 
and organizational differentiations. Nathaniel Leff propounded 
a technocratic reason for nation-building in his Economic Policy 
;.raking and Development in Brazil 1947-1964. 
Helio Jaguaribe saw in the state a major driving force of national 
development, in his Political Deye10Ilment - A General Theo'Y'v 
and a Irati n American Case Study. 
Juan J. Linz even constructs his argument on the automony of 
the militarJ - Juan J. Linz,'The Future of an Authoritarian 
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Regime: The Case of Brazil' in A. stepan (ed.), Authoritarian 
Brazil; Orie-ins " Policies - and Future (N e w Haven, Yale 
University Press, 1973), p.2}4. 
The ideological view of the Brazilian state occupied during 
the 1964-1967 period by t~cnicos and supported by a technical 
military rather than just armed bureaucrats has helped to build 
up an image of peculiarity for the Brazilian Armed Forces in 
particular and for the Brazilian state in general which also 
helped to legitimate the new regime. Such an image of singu-
larity has also, almost projected the Brazilian polity beyond 
the realm of traditional social and political sciences and 
reified the state to a large extent, although in time political 
reality (traditional class conflict and social struggle) have 
taken care of demolishing the myth of Brazil's particularity. 
Examples of such emphasis on the techno-bureaucracy and the 
military are respectively Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira, Desen-
vQ,lvimento e Crise no Brasil (Sao Paulo, Ed. Brasiliense, 1973 ), 
and Edmundo Campos Coelho, Em Busca da Identidade: 0 Exercito. 
e a politica na Sociedade Brasileira.(Rio de Janeiro, Forense 
Universitaria, 1976). 
See P. Flynn, op.cit., p.520. 
The Bonapartist coup in the name of the middle classes was 
studied by Jose Nun - 'The Middle Class }ulitary Coup' in 
C. Veliz (ed.), The Politics of Conformity in Latin America 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1967), pp.89-92, 112. See 
also Irving Louis Horowitz, The Hili taI"J Elites' in .61i tes in 
Latin America, edited by Seymour Hartin Lipset and Aldo Solari 
(Oxford, Oxford Universiiy Press, 1967), pp.146-189. 
S.ee T. dos Santos, Socialismo 0 b'ascismo: Dilema Latinoamericano 
(Santiago de Chile, Ediciones Prensa Latinoamericana, 1969), 
chapters VIII and IX; Alain Rouquie, 'L'hypothese Bonapartiste 
et l'emergence des syst~mes politiques semi-competitifs' in 
Revue francaise de science poli tigue, Xi.V (6), December 1975, 
pp.1077-1111; C. Furtado, 'De la Republica Oligarquica al 
Estado Hilitar, in J .C. Bernadet et ale (eds.), Brasil Hoy 
(Mexico, Siglo XXI, 1968), pp.21-24; H. Jaguaribe, 'Brasil-
Estabilidad Social por el Colonial Fascismo' in Brasil Hoy, op.cit., 
pp.44-53; Guy Hermet, 'Dictature Bourgeoise et Modernisation 
Conservatrice: Problemes.Hethodologiques de L'Analyse des 
Situations Autoritaires' in Revue francaise de science politique 
XXV (6), December 1975, pp.1029-1061, France. 
Nicos Poulantzas, Fascism or Dictatorship? (London, NLB, 1973), 
p.313. 
N. Poulantzas, The Capitalist State ••• , op.cit., p.74. 
G. O'Donnell, Corporatism ••• , op~cit., p.54. 
See also T. Skidmore, 'Politics and Economic Policy Haking in 
Authoritarian Brazil, 1937-1971' in A. Stepan (ed.), Authori-
tarian Brazil: Origins, Policies and Future (New Haven, Yale 
Uni versi ty Press, 1978). 
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See Carlos Estevam Hartins, Tecnocracia e Capi talismo (Sao Paulo, 
Editora Brasiliense, 1974) and L. C. Bresser Pereira, Estado e 
Subdesenvolvimento Industrializado: Esbo 0 de uma Economia 
politica Periferica Sao Paulo, Editora Brasiliense, 1977 • 
On the difficulties surrounding the notion of 'ruling class', 
or 'ruling power bloc', see R. Miliband, Marxism ••• , op.cit., 
pp.67-74. See also Nicos Poulantzas, Political ••• , op.cit., 
pp.100-114, 117-119, 300-301 and N. Poulantzas, The Capitalist, 
op.cit., p.75. 
The nature of the State has been the bone of contention of poli-
tical analysis for many years and has been the subject of the 
famous and fruitful 'Miliband-Poulantzas debate'. The debate 
itself is contained mainly in a series of articles, namely 
N. Poulantzas, 'The Problem of the Capitalist State' in Ne~ 
Left Review No.58, London, 1969; R. Hiliband, 'Reply to Nicos 
Poulantzas' in NLR No.59, London, 1970; R. Hiliband 'Poulantzas 
and the Capitalist State' in h'LR No.82, London, 1973; N. Poulantzas, 
'The Capitalist State: A Replno Hiliband and Laclau' in ~iliR 
No.95, London, 1976. ---
The debate stimulated spinoffs and although it has subsided in 
rec~nt years, the issue and the 'problematic' are certainly 
there, and far from exhausted. 
Ernesto Laclau, 'The Specificity of the Political: The Pou1antzas-
~1iliband Debate' in Economy and Society. Vol.5 No.1, 1975 has 
been one of the more influential additions. 
See also Amy Beth Bridges, 'Nicos Poulantzas and the l<larxist 
Theory of the State' in Politics and Society Vo1.4 No.2 1974; 
J. Ho11enkopf, 'Theories of the State and Power structure 
Research' in Special Issue of The Insurgent Sociologist Vol.5 
No.III, 1975 and A. vlo1fe, 'New Directions in the 11arxist Theory 
of Politics' in Politics and Society, Vol.4 No.2, 1974. 
39 Lewis Coser, one of the most influential opponents of the notion 
of ruling class or ruling power bloc states that 'Proponents of 
the pOvTer elite thesis have not been fully convincing in that 
they have not been able to show that those they claim to be in 
structural power positions have in fact the organizational and 
ideological capacity to act in common in the pursuit of super 
individual interests'. Lewis Coser 'The Notion of Power: Theore-
tical Developments, American Sociological Association Heetings, 
1973, quoted in G. William Domhoff, Social Clubs ••• , op.cit., 
p.173. 
40 See P. Evans, De endent Develo ment: The Alliance of I1ultinational, 
State and Local Capital in Brazil Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, 1979). 
See also Sergio Hudson de Abranches, The Divided L.evia than: 
state and Economic Policy Formation in Authoritarian Brazil -
Ph.D. Thesis, Cornell University, 1978; and Renato Raul Boschi, 
National Industrial Elites and the state in Post-1964 Brazil: 
Institutional Mediations and Political Chan~- Ph.D. Thesis, 
University of r1ichigan, 1978). 
41 See N. Poulantzas, The Problem ••• , op.cit., pp.70-74. 
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42 It would prove interesting to study the historical roots of 
what seems to be the extraordinary common background and origin, 
education and kinship, friendship and connections and shared 
political and ideological attitudesmd presumptions, of the 
entrepreneurs and techno-entrepreneurs who composed IPSS. 
43 On Class structures, Class Struggle, Class Interests and Class 
Capacities, see Olin Wright, op.cit., pp.98-l08. 
See also Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes 
(London, IffiB, 1975) and his notions of 'specific presence' and 
'pertinent effects', in PP.78-84, and his view of social classes 
conceived as class practices existing in oppositions, in pp.85-93i 
and Fernando Henri~ue Cardoso, 'La Cuestion del Estado en Brasil' 
in Autoritarismo e Democratiza9ao ••• , .op.cit., edited by F.R. 
Cardoso. 
44 R. f1ili band, 'The Coup in Chile' in Revolution and Class Struggle, 
edited by Robin Blackburn (London, Fontana, 1977), pp.412=4'13. 
45 R. }liliband, I'1arxism ••• , op.cit., pp.54-55. 
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